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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
STACEY GROVE, 
SUPREME COURT NO. 43537 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
· ct~RK'S RECORD· 
Appeal from the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County bf Nez Perce 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE CARL B. KERRICK, DISTRICT JUDGE 
Counsel for Respondent 
Mr. Lawrence G. Wasden 
Attorney General 
Post Office Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010· 
Counsel for Appellant 
Ms. Sara B. Thomas 
State Appellate PD 
PO Box 2816 
Boise, ID 83701 
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Date: 11/4/2015 
Time: 11 :36 AM 
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Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
ROAR~port 
Case: CV-2012-0001798 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
I !: : ·: ·': -- -- . :: __ ·- -- ___ :c:J 
User: BDAVENPORT 
































































New Case Filed-Post Conviction Relief Carl B. Kerrick 
Plaintiff: Grove, Stacey Lewis Attorney Retained Carl 8. Kerrick 
Dennis Benjamin 
Verified Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
Affidavit of Stevie Grove in Support of Verified 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
Affidavit of Lori Stamper in Support of Verified 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
Affidavit of Carol Grove in Support Verified 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
· Affidavit of Lyn·ette Walton ·in Support Verified 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
Affidavit of Deborah Grove in Support V~rified 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl 8. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
·· Affidavit of J~ck Grove in SupportVerified·Petition Carl B. Kerrick 
for pest Conviction Relief 
.. Order for Telephonic Scheduling Conference 
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Scheduling 
Conference 10/11/2012 10:45 AM) 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
B~~ue·~t for Juqicial Notice Carl B. Kerrick 
Affidavit of Karen Stamper in Support of Verified Carl B. Kerrick 
Petition fcir Post Conviction Relief · 
' . . . ~ ·-. ., . ; . 
Affidavit .qf ,Craig Stamper in Support of Verified Carl B. Kerrick 
Petition for Post Conviction Relief . 
M.9~ion to ·_bra.~iare Petitioner a Needy Person . _ .. ,- '., .. 
rvtotion:fo~ Summary Disposition and Dismissal 
a,nd.fo.SeJ fqr Hearing · 
. .' '.:, . "• . ; 
Objecti9n ,to ~tate's Motion for Summary, .. 
Disposition ana. Motion for a More Definite' 
Statement . . . , 
H~~~ng Sch~d{j1ed •. (Hearing: 12118/2012 11 :00 
AM) TELEPHONIC Motion for Summary 
Dispositioh . . . . ' . . I 
He~ring 'r~s~ltfor Telephonic Scheduling 
Conference·scheduled on 10/11/2012 10:45 AM: 
Heari~ He1d"'--in chambers no court reporter 
pre;;;ent, : . 
, Noti9e ~f Hearing 
Order Granting Request for Judicial Notice 
Order· Grahting Motion to Declare Petitioner a 
.Nee~y Perso.o .. 
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition 
Affidavit of Eric·Fredericksen 
Affi~avit of Diane Walker 
:T• 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
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Second Judfoiil Distri~t Court - Nez Perce County 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2012-:-0001798- Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff -vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
'] ; --------
User: BDAVENPORT 




































-Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin 
Affidavit of Jonathan L. Arden MD 
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary 
_ Disposition---State 
Defendant: State of Idaho Attorney Retained 
Nance Ceccarelli 
Judge 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on Carl B. Kerrick 
12/18/2012 11:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estir:n~ted: less than 100 pages 
" .. " ,... . . ~ . 
TERESA Hearing Scheduled - (Telephonic Status -
Conference -02/12/2013 11: 15 AM) 
Carl B. Kerrick 
TERESA - -Minute Entry Carl B. Kerrick 
. Hearing zype: t\llotion for Summary , 1. 
-- ·rnspositfon1Dismissal 
Hearing date: 12/18/20t2 
·nn'.u~: J):()tam 
-- " Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape_N_umber: _CRTRM 1 
Dennis· Benjamin 
Nance: Ceccarelli 
TERESA Order for Telephonic Status Conference Carl B. Kerrick 









Sti~ulat~d Motion for Permission to Conduct 
9iscovery' - - i _ -
Order Granting Stipulated Motion for Permission 
to Conduct Discovery 
Ex· P~rt~ Motion to Authorize Payment of Costs 
(FILED- UNDE_R SEAL) . 
':" .. :: .. · . . . 
:·: .. :·'' ' Document sealed 
Order Granting Ex Part~ Motion to Authorize 
Payrryent of Costs (FILED UNDER SEAL) 
Document sealed 
Aoie.r,:de~ Yerifieq Petition for Post Conviction 
Reli,~f -: .-i ·. : .. -- . 
. , 
Notice _of,Ta!<il'!Q Deposition 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Amended Notice of Taking Deposition--petitioner Carl B. Kerrick 
($~tt Ch~pman) 
Answer arid Amended Motion for Summary Carl B. Kerrick 
Di~position and Dismissal and to set for hearing 
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·. S~cond Judi¢ial' District Court - Nez Perce County· . · .. :· > ,-·-·.: 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2012-0001798 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: BDAVENPORT 





































Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference 
scheduled on 02/12/2013 11:15 AM: District 
CourtHearing Held 
· Court Reporter: Nancy Towler . 
Numberof Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
Minute Entry 
Hearing type: tele status conf 
Hearing date: 2/12/2013 
Time: 11:17 am 
Courtroom: 
Cqurt reporter: Nancy Towler 
" .. ,·.:.)MmutesCierk: TERESA · · • · 
Tape Number:. CRTRM 1 
Dennis B~njamin/Oebra Whipple 
· •· ·. Nance Ceccarelli 
· Order Sc;heduling Briefs and Argument 
Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument04130/2013 
?1?0 ~M) __ • 
2nd Ex Parte Motion to Authorize Payment of 
Costs-FILED UNDER SEAL 
Document sealed 
Judge 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Order Granting 2nd· Ex Parte Motion to Authorize Carl B. Kerrick 
Payment of Costs---FILED UNDER SEAL: 
Document sealed 
P~titi<;>h'¢rirBriefFiledin Response to Stat~·s Carl B. Kerrick 
Mo'tion)or'Suniinary Disposition and in Support of 
Petiticinerr's Motion 
3rd' Ex Parle Motion to Authorize Payment of Carl B. Kerrick 
Cdsts~FILED UNDER SEAL 
_,,. ;; ·,_, ~ .. '· ' -, .. ·,:,; :, -. 
Document sealed 
Orqer: $ranting Ex Parte Motion to Authorize 
Paymentof..Costs-:--FILED.UNDER SEAL 
Document sealed 
. R.eply ·arief in· Support of State's Motion for 
$ummary Dispoi;ition and Response to 
Petitioner's Briefin Support of Petitioner's Motion 
for ~u111ma:ry (jispositiop . 
Affiqqvit e>f.ArJd,re11V Parnes 
Petitioner's Reply Brief in Support of Petitioner's 
Motion for Summary Disposition 
2nd Affidavitof Dennis Benjamin 
. :' ( 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
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Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2012-0001798 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 



































Hearing type:· Oral Argument 
Hearing date: 4/30/2013 
Time: 1 :30 pm 
Courtroom: 
• ~ourt reporter: Nancy Towler 
Mfnutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
Dennis Benjamin 
· Nance CeccarelH 
Hearing result for Oral Argument scheduled on 
04/30/2013 01:30 PM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement. 
Affidavit of;Stacey-Grove in Opposition to State's 
Motion for Summary Disposition 
... / ·:·-.·,' .·-,:. · ....... ' ' ·. ·, 
Motion to Strike---State 
o'bjecti6n to State's Motion to Strike--Petitioner 
Opinion & Order on Motions for Summary 
. Disposition· . 
Motion for Reconsideration---Petitioner TERESA 










P~t[tionei$"Reply-_Memorandum in Support of 
Mo~~n. tor::~,corisideration 
Nqtice pf; J"elephonic Hearing---Petitioner 
Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 1012212013 11 :oo 
AM): PetitiOnar's )Jlotion for Reconsideration 
Cpntinue~((Hearing 10/28/2013 10:00 AM) 
Petitioner's f"!'lotion for Reconsideration 
.Al'Jle.nded. Notice Of Hearing . . . - ' . 
Updated Authority ih Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration 
Minute;Entry . · 
Hearing type; Motion to Reconsider 
Hearing_ date; 1012a12013 
Time: 10:62 am · 
courtroom:. 
Cqurtr,porter: N~ncy i;-o~ler .. 
M(r,.1Jte.s Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
Dennis Benjall'iin · . 
Nan.ce ·Ceccarelli · 
fi"earing resultfor Hearing scheduled on 
1'0/28/2015 1-0:00 AM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement .Petiti.oner's Motion for 
R,econsideration 
- • f:; --:'C. -.",c' C .·:.- ~· - • :-• :"~ ; ' 
- ~- ----------- - -
User: BDAVENPORT 
Judge 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl. B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
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Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
· • ' · . :ROA Report 
Case: CV-2012-0001798 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: BDAVENPORT 






































District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
Opinion &. Order on Petitioner's Motion for 
R.econsideration---DENI ED 
Judge 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
· Petitioner's Motion for Permission for lnterlocutroy Carl B. Kerrick 
Appeal 
Petitioner's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Carl B. Kerrick 
Permission for Interlocutory Appeal 
Motion Objecting to Petitioner's Motion for Carl B. Kerrick 
:permission for Interlocutory Appeal 
Hearing'Scheduled (Hearing 12/19/2013 10:45 Carl B. Kerrick 
. Al\,1) l;EJ...EP,HONIC OBJECTlQN T.0 
. PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION 
·· FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL:· 
Notice Of Hearing 
TERESA. • .. ·. Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on 
12/19/2013 10:45 AM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement TELEPHONIC OBJECTION TO 
Carl B. Kerrick 











PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR PERMISSION 
FOR INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL 
Minute Entry Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing type: Mtri ~ermission Interlocutory Appeal 
Hearing date:· 12/19/2013 · 





0~~-e.(c:irariting _ fVlot_ion f9r Perrpiss1on: for;' Carl B. Kerrick 
I riterlocutory Appe~I ·· . . 
o'rdi{o~~yiog Moti.on Requesting:Court to Carl B. Kerrick 
Accept Appeal By Permission 
Case·s.tatus Changed: closed 
. ·.•. ' ... _.;. Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Change Assigned Judge (batch process). •. : 
Ad;,,inistrativeOrderAssigning Judge-GASKILL Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Order for Telephonic Status Conference 
He.aring Scl'leduled (Tefephonic St~tus 
Gori.fer¢n~~ 04/29/2014 02:15 PM) · ·, 
S~ggesti~~:forVoluntary Disql,Jalificationi I• .• 
Alternate.M9tiqn for Disqualification With Cause; 
Sec;ond Alternative Motion for Disqualification 
Without ·Cause 
'''r··: . ,. ' \• 
Affidavit of pounsel in Support of Disqualificau"on 
, . 
. •' ... • 
Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
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Second Judicial.-Oi~trict Court - Nez Perce County.,;.:.'. . 
., . ' '· . __ . - '; ·. . . ' . . . : ~ . ' ' ' : ., 
• · ~OA Report 
Case: CV-2012-'0001798 C·urrent Judge: Carl B. Kerrick'·· 
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: BDAVENPORT 
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
4/29/2014 ORDR TERESA · Order of Voluntary Disqualification for Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
Cause---GASKILL . 
4/30/2014 ORAJ TERESA · Order Assigning Judge-CARL KERRICK Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
SENIOR JUDGE 
CHJG TERESA· Change A~signed Judge Carl B. Kerrick 
HRHD TERESA Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Jay P. Gaskill DJ 
scheduled. on 04/29/2014 02:15 PM: Hearing 
. Held...;~IN CHAMBERS NO COURT REPORTER 
PRESENT 
5/1/2014 ORDR TERESA Order for Telephonic Status Conference Carl B. Kerrick 
HRSC TERESA. ti~ariog Scheduled (Status Conference Carl B. Kerrick 
05/15/20.1410:45 AM) 
5/2/2014 BDAVENPORT Misce.llaheous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Carl B. Kerrick 
File Or ·Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
_ Oepbi.e .M ~rove ReGeipt number: 0.0075€;)0 
Dated: '5/2/2014 Amount: $3.00 (Ci:lsti) ' ' ' 
5/15/2014 HRHD JANET Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Carl B. Kerrick 
on 05/15/2014 10:45 AM: Hearing Held 
HRSC JANET Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 10/24/2014 09:00 Carl B. Kerrick 
AM) Evidentiary Hearing 
CONT JANET Gontin4ed (Hearing 10/31/2014 OQ:00 AM) Carl B. Kerrick 
Ev1dentiary, Hearing . . . . . 
5/16/2014 MINE JANET fv.linute.~n.trY,. . . . ·. Carl B. Kerrick 
li~~fin_g-; ty,pe: .Status Conference 
Hearing date: 5/15/~014 
ririie:: ro:45 ·am· 
Co1Jrtrqom: ... : 
Court. report~r: .Linda Carlton 
Min1,1tesC.lerlr JANET 
T~pe Number: 1 
Party: Sta~y Grove, Att9rney: Denr:iis. Benjamin 
Party: State of Idaho, Attorney: Nance Ceccarelli 
JANET .Notice· Of Hearirig . 
'.·:,i·1'· 
Carl B. Kerrick 
: • ·: ' ·,' ' • : ·:~~ ·~ ~.: "' • ' k •• 
5/19/2014 ORDR JANET Ord,~~-~signing Judge Carl B. Kerrick 
' \ < • ~- •• .- ,.. • 
•'' 
8/26/2014 PETN TERESA Petition for Appointment of Special Prosecutor Carl B. Kerrick 
8/29/2014 ORDR TERESA Or,der to'.f ~ppointnient of $pecial PrO$ecutor Carl B. Kerrick ,, 
9/29/2014 STIP TRISH Stipulation to vacate hearing and reset Carl B. Kerrick 
' ' ' .. : ..... ~ . '.. : ~:. .. . . ., . . ' . ' : ' . 
ATTR TERESA Defendant:: State of ldah.o Attorney Retained Carl B. Kerrick 
J.~ssi.ca M_ L,orell9 
10/14/2014 NOTC TERESA Nqtice pf tle~ring Carl B. Kerrick 
CONT TERESA Continued (Hearing 03/24/2015 09:00 AM) Carl B. Kerrick 
Evidentiary Hearing--2 days 
11/26/2014 MOTN TERESA Motion forPermission to Conduct Carl B. Kerrick 
Discovery-,~Petitioner 





Time: 11 :36 AM 
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Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
. . >' ROA Report 
' .' ··: ;.: .. .:_ .. ·:' . -\1, . '. . . . . - '. i ~ ; ,, 
Case: cv-2012:0001798 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
'' ':.: 
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
-_J 
User: BDAVENPORT 




































Order Granting Ex Parte Motion to Authorize Carl B. Kerrick 
Payment of Costs-filed under seal 
Document sealed 
Order Granting Motion for Permission to Conduct Carl B. Kerrick 
Discovery . 
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Carl B. Kerrick 
Conference 03/13/2015 09:30 AM) 
Notice Of Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
Notice of State's Potential Trial Witnesses Carl B. Kerrick 
Motion for Order to Transport Petitioner to Carl B. Kerrick 
-... Hfllarifl~L · 
Ex-Parfe. Motiqn .to Authorize Payment of Costs Carl B. Kerrick 
FILED UNDER SEAL 
Document sealed 
.· Motion for Discovery Pursuant to ICRP , , . 
26(b)(4)(A) 
Carl B. Kerrick 
BDAVENPORT . Ord.er to Transport Petitioner to Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
:.·. '•'. ... •• > :, :-;., :-.1:(" 
JANET Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Carl B. Kerrick 






Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 03/24/2015 09:00 Carl B. Kerrick 
AM). Evidentiary Hearing-2 days 
Minute Entry Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing type:Telephonic Status Conference 
Hearing date: 3/13/2015 
Tir:ne;-~:~3.am, .. 
Cou~roonj: . · 
Gourt reporter: 
Minuteir Clerk:' JENNY 
Tape-Number: CTRM#2 
D.ENN1$. BENJAMIN & DEBRA WHIPPLE 
JESSICA LARELLO & KEN JURGENSON 
··.·, .•. -
Order Gra_ri~ng ,Request for Petiti.oner to Wear Carl B. Kerrick 
·. s;iynian::9l6tftiiig at Evidentiary · · '·· 
Hearin!f--ORANTED 
IVlin.ute Entry. . . . 
Hea.r_irig type:. Evidentiary Hearing · 
Hearing date: 3/24/2015 
lime: 9:,03- am · · · · 
CQL,lrtrqom:. . . 
Court rep9rter: Nancy. Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 1 
Dennis l3enjamin & Debra Whipple 
Jessica l.iorello arid Ken Jurgeson 
... ,· ·-· 
Carl B. Kerrick 
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Second Judicial Oist.rictCourt- Nez Perce County ........... 
. ROA Report · · 
Case: CV-2012-0001798 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
,. 
User: BDAVENPORT 







































Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on· Carl B. Kerrick 
03/24/2015 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing 
Held---MARCH 24 & 25, 2015 
. Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
. estimated: 325 PAGES Evidentiary Hearing--2 
days. 
Hearing Scheduled (1-;tearing 03/25/2015 09:00 Carl B. Kerrick 
· AM} Evidentiary hearing continues 
Petitioner's Exhibit List Carl B. Kerrick 
Ex Parte Motion to Authorize Payment of Costs Carl B. Kerrick 
·,c:;fUe'dur:ider seal .. : :i.1:,1,! 
Document sealed 
,. . . 
Order Granting Ex Parte Motion to Authorize Carl B. Kerrick 
· Additional Payment dH1msts · .' 
TERESA 
.. ;:~t.":' c: Document seal,ed 
BDAVENPORT Ex Parte Motion to Authorize Paymentof Expert Carl B. Kerrick 
Fees and Costs--filed under seal 
Document sealed 
TERESA Transcript Filed Carl B. Kerrick 








TERESA-':., ~, ;:~:-~ 
TERESA 
TERESA 
Payment of .Expert F.ees and Costs-... filed under 
seal· ·· ·· 
,. ; ::.: . ;: Document sealed 
2nd M6tio6 for Reccibs.i,deration Carl B. Kerrick 
;" -; /:. ·: . -~· ; -· :.L -~<i -- . l 
l\flemorandum, in. Supp!)ft of 2i:,d Motionfor : Carl B. Kerrick 
R~consideration 
R~.Part.e: Motion to A1.;1tt3or.ize Paym~nt of: ·.: . Carl B. Kerrick 
Exper;is·es:of. Coµnsei..-fi!ed under seal 
Document sealed 
Affida~it in Support of l;:x Parte Motion to 9arl B. Kerrie!< 
Authorize'Payr'nent Of Expenses of Counsel:..-filed 
under seal· .· . 
Document se~led 
Order Granting Ex Pa~e Motion to Authorize Carl B. Kerrick 
Paymenfof Expenses o(Counsel---filed under 
seal 
: - :. " ·· Document sealed · 
Memorandum in Oppos1t1on to Motion for 
Reconsideration---Respondent 
Petitioner;s Closing Argument 
f{e$po_n~eilt's .Pos_t Evi~e~tiary Hearing d6sing 
Argµment (fax} · ·. ·· · · .1 1, · 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Respondent's Post Evidentiar:y Mearing Glosing Carl B. Kerrick 
Arg_ument (original} · · . · '' · ,., · 
~ . . ,, ~ 
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Second Judicia.LDisJri~(Court - Nez Perce County 
: . ··· ·· ROA Report :.':: 
Case: CV-2012-0001798 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
. . .• .. · .: . : : . "' '' . . . ( ~: ·; .. . : .; l,'·'i " 
Stacey Lewis Gro~e,. Plaintiff vs State Of ·1daho, Defendant 
User: BDAVENPORT 
























TERESA Request for Oral Closing Argument and Carl B. Kerrick 





Hearing Scheduled (Oral Argument 05/29/2015 Carl B. Kerrick 
10:00 AM) 
NoUce Of.Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
Minute Entry Carl B. Kerrick 
-Hearing type: oral argument 
Hearing date: 5/29/2015 
Time: 10:02 am 
Courtroom: 
. Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: TERESA 
Tape Number: CRTRM 3 




Firtdings.Of Fact And co·nclusions Of Law'and Carl B. Kerrick 
Order; Order Denying Motion -to Reci5nsider 
Final,Judgment--all claims contained within the Carl 8. Kerrick 
Petition for Post Conviction relief are hereby 
DISMISSED . 
TERESA Ciyil Qispg~ition enteredfor: State of Id.aha, 
p~_feb~~n( Grove, ·Stacey Lewis, Subject. Filing 
d~t~; .8/25/201_ 5 
TERESA . Case $tatus Cl:tanged: Closed pending clerk 
action:· • . . ' .. • . . 
• ! , ...... , 
BDAVENPORT ~pti~. O[Appeal 
BDAVENPORT Appealeq Io The Supreme Court 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl 8. Kerrick 
Carl 8. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
BDAVENPORT Motion-to Appoint State·Appellate Public Carl B. Kerrick 
Defend.~r, ·,,: . , 
BDAVENPORT O'tder A.ppointing State Appellate Public Defender Carl B. Kerrick 
BDAVENPORT sJbje~t'.Grm,:e, .Stacey Lewis Order Appointing Carl B. Kerrick 
P.ublio pefentjer Public. defender Sara 8 Thomas 
BDAVENPORT Notice of Transcript Lodged .. .. .. ' . . ; .. :._ .. _ \. Carl B. Kerrick 
· .. ,"" r·~:. ,,· 
: ... •·· 
11
Dennis Benjamin, ISB #4199 
Deborah Whipple, ISB #4355 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Ft LED 
2tl]2 SEP 7 Pfll 4 0~ 
P~T-v O 11 •r-c:-•:·~  
CLERK" F' '.E ~1\·-;.~ '! ,T 
. ~:JTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 


















1. Petitioner, Stacey Grove, is currently incarcerated at the Idaho Correctional Institution 
in Orofino, Idaho. 
2. Mr. Grove is serving a sentence imposed by the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District, State ofldaho, County of Nez Perce, the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick, presiding. 
3. The Nez Perce County District Court Number for that case is CR-2007-768. 
4. Mr. Grove was charged with the first-degree murder of  Martin (hereafter 
"  
5. Mr. Grove was represented at trial by attorney Scott Chapman (hereafter "defense 




6. The state was represented by the Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney, Daniel 
Spickler (hereafter "prosecutor"). 
7. The jury returned a guilty verdict. 
7.1 A true and correct copy of the Clerk's Record in the criminal case is attached 
as Exhibit A. 
7.2 A true and correct copy of the transcripts of the proceedings in 
the criminal case is attached as Exhibit B. 
7.3 A copy of the exhibits introduced at trial aTe attached hereto as ExhibitC. 
8. The district court sentenced Mr. Grove to a life sentence with 22 years fixed. 
9. Mr. Grove appealed froth the Judgment and sentence. 
10. Attorneys Diane Walker and Eric Fredericksen (hereafter "appellate counsel") 
represented Mr. Grove on appeal. 
11. On March 25, 2011, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction 
and the sentence. State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 259 P.3d 629 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied 
(September 12, 2011). 
11.1. A copy of the opinion is attached as Exhibit D. 
12. The Supreme Court denied Mr. Grove's Petition for Review on September 12, 2011. 
13. The remittitur issued that same day. 
14. With respect to this conviction, Mr. Grove has not filed any other petitions for 
post-conviction relief. 
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner was Denied the Right to Confront 
Witnesses Against Him in Violation of the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article, 1, § 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution (LC.§ 19-4901(a)(l)). 
A. Facts Pertaining to Cause of Action. 
15. Petitioner re-alleges paragraphs 1-14 above . 
. 16. Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses was violated when state witnesses testified at 
' . . . . 
trial about neuropathology tests and examination results when those witnesses neither performed 
nor had personal knowledge of the neuropathology testing and examination, and when the 
neuropathologist who did perform the tests and examinations was not a witness at the trial. 
16.1. ·A farther confrontation clause violation occurred when the autopsyreport 
was admitted into evidence at trial. 
17. Dr. Marco Ross is a forensic pathologist. Exhibit B, pg. 892, In. 20. 
18. Dr. Ross performed the autopsy of  while he was employed at the Spokane 
County Medical Examiner's Office. Exhibit B, pg. 893, In. 23. 
19. Dr. Ross testified at Mr. Grove's trial. Exhibit B, pg. 892-988. 
20. Dr. Ross's autopsy report was introduced as State's Exhibit 11 at the trial. Exhibit C 
(State's Exhibit 11); Exhibit B, pg. 902, In. 5. 
20.1. Defense counsel did not object to the introduction of the autopsy report. Id 
21. Dr. Ross testified that there have been occasions where the Medical Examiner's 
Office would send tissue samples to outside experts for examination and interpretation. Exhibit 
B, pg. 900, In. 21-24. 
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22. In this case, Kyler's brain was sent to Dr. R. Ross Reichard, a forensic 
neuropathologist at the University ofNew Mexico for examination. Exhibit B, pg. 901, In. 5-7; 
pg. 928, In. 18-20. 
23. The results of the examination were included in the autopsy report which was 
admitted as Exhibit 11 at trial. Exhibit B, pg. 901, In. 1-2. 
24. At trial, Dr. Ross was permitted to testify to Dr. Reichard's findings. Exhibit B, pg. 
928, In. 21 - pg. 930, In. 23. 
24.1. Dr. Ross testified that Dr. Reichard reported there were bilateral subdural 
hemorrhages in the brain. Exhibit B, pg. 928, In. 21-23. 
24.2. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there were bilateral 
subarachiioicfhemoirliages in tlie brain. Exhibit B; pg. 929, lii. 1.;2. 
24.3. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported that the brain was swollen. 
Id. 
24.4. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there was a laceration in 
the corpus callosum. Id, In. 3. 
24.5. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there was a hypo-ischemic 
injury to the brain. Id, In. 5-6. 
24.6. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there were vascular axonal 
injuries to the brain. Id, ln. 10. 
24.7. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there were autolytic 
changes in the brain. Id, ln. 11. 
24.8. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported that the subdural 
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hemorrhage and the subachnoid hemorrhages were "acute." Exhibit B, pg. 930, 
In. 3-4. 
24.9. Dr. Ross testified that the significance of a tear in the corpus callosum 
reported by Dr. Reichard is that it is indicative of a high degree of force which 
would render the victim unconscious or nearly unconscious at the time of impact. 
Id., ln. 21-23. 
24.10. Dr. Ross also testified that the swelling reported by Dr. Reichard indicated 
that the fatal injury occurred sometime immediately before death or within a day 
or two prior to death. Id., In. 6-9. 
24.11. Dr. Ross testified that the degree of hemorrhage in the brain and the tear in 
ffie corpuschlfoslitn reported by Dr. Reichard would be mcons1steni with a full 
from a kitchen counter onto a linoleum floor. Exhibit B, pg. 936, ln. 3-7. 
24.12. Dr. Ross testified that the degree of hemorrhage in the brain and the tear in 
the corpus callosum reported by Dr. Reichard would be consistent with a very 
significant blunt force impact or impacts to the head that would be in excess of 
what would be expected from a fall to the floor. Id., ln. 12-17. 
24.13. Dr. Ross testified that the widespread vascular axonal swelling reported by 
Dr. Reichard was indicative of injury to the axons which could occur as a result of 
blunt force trauma tearing the axons. Exhibit B, pg. 941, In. 13-18. 
24.14. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard noted in his report that there were 
axonal injury changes occurring in the vicinity of the corpus callosum which 
would be consistent with a shearing injury, in Dr. Ross's opinion. Exhibit B, pg. 
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24.15. Dr. Ross also testified that it was not surprising for Dr. Reichard to report 
axonal injury given that he also reported a laceration or tear in the corpus 
callosum. Id., at 18~23. 
24.16. Dr. Ross repeated his testimony that Dr. Reichard's observation of a tear 
in the corpus callosum shows there was "a very significant force" applied, 
something comparable to a "very high fall" of "a couple of stories or so," or a 
"motor vehicle accident, or inflicted blunt force trauma." Exhibit B, pg. 945, ln. 
5-12. 
24.17. Dr. Ross also testified that the brain injuries reported by Dr. Reichard did 
not result from a. singleimpact. Exhibit B, pg. 94 7, hi. 20. 
24.18. Dr. Ross also repeated his testimony that the head injuries reported by Dr. 
Reichard would have caused immediate or near immediate unconsciousness or 
near unconsciousness to  Exhibit B, pg. 948, ln. 23 - pg. 949, ln. 4. 
24.19. Dr. Ross testified that  could not have been engaged in certain 
activities previously described by the state's witness Lisa Nash with the injuries 
reported by Dr. Reichard. Exhibit B, pg. 949, In. 5 - pg. 95, ln. 15. 
24.20. On redirect examination of Dr. Ross, the prosecutor stated that "in the 
report from New Mexico that the doctor there talked about the loss of clear 
distinction between gray-white junction and generalized gray discoloration." 
- Exhibit B, pg. 984, ln. 23 - pg. 985, ln. 2. 
------_---- _'-:I 
24.21. Dr. Ross explained that finding to show that "brain death has occurred, but 
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there's still ongoing cardiac activity." Id, pg. 985, In. 3-5. 
24.22. The prosecutor asked Dr. Ross, "Is there anything in your autopsy report or 
in the report from Dr. Reichard that would be inconsistent with those injuries 
occurring approximately 48 hours prior to cardiac death?" Id, pg. 987, In. 4-7. 
24.23. Dr. Ross answered, "No." Id, In. 8. 
24.24. Dr. Ross relied upon Dr. Reichard's report in his opinions that the cause of 
death was brain swelling and cerebral hemorrhage due to blunt force impact to the 
head, that the manner of death was homicide, and that the fatal injuries could have 
been inflicted approximately 48 hours prior to cardiac death. Id, pg. 987, In. 9 -
pg. 988, In. 8. 
5. Dt. Reichard was never called to testify at tnal. 
26. Dr. Ross admitted that he did not do anything with the brain other than to remove it, 
examine its surface and have it sent to Dr. Reichard's laboratory. Exhibit B, pg. 951, In. 23 - pg. 
952, In. 7. 
27. Dr. Ross admitted he did not prepare the brain tissue slides or inspect the brain 
internally. Exhibit B, pg. 952, In. 10-12. 
28. Dr. Ross admitted he did not observe the corpus callosum laceration. Exhibit B, pg. 
956, In. 10-15. 
29. Dr. Ross admitted that he did not observe the global hypo-ischemic brain injury. 
Exhibit B, pg. 956, In. 18 - pg. 957, In. 7. 
30. Dr. Ross admitted he did not examine any of the original slides or recuts of the brain 
tissue. Exhibit B, pg. 959, In. 10-15. 
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31. Dr. Ross testified that he did not recall whether he had seen any photographs taken of 
the brain by Dr. Reichard. Id, In. 23-25. 
32. The introduction of Dr. Reichard's report and Dr. Ross's testimony about Dr. 
· ·Rei chard's examination'of the brain and ·his interpretation of the meaning of those findings 
violated Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions. 
33. Dr. Ross also testified about hemorrhages which he did not observe but were 
reported "by the surgeon who did the transplant surgery," in the retroperitoneal areas and the 
psoas muscles. Exhibit B, pg. 938, ln. 20-23. 
34. That surgeon did not testify at trial. 
35. That testimony from Dr. Ross also violated Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses. 
36. The testimonyofDr.DonaldChln, which referred to the autopsy report, which 1n 
turn contained Dr. Reichard's observations, findings and conclusions, violated Mr. Grove's right 
to confront witnesses. 
36.1. Dr. Chin testified that based "on what I've read on this autopsy report is the 
most brutal case ... I've ever seen." Exhibit B, pg. 851, ln. 5-6. 
37. The testimony of Dr. Jay Hunter which referred to Dr. Reichard's observations, 
findings and conclusions violated Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses. 
3 7 .1. While Dr. Hunter admitted that he is "not a pathologist," he testified that, 
''this child on autopsy, had . . . a fair amount of subarachnoid hemorrhage" that 
"should have produce[d] immediate symptoms," such as "unconsciousness," 
given the degree of injury described by Dr. Reichard. Exhibit B, pg. 874, ln. 24 -
pg. 875, In. 22. 
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37.2. Dr. Hunter also testified that the defense version of the events on the 
evening prior to Kyler's hospitalization would be "virtually impossible" given the 
injuries described by Dr. Reichard. Exhibit B, pg. 876, ln. 11-20. 
373. Dr. Hunter repeated that testimony during the state's redirect examination. 
Exhibit B, pg. 886, ln. 18-24. 
38. The testimony of Dr. Deborah Harper which referred to Dr. Reichard's observations, 
fmdings and conclusions violated Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses. 
3 8 .1. Dr. Harper testified that she had the autopsy report from Dr. Ross, which 
contains the observations, findings and conclusions of Dr. Reichard, and which 
was introduced at trial as State's Exhibit 11. Exhibit B, pg. 1031, ln. 19-20. 
-s-:---2. Dr.Harper used thatreport, an::i:ong other llimgs,to reach heroprmon as to 
the cause of death, i.e., the brain injury. Exhibit B, pg. 1032, In. 3-10. 
38.3. Dr. Harper also testified that based upon the injuries described by Dr. 
Reichard,  "would have been unconscious or semi-conscious." Exhibit B, 
pg. 1033, ln. 17-18. 
38.4. Dr. Harper also testified that in her experience, the extent of the brain injury 
described by Dr. Reichard was unusually severe. Exhibit B, pg. 1034, ln. 2-21. 
38.5. Doctor Harper also testified that the defense version of the events on the 
evening prior to Kyler's hospitalization would be "not consistent" given the 
injuries described by Dr. Reichard. Exhibit B, pg. 1036, ln. 7-20; pg. 1037, ln. 
20-24; 
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39. Trial counsel did not object to any of this testimony. 
40. The failure to object was not a strategic decision on the part of trial counsel. 
41. These violations of Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses were not harmless error. 
42. The Ccnitt of Appeals did not permit McGrove to raise this issue for the first time on 
appeal. State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483,259 P.3d 623 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied. 
B. Why Relief Should be Granted. 
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that, "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with witnesses against him." 
The Supreme Court has held "that this bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal and 
state prosecutions." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,406 (1965). Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution similarly guarantees a criminal defendant the right to "appear and defend in person." 
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held 
that testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial are admissible only where declarant is 
unavailable and where defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 541 U.S. 
at 59. Here, the statements of Dr. Reichard and others were introduced at trial without a showing 
of unavailability or a prior opportunity to cross-examine. 
Further, the testimony was undoubtedly testimonial in nature. The determination of 
whether evidence is testimonial requires the court to consider the purpose behind the 
Confrontation Clause. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 143, 176 P.3d 911,915 (2007). The 
Supreme Court noted in Crawford, supra, that "the principal evil at which the Confrontation 
Clause was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex 
parte examinations as evidence against the accused." Hooper, 145 Idaho at 143, 176 P.3d at 915, 
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quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50. 
The Hooper Court analyzed the guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme Court 
in determining what constitutes testimonial statements: First, the Court looked to Webster's 
dictionary definition·of"testimony" from 182-8; i.e., 'Ta] solemn declaration or affirmation made 
for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. Next, the Court 
listed three formulations of"core" testimonial statements: (1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its 
functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony 
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants 
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially;" (2) "extrajudicial statements ... contained in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;" 
. and (3) "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an obJective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted). Dr. Reichard's report and its incorporation into 
Dr. Ross's autopsy report clearly fits within the definition of "core" testimonial statements. See, 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, -U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 2716-17 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,310 (2009). 
The unconstitutional admission of the evidence cannot be found to be harmless. Here, the 
Court of Appeals in the direct appeal noted the importance of Dr. Reichard's evidence to the 
state's case: 
Initially, we clarify that the crux of this issue affects the central disputed question 
in this case-when the injuries which ultimately caused K.M.'s death occurred and 
whether it was likely that K.M. would have lost consciousness and/or shown 
severe symptoms immediately after the injuries were inflicted. In other words, did 
the injuries occur on the morning that K.M. lost consciousness-and was alone 
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with Grove-or several days prior, when it was undisputed that the injuries could 
not have been inflicted by Grove because he was not alone with K.M. In this 
regard, important to the state's theory of the case that Grove caused the fatal 
injuries on the morning of July 10 was the conclusion of Dr. Reichard, based on 
his microscopic examination ofK.M.'s brain, that K.M. had suffered a laceration 
of the corpus callosum, which would have likely caused immediate loss of 
· ·· consciousness, thereby implicating Grove as the cause of K.M. 's injuries during 
the 36-45 minute period of time during which he was alone with K.M. Grove 
points out that both Dr. Ross and Dr. Harper recited Dr. Reichard's observations 
in this regard, as gleaned from the autopsy report, as neither was present during 
the autopsy nor conducted their own microscopic analysis, and relied on these 
observations in forming their respective opinions that K.M.'s injuries had been 
inflicted on July 10. 
By contrast, Grove's ~xpert, Dr. Arden, testified that he did not agree with Dr. 
Reichard that a laceration was present and that the anomaly was the result of 
handling of the brain after death. He also offered his opinion, after examination of 
the microscopic slides, that K.M.'s injuries had been inflicted at least three days 
prior to death (thus absolving Grove of having caused them) and that they would 
not have necessarily resulted in immediate loss of consciousness. 
State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483,490, 259 P.3d 629, 636 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied (Sept. 12, 
2011). In light of the central importance of the evidence from Dr. Reichard, the state cannot 
meet the burden of proving its unconstitutional admission was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)("[W]e hold ... that before a federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner was Denied a Fair Trial and Due 
Process of Law in Violation of Idaho Constitution 
Art I,§ 13 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution by the Multiple 
Instances of Prosecutorial Misconduct (J.C.§ 19-
4901(a)(l)). 
A. Facts Pertaining to Cause of Action. 
43. Petitioner re-alleges paragraphs 1-42 above. 
12 - VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
23
44. The prosecutor committed misconduct outside the presence of the Court during trial. 
44 .1. During the trial, but prior to the Court going on the record, the prosecutor 
projected family photos of  onto the court room screen while the jury entered 
the courtroom. - ---
44.2. The family photos would then be interchanged with the autopsy 
photographs. 
44.3. Affidavits of witnesses to this misconduct are being filed in support of this 
Petition. 
44.4. The prosecutor's actions exposed the jury to evidence outside the presence 
of the Court, invoking sympathy for  and his biological family and arousing 
passion and prejudice against Mr. Grove. 
44.5. Defense counsel did not draw this behavior to the attention of the Court, ask 
that the prosecutor be ordered to desist or move for a mistrial. 
45. The prosecutor committed misconduct during the state's case-in-chief. 
45.1. The prosecutor called  Bandel, the sister of  as a witness. 
Exhibit B, pg. 823, In. 25 - pg. 824, ln. l. 
45.2. Defense counsel objected noting that  was a child and arguing that 
the prosecutor's purpose in calling her was "obviously ... just to impassion or 
inflame the jury" and he expected  to testify that when she last saw her 
brother "he was lying on his mother's bed, and she gave him a hug and kiss and he 
said good bye." Exhibit B, pg. 821, In. 24 "'pg. 822, ln. 8. 
45.3. In response, the prosecutor told the Court that his purpose in calling  
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was to elicit evidence regarding the "condition of  Martin on the morning of 
July 10th," and argued that he only had Lisa Nash and  to provide evidence 
on that topic. Exhibit B, pg. 822, ln. 17-23. He stated, "I'm entitled to ask her 
what she recalls that morning, what she recalls of the physical condition of her 
brother the last time she saw him." Exhibit B, pg. 823, In. 1-3. 
45.4. The Court overruled defense counsel's objection "based on the argument 
made by Mr. Spickler on behalf of the State." Exhibit B, pg. 823, ln. 8-9. 
45.5. Mr. Spickler then elicited testimony from  that she was a "[p]retty . 
strong little girl," that she said "bye" to  before she left that morning, gave 
him a kiss and a hug and that she never saw her "brother again after that." Exhibit 
, pg. 825;IiL2'2; pg. 826, In. 15-f8; pg. 827, lii.16- ·. 
45.6. That testimony, elicited by the prosecutor from  went beyond what 
the prosecutor told the Court he would elicit and it had the effect of inflaming the 
passions and prejudices of the jury and encouraging the jury to convict Mr. Grove 
for reasons other than the relevant evidence. 
45.7. Defense counsel failed to object that the prosecutor's actual questioning of 
 went beyond what he had represented to the Court and was inadmissible. 
45.8. During Detective Birdsell's testimony, photographs taken inside the Nash 
trailer approximately a month after Kyler's death were admitted. Exhibit B, pg. 
996, ln. 19 - pg. 997, ln. 23; Exhibit C (State's Exhibits 4, 5 and 6). 
45.9. The photos were inflammatory because they included a large display of 
sympathy cards sent to Lisa Nash. 
14 - VERlFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
25
45.10. These photographs were inadmissible under IRE 403 as the danger of 
unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value. 
46. The prosecutor committed misconduct in his cross-examination of Mr. Grove where 
the prosecutor characterized Mr. Grove's sworn testimony as-the "story you told, which is "the -
story you need the jury to believe" and then opined that "some things ... just don't really make. 
sense." Exhibit B, pg. 1113, ln. 8-11. 
47. In his cross-examination of Dr. Jonathan Arden, the prosecutor suggested by a 
question that Dr. Arden was "on a special mission here, which is to provide such evidence as you 
might that would support the defense's case[.]" Exhibit B, pg. 1321, ln. 18-20. 
48. The prosecutor committed misconduct during the cross-examination of Mr. Grove. 
48. r.-Tlie prosecutor cross-exammed .l\,tr. Grove about the fact that Mr. Grove 
was behind on child support to his biological son, a fact both irrelevant and 
unfairly prejudicial. Exhibit B, pg. 1115, ln. 21-24. 
48.2. During the cross-examination of Mr. Grove, the prosecutor asked Mr. 
Grove when he had been prescribed Ativan and whether the prescription "was a 
result of [his] emotional state Friday[.]" Exhibit B, pg. 1120, ln. 9-12. 
48.3. This questioning went beyond the Court's procedure at the time of the 
medical recess, which only informed the jury that "an unforeseen medical 
situation has arisen which affects our ability to proceed with trial today" and did 
not mention Mr. Grove or the nature of the medical situation. Exhibit B, pg. 
1067; ln. 3-5. 
49. The prosecutor committed misconduct during closing and rebuttal argument. 
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49.1. The prosecutor misstated the defense position regarding preexisting head 
injury, saying that the defense was that there was "some long-term brain injury." 
Exhibit B, pg. 1419, In. 6-10. 
· 4~.2. The prosecutor called Dr. Arden's-testimony-about the· absence of a tear-in 
the corpus callosum "a bit of smoke and mirrors to get you confused." Id, pg. 
1426, In. 16-18. 
49.3. The prosecutor suggested without supporting evidence that Dr. Arden's 
"financial position" leads him to decide what cases he can take. Id, pg. 1429, In. 
8-9. 
49.4. The prosecutor testified that a "colleague" said that Dr. Arden's answers 
· during cross-exammat10n were slippery as an ice cube and the prosecutor opined 
that the doctor "was stretching things." Id, pg. 1430, ln. 4-8; pg. 1461, In. 11. 
49 .5. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "[ c ]are takers 
kill little babies all the time." Id, pg. 1460, In. 5-6. 
49.6. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "[p ]arents kill 
babies all the time." Id, In. 6-7. 
49. 7. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "there are 
literally thousands of [similar] incidents in any given span of time[.]" Id., In. 8-
10. 
49.8. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that he believed 
that "our local paper has probably shown ... probably six more of these cases 
since - since this one started." Id, In. 11-14. 
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49.9. The prosecutor misstated for a second time Dr. Arden's testimony about 
head injuries. Id., pg. 1462, In. 18-19. 
49.10. The prosecutor argued that "Dr. Ross had the unenviable task of taking 
· · .-_- -- KyI-er's body apart piece ·by piece[~}" Id; pg.· 1464, In. 24-25. 
49 .11. The prosecutor implied that he had evidence not presented at trial that Mr. 
Grove had previously been "violent with  Exhibit B, pg. 1430, In. 15-21. 
49.12. The prosecutor argued that '-'we don't want to let a murderer go free." Id, 
pg. 1466, In. 9. 
49 .13. The prosecutor told the jury that he did not call  s biological father as 
a witness "because my medical experts unanimously, to no exception, said he 
could not have done 1t." id, pg. 1477, In. 18- . 
49.14. The prosecutor argued without supporting evidence that the 
emotional breakdown of Mr. Grove at trial showed that Mr. Grove had a 
different kind of "emotional breakdown, an instantaneous fit of anger, that 
morning that resulted in these injuries[.]" Id, pg. 1458, In. 16-18. 
50. Defense counsel did not object to any of the misconduct alleged in paragraphs 47-49. 
51. The failure to object was not a strategic decision on defense counsel's part. 
52. Had defense objected, the objections would have been sustained. 
53. In addition, the Court would have given curative instructions to the jury. 
54. Further, defense motions would have alerted the prosecutor that his misconduct 
· would be challenged, which would have prevented some or all of the subsequent misconduct. 
55. Had a motion for a mistrial been made based upon the totality ofprosecutorial 
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misconduct, the motion would have been granted. 
56. This prosecutorial misconduct was not harmless error. 
57. The unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct could not have been raised on appeal. 
State·-v: Perry, 150 Idaho 209,226,245 P.3d 961, 978'{2010). 
B. Why Relief Should be Granted. 
The due process clauses of Art. 1, § 13, of the Idaho Constitution, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment ensure, at a minimum, "that criminal trials shall be fundamentally fair." 
Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19,576 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1978). Further, "[i]t is the 
duty of a prosecuting attorney to see that the accused has a fair and impartial trial." State v. 
Spencer, 74 Idaho 173,183,258 P.2d 1147, 1153 (1953) (emphasis added) (finding that the 
prosecutor's misconduct warranted a. iiew trial). In this case, as demonstrated above, the 
prosecutor grossly violated his duty to ensure fairness at every stage. of the trial proceedings. 
He exposed the jury to extra-judicial evidence. He appealed to the emotions, passions 
and prejudices of the jury through the use of inflammatory tactics. And he elicited inadmissible 
evidence both in direct and cross-examination of witness. 
Further, his closing and rebuttal arguments are replete with misconduct. "Closing 
argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal 
case .... [t]o enlighten the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence." State 
v. Phillips, 144 Ida.ho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). 
Therefore, "[t]he prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to appeal to the prejudices of 
the jury." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution arid Defense Functions § 3-5.8 (3d. 
ed.1993). The prosecutor is charged with the dual task of ensuring that the government's case is 
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presented "earnestly and vigorously, using every legitimate means to bring about a conviction, 
but also to see that justice is done and that every criminal defendant is accorded a fair trial." 
State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,449, 816 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Ct. App.1991). Therefore, it is 
-improper for a prosecutor to appeal to-the emotions, passion or prejudice of the jury through the 
use of inflammatory tactics. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87, 156 P.3d at 588. Here, however, the 
prosecutor appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury, misstated the evidence, used 
_ inflammatory language in reference to defense witnesses, argued evidence not presented at trial, 
and misrepresented the state's burden of proof. This was clear and repeated misconduct. 
The effect of the prosecutor's misconduct requires the granting of the petition. "The 
cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself 
might oe harmless, but when aggregated show the absence of afatt tnhl m conttaventrnn of the 
defendant's right to due process." State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 21, 189 P.3d 477, 483 (Ct. 
App.2008). Thus, it is the cumulative effect of the misconduct engaged in here that should be 
considered. Id Considering all the misconduct, it is clear that the state cannot meet its burden of 
proving its misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as required by Chapman v. 
California, supra. 
TIDRD CAUSE OF ACTION: 
A. Facts Pertaining to Cause of Action. 
Petitioner was Denied Due Process and the Right 
to Jury Trial in Violation of Idaho Constitution 
Art. I, §§ 7 and 13 and the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution 
(J.C.§ 19-4901(a)(l). 
58.- Petitionerre-alleges paragraphs 1-57 above. 
59. Petitioner was denied his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and 
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jury trial when jurors repeatedly slept during the presentation of evidence. 
5 9 .1. Affidavits of individuals who witnessed jurors sleeping during trial 
testimony are being filed in support of this Petition. 
· · 5 9·.2: ·The witness's affidavits are confirmed by the trial -transcript which show the -
Court was required to take several unplanned recesses because jurors repeatedly 
fell asleep during the presentation of the evidence. Exhibit B, pg. 921, ln. 16 - pg. 
922, ln. 6; pg. 983, ln. 9-13; pg. 1351, ln. 19-25. 
60. Sleeping jurors cannot independently evaluate the evidence and function as the 
constitution requires. 
61. This issue could not have been raised on appeal under State v. Perry, supra, because 
defense counsel did not obJect to the sleepmgJllfdrs or make a motion forrr.ustnaL 
62. This error was not harmless. 
B. Why Relief Should be Granted. 
A juror's inattentiveness, by sleeping during witness testimony, may constitute 
misconduct. State v. Strange, 147 Idaho 686,689,214 P.3d 672, 675 (Ct. App. 2009). See e.g., 
State v. Majid, 914 N.E.2d 1113, 1115 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (Numerous instances of jurors' 
sleeping during murder trial, including during eyewitness testimony, violated defendant's right to 
due process and constituted plain error). "[A] juror who sleeps through much of the trial 
testimony cannot be expected to perform his duties." Id, citing United States v. Smith, 550 F.2d 
277,285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 434 U.S. 841 (1977); United 
States v. Cameron, 464 F.2d 333,335 (3rd Cir. 1972). 
"Due process mandates that the defendant is entitled to have a jury hear and evaluate the 
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evidence," id., and the jurors in this case were instructed by the Court "to decide the facts from 
· , all the evidence in the case." Exhibit B, pg; 1399, -In. 24-25 (emphasis added). The repeated 
instances of sleeping by one or more jurors, especially given they were sleeping during the 
. - critical medical testimony-of Drs. · Ross and Arden, denied Mr. Grove his state and federal 
constitutional rights to a jury trial and due process. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner was Denied the Effective Assistance of 
Counsel on Appeal in Violation of Idaho 
Constitution Art I, § 13 and the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution (J.C.§ 19-4901(a)(I)). 
A. Facts Pertaining to Cause of Action. 
63. Petitioner re-alleges paragraphs 1- 62 above. 
64. Alternative argument: If the Court determmes that the prosecutortiil nusconduct 
issue raised in the Second Cause of Action could have been raised on direct appeal, Petitioner 
alleges that it was therefore deficient performance for appellate counsel to fail to raise that issue. 
64.1. Had appellate counsel raised the issue on appeal, the conviction would have 
been reversed by the appellate court. 
65. Alternative argument: If the Court determines that the juror misconduct issue raised 
in the Third Cause of Action could have been raised on direct appeal, Petitioner alleges that it 
was therefore deficient performance for appellate counsel to fail to raise that issue. 
65 .1. Had. appellate counsel raised the issue on appeal, the conviction would have 
been reversed by the appellate court. 
B. Why Relief Should be Granted. 
: A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the 
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Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has 
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the 
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). The Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth .Amendment guarantee the right to counsel on appeal. Douglas v. · 
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). This right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance 
of that counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal 
defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; LC.§ 19-852. 
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or 
federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984), standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's 
performance was deficient in that 1t fellbeloW standards of :reasonable professional performance; 
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Stricklandv. Washington, 466 
U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a 
different result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id. 
An ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is judged under the standards set forth in 
Strickland. See e.g., Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656,658, 168 P.3d 40, 42 (Ct. App. 2007). 
· Petitioner draws the Court's attention to the fact that Mintun holds that it cannot be 
ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise claims of fundamental error for the first 
time on appeal. Id. (Petitioner disagrees and believes the Mintun bright-line rule is contrary to 
Strickland and should be overruled by the Idaho Supreme Court.) Right or wrong, the rule is 
based in part upon a concern that the record on appeal might not be "complete enough to allow --
appellate examination of all the factors that must be considered on such a claim." Id. Thus, the 
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Court of Appeals decided to leave such issues "for presentation in a post-conviction proceeding, 
where an adequate record could be developed." Id. Moreover, "the allowance of this type of 
claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is ordinarily not necessary to protect a 
defendant's rights because the defendant can bring th"e- same-claim· of impropriety in the trial · 
proceedings as a claim of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel for failing to object to the 
alleged error in the trial court." Mintun, 144 Idaho at 662, 168 P.3d at 46. 
In this case, Mr. Grove has raised claims of prosecutorial misconduct and the deprivation 
of the right to jury trial, which were not objected to below. Mr. Grove does not believe appellate 
counsel could have raised those issues on direct appeal under State v. Perry, supra, as was the 
case with his confrontation clause claim. Thus, he can raise all those issues in this Petition, both 
as direct claims and as aspects oflhe ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim alleged below. 
See e.g., DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603-604, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152-53 (2009) (deprivation 
of the right to testify raised as direct constitutional violation) with Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 
469, 476, 224 P.3d 536, 543 (Ct. App. 2009) (deprivation of the right to testify raised as an 
aspect of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim). If the Court disagrees and holds that 
Claims Two or Three could have been raised on appeal and thus cannot be raised now, it should 
then grant relief due to the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as the rationale behind the 
Mintun rule would no longer be applicable. In either case, trial counsel's failure to make proper 
objections at trial to the errors above are all incorporated into the ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claim alleged below. 
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION: 
· A. Facts ·Pertaining to Cause of Action. 
·:] ~:-_ :. :: __ · ___ . 
Petitioner was Denied the Effective Assistance of 
Counsel at Trial in Violation of Ida/to 
Constitution Art. I, § 13 and the Sixtlt and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution (J.C.§ 19-490J(a)(J)). 
66. Petitioner re-alleges paragraphs 1-65 above. 
67. Defense counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to present an adequate 
analysis to support his pretrial motion to allow the admission of alternate perpetrator evidence. 
67 .1. The failure to present an adequate analysis resulted in the District Court 
denying admission of that evidence - evidence which was crucial to the defense 
and the lack of which was prejudicial. 
68. Defense counsel rendered deficient performance m failing to move for a mistrial or 
for the summoning of a new jury pool after a potential juror made statements in voir dire that 
polluted the entire jury pool. 
68 .1. The potential juror stated in front of all the potential jurors that he worked 
in the funeral business and he knew the police officer witnesses Greene and Petrie 
well, both from their work investigating cases that came through the funeral 
home, and through their work for his wife who was the city manager, and that they 
are very credible. Exhibit B, pg. 155, ln. 13-14. 
68.2. He also stated he had worked in the funeral business for a long time and 
seen "these situations" before and did not have a lot of empathy except for the 
victims. Id., pg. 155, ln. 21 - pg. 156, ln. 2. 
68.3. The failure to object and move for a cautionary instruction or for the 
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summoning of a new jury pool prejudiced Petitioner. 
69. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to challenge for cause or 
peremptorily challenge Juror #5 (Loetscher) after voir dire revealed that he worked at St. 
Joseph's Hospital and knew of "just about everyone on the [state's witness list] . : . particularly 
the ER doctors that was listed there." Exhibit B, pg. 144, In. 14-19. 
69.1. Juror #5 became the presiding juror. Exhibit B, pg. 1471, ln. 19-22. 
70. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to assert Petitioner's state and 
. . . 
federal constitutional rights to confrontation (Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13, United States Const.· 
Amendments 6 and 14) and by failing to make proper evidentiary objections. 
70.1. During trial, state's witnesses, i.e., Nash, Chin, Harper, Hunter and Ross, 
repeatedly testified to the contents of the autopsy report which contained 
information from Dr. Reichard. 
70.2. Dr. Reichard's information was the state's only basis of proof for the nature 
of head and alleged brain injuries, the only basis for testimony as to the timing of 
the head and alleged brain injuries, and the only basis for the state's claim that 
 had suffered a tear to the corpus callosum and axonal shearing. 
70.3. However, the state did not present the testimony of Dr. Reichard in 
violation of the state and federal constitutional rights of confrontation. 
70.4. Petitioner was prejudiced because had counsel objected on confrontation 
grounds, the state would have had no testimony as to any head or alleged brain 
injuries and the timing of those injuries and thus, could not have obtained a 
conviction. 
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70.5. In response to the defense motion for acquittal or in the alternative a 
new trial, the state argued that Dr. Reichard was the one person who 
actually examined the brain and therefore was a more credible witness 
than Dr. Arden. Exhibit B, pg. 1486, ln. 6-15. 
70.6. Prosecutor Spickler said in discounting Dr. Arden's testimony, 
" ... [Dr. Arden] was trying to contradict the findings of an expert in New 
Mexico who actually had the brain and actually took a look at the brain in toto, as 
opposed to one or more slides." Exhibit B, pg. 1486, ln. 8-12. 
70.7. Defense counsel failed to object to the testimony from Dr. Chin 
which referred to Dr. Reichard's report. 
70.8. Defense counsel failed to obJect to the teshin6n.y from Dr. Hunter 
which referred to and relied upon Dr. Reichard's report. 
70.9. Defense counsel failed to object to the testimony from Dr. Harper 
which referred to and relied upon Dr. Reichard's report. 
70.10. The testimony ofDrs. Chin, Hunter, Harper and Ross which 
related the findings of Dr. Reichard, were inadmissible under IRE 703 as 
well as the confrontation clause. 
71. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to hearsay testimony 
from Lisa Nash regarding the autopsy report contents. 
71.1. At trial, Lisa Nash testified that she was told that  had blood in his 
brain that could not be removed. She did not identify who told her this and the 
testimony was admitted without limitation including for the truth of the matter 
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asserted. Exhibit B, p. 755, ln. 16-25. 
71.2. Defense counsel did not object on hearsay grounds. Had counsel objected, 
the objection would have been granted. 
71.3. The failure to object prejudiced Petitioner because, as noted above, had 
counsel asserted Petitioner's constitutional confrontation rights, the state would 
have had no proof of cause of death other than Ms. Nash's hearsay testimony. 
Without that testimony, Petitioner would not have been convicted. 
72. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to the testimony of Steve 
Stocking, a paramedic, that Petitioner was too calm in his opinion when the paramedics arrived 
in response to the 911 call. Exhibit B, pg. 838, ln. 22. 
72.1. Mr. Stocking was not a psychologist or psychiatrist an:dhad no 
qualifications as an expert on the appropriate reactions in a crisis. 
72.2. His opinion regarding Petitioner was not relevant (IRE 401 and 402) and 
did not fall within the scope of admissible opinion testimony by a lay witness 
(IRE 701) because it involved specialized knowledge of the appropriate reaction 
of people in crisis. 
73. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. 
Chin's testimony that there was "no way we would have missed any of the[] injuries" described 
in the autopsy report. Exhibit B, pg. 851, In. 5-6. 
73.1. Defense counsel failed to cross-examine Dr. Chin on this claim even 
·though, according to Dr. Ross, some of the injuries in autopsy were old enough 
that they did exist when he saw  specifically, Dr. Ross testified that the 
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injury to the left thigh and the injuries on the back were older. Exhibit B, pg. 978, 
ln. 23 -pg. 979, ln.17; pg. 987, In. 9-20. 
74. Defense counsel's perfonnance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. 
Chin's testimony that what he·t1read irrthi;sautopsy report is·-the-most brutal case" he had ever 
seen. Exhibit B, pg. 851, ln. 6-7. 
7 4 .1. This testimony was not relevant under IRE 401 and 402. 
74.2. This evidence was unfairly prejudicial under IRE 403. 
75. Defense counsel's perfonnance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. 
Hunter's testimony that subarachonoid hemorrhage has to have immediate symptoms. Exhibit B, 
pg. 874, ln. 24 - pg. 875, ln. 22. 
75. I. l liete was msuffic1ent foundation for thattestimony as Dr. Hunter admitted 
that he is not a pathologist. Exhibit B, pg. 874, ln. 24-25. 
76. Defense counsel's perfonnance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. 
Hunter's testimony that  was either "ejected from an automobile" or "was beaten very 
severely." Exhibit B, pg. 871, In. 12-14. 
76.1. There was insufficient foundation for Dr. Hunter to give this opinion. 
77. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. 
Hunter's testimony that a short fall "is rarely, rarely likely to produce any kind of significant head 
injury or bleeding" and then failed to impeach that testimony. Exhibit B, pg. 888, In. 16-20. 
77 .1. This evidence was inadmissible because there was no foundation for 
· his opinion; 
77.2. Dr. Hunter's opinion could have been impeached with medical research 
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published in peer-reviewed medical journals. 
77.3. That an affidavit with medical journal articles documenting the possibility 
of serious head injury from short falls will ?e filed in support of this Petition. 
78. Defense-counsel's petforma:nce-was1ieficient"because-he failed to object to Dr. 
Hunter's opinion, stated without any qualification as an expert, that  had sure signs of 
shaken baby syndrome. Exhibit B, pg. 869, In. 4-16. 
79. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. 
Ross' s testimony that, although he did not see certain hemorrhages in the psoas and 
retroperitoneal areas, he was told about them by the transplant surgeon. Exhibit B, pg. 93 8, ln. 
20-23. 
9 .1. That testrmony is inadmissible hearsay and v10lates the confrontation. 
clause. 
80. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to the 
foundation for Dr. Ross's testimony regarding the head and alleged brain injuries because Dr. 
Ross also testified that he had never viewed any of the slides or recuts himself. Exhibit B, pg. 
959, In. 10-15. 
81. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. 
Ross's testimony that Dr. Reichard's observation of a tear in the corpus callosum shows there 
was "a very significant force" applied, something comparable to a "very high fall" of "a couple of 
stories or so," or a "motor vehicle accident, or inflicted blunt force trauma." Exhibit B, pg. 945, 
ln. 5-12. 
81.1. That testimony violates the confrontation clause. 
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81.2. That testimony is not admissible under IRE 703. 
81.3. There was no foundation for Dr. Ross's opinion about the amount of force. 
82. Counsel rendered deficient performance in regard to the testimony of Dr. Deborah 
Harper .. 
82.1. Counsel failed to object or move to strike when Dr. Harper vouched for the 
abilities of state's witness Dr. Ross. Exhibit B, pg. 1031, ln. 12-14. ("Dr. Ross, 
I'm sorry to say, is no longer our- in our Medical Examiner's Office, because he 
is a super clinician.") 
82.2. Counsel failed to object to irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial testimony 
regarding the estimated force needed to inflict the injuries, comparing it to the 
force of being hit by a car, or being dragged behind a horse, or having a horse step 
on Kyler's abdomen, or being hit by a baseball bat, even though there was no 
foundation showing she could accurately make such estimates of force. Exhibit 
B, pg. 1034, In. 7-21. 
83. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to the admission of 
photographs taken a month after Kyler's death, which included many sympathy cards sent to the 
family. 
83.1. During Detective Birdsell's testimony, photographs taken inside the Nash 
trailer approximately a month after Kyler's death were admitted. Exhibit B, pg. 
996, In. 19 - pg. 997, ln. 23; Exhibit C (State's Exhibits 4, 5 and 6). 
83.2. The photos were inflammatory because they included a large display of 
sympathy cards sent to Lisa Nash. 
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84.3. If counsel had objected, the photographs would have been excluded under 
IRE 403 as the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value. 
84. Counsel rendered deficient performance in not moving to exclude any reference by 
any witness to the brain autopsy because no valid chain of custody for the brain was. presented. -
84.1. The state failed to present any evidence that the brain examined at the 
pathology laboratory in New Mexico was s brain. 
85. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to move to strike the 
prosecutor's comments after his objection to prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination 
was sustained. ExhibitB, pg. 1113, ln. 12-13. 
85 .1. In his cross-examination of Mr. Grove, the prosecutor characterized Mr. 
Grove's sworn testimony as the "story you told, which is "the stmy you need tire 
jury to believe" and then opined that "some things ... just don't really make 
sense." Exhibit B, pg. 1113, ln. 8-11. 
85.2. Defense counsel's objection was sustained, but counsel did not ask that the 
comments be stricken or that the jury be instructed to disregard the comments. Id 
86. Defense counsel's performance was deficient when he failed to object to the 
prosecutor asking Mr. Grove when he had been prescribed Ativan and whether the prescription 
"was a result of [his] emotional state Friday[.]" Exhibit B, pg. 1120, ln. 9-12. 
86.1. This questioning went beyond the Court's procedure at the time of the 
medical recess, which only informed the jury that "an unforeseen medical 
situation has arisen which affects our ability to proceed with trial today" and did 
not mention Mr. Grove or the nature of the medical situation. Exhibit B, pg. 
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1067, ln. 3-5. 
87. Defense counsel's performance was deficient for failing to object to the prosecutor 
attempting to impeach Dr. Arden with alleged "gross mismanagement" when he was the Medical 
- -fac-amineFin the District of Columbia. Exhibit B, pg. 1382, ln. 6 - pg. 1388, ln.·-12. -·---, 
87 .1. These allegations of administrative errors and allegations of sexual 
harassment were irrelevant under IRE 401 and 402 because they did not 
impeach Dr. Arden's medical testimony. 
87.2. The allegations' unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value 
and were inadmissible under IRE 403. 
87 .3. The allegations were not admissible under IRE 404, nor did the state 
give ariy notice of its intentto use tire evidence to the ex.tent itelairns the 
evidence was admissible under IRE 404(b). 
88. Defense counsel's performance was deficient for failing to attempt to rehabilitate Dr. 
Arden on re-direct examination. 
89. It was deficient performance for defense counsel to fail to introduce photographs of 
 taken at St. Joseph's Hospital soon after he arrived in an ambulance. 
89.1. The photographs show no redness or bruising and therefore are inconsistent 
with the state's theory that Mr. Grove had just brutally beaten  
89.2. The photographs will be filed with the Court under separate cover. 
90. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to move for a mistrial 
. after many jurors-fell.asleep.during the testimony. See e.g., Exhibit B, pg ... 921, ln. 16 - pg. 922-,- ·: ---· ---~ 
ln. 6; pg. 983, ln. 9-13; pg. 1351, ln. 19-25. 
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91. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he introduced evidence in the 
direct examination of Mr. Grove regarding the bad relationship between Mr. Grove and his son 
Alex. Exhibit B, pg. 1074, ln. 1-24. 
9 LL_, This evidence_could_have been kept out by filing a motion in limine 
as it is both irrelevant and inadmissible other acts evidence. 
92. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to the 
prosecutor questioning Mr. Grove about the fact he was behind on child support. Exhibit B, pg. 
1115, ln. 21-24 
92.1. This evidence could have been kept out by filing a motion in limine as it is 
both irrelevant and inadmissible other acts evidence. 
93. Defense counsel's performance v,ras deficient because he failed to question 
paramedic David Chenalt about Lisa Nash's reaction to Kyler's injury. 
93.1. Mr. Chenalt could have testified that Ms. Nash's behavior was "the most 
bizarre reaction we've ever seen for especially a kid call." See Grand Jury Tr. p. 
214, ln. 5 - pg. 217, ln. 15. 
93 .2. The fact that defense counsel allowed the prosecutor to elicit evidence from 
a paramedic that Mr. Grove's affect was "too calm," while failing to bring out 
evidence from a paramedic that Lisa Nash's affect was ''the most bizarre reaction 
we've ever seen" demonstrates the absence of a strategy regarding this type of 
evidence. 
_9JJ .. The Grand Jury Transcript is not attached hereto lls_it is a confidential 
document. 
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93.4. Mr. Grove asks the Court to take judicial notice of the Grand Jury 
Transcript pursuant to IRE 201(d). 
94. Defense counsel's performance during closing argument was deficient because he 
. failed to argue that-the state had failed to carry its-burden of proof because Dr._Reichard did not.. . _ ·- ,. ______ _ 
testify and the other doctors had no foundation for their opinions of when the injury happened. 
95. Defense counsel's performance during the state's closing and rebuttal arguments was 
deficient because he failed to object to multiple instances of misconduct by the prosecutor. 
96. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to move for a mistrial 
after the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments. 
97. The cumulative effect of defense counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Mr. 
-- Greve; 
B. Why Relief Should be Granted. 
In analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court should not look to 
each example of deficient performance and determine whether it was prejudicial. Instead, the 
Court should consider all the deficient performance and then determine whether the cumulative 
effect was prejudicial. See, Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 527, 927 P.2d 910, 917 (Ct. App. 
1996) and Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24, 32, 878 P.2d 198,206 (Ct. App.1994). As the Ninth 
Circuit has explained, "Separate errors by counsel ... should be analyzed together to see whether 
their cumulative effect deprived the defendant of his right to effective assistance. They are, in 
other words, not separate claims, but rather different aspects of a single claim of ineffective _ 
assistance of trial counsel." Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (91h Cir. 2003). __ 
As set forth above, there is a reasonable probability of a different result had defense 
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counsel's performance not been.deficient. Crucial state's evidence would have been excluded, 
exculpatory defense evidence would have been presented, and egregious prosecutorial 
misconduct would have been prevented or resulted in a mistrial, or a mistrial would have been 
..... granted due 0 to. jut.or misconduct .. Accordingly, this Court should grant the Petition. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF: Petitioner Requests tlie Following Relief: 
A. That the judgment be vacated and a new trial be granted; and/or 
B. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
Respectfully submitted this 5<ft\ day of September, 2012. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
~~{ 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorneys for Stacey Grove 
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VERIFICATION OF PETITION 
I, Stacey Grove, being duly sworn under oath, state: 
I know of the contents of the foregoing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and that the 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
~7 j,_,-... 
I CERTIFY that on September_ 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 




c_.../ hand delivered 
to: Daniel L. Spickler, Nez Perce County Prosecuting A.ttorney, 1221 F)Street, Lewiston, ID 
83501 /\ \ · 1 
if)~~-\\ () / 
~ ~-. (J . I \J ~::¥:::--------... u~ -. 
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
FILED 
Wl2 SEP 1 P~ '-I Oi 
PATTY 0. WEC:KS ~ 
CLERK FT'iEDiST.CO 5 
o~.UTY -· 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STACEY GROVE, 
Petitioner, 











CASE NO. CV 1 2 - 0 1 7 9 8 
AFFIBA¥1'.f OF STEVIE GaOVE IN 
SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Stevie Grove, being duly sworn and upon oath hereby says: 
1. That I was present in the courtroom during the criminal trial proceedings in State v. 
Grove, No. CR-2007-0000768, held before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick in Lewiston, Idaho. 
2. That during the trial, I observed the following five jurors sleeping during in court at 
various times during the proceedings: Casey Neuman; Mike Keller; Cynthia Barrett; Greg 
Lind; and James Yates. 
3. That I observed jurors sleeping during the testimony of Dr. Marco Ross on July 
1 - AFFIDAVIT OF STEVIE GROVE IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
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22, 2008, during the testimony of Dr. Deborah Harper on July 24, 2008, and during the 
testimony of Dr. Jonathan Arden on July 29, 2008. 
4. One juror, Mike Keller, was so soundly asleep that his head was resting against the 
back wall during Dr. Ross's testimony. 
5. During the trial, I witnessed prosecuting attorney Spickler repeatedly adjust his 
projector as the jurors were entering the courtroom prior to presentation of evidence so as to 
project alternating images of photographs of  during his lifetime and autopsy photos. 
This ends my affidavit. 
\1 j ) 'i -
.r .· · l 1).vi,g_,, · /lltiJ:L--: 
'-Stevie Grove 
SUBSCRIBED ~ SWORN TO 
before me this __:i_ day of ~ttgu5t, 2012. 
\\);\· ~~~~~ 
Notary Public for the State of Idaho 
Residing at: i,._ <e. ._p 'j ~ <} l..l"'-
My commission expires: >-).:~ ~ {) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-- '/ /,.1,..,.._ 
I CERTIFY that on September L 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the 




t--·_,, hand delivered 
faxed 
Daniel Spickler 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 








NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
,_---- --- J 
FI I F n 
- .,,_ :z..J 
2D1Z SEP 7 Prl 'f l O 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZPERCE 




Petitioner, cAsENcCV 12 -_o 1 7 qg 
vs. ) 




AFFIDAVIT OF LORI STAMPER IN 
SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Respondent. ) _____ _) 
Lori Stamper, being duly sworn and upon oath hereby says: 
1. That I was present on July 29, 2008, during the testimony of Dr. Jonathan Arden in 
the criminal trial proceedings in State v. Grove, No. CR-2007-0000768, held before the 
Honorable Carl B. Kerrick in Lewiston, Idaho. 
2. That during the testimony, I observed a juror in the back row sleeping. 
3. That juror was either Michael Keller or Kendall Loetscher. 




This ends my affidavit. 
~~-~--~te 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO 
before me this day of September, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
- I-:,..__ 
I CERTIFY that on September 7 , 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the 






Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
----·-







NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box2772 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Fl LED 
2012 SEP 7 Pfl y OS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND WDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 













STATE OF IDAHO, 
A:FFIDAVIT.OF CAROL GROVE IN 
SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Respondent. 
Carol Grove, being duly sworn and upon oath hereby says: 
1. That I was present in the courtroom during the criminal trial proceedings in State v. 
Grove, No. CR-2007-0000768, held before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick in Lewiston, Idaho. 
2. That during the trial, I observed the following five jurors sleeping during in court at 
various times during the proceedings: Casey Neuman; Mike Keller; Cynthia Barrett; Greg 
Lind; and James Yates. 
3. That I observed jurors sleeping during the testimony of Dr. Marco Ross on July. 
1 - AFFIDAVIT OF CAROL GROVE IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR 
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22, 2008, during the testimony of Dr. Deborah Harper on July 24, 2008, and during the 
testimony of Dr. Jonathan Arden on July 29, 2008. 
4. One juror, Mike Keller, was so soundly asleep that his head was resting against the 
back wall during Dr. Ross's testimony. 
This ends my affidavit. 
My commission expires: S,] (C ~ , I 
~,,,,,,mum,,,. 
~,~-t\tlA Hr. :1,.,~ 
.§~e.' ••••••• 'I)~~ S" .;) o• "• ?$) ~~ ~ ~ ... .. ~ 
;:: ~.· .. ~ 
.. 
~ l ... ~oTARli\ "s 
~ • " r • -- . . ... = • • = - . . -- . ... s. \ : s 
~ ... ..-. ~ 
~ ~~·. ·~~o ~ ~-~.;;:·····~t\..'\' ~ 
~~ 1 t: OF \v'i,~ 
1111111111 Ill\\\\\'. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
"{~ 
I CERTIFY that on September --l-, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the_ 




to: Daniel Spickler 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
P.Q. Box: 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
3 - AFFIDAVIT OF CAROL GROVE IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
56
------ j ~ '·''C',, :_ ------'-' ,,,,,',' _____ ,J ;' ,.,< ,'' ,," ---- _,, ________ < J ' 'c' ' ,,,,, ,' ' '""'' "i I'''' ,·, " . '--' - '. --------- -
Dennis Benjamin 
ISBA#4199 FIL F n 
Deborah Whipple - -· 
~::/~iNJAMIN, McKAY &BART1~¥r3l£p 7 Pf) y 09 
P.O. Box 2772 PATT'( . WEE,,~~, 
303 w. Bannock CLERK OF TH Di ST. co (~o~S 
Boise, Idaho 83701 0 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 











STATE OF IDAHO, 
CASE NO. C V 1 2 - 0 1 7 9 8 
AFFIDAVIT OFLYNETTE 
WALTON IN SUPPORT OF 
VERIFIED PETITION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Respondent. 
Lynette Walton, being duly sworn and upon oath hereby says: 
I. That I was present in the courtroom during the criminal trial proceedings in State v. 
Grove, No. CR-2007-0000768, held before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick in Lewiston, Idaho. 
2. That during the trial, I observed the following five jurors sleeping during in court at 
various times during the proceedings: Casey Neuman; Mike Keller; Cynthia Barrett; Greg 
Lind; and James Yates. 
3. That I observed jurors sleeping during the testimony of Dr. Marco Ross on July 
I - AFFIDAVIT OF LYNETTE WALTON IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR 
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. . . -- ... _ .:. -- .! 
22, 2008, during the testimony of Dr. Deborah Harper on July 24, 2008, and during the 
testimony of Dr. Jonathan Arden on July 29, 2008. 
4. One juror, Mike Keller, was so soundly asleep that his head was resting against the 
back wall during Dr. Ross's testimony. 
This ends my affidavit. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO 
before me this -1 day of A~ 2012. 
-_-. S \-e.-vnbLv 
~,,,,,nmuu,,,l • 
~,~ ~\NA,.,.,.,,~ 
~ ~,~~-·····-.{()~~ ,;;: ~-v.- ·-,~~ 
::§ •• • ··":r ~ 
E: _.. ... ,QTAft \ ~ :::: .,, qt..= - . r • .... = • : = ::: ~ p : = :: ~as1 ,c · ;I:; ~ . ~ : ~ 
~ .. . ~ 
~ <.P~·· •• § 
~ '4'fj:;·· ..... ~O~ 
~~ ,OF\~r~~ 
'l/111111 nm,,\\\~ 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1/A,-I CERTIFY that on September _, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the 




to: Daniel Spickler 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
L ·st\>n., \ 83.50. ltt .. 
\ , i \ I" 
~ ;st,;· \ ' ) )L--
,' -
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STACEY GROVE, 
Petitioner, 






CASE NcC V 1 2 - 0 1 7 9 8 
-----------i-)--~AF¥F¥1I1-t:DJfl.AH,~lJT+-+OHF'-!DnEt;..tBH-OnR{;(~H..Jli-Gtt«RYOwV.,11,E .. --~~ 
) IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED 
) PETITION FOR 
) POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
) 
Deborah Grove, being duly sworn and upon oath hereby says: 
1. That I was present in the courtroom during the criminal trial proceedings in State v. 
Grove, No. CR-2007-0000768, held before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick in Lewiston, Idaho. 
2. That during the trial, I observed the following five jurors sleeping during in court at 
various times during the proceedings: Casey Neuman; Mike Keller; Cynthia Barrett; Greg 
Lind; and James Yates. 
3. That I observed jurors sleeping during the testimony of Dr. Marco Ross on July. 
1 - AFFIDAVIT OF DEBORAH GROVE IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR 
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. 22, 2008, during the testimony of Dr. Deborah Harper on July 24, 2008, and during the 
testimony of Dr. Jonathan Arden on July 29, 2008. 
-4. One juror, Mike Keller, was so soundly asleep that his head was resting against the 
back wall during Dr. Ross's testimony. 
5. During the trial, I witnessed prosecuting attorney Spickler repeatedly adjust his 
projector as the jurors were entering the courtroom prior to presentation of evidence so as to 
project alternating images of photographs of  during his lifetime and autopsy photos. 
This ends my affidavit. 
Dibw.A_~. 
Deborah Grove 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO 
L.I .)..,,,. 
before me this _L_ day ofA.ugl:l:st, 2012. ~~~<-- s~+Q_~-Ji 
Notary Public for the State ofldaho 
Residing at: L ..._u.) ~ ~.J- °"' 
My commission expires: S -:}~ -\). 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
16-_ I CERTIFY that on September _, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the 




to: Daniel Spickler 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 







ISBA# 4199 2~12 SEP 7 p !fl ~ 01 
Deborah Whipple  
ISBA# 4355 PAT Y 0. WEH.S 
NEVIN,BENJAMIN,Mc;r<AY&BARTLETTLJg!ERK FI IE 'ST.rn- T ~ 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STACEY GROVE, 
Petitioner, 












AFFIDAVIT OF .U ... CK GROVEJN 
SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION 
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
Jack Grove, being duly sworn and.upon oath hereby says: 
1. That I was present in the courtroom during the criminal trial proceedings in State v. 
Grove, No. CR-2007-0000768, held before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick in Lewiston, Idaho. 
2. That during the trial, I observed the following five jurors sleeping during in court at 
various times during the proceedings: Casey Neuman; Mike Keller; Cynthia Barrett; Greg 
Lind; and James Yates. 
3. That I observed jurors sleeping during the testimony of Dr. Marco Ross on July 




22, 2008, during the testimony of Dr. Deborah Harper on July 24, 2008, and during the 
testimony of Dr. Jonathan Arden on July 29, 2008. 
4. One juror, Mike Keller, was so soundly asleep that his head was resting against the 
back wall during Dr. Ross's testimony. 
This ends my affidavit. 
/ ~--1--~--_:1__ ----="'------',IL"'--""'-"-~ 
.C:: jck Grove 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO 
before me this~ day of~, 2012. 
~-\tinbLr ----· 




l- ·-· -, 
~- -- ------- -_ ----· _. __ 
• ~· • ~CC - 7.~ -. ~-0 :__-,,_ •. : - "-\ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-7/...v-
I CERTIFY that on September_ I, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the 




to: Daniel Spickler 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
\i;Lewiston, ID ?35~l 'J 
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2012. SE? 1.3 fff't\ lD 31 
~~)tln·M~ 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
) 
STACEY GROVE, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO. CR12-01798 
) 
vs. ) ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
) SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Defendant. ) 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Thursday, the 11th day of October, 2012, at the hour 
of 10:45 A.M. Pacific Time in the District Court Chambers of the Nez Perce County Courthouse, 
Lewiston, Idaho, is the time and place set for a Telephonic Scheduling Conference in the above-
entitled matter with THE COURT initiating the call. 
DATED this / 7,- day of September, 2012. 
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 
CARL B. KERRICK- District Judge 
1 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC SCHEDULING 
CONFERENCE was: 
~and delivered via court basket, or 
___ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this f 3 ~ay of September, 
2012, to: 
Dennis Benjamin -tn/4. t..i.J_ 
P 0Box2772 
Boise ID 83701 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor 
P OBox 1267 
Lewiston ID 83501 
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 






NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STACEY GROVE, 
Petitioner, 










CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
Petitioner, Stacey Grove, asks this Court, pursuant to I.R.E. 201 ( d), to take judicial notice 
of the transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged documents, exhibits and record in the case of State v. 
Stacey Grove, Nez Perce County Case No. CR-2007-0000768, including the documents listed in 
the Register of Actions attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
Dated this ·J r day of September, 2012. 
~:E.~--
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Stacey Grove 
1 • REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
68
I i - ~ • ... _. ·.: . _____ . - <--· --
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on September / :J.. , 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the 




to: Daniel Spickler 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
b.eM,\A~ ~c-:_~ 
Dennis Benjamin l 




, ____ ._-_s_-_,,_··----· .. 1 ·1 r"''""'::- -':- . =--,_-.-.. ,·.--
\I 1/VV/C...U IL. VU,""T"" I"' OGlllll~ I IVIU 
01/03/2012 Order for Telephonic status Conference 
0312012 Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Conference 01/23/2012 08:45 
AM) 
Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference scheduled on 
1/23/2012 08:45 AM: Hearing Vacated 
02/02/2012 Or r for Telephonic Status Conference 
02/02/2012 Hearin Scheduled (Telephonic Status Conference 02/16/2012 09:00 
AM) 
Hearing resu r Telephonic Status Conference scheduled on 
0211612012 02/16/2012 09: AM: Hearing Held 
02/16/2012 Order for Telephoni Status Conference 
0211612012 Hearing Scheduled {Te 
AM) 
0311312012 Hearing result for Telephonic tatus Conference scheduled 
03/13/2012 09:00 AM: Hearing eld 
04/03/2012 Notice Of Service - def Nash 
06/28/2012 Child Support Order Transmittal Form 
08/08/2012 Stipulation to Continue Trial 
08/08/2012 Notice Of Taking The Deposition of Steven 
08/13/2012 Order to Vacate Trial Setting 
0811312012 Hearing r~sult for Pretrial Confere 
AM: Heanng Vacated 
0811312012 Hear~ng result for Jury Trial eduled on 08/27/201 
Hearing Vacated 
08/13/2012 Order For Telep hon· cheduling Conference 
0811312012 Hearing Sched d (Telephonic ScheduUng Conference O 
. 09:00AM) 
0911412012 Hearin sultfor Telephonic Scheduling Conference schedule 
09/1 012 09:00 AM: Hearing Held 
i:ler Setting Trial & Pre-trial Conference 
Hearing Scheduled {Pretrial Conference 02/15/2013 10:00 AM) 
2012 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/25/2013 09:00 AM) 
State of Idaho vs. Stacey Lewis Grove 
No hearings scheduled 
Case: CR-2007-0000768 District Judge: Carl !3· Amounl23 450.73 
Kerrick due: ' 
Closed pending clerk action 
• Ch . Violation 
, arges: Date Charge 
Register 
07/10/2006 118-4001-1 Murder I 




01/26/2007 New Case Filed-Felony 
Citation 






Fines/fees: $97 .50 




0112612007 Warrant lss~ed -Arrest Bond amount: 100000.00 Defendant: Grove, 
Stacey Lewis 
01/26/2007 Notice Of Appearance 
01/26/2007 Request For Discovery-defendant 
01/26/2007 Defendant Grove, Stacey Lewis Attorney Retained Scott M Chapman 
01/26/2007 Exhibits to Deanna for appeal process. 
01/29/2007 Warrant Returned Defendant Grove, Stacey Lewis 
01/29/2007 Case Status Changed: Activate (previously inactive) 
01/29/2007 Notification Of Rights-felony 
· 01/29/2007Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 01/29/2007 04:00 PM) 
01/29/2007 Request and Order to Photograph-Tribune 
01/29/2007 Request to Broadcast 
01/29/2007 Order To Broadcast-KLEW 
0112912007 Hearing result for Arraignment held on 01/29/2007 04:00 PM: Hearing 
Held 
01/29/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment 02/01/2007 02:00 PM) 
01/29/2007 Notice Of Hearing 
01/31/2007 Requestto Broadcast--KLEW 
01/31/2007 Order to Broadcast--granted--KLEW 
J I. 
0210112007 Hearing result for Arraignment held on 02/01/2007 02:00 PM: Arraignment 
/ First Appearance 
02/01/2007 Appear & Plead Not Guilty- NG (118-4001-1 Murder I) 
0210112007 Minute Entry Hearing type: Arraignment Hearing date: 2/1/2007 lime: 
2:14 pm Court reporter: Nanc}! Towler Audio tape number: DC# 3834 
02/01/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 06/18/2007 09:00 AM) 
02/01/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Final Pretrial 06/04/200710:00 AM) 
02/01/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Motions 05/11/2007 09:00 AM) 
02/02/2007 Order Setting Jury Trial & Scheduling Procedings 
0210212007 Motion for Preparation of Grand Jury Transcript and Disclosure of Vote-
def 
02/02/2007 Order Granting Motion 
02/06/2007 Notice of Intent not to Seek the Death Penalty--state 
02/06/2007 Response To Request For Discovery-plaintiff 
02/08/2007 Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 50000.00) 
02/08/2007 Bond Posted - Surety (Amount 50000.00) 
02/13/2007 1st Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery--state 
02/15/2007 Transcript Filed---Grand Jury Proceedings January 22, 23, 25 & 26, 2007 
03/07/2007 2nd Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery--state 
03/21/2007 Request For Discovery-plaintiff 
04/12/2007 3rd Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery--state 
04/16/2007 Order Setting Jury Trial and Scheduling Proceedings 
04/17/2007 Continued (Jury Trial 12/03/2007 09:00 AM) 
04/17/2007 Continued (Final Pretrial 11/16/2007 09:00 AM) 
04/17/2007 Continued (Pretrial Motions 06/18/2007 09:00 AM) 
04/17/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 07/13/2007 09:00 AM) 
04/17/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 10/26/2007 09:00 AM) 
05/11/2007 Stipulation to Continue Briefing Schedules 
05/14/2007 Waiver Of Speedy Trial 
05/15/2007 Order ContinuinA BriefinA Schedules 
:tps://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.dc?roaDetail=yes&schema=NEZ_PERCE&county=Ne ... 
-- ------ - ---- ------ - - i 
8/24 
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05/18/2007 Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Polygraph Results-state 
0511812007 M?tion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Lisa Nash's Character and/or 
pnor acts--state 
0511812007 Moti~n to Allow Witnesses to Review the Transcript of Their Grand Jury 
Testimony--state . 
05/18/2007 Pretrial Motions--def 
05/25/2007 Motion for Continuance of Pretrial Motion Hearing--state 
05/25/2007 Order for Continuance of Pretrial Motion Hearing 
0512512007 Ord~r Allowing Witnesses to Review the Transcript of Their Grand Jury 
Testimony -- · --
05/25/2007 Continued (Pretrial Motions 07/23/2007 09:00 AM) 
06/27/2007 4th Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery--state 
06/27/2007 Supplemental Request for Discovery--state 
0711312007 Hea~ng result for Status Conference held on 07/13/2007 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Held 
07/13/2007 Continued (Pretrial Motions 09/07/2007 09:00 AM) 
07/13/2007 Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Motion Hearing 
08/14/2007 Motion to Extend Briefing Schedule and Reset Pretrial Hearing-def 
08/14/2007 Affidavit of Scott Chapman--clef 
08/15/2007 Amended Order Setting Briefing Schedule and Motion Hearing 
08/15/2007 Continued (Pretrial Motions 10/09/2007 11 :00 AM) 
09/24/2007 Response To Request For Discovery-defendant 
09/24/2007 Brief Support Defendanfs Pretrial Motions--def 
10/02/2007 Supulatlon and Mofionfor Continuance of Fina1 Pretrial0onfe1e11ce 
10/03/2007 Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Pretrial Motions 
10/09/2007 Continued (Pretrial Motions 10/12/2007 02:00 PM) 
10/09/2007 Order for Continuance of Final Pretrial Conference 
1010912007 Minute Entry Hearing type: Pretrial Motions Hearing date: 10/9/2007 Time: 
11 :20 am Court reporter: Towler Audio tape number: 3948 
10/09/2007 Continued (Final Pretrial 11/20/2007 11 :00 AM) 
1011212007 Minute Entry Hearing type: Pretrial Motions Hearing date: 10/12/2007 
Time: 2:00 pm Court reporter: Towler Audio tape number: 3953 
1011212007 Hearing resultfor Pretrial Motions held on 10/12/2007 02:00 PM: Hearing 
Held 
10/25/2007 Continued (Status Conference 11/02/2007 10:30 AM) 
10/25/2007 Notice Of Hearing 
10/25/2007 Opinion & Order on Pretrial Motions 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The 
10/30/2007 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: LAND ECK WESTBERG JUDGE & GRAHAM 
Receipt number: 0304771 Dated: 10/30/2007 Amount: $19.00 (Check) 
11/01/2007 Motion to Vacate--clef 
11/01/2007 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Vacate-def 
11/01/2007 Motion to Reconsider--def 
11/01/2007 Motion to Compel---def 
11/01/2007 Motion to Allow for Juror Questionnaire-def 
11/02/2007 Notice of Hearing--def 
1110212007 Hearing result for Status Conference held on 11/02/2007 10:30 AM: 
Hearing Held IN CHAMBERS 
1110212007 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing on Motions 11/07/2007 04:00 PM) 
Defendant's Motion to Vacate Trial Setting 
tps://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.do?roaDetail=yes&schema= NEZ_PERCE&county= Ne ... 9/24 
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1110712007 Hearing result for Hea, ... l::J on Motions held on 11/07/2007 04:00 PM: 
Motion Granted Defendant's Motion to Vacate Trial Setting 
Minute Entry Hearing type: Defendant's Motion to Continue Trial Hearing 
11/07/2007 date: 11/7/2007 Time: 4:01 pm Court reporter: Nancy Towler Audio tape 
number: DC# 3938 
11/15/2007 Affidavit Of Service--UNSERVED Dr .. Noelle Westrum 
11/15/2007 Affidavit Of Service--SERVED Valley Medical Center, Carmen Stolte PA 
11/15/2007 Affidavit Of Service--SERVED Valley Medical Center, Dr. Gregory Schultz 
1111512007 Affidavit Of Service--SERVED Valley Medical Center, keeper of the 
records Donna Ernsdorff 
1111512007 AffidavitOfService--SERVED StJoseph Medical Center, Sabrina Tschirgi 
records keeper 
1111512007 Affidavit Of Service---SERVED Idaho Dept of Health & Welfare, Gaylene 
Strandbakke records keeper . 
1111612007 Hearing ScheduJed (Hearing ~n Motions 12/10/2007 09:00 AM) 
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider 
11/16/2007 Motion to Quash Subpoena 
1112012007 Hearing result for Final Pretrial held on 11/20/2007 11 :00 AM: Hearing 
H~ . 
1112012007 Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 12/03/2007 09:00 AM: Hearing 
Vacated · 
11/20/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/21/2008 09:00 AM} 
11/20/2007 Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 03/21/2008 09:00 AM) 
1112012007 ~earing S~edu~ed (Hearing 02/15/2008 09:00 AM} conference to finalize 
Juror questionnaire 
1112012007 1 leari~g Se~edul~d (Hearii,g 94197/2008 09;00 AM) eempletion ofjmor 
quest1onna1re by Jury panel 
1112012007 Hearing ~?hedule? (~earing 04/09/2008 09:00 AM) Vair dire in open 
court/ind1v1dual vo1r dire 
· 1112012007 H_earing Sche~uled (Hearing 04/10/2008 09:00 AM) individual voir 
d1re~ury selection . 
11/20/2007 Order Setting Jury Trial & Scheduling Proceedings 
11/26/2007 Affidavit Of Service 
11/26/2007 Affidavit Of Service 
11/26/2007 Affidavit Of Service 
11/26/2007 Affidavit of Service 
11/26/2007 Affidavit Of Service 
1211012007 Hearing result for Hearing on Motions held on 12/10/2007 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Held Defendant's Motion to Reconsider 
Opinion & Order on Defendant's Pretrial Motion for Discovery of 
Documents--ldaho Dep Health and Welfare, Family and Children's 
01/04/2008 Services' Motion to Quash Subpoean--DENIED. Motion to Review 
Records-GRANTED, all records shall remain under seal and not be 
disseminated to the public consistent with the foregoing opinion 
0211512008 Hearing result for ~ea.ring held o~ 02/~5/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Held 
conference to finalize Juror questionnaire . 
02/15/2008 Hearing Scheduled {Hearing 03/07/2008 09:00 AM) motion to reconsider 
0310712008 He~ring resultfo~ Hearing held on 03/07/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Held 
motion to reconsider 
0310712008 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Nancy Towler Number of 
Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pgs 
03/14/2008 Continued {Pretrial Conference 03/27/2008 09:00 AM} 
03/14/2008 Notice Of Hearing 
03/21/2008 Opinion & Order on Defs Motion for Reconsideration 
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03/26/2008 2nd Supp Response To Request For Discovery-defendant 
03/27/2008 Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of an Alternate Perpetrator---state 
0312712008 Heari~g result for Final Pretrial held on_ 03/27/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing 
Held (m Chambers) · · · 
0312712008 Conti~ued ~Heari~g 04/16/2008 09:00 AM) completion of juror 
quest1onna1re by Jury panel 
0410212008 Conti~ued (Hearing 04/17/2008 09:00 AM) individual voirdire~ury 
selection 
0410212008 Continu~d. (Heari~g ~4/18/2008 09:00 AM) Voir dire in open 
court/indlVldual voir dire 
0410312008 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 04/08/2008 11 :OO AM) Mtn to Quash 
Subpoena Dr. Schultz 
04/03/2008 Motion for Order to Shorten Time for Hearing 
04/03/2008 Notice of Hearing re: Motion for Order to Shorten Time for Hearing 
04/03/2008 Motion to Quash Subpoena 
04/03/2008 Affidavit of Gregory P. Schultz in Support Motion to Quash Subpoena 
04/03/2008 Notice of Hearing re: Motion to Quash Subpoena 
04/04/2008 Acceptance of Service--Bryan Cridlebaugh 
04/04/2008 Acceptance of Service--Donnie Stamper 
04/07/2008 Order Shortening Time for Hearing 
0410812008 Hearing result for Hearing held on 04/08/2008 11 :00 AM: Case Taken 
Under Advisement Mtn to Quash Subpoena Dr. Schultz 
0410812008 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter: Number of Transcript Pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pgs 
04 '08'200S Minute Entry Hearing typ~: Hearing on Motions Hearing date: 4/8/2008 
1 ' Time: 11 :11 am Court reporter: Towler Audio ta.pa number: 4047 · 
04/08/2008 3rd Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery--def 
04/10/2008 Amended Order setting jury trial and scheduling 
0411012008 Conti~ued ~Heari~g 07/16/2008 09:00 A~) _completion of juror 
questionnaire by Jury panel · 
0411012008 Conti~ued (Hearing 07/17/2008 09:00 AM) individual voir dire~ury 
selection 
0411012008 Continu~d. (Hearin_g ~7/18/2008 09:00 AM) Voirdire in open 
court/individual vo1r dire 
04/10/2008 Continued (Jury Trial 07/21/2008 09:00 AM) 
04/10/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Final Pretrial 06/27/2008 10:00 AM) 
04/10/2008 Affidavit Of Service---Andrea Williams 4-4-08 
04/16/2008 Affidavit Of Service Andrea Williams 4-11 ~oa 
04/18/2008 5th Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery--state 
04/18/2008 Motion for Release of Evidence-state 
04/21/2008 Order for Release of Evidence 
04/22/2008 Acceptance of Service Julie Grove 
04/22/2008 Acceptance of Service Brandon Krueger 
04/23/2008 Acceptance of Service DONNIE STAMPER 
04/23/2008 Acceptance of Service BRYAN CRIDLEBAUGH 
04/23/2008 Acceptance of Service RONNIE STAMPER 
04/23/2008 Acceptance of Service LORI STAMPER 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service- CRYSTAL HANSON 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service~-JOSEPHINE LIGHT 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--JON PETRIE 
tps-j/www.idcourts.us/reposit.ory/caseHistory.do?roaDetail=yes&schema=NEZ_PERCE&county=Ne ... 
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04r~o/2008 Affidavit Of Service-G, )ORY SCHUL lZ MD 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--R. TODD PARKEY MD 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service-CRAIG N. AMBROSEN MD 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--CRAIG BURNS 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service-DAVID CHENAULT 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--MIKE SCHMIDT 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service-STEVE STOCKING 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--TODD MARTIN 
04/25/2008 AffidavitOf Service--JESSE JACOBS -
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--COURTNEY JACOBS 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--JONI DRAKE 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--JONI DRAKE 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--JESSE JACOBS 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--COURTNEY JACOBS 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--TODD MARTIN 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service-CRAIG BURNS 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--BRIAN FREI RN 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--DONALD CHIN MD 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--LISA BOMLEY 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--CRYSTAL HANSON 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--JON PETRIE 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--BRIAN BIRDSELL 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--JOSEPHINE LIGHT 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--DAVID CHENAULT 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--MIKE SCHMIDT 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--STEVE STOCKING 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--GREGORY SCHU.L lZ MD 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--R TODD AMBROSEN MD 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--SHARI SUMMERS RN 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--CORY BLAIR 
04/25/2008 Affidavit Of Service--LISA BOMLEY 
06/26/2008 6th Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery--state 
0612712008 Hearing result for Final Pretrial held on 06/27/200810:00 AM: Hearing 
Held (in Chambers) 
0612712008 He~ri~g Scheduled (Hearing 07/08/2008 01:30 PM) pick names go over 
exh1b1ts · 
06/30/2008 Rule 16(c) Supplemental Response~ Request for Discovery--Defendant 
07/07/2008 4th Supp Response To Request For Discovery-defendant 
0710812008 H.earing result for Heari~g. he!d on 07/08/2008 01 :30 PM: Hearing Held 
pick names go over exh1b1ts (m Chambers) 
07/10/2008 State's Requested Instructions 
07/10/2008 Affidavit Of Service Jonathan Ockwell 
07/14/2008 Supp Motion in Limine 
0711612008 Hearing_ resul~ for Hearin~ hel~ on 0~ /16/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Held 
completion of Juror questionnaire by Jury panel 
07/16/2008 Stipulation for Authentication of Evidence at Trial 
. 0771612008 Minute EntryHearing type: Jury Trial Hearing date:. 7/1E>/2PQ8. Tirne: 9:00 
am Court reporter: Nancy Towler Audio tape number: 4096-4114 
n~ /-to /rtnn.o 
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u '' 1 °,~uuo individual voir dire~Ul"}- -,ection 
I - ~ .. -- --.- .. - - _, ·.: .. - · __ · - . ··. -· .· 
0711812008 He.ari~g ~esultfor Hearing. h_eld on ~7/1.8/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Held 
Vair dire m open court/ind1v1dual vo1r dire 
07/18/2008 Order for Ahthentication of Evidence atTrial 
07/18/2008 Request to Obtain Approval to Broadcast Photograph (KLEW) 
07/21/2008 Continued (Jury Trial 07/22/2008 09:00 AM) 
07/21/2008 Request to Obtain Approval to Broadcast Photograph (Tribune) 
07/22/2008 Continued (Jury Trial 07/23/2008 09:00 AM) 
07/22/2008 Affidavit Of Service Marsha Bums 
07/22/2008 Affidavit-Of Service Lisa Nash -· - .' -, ·· ·- . -- - -
07/23/2008 Continued (Jury Trial 07/24/2008 09:00 AM) 
07/24/2008 Continued (Jury Trial 07/25/2008 09:·oo AM) 
07/25/2008 Continued (Jury Trial 07/28/2008 09:00 AM) 
07/25/2008 Motion to exclude testimony of Jason Eldred and Becy Overall 
0712512008 Response to Motion to exclude testimony of Jason Eldred and Rebecca 
Overall 
07/25/2008 Defs Proposed Jury Instructions 
07/28/2008 Continued (Jury Trial 07/29/2008 09:00 AM) 
07/29/2008 Continued (Jury Trial 07/30/2008 09:00 AM) 
0713012008 District Court Hearing Held Court Reporter:Nancy Towler Number of 
Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: trial 1275 
07/30/2008 Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 07/30/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing Held 
07/30/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 07/31/200811 :00 AM) 
OZL30L20D8 , lmy Verdict 
07/30/2008 Found Guilty After Trial 
07/30/2008 Instructions Submitted to the Jury 
07/30/2008 Estimated Reporter's Transcript Costs 
0713112008 Hear!ng result for Status Conference held on 07/31/2008 11 :00 AM: 
Hearing Vacated 
08/06/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 10/22/2008 09:00 AM) 
08/06/2008 Presentence Investigation Ordered DUE 10-1-08 
08/06/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 08/21/2008 11 :00 AM) re: PSI 
08/07/2008 PSI Order 
08/12/2008 Motion for Acquital or, in the Alternative, a New Trial--def 
Hearing result for Hearing held on 08/21/2008 11 :00 AM: District Court 
08/21/2008 Hearing Held Court Reporter: Nancy Towler Number of Transcript Pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages 
0812112008 Minute Entry Hearing type: PSI Hearing date: 8/21/2008 lime: 11 :OO am 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler Audio tape number: DC#4123 
0812712008 Miscellaneous Payment: Miscellaneous Fees Paid by: Justine Foster 
Receipt number: 0320188 Dated: 8/27/2008 Amount $2.00 (Cash) 
09/23/2008 Order for Telephonic Status Conference 
Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Conference 09/29/2008 10:30 
09/23/2008 AM) . : · · 
0912912008 Hearing result f~r Teleph~nic Status Conference held on 09/29/2008 
10:30 AM: Heanng Held (m Chambers) 
09/29/2008 Continued (Sentencing 11/24/2008 09:00 AM) 
09/29/2008 Notice Of Hearing 
10/29/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Hearing on Motions 11/10/2008 11 :00 AM) 
1012sJ2ooa Notice bf Hearing 
PSI received-copies delivered by messenger to prosecutor and Scott 





. j ,· - ------------------ - -- :·.:1 
• ...,,\J'...,,_...,. __ vnapman 
1110512008 Hearing result for Sentencing held on J.1 /24/2008 09:00 AM: Hearing 
Vacated ;.•- ,;;, ;_:.:. 
11/05/2008 Continued (Hearing on Motions 11/24/~008 09:00 AM) 
11/06/2008 Hearing Order ,-:.: · · 
11/21/2008 Brief in Support of Defendant's Pretrial Motions 
Minute Entry Hearing type: Defs Motion for Aquittal or New Trial Hearing 
11/24/2008 date: 11/24/2008 Time: 8:58 am Court reporter: Nancy Towler Audio tape 
number: CRTRM 1 
1112412008 Hearing result for Heari~g on Motions held on 11/24/2008 09:00 AM: 
_ Case Taken Under Advisement . __ -,,-." __ _ ___ __ 
1211612008 Opinion & Order ON Defendant's Mo.tion for. Acquittal or, in the 
Alternativea New Trial--DENIED 
12/29/2008 Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 01/28/2009 09:00 AM) 
12/29/2008 Notice Of Hearing 
01/26/2009 Sentencing Exhibits--def 
01/27/2009 Request to Broadcast--Lewiston Mo-ming Tribune 
01/27/2009 Request to Broadcast---APPROVED Lewiston Morning Tribune 
01/28/2009 Request and Order to Broadcast--APPRClYED-KLEW 
0112812009 Minute Entry Hearing type: SentencingHearing date: 1/28/2009 Time: 
9:03 am Court reporter: Nancy Towler Audio tape number: CRTRM 1 
01/28/2009 Commitment 
01/28/2009 Motion to Withdraw and Appoint Public Defender 
01/28/2009 Affidavit of Scott Chapman 
Hearing result for Sentencing held on 01/28/2009 09:00 AM: District Court 
----~0~172=81=2=0=09~·Rearing Held Court Reporter: Nancy I owler Number of I ranscnpt Pages 
for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages 
01/28/2009 Case Status Changed: closed pending clerk action 
0112812009 Sentenced To Incarceration (118-4001-1 Murder I) Confinement terms: 
Penitentiary determinate: 22 years to lire 
01/28/2009 Surety Bond Converted/ Exonerated (Amount 50,000.00} 
01/28/2009 Surety Bond Converted/ Exonerated (Amount 50,000.00} 
01/28/2009 Commitment 
01/28/2009 Motion to Withdraw and Appoint Public Defender 
01/28/2009 Affidavit of Scott Chapman 
01/28/2009 Order for Bond Release 
01/28/2009 Confidential Order 
01/28/2009 Judgment of Conviction 
01/28/2009 Presentence Investigation Sealed In File 
01/28/2009 Order for Withdrawal 
01/29/2009 Order Appointing Public Defender 
01/30/2009 Notice of Conviction 
Order For Restitution And Judgment STATE OF IDAHO MEDICAID 
02/04/2009 $17,730.34 INST #766812 . 
02/04/2009 Order For Restitution And JudgmenfCRIME VICTIMS FUND $622.89 
INST-#766813 
0210412009 Order for Fine Pursuant to § 19-5307 LISA M. NASH $2,500.00 INST 
#766811 · 
0210412009 Order for Fine Pursuant to § 19-5307 TODD D. MARTIN $2,500.00 INST 
#766810 
- 02/13/2009 Appealed To The Supreme Court- --
02/13/2009 Notice Of Appeal 
tps://www.idcourts.us/repository/caseHistory.do?roaDetail=yes&schema= NEZ_PERCE&cou nfy=Ne •.. 14/24 
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02/24/2009 Motion to Appoint SAF..., and Affidavit of Counsel 
02/26/2009 Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender 
I - '--
. 02/26/2009 Defendant: Grove, Stacey Lewis Attorney Retained Molly J. Huskey 
03/09/2009 Supreme Court Receipt - Clerk's Certificate filed at the SC 
0310912009 Supreme Court Receipt - Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript due at 
SC by June 12, 2009 
03/31/2009 Amended Notice of Appeal 
04/13/2009 Supreme Court Receipt - Amended _t'.J(?tice pf Appeal filed at the SC 
04/30/2009 Order Granting Court Reporter's Motion for Extension of Time 
05/28/2009 Motion for Release Pending Appeal~ef --
05/29/2009 Order 
07/20/2009 Supreme Court Receipt - Court Reporter's Motion for Extension of Time 
Supreme Court Receipt - Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcripbt - The 
07/24/2009 Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transript must be filed at the SC by October 
2,2009 
0712412009 Supreme ?ourt Receipt- Order Granting q~urt Reporter's Second Motion 
for Extension of Time .: :· '_ 
07/24/2009 Affidavit of Janet Kough 
07/27/2009 Order Rescinding Instrument Number 771384 INST #771860 
08/19/2009 Notice Of Service of Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript 
09/28/2009 Supreme Court Receipt - Appeal Record filed at the SC 
11/02/2009 Supreme Court Reeipt - Motion to Augment - Due Dates Suspended 
11/04/2009 Supreme Court Receipt - Briefing Due Dates Suspended 
11/04/2009 Order Granting Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule 
11/05/2009 Supreme Court Receipt- Document filed a.t'the SC 
11/23/2009 Supreme Court Receipt - Briefing Resumed 
1112312009 Supreme Court Receipt - Order to Withdraw Order to Augment Record 
with Requested Transcripts and Reset Briefing Schedule 
01/26/2010 Supreme Court Receipt- Due Dates Suspended 
0210212010 S~preme Court Receipt - Order to Augment the Record and Reset the 
Briefing Schedule 
02/02/2010 Supreme Court Receipt - Briefing due dates are Suspended 
02/09/201 O Affidavit of DeAnna P. Grimm 
03/22/201 O Order re: Appellanfs Brief 
03/26/201 O Order re: Appellant's Brief 
Supreme Court Receipt - Order re: Appellanfs Brief, due on or before 
05/20/2010 June 11, 201 O - no furrther extensions of time to file appellanfs brief shall 
be granted 
10/06/2010 Supreme Court Receipt - Motion to Suspend - All Due Dates Suspended 
10/07/2010 Supreme Court Receipt- Objection to Motion to Suspend filed 
11/19/2010 Supreme Court Receipt-Appellant Reply Brief filed at the SC 
03/11/2011 Supreme Court Receipt - Additional Authorities filed at the SC 
03/28/2011 Supreme Court Receipt - Opinion - Grove's conviction of first degree 
felony murder, by aggravated battery of a child under twelve years old, is 
affirmed. 
0512612011 Supreme Court Receipt - Brief in Support of Petition for Review filed at the 
SC 
05/26/2011 Supreme Court Receipt- Document filed at the SC 
09/20/2011 Remittitur 
____ :_-J t. 
•••-• ·--••••••••-•• 'u0·-·-····• -- -•••••••••-
-• -Miscellaneoi.JsPaymentForMaki11g· Cop}rotAnYFile--OrRecora ByTller ----~ - -
10/06/2011 Clerk, Per Page Paid by: Danny Radakovich Receipt number: 0016855 




./~:~ i{f·.i.. ~ .,:. (:S~ 
Ui:ll~U; IU/0/LU I I /-\Ill\ ; ~.)0.UU ~._:;,ll~UKJ 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying ;The Same Additional Fee For 
10/07/2011 Certificate And Seal Paid by: Danny Radakovich Receipt number: 
0016866 Dated: 10(1/2011 Amount: $4.00 (Check) 
Perfection Tire of Lewiston LLC vs. Stacey Lewis Grove 
Magistrate Ried: 10/24/2002 i· Subtype: Small Claims Judge: Michael 
,:: . . · Griffin 
Defendants: Grove, Stacey Lewis :fl ·p · ,: · ·i · 
Pia in tiffs: Perfection Tire of Lewiston LLC· 
--·-- --·- -·· - ,r\:. ' 
'Disposition: Date ~~~~ment g:~osition ~~~~osition Partfes 




(Defendant), Perfection Tire Plaintjff 
.. of Lewiston LLC (Plaintiff) 
,,'Judgment amount: 289.42 
r· . . 
Comment: 
: Register of Date 
,actions: 
./ "f;··:· 
10/24/2002 New Case Filed 
1012412002 Filing: H • Small Cla s Paid by: Perfection Tire (plaintiff) Receipt 
number: 0215195 Da d: 10/24/2002 Amount $35.00 (Check) 
10/24/2002 Claim And Complaint 
10/24/2002 Summons Filed 
1211912002 Hearing r~sult for Hearing held on 12/1 
With Hearing . 
12/19/2002 Judgment-$289.42 Default 
12/19/2002 Case Status Changed: closed 
1212612002 Perfection Tire, Plaintiff vs Stace G 
Order Or Decree Entered 
0512112003 Miscellaneous Payment: Writs Ex~~~tibri Paid by. erfection Tire 
Receipt number: 0225035 D ed: 05/21/2003 Amoun $2.00 (Check) 
05/21/2003 Application For Continuou 
05/21/2003 Writ Issued 
08/14/2003 Satisfaction Of Judg ent 
08/14/2003 Writ Returned-Sa · fled 
it Bureau of Lewiston-C"rkston Inc vs. Stacey Lewis Gr e 
, Case:CV-2002-0002056 
. reg K. C d 
Subtype: Other Claims Judge: Status: lose 
Ka leisch 06/26/2003 
Defend ts:Grove, Stacey Lewis 
Pl ntiffs:.credit Bureau of Lewiston-Clarkston Inc 
Judgment Disposition Disposition Parties 
Type Date Type 




-·~ ..... ,_,. ___ ,,_-=_ __ --:06726/2-003 ~;~~::a1----------------;:_~fe8::0~c~~::u:~~u~:P-laintiff~------·-··---·--- -------: ·--
. . {Plaintiff) 
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
zm OCT 1 RM ID 13 
At~Ji]!_,g. w.~., ~ 
~~~GOw~T 
303 W. Bannock DEPUTY 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343~ 1000 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 







CASE NO. CV12-01798 
-----".--~-~~-~~------- -}------f':A:F1c1:'"i"FtlD1:;1,,t\:A.._e-¥l;lJ+T:f-'=OnFYKi""-·,',1.:1\R~tEo11,~~NHS~T1cil1""'..Mn. FPE.8tRA-----
) IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) PETITION FOR POST-
) CONVICTION RELIEF 
Respondent. ) ______________ ) 
Karen Stamper, being duly sworn and upon oath hereby says: 
1. That I was present during the testimony of state's witness Dr. Marco Ross in State v, 
Grove, No. CR-2007-0000768, held before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick in Lewiston, Idaho. 
2. That during the testimony, I observed jurors sleeping. 
3. That I observed the third juror in the back row sleeping. 
4. That I observed a juror in the .front row sleeping. 
1 - AFFIDAVIT OF KAREN STAMPER IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-
-CON\llCIIDN.RELIEF ····----·· --~- --... ·--- --------·--
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5. That I observed the prosecuting attorney showing photographs of the autopsy of 
 Martin on the overhead screen prior to the commencement of court. 
6. That while the prosecutor was showing the autopsy photographs, I observed Juror 
Number 4 talking with a bailiff within sight of the screen. 
7. That on July 29, 2008, during the lunch recess from the trial, I was at the Taco Time 
in Lewiston, Idaho, with three other people. 
8. That during that time, my companions and I were discussing the trial. 1 
9. That during the discussion, my son noticed a juror sitting directly behind us in a 
place where he could clearly hear our conversation. 
10. That we immediately stopped our conversation. 
11. That thejmm did nut infonn us oflris presence, leave our vidnity, nor speak: to ms~ 
This ends my affidavit. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO ,,,,,,,mm111111,l 
2 1 _ ~,-.. ~\NA HJ,. ,,..,.,; 
• 
before me this lP day of September, 2012 .. ~$:,; ~~ •••••••••• b~ 
~--~ 'S •• · ··.~~ ~ :::/·· T ··.~ y {\\0 ARJ,·-. i - . -:: : : a 
% \ *°UBL\Ci i f 
~ .n··. .• JI§ ~ V').• •• D Sf 
~ '1i,"········ .... ~, 
1q,1. l: OF \Qr~~ 
i11111,um1\\\\\1 -· _, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on September}i:, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the 




to: Daniel Spickler 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
3 - AFFIDAVIT OF KAREN STAMPER IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-







NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box2772 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 




Petitioner, CASE NO. CV12-0l 798 
vs. . ) 






AFl?UM .. VfT OF CRAIG STAMPER 




Craig Stamper, being duly sworn and upon oath hereby says: 
I. That I was present during the trial proceedings in State v. Grove, No. CR-2007-
0000768, held before the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick in Lewiston, Idaho. 
2. That during the testimony, I twice observed a juror in the back row sleeping. 
3. That this sleeping juror leaned back to rest his head on the wall as he slept. 
4. That I observed the prosecutor showing slides of the autopsy of  of Martin on 
the screen as the jurors were entering the courtroom prior to the official commencement of 
1 - AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG STAMPER IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-
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court. 
This ends my affidavit 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO 
-------c_c I 
--·~· - ----. -- - r "------
.. ,:q--. 
~\\\\\111111111,,,, ~,,~,<\NA HJ,. 11~ 
~~(b, ••••••••• ~~ 
~ ~ .. -· ···!'?s)~ 
before me this cll.t. day of September, 2012. ... .. TA .. ~ rs : .. \o Rr..·. ~ = .,, , .... - . . ... - . • = = : ' : = 
% \. PUBL\P I § ~. _.•;::: 
~ o1,:·.. - ····o ~ 
~ '~r.········ .... ~ ~ ~''" c OF \')r~~ 'l/1111111 mu\\\\~ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on September]:&, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the 




to: Daniel Spickler 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
3 - AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG STAMPER IN SUPPORT OF VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-
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Nez Perce County, Idaho 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 




~12 OCT S PJ111 2 58 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 








STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent, ) 
CASE NO. CV2012-0001798 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
AND DISMISSAL AND TO SET FOR 
HEARING 
COMES NOW, Respondent, State of Idaho, by and through its attorney of record, 
NANCE CECCARELLI, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Nez Perce County, Idaho, and moves 
this Court for Summary Disposition and Dismissal of Petitioner's Application for Post-
Conviction Relief as it presents no genuine issue of material fact, raises issues decided in other 
appeals, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and, the Respondent is entitled 
to judgment as a matter oflaw pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-4906(c). 
Further, that this matter be set for hearing at a time convenient for the Court. 
r_~l . 
DATED this I/) day of October, 20121 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
1-:,,.c;- "'.'."C. • .~-=--.-. -:-.- -
- ---------. 
--·· - -·· ·-·- -~•·-=-__ :.__ __ :=-=•::-M0Ti0N-F01FSBMMAR:-Y-f>fSPt'}S~i'I6N-----




--- : _·:·--:-:-:- __ --- J ------- ---- -
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND DISMISSAL AND TO SET FOR 
HEARING was 
(1) __ hand delivered, or _ 
(2) __ hand delivered via court basket, or 
(3) __ sent via facsimile, or 
( 4) ~' postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United 
States Mail. 
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
Dennis Benjamin 
Deborah Whipple 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Barlett LLP 
P .0. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
-~ 
DATED this 6 day of October, 2012. 
--- - ---- -~- -MOrf0N--FtHl~B'M:MAAY-fl1SP08TI-<:>N 
AND DISMISSAL AND TO SET FOR 
HEARING 2 
- . - ---·-- ···- - . -- -... ··-··- -- --·---- --
-- ---
___ I I 
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NEVIN. BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-_1000 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
D[PUTY 
IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 















CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
OBJECTION TO STATE'S MOTION 
FOifSUIVfMARY DISPOSITION AM) 
MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE 
STATEMENT 
(Oral Argument Requested) 
Petitioner, Stacey Grove, objects to the State's Motion fof Summary Disposition and 
Di~missal because it fails to adequately set forth the basis for the motion. Petitioner also moves, 
·pursuant to I.R.C.P. 12(e), for a more definite statement before he is required to interpose a 
. responsive pleading. 
Post-conviction relief proceedings are governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 813, 907 P.2d 783, 790 (1995), and Rule 7(b)(l) requires that 
"[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion which ... shall state with 
particularity the grounds therefor[.]" See Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319> 322,900 P.2d 
I • OBJECTION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND 
_MQ.TIONEORAMOREDERJNIIB -STATE:MENTL--·=· -~===...:....~------------------~ 
ORJGlf~AL 
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- .-;'J _ ,._. ·-·- ------ ----- C ___ :. _. :1 
)ct 10 ?012 3:15PM Nevin Benjamin,McKay&~I'.!ct 208 345 8274 page 3 ..,._..__ 
795, 798 (1995) (applying rule to post-conviction proceedings). The Comt of Appeals wrote in 
.A{artinezv. State, 126Idaho 813,818, 892P.2d488, 493 (Ct. App.1995): 
It is clear that in summary judgment proceedings the nonmovant is required to 
respond only to alleged grounds for smnmary judgment asserted by the moving· 
party. The nonmovant need not address any aspect of the nonmovant's case that 
has not been challenged by the opposing party, s motion .... In Mason [ v. Tucker 
and Associates, 125 Idaho 429,871 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1994)], we emphasized 
the necessity of notice of the grounds for a motion in order to afford the 
nonmovant an opportunity to address the issues raised and present evidence and 
legal argument· directed to those issues. 
See also, DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,601,200 P.3d 1148, 1150 (2009) (Rule 7(b)(!) 
requires grounds be stated with "reasonable particularity"), citing Patton v. Patton,. 88 Idaho 288, 
292,399 P.2d 262, 264-65 (1965). 
Rule 12( e) gives the Court authority to order a more definite st~tement in cases \vhere a 
pleading "is so vague and ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a 
responsive pleading[.]" 
Here, the state's motion consists of a single desultory paragraph consisting of nothing 
more than timeworn boilerplate allegations which are not linked to particular claims in the 
Petition and do not provide notice to the Court or Petitioner of an actual reason to grant the state 
relief. The motion fails to even mention any of the claims raised in the thirty~five page long 
Petition and it fails to address any of Petitioner's arguments made in support of those claims. 
See Verified Petition, p. 10-12 (argument regarding confrontation clause claim); p. 18~19 
(argument regarding prosecutorial misconduct claim); p. 20-21 (argument regarding juror 
misconduct claim); p. 20-23 (argument regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
claim); and p. 34-35 (argument regarding the~ineffective assistance of trial cou.nsefciaiirif It also 
2 • OBJECTION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND 
----~· MB'I'i0N-FeR~:_M6R.EbEFINriE~TA:TEMEN f .. -
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)ct 10 ?..012 3:15PM Nevin Benjamin,McKay~~rt 208 345 8274 
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page 4 
.-:":-"';' -', 
fails to mention any of the eight affidavits filed in support of the Petition. Mr. Grove is not ~tble 
to respond to the state's motion because there are no actual arguments advanced in support or its 
request. 
Therefore, the Court pursuant to I.C.R. 12(e) should order the state to file a motion 
compliant with Rule 7{b)(l) before Mr. Grove should be expected to respond. 
Oral argument is requested. 
Respectfully submitted this /0-('-,. day of October, 2012. 
Attorneys for Stacey Grove 
----·------------- ----~- . -··- -----·---··--·----------.... __________________ . --·-· -·----·-- .. ·---·-
···--- ---------··-
3 • OBJECTION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND 
MOTION FOR A MORE DEFINITE STATEMENTXL-__:.::_···----------------
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on October I~ 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
docwnent to be: 
Kmailed 
hand de]ivered 
)( faxed to (208) 799-3080 
~ emailed to nancececcarelli@co.nezperce.id.us 
to: Nance Ceccarelli 
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
D jlAA~~ ~.. , ~--
Dennis Benjamin ~ 
OBJECTION TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND 
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CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
ORDER GRANTING REQUEST 
FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
THE COURT, having considered Petitioner's Motion, pursuant to I.R.E. 20l(d), to take 
judicial notice of the transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged documents, exhibits and record in the 
case of State v. Stacey Grove, Nez Perce County Case No. CR-2007-0000768, including the 
·documents listed in the Register of Actions attached as Exhibit A to this Order, and the State 
stipulating to the granting thereof, HEREBY TAKES JUDICIAL NOTICE OF THE ABOVE 
MENTIONED MATERIALS. 
Dated this /S't7-day of October, 2012. 
Carl B. Kerrick 
District Judge 
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CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
TO DECLARE PETITIONER A 
NEEDY PERSON 
THE COURT, lut:ving considered Petitioner's Motion, pursuant to IC §§ l 9-851 (c) and 
19-852, to declare that he is a "needy person" for purposes of obtaining necessary services and 
facilities of representation in this case, finds he is a needy person and eligible for such services at 
county expense. Counsel for Petitioner shall direct any specific requests for services to this 
Court for prior approval. Any specific request may be made on an ex parte basis with the 
moving papers and orders to be sealed. 
Dated this JS ")t.day of October, 2012. (1 
~--JJ~tJ...J.!::.L=========::--0 
Carl B. Kerrick 
District Judge 
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P.O. Box 2772 
303 W_ Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
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CASE NO. CV-12-01798 






PETIT101\'ER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Petitioner, Stacey Grove, asks the Court to grant summary disposition in his favor and 
grant the relief requested in his Petition. There is good cause to grant the motion because the 
Respondent has not answered the Petition and the allegations therein, even construed most 
favorably to the state, establish that the Petitioner is entitled to relief as a matter of law. 
This Motion is made pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c). It is supported by the affidavits 
already filed herein as well as the allegations and arguments made in the Petition. See Verified 
Petition, p. 1 O~ 12 (argument regarding confrontation clause claim); p. 18-19 (argument regarding 
prosecutorial misconduct claim); p. 20-21 (argument regardingjurOT misconduct claim); p. 20-23 
1 • PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY D-1SJ~QSITION _______ ~--- ______ ··-·--·-----------------------~---
ORJGtNAL 
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(argument regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim); and p. 34-35 (argllmcnt 
regarding the i:ueffective assistance of trial counsel claim). 
~ 
. Respectfully submitted this t5'"' day of October, 2012. 




Attorneys for Stacey Grove 
-,] -
I I 
_________ 2 • PETITTO~~S MOJJOREORBI.IMMARYDISP_osmoN ________ .. ____________ ~---------·--
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on October ~ 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be: 
xmailed 
hand delivered 
\<: emailed to nancececcarelli@co.nezperce.id.us 
to: Nance Ceccarelli 
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
________ 3_ • PETITIONER:S_MOIIQN_F_O_R__SJJMMARY_J)JSPOSITION 
- ------------- :,I 
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Dennis Benjamin, ISB #4199 
Deborah Whipple, ISB #4355 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P .0. Box 2772 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
page 2 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE.DISTRICT COURT FOR TIIE SECOND mDICIAL DISTRICT OF 






) CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
) 
} AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC 




Eric Fredericksen, being duly sworn and upon oa~ hereby says: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho. 
2. That I represented the Petitioner herein, Stacey Grove, during the appeal in Slate v. 
Stacey Grove, Supreme Court Docket No. 36211 (Nez Perce County District Court Number CR-
2007-768). 
3. Attorney Diane Walker was my co-counsel in the appeal. 
4. That I have read the post-conviction petitio.Q. filed in this case. 
5. That I did not raise the prosecutorial misconduct issue raised in the Second Cause of 
Action on direct appeal because trial counsel did not ·object to the alleged instances of 
l - AFFIDAVIT OE.ERIC FREDRRTCK.,:,S.c...EN~-------------~~------
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misconduct and thus did not preserve the issue for appeal or the record was not sufficient to raise 
the issue on appeal. 
6~ Fmther~ the issue could not have been raised under the fundamental en-or doctrine 
under State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P .3d 414 (2009) and State v.- Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
245 P.3d 961 (2010). 
7 .. The juror misconduct issue raised in the Third Cause of Actio11 could not have been 
raised on ditect appeal because trial counsel did not draw the misconduct to the Court's attention 
or ask the Court to take any action about it, and there was no definitive evidence in the record 
. thatjuxors had been sleeping during trial testimony. 
8. Further, the issue could not have been raised under the fundamental ·e1ror doctrine 
under State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P .3d 414 (2009) &nd State v. Perry, 150 Idaho, 209, 
245 P.3d 961 (2010). 
9. That attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of an emaiLex.change 
between me and trial counsel. 
This ends my affidavit. 
Eric Frederickse7' 
No Public for the State r Idaho 
Residing at: ~ba_,~-+\'D)=-----.-----,--
My commission expires: ctfz"Z../'20\1 
98
lov 28 2012 2:34PM Nevin Benjamin,McKay~~-art 208 345 8274 page ~--"~-
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that onNovembeJ-1-: 2012, I caused a true arid correct copy of the 






Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
3 - AFElDAVITOE..ERI-C.rnDE--&IGK---SEl'-J-J ---------------------
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Eric Fredericksen 






Scott Chapman [Scott@rbcox:.com} 
Tuesday, April 06, 2010 9:37 AM 
Eric Fredericksen 
Diane Walker 
RE: State v. Grove 
As best as I can recall it was not discussed. Please do not hesitate to contact me regarding any questions you mlg!it 
have and good luck. 
___ .........,,....,..._,_~-~ . . . ' . -=-- -------.~---.-------
From: Eric ·Fredericksen [maUto:efrederlcksen@sagd.st.ate.jd .us] 
Sent: Tuesday, Aprll 06, 2010 8:26 AM 
To: Scott Olapman · 
Cc: DTane Walker 
Subject: State V. Grove 
Scotti 
I am working on Stacey's direct appeal 1md have a quick question for you. One of the issues I will be raising is whether 
the district court committed fundamental error by allowing Dr. Ross to testify as to the Dr. Reichard' s report based vpon 
his autopsy of the brain (Confrontation clause violation- Melendez-Diaz v. Mass, 129 S.Ct. 2527). Based upon your 
cro5s-examinatlon of Dr. Ross, It appears as though the Issue was likely addressed at some point in the case, but I can't 
find- anything "In the pretrialrulings~ -t know there-was---a-bunch·of·in-chamben.-discussions thatwenrnot·recorded, cari·- --- - -------- --
you tell me if Dr. Reichard's report was adclressed in any of those unrecorded hearings. 
Diane Walker is co-counsel on appeal, so I cc'ed her to this e-mail. 
Thanks, feel free to reply to this e-mail or call Diane or me at your convenience!: 
Eric D. Frederlckeen 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
36.47 Lake Harbor·Lane 
Boise, ID B3703 
(208) 334-2712 
Fax: 334-2985 
DO NOT read, copy or disseminate thls communication unless you are the intended addressee. This e-mail 
communication contains confidential and/or privileged information intended only for the addressee. Unless 
otherwise Indicated, the information contained in this email message is information protected by the atlomey~client 
and/or attorney work product p~iveleges. If you have received this communication in error, please call us 
immediately at (208) 334-2712 and ask to speak to the sender of the communici;ition. Also, please e-mail the 
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Dennis Benjamin., ISB #4199 
Deborah Whipple, ISB #4355 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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. ~DEPUTY . · 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STACEY GROVE, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
) 
vs. ) AFFIDAVIT OF DIANE WALKER 
) -···-··- ·- --· "- ----· -------··-·· ------- ... -------------------~·-- .... ---------- --------- .. -----·-----------.. ----·------- -- --- ----· --------------
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
Diane Walker, being duly sworn and upon oath, hereby says: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho. 
2. That I represented the Petitioner herein, Stacey Grove, during the appeal in State v. 
Stacey Grove, Supreme Court Docket No. 36211 (Nez Perce County District Court Number CR-
2007-768). 
3. Attorney Eric Fredericksen was my co-counsel in the appeal. 
4. That I have read the post-conviction petition filed in tins case. 
5. That I did not raise the prosecutorial misconduct issue raised in the Second Cause of 
Action on direct appeal because trial counsel did not object to the alleged instances of 
1 - AFFIDAVI1 OF DIANE WALKER 
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misconduct and thus did not preserve the issue for appeal or the record was not sufficient to raise 
the issue on appeal. 
6. Further, the issue could not have been raised under the :fundamental error doctrine 
under State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P .3d 414 (2009) and State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
245 P.3d 961 (2010). 
7. The juror misconduct issue raised m. the Third Cause of Action could not ha-ve been 
raised on direct appeal because trial counsel did not draw the misconduct to the Court's r.ttention 
or ask the Co'urt to take any action about it, and there was no definitive evidence in the record 
that jurors had been sleeping during trial testimony. 
8. Further, the issue could not have been raised under the furi,damental error doctrine 
-- __ "_! 
- -- -- ------ - -- - -- -- ---- -- - - - -- --- . -------·---------- -· --·----· -·---··~·-· ---· .. ~ .··-.-.. - --- ----- --- - --~ --------
under State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P .3d 414 (2009) and State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
245 P .3ci 961 (2010). 
1bis ends my affidavit. 
{J:-.,WJL. 
DianeW alker 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO 
this 'Z~day 
Notary blic for the State ofldaho 
Residing at: B,o,~ ,'I.~ 
My commission expire~: 9 h'7.I \7 ~, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVlCE 
I CERTIFY that on November,.2-°+; 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the 




to: Nance Ceccarelli 
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
-------~----·" -,-. ,- -----~--- --- -- -- ---····------·-· .. -.. - ---- -------- - .. ·. -
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Dennis Benjamin, ISB #4199 
Deborah Whipple, ISB #4355 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Ff LED 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
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Dennis Benjamin, being duly sworn and upon oath, hereby says: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho. 
2. That I, along with co-counsel Deborah Whipple, represent the Petitioner herein. 
3. That the petition alleges at Paragraph 77 that defense counsel's performance was 
deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Hunter's testimony that a short fall "is rarely, rarely 
likely to produce any kind of significant head injury or bleeding" and then failed to impeach that 
testimony. 
3 .1. That attached hereto as Exhibit A is a medical j oumal article wherein the 
author, John Plunkett, M.D., a forensic pathologist, documented 18 cases of fatal 
1 - AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS BENJAMIN 
104
head injuries where an infant had fallen 3 meters or less. "The author concludes 
that an infant or child may suffer a fatal head injury from a fall of less than three 
meters (10 feet). The injury may be associated with a lucid interval and bilateral 
retinal hemorrhages." ExhibitA, pg. I. 
3 .2. In this case, there was testimony that  had both bilateral retinal hemorrhages 
and a possible lucid interval. 
3 .3. This study was readily available to defense counsel at the time of the trial. 
4. That the petition alleges at Paragraph 89 that it was deficient performance for defense 
counsel to fail to introduce photographs of  taken at St. Joseph's Hospital soon after he 
arrived in an ambulance. 
4.1. True ana correct copies of ffiose pfi.otograpfis are attach.ea hereto as Exli:i.6it 
B-1 to B-6, filed under seal. 
4.2. The absence of serious bruising in the photographs rebuts the state's theory 
that Mr. Grove beat  causing massive internal injuries just prior to  s 
admission to St. Joseph's. 
This ends my affidavit. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on December[)__, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the 




to: Nance Ceccarelli 
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
~~ 
DennisBeajamin 
3 - AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS BENJAMIN 
~ . -J ! . 
106
Fatal Pediatric Head Injuries Caused by Short-Distance Falls 
John Plunkett, M.D. 
Pbysici!ll'ls cw.agree oc se~l issue:i n:gwdms bead in- Many physiciWlS believe that a simple fall can-
jury i.n i.1::a!ants 8.Dd c:bildren, including I.he potct1tial not cause serious injury or death (1-9). th& a 
lethality of a $hor:l-dut11nce fall, fl \ueid interYsi.l in an ul- lucid interval does not exist i.n an ultimately faw 
timawy fataf head i.njwy, :and me s:pec:ificiry of reriDal 
bc:morrli.agc for infilctcd 1:rfWma. There is scant objective pedi!l.tric: head injury (7-13) •. and that. retinal hem-
evidence to resolve mac quesLiollS, and more intbrma- orrhage is highly suggestive if not diagnostic: for 
tion u Deeded. n&e objecrive of this study was to deter- inflicted trauma CT,12.14-2.l). HoweveT. several 
mine ~he:ther then: llffl witne~sed or inves\ig::!ted f-4w have qw:.<;tionc:d these condus.ioru; or meed c:au-
sbon-<iisaancc r.ans chat were concluded to be accidental. tion when interpreting head i.njury in a child -
The 11uch01" rcv;ewed me January 1, 1988 dmnlgh June . . 
30. 1999 Ul'lired States Conmmer Product Safety Com· ~15.22-:2~) .. Tb.is con~versy eX\StS because mo~t 
· - --~-mission ciambasc-fm·b.cad mjwy :1ssoc:i:ut:d.with-ihe-use---1nfmt~anJU!")e~-.occur-1t1 the home--(29..30),-and-if ______ ---··--
of playground cquiprne11t. The auchor obtained and re-- there is history of a fall, it i~ u.~u.ally not wia,esscd 
v~ed the P?~ SOUtCC data (hospital and c:magc.ucy or is seen only by tile caretaker. Objective data ue 
m..-dic::1 servi~ record:. lew e:..l'\force,_menr. repo,u; and needed to resolve chis dispute. It would be helpful 
coroner or a,edica.1 exB.llllN:r records) tor all btalities in· . 
volving II r.n. · if the~ were a database of (al.al falls mac were 
The re:-ul~ revealed 18 fall-re~ head injuey fatzili· witnessed or wbe.rcin medical and law enforce· 
ties in the da~b:lsc:. The youngest c:bild wt1.11 12 monthS mept invc:stig&tion unequivocally coo.eluded that 
old.. \he oldest 1 3 years. The falli. were from 0.6 to 3 me.- the death wa.s a.n accident. ., 
ten (2-10 feet). A~ witDC5Scd 12 of lbc 18. y1... U · ed Co n.-..1 Safe 
md 12 Nt.d a 1ye;,;1 intet'Val. FoUY" of the dx -:hlld.rel1 i.n ~e rut States n.sumer .inuuuct ty 
whom fundllSCOlric e,:amiu:stion was doc:umcnccd in I.be Commission (CPSC) National lnjury Tnfonnaticm 
medical rccmd bad bila\C!'81 retinal bcmor:ma~. The :iu- Clearinghouse uses four computerized data sources 
thor concludes mat an ,nfant or child may s.uffer a fatal (31). The National Electronic Tnjmy Sur,eillance 
he~ injury from a fall of less than 3 meters (10 feet). System (NEISS) file collects c:unent injury dara as-
The injury m:iy be associated with ll ]lla.d interval af\d sociated with 15,000 categories of consumer prod-
bilateral rctioal bemotrl\9te. 
KeyWords:Ou,dabuse :fie.\dinjury--4..ucidin~l- w:t.s from 101 U.S. h.ospital ~ .dcpaa-. · 
Retinal tiemnnttage-Subduml hem.tstomA. met1t.", including 9 pediatric hospiws. 'Jae file is a. · 
probability sample and is used w estimalc the num-
ber and types of consumer prodw:t-n:\ated injuries 
each year (32). Th£ Death Cati6catc (DC)· file i~ a 
demographic summary created by infonnation pro-
vided to the CPSC by selected U.S. State Health 
Dq)a:nments. The Injury/Pocential Injury Incident 
(IR) file contains summaries, indcJted by consumer 
product, of reports {O the CPSC m>m consumers. 
medical examiners and coroners (Medical Exam-
iner and Corot1er Alen Project (ME.CAP]). and 
newspaper ::w::counts of product-relawi incidents 
discovered by Joe.al or n:gional CPSC !iUff 03). 
The In-Depth Invei,tigations (Al) file contains sum-
-----MaauscripU"ecei:ved April 10 2000: revised s~ u, 
2000: ~ S=ptember 24. 2000, 
f'rvm 1.1K ~ of h!.bOlogy 1111d Medi~ fduia11lin1, 
llcsin.111. ~ O:sw:r. I J7S !'l"1t1iA2er RNd. Haslia;s MN 
55033. U.S.A.; E.mai.l! ~a.keujli're&in.:unwie11l.1:t1"'· 
maries of investigations perfonned by CPSC ,;i.aff 
based oc reportS received frum ll1t NE!SS. DC, 9c 
IR files (34). The Al file..,; provide details abou[ 
the focident from victim and witness intcrViews, 
accident rcconstru~cion. and review of la-.i~. . . L .. .... ,,. n-p-lT 
J \,- • L"\ ' ·,.J 1;.../\n1w 
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ment. b.ealtb care facility, and coroner or. medical 
ex;miner records (if a death occwred). 
METHODS 
l reviewed the CPSC. OC. ~ and Al files for s.11 
head and neck injllries involving playground cq~p-
lUCM recorded by the CPSC from January 1. 1988 
through Jone 30. 1999. There are 323 cnrrics iA !he 
playground equipment Ill file.. 262 ia the Al file, 47 
in d:ac DC file. and mote than 75,000 in the NEISS 
lile. All deaths in the NEISS file geneuced an IR or 
Al file. lf Che file indicated dm a dUih had oc-
cured from a fall. I obtained and reviewed each 
original source rcccnd from law enforcement, hos-
piws, emergency medical services (EMS), aad 
caroaer or medical examiocr offices except for one 
autopsy report. However. I discussed the autopi:y 
fiodlngs with the pathologist in this case. 
-· . 
be the highest point of rhe arc. Twc~ve of the 18 
falls were witnes~ by a no~ or were 
videotaped: 12 of the children bad a lucid in,crval 
(5 minuteS-48 hours): and 4 of tbc 6 in whom fun-
duscopic cx.aro.ination was pcri'ormed. had bilateral 
retinal hemorrhage (Table 1). -- -· .. --. -· ·· . 
Casel 
This 12-month-old was seated on. a porch swing 
between her mother and ~ when the chain on 
her mother's side broke and all three fell sideways 
and backwvds 1.5 to 1.8 meters (5-6 fed) onto 
dccoristivc: nxks in' from o( die porch. The mother 
fdl first. then the child. 1ben ·her father. It is n.0t: 
known if her father bnded on top of her or if she 
suuck only the ground. She was unconscious im-
mediately. EMS wu called; sbc ~as ween to a 
local hospiul: and W&S ictal and bad ~
RESULTS posturing in [he emergency raom. She was intu-
__ . -·'-·. _ ... _.. ---'llierc-m:~11.-4 -dcaths~ilrlhe" etcafifiglJoU$e data- ___ M._~ypg:,.:e.Qma&e~and ~-~~~tb 1J'1!DDi10l, ~-c---~---,--·-
basc., 18 of wl)ich were due lO head injuty from a A computed tomography (CT) sc:an indicated a 
fall. The following deaths were excluded from this subgal~ helmtoma at lb~ vcr\CX of the .skull. a 
. . con:muaut.cd fracmre of the vault, parafakmc s\lb-
study: those that 11Nolved equipment mat broke or d 1 hcmorrh d . 11 ·ew buacbno"d 
collapsed, striking a person on lhe head or nee\t ura. age, an · ng: t pan su 1 
(41); those in which a person became enwigled in b~morrhagc. There wss _also acute cerebral edema 
the equipment and suffocafed or was Slr&D8led (4S). MUI ~ffacc:ment of the_ nght frontal ham and. com-
those that involved equipmellt or incidents other press1on of me b~al cisterns. She bad a ~opul-
tban playgrowid (6 (includin.l a 13.,_meter fail monaey arrest wbilc ~ CT scan wu being done 
from a homemade Fems wheel ·and a 3-merc:r fall and could not be resusc,tat.ed. 
ftom a cyclone fence .dj-=ent to a playground)); . 
and faJlll in. which the death was ca-used exclusively 
by nec\t (carotid vessel. ahway. or cervical spinal 
conl) injury ( 4). . 
The rans were from horizontal ladders (4), 
swinls (7), stationary platfomu (3), a ladder at-
tacbed t0 a slide. a .. see-saw", a slide, and a retain-
inc walL 'ThirtecD occurred ~ a school. or public 
playground. and ftve occurred. a.t borne. The dala-
bu: is ®' limited \0 infants :md children, but a 
13-ycar-old wu the oldest fatality (range, 12 
moatbs-13 years; mean. 5.2 years; meclian. 4.S 
yiws). Tbe distance of me fall defined as lbe c:lis-
UIDC:e of rbe closes, body part Crom- the ground Al 
lhe ·begin11ing of the fall, could be determined from 
CPSC c,r law enforcement reconsa-w:ticm and acNal 
mca.,;11remem: \ft 10 cases and wu 0.6 tO 3.0 me~ 
(mean. 1.3 = 0.77; median. 0.9). Tbc disUtnCC 
could llOI be accurately decerminc:cl in lhc seven fa-
tallcies involving SWU\QS and one of the falls fron, a. 
honzoiliil liddei. aad may have been ft0tt1 as little 
as 0.6 meters to as much as 2.4 meters. The maxi-
mvm beigbc for a fall from a swing was assumed ta 
Casel 
A l 4"mouth.-old was oa a backyard ""sec-saw" 
and was being held in place by bis gnmdmotllca'. 
The gtUdmodler said that she was diso:x:t.ed for a 
moment and he fell backward, Striking me grass-
covered ground 0.6 meters (22.S inches) below the 
plastic seat. He was conscious but crying, a.ad she 
clllrled him into the house. Within 10 to 15 minuies 
he became lethargic and limp, vomited, and was 
taken to the local hos'piw by 'EMS pasonai:L He 
was unco&lSCious but purposefully moving all ex-
tremilics when evaloaicd, and results of madus-
copic examination were nomaal. A er scan indi· 
. cated an occi.p&tal subpleaJ hemacoma.. leh-J1ided 
cerebral edeJna wirb compl&ee obliteration of the 
left ln,ntal hom, and small p11ncwe hemorrhages 
in ll\e left frol,Ul.1 lobe. Then: wu no fracture or 
subdural 'hematom:a. He war. trca1c:cl wilh mUAnilul: 
his level of consciO\Uncss rapidly improved; and he 
was exNbated. However. approxima1ely 7 boun 
after admiuion he began to have difficulty breath-
ing, bor.b pupils suddenly dil.dted, and ,So~=tirrin· 
108
· 1 
TABLE 1, S11mm11ry al.,.~,. 
f' lucid !A1llnal Subdu111I 
N CPSCHo. Age ... Falllrom· DlllancaM/F Wlln•n•d lnleMI hemorlfllge h1montiage Aulclpsy CIUH df cfHlh FP 
DC.110801~ 12 nfal F Swing 1.s-1.11&.o-e.o No No NIR YG9 +IHF No Complex Cllulrlal lraclure No 
I \Vlth edema·and 
i oon1u1lans 
Al 11110208H8C3081 ... fflO$ M S81•U\V ~.612.0 No 10-15 Nd' No No Malignant cerebral edema No 
minutes I ,vllh harnlallon 
IR Fl103111A 17111C1S F Swlog U-1.8/$,H.O No No. H/A Yes +l~F VN Acute 1vbdunil hem11lama Yes 
I wllh ncondary cer1bral 
i edema ' . 
Al 1121001HCC2283 20mOI , Platform 1.113.5 No $-10 Bllaltrll Y11 +IHF Limned · Ooclpllal lracfure wllh Yea ~ minutes hlulllayered 1ubdural/1uti.mchnold 
I hemorrtlage. pro11resarng ~ I >, ! to cerebral edema and ::) 
' hemlaUOn ; • DC 1312080161 23 fflOI f Plelform 0.70/2.3 Vu 10m1nvtes aal.1111111, NOS Ye1 Yea Acule 1ubdura1 h11matom11 Yea 
DC 845101&513 28mo1 M Swing 0.1-1.113.o-e.o Ves No Bi1lat1r1I Yet f.lHF v .. Subdural heniatoma wllh Yes ti 
ru•111av1rid HICICl&led CUlbl"II 
~ edema • Al lt1215HclC10!M :lyra M Platform D.9/3.0 Yat 10mlnuln NtR Yet No Ac:ule c1rebral edema with 
~ hernlallOn No ~ Al 91D515HCC218Z 3y .. F laddar 0.6/2.0 YH 16mlnutea Y111 Yea Complex c1lwilal fracture, Yas a (aulopay only) contu1lon1, .cerebral 
J edema with• herniation ~ DC 9253024S77 4y11 M Sllde z.,n.o v .. .1 llours No Vea Eptduf91 hematoma Vea Al 920710HWE4014 s, .. M Harlzantal Z. 1(7.0 No No NIF,I V.1 No Acute ,ubdum her111foma Vas :z: 
tadcfer ! with acute cerebral !i: edema i 
Al 9I0517HCC&l75 Byrs ,.. SYAnv 0.11-2.412.0-8.0 No IOmlnutu Nol Vea +IHF No Acure 1ubdural hemaloma Ve1 ~ ' 
N/' Malignant earibral edema 
t .. ·_ 
Al9703Z~HCC3040 ey,, M Horizontal 3.0/10.D Vea 45mlnutu Na No YN 'ii ladder wllh harnlaUjm t, 
t Al 881229HC~3070 
., .. F HorlJonlal 0.9/3.0 Yea 1-t hOUI NIB Yes +IHF "9s Subd,urel and iuberachnold v.s 
~ ladder ' hemorrhage, cerebral I... I lnlarcl, and edema ~ 1· Al930930HWE5025 71'* M Horizontal 1.2-2.414.0-8.0 Yea 48 h0ur1 NI' No Yes Cerebral lr\fln.t iecond.11)1 Vu ladder i lo carolfd/wmebnil artery tll:j lhrornboals -~ 
~ 
,:,. 
l 1 Al97040&HCC1091 . .,,. , R11talnmg 0.913.0 Vaa 12* houra Ni'f Yu VIII Acilla 1ubdurll hemaloma Yes •' wall (eutopsy only) 
I 1 Al 890821HCC818S 10y,a M Swing O.I-U,/3.o-6.0 Yu 10mlnulaa Blac.1111 'VIII Yea Acul• 1ubdural hemafoma ND ~u11naver1d contiguous vihh 1n AV le-:.,' 
~ 
i malfarmaUcn 
1 Al 928'21HCC1871 12, .. f Swing 0.1-1.B/3.o-e.o Yea No N,, No VIII Ooclpilll tracl"r• wllh VII 
~ I Htenalva C1ont1a,ooup I aonblslons i 
J 1 Ai 8910tlHCC1511 13\lfl F Swing 0.8-1.~.~-0 v.. No N/R Vea +IHF V.1 Oaclpll1I traclu,te, 1ubdural Ya 
:- hemormage, oer•bral 
I 
idem. 
• odgln1I CT ,can laf can •1 amt 11111ah IIMUII ct wln4owa for cue IJ could nol be localed andiwt1re u111v1llabl1 lor review. . i 
I 
PSC Cona11mer PRIChlcll Safely Co«nllllulon; Al. accident lnYtatlgallan;tR, lnold•nl teplirl; DC, d••ltlic:arUllcale; M, mate: F, female; Olalalloa, lhe dlltanca ol ttla dolast body par1 
f, Ille 'around al the tlarl af Che fall (1H lul); MIF, mettralleel; Wlln111aed, w1tr,e1Nd by I nonctrelak•f or vkleota11ed: NIA, nol r1cord1d; IHF, Including ln1e1hln,lapherlc or labl; FP, I.A, 




-- -- ·-·--:. --. -- ---
: I I .:. '] 
4 I. PWNKEIT 
tubatcd. A second CT scan demon.-.trated props-
sion of tbe left hemispheric edema despite medical 
management, and he was re.moved from life sup-
port 22 hour$ after admission. · 
Cases 
A 23-monrh-old was playing on a plascic gym set 
in the garage .at her .home with her older brother. 
She had climbed the atlached ladder to the top rail 
. __ ____ _ aJ:)_Q!'C_tl!e.plalfom1 and was svaddling·tbe raH. w,th 
Case 3 be:r feel 0. 70 ·mcCCtS (28 ·- inches) ~- the floor. 
'This 17-month-old bad been placed in 8,. baby She lost her balance and fell bcadfim onto a 1-c:m 
c:an:ier-type swing auacbed to an overhead a:ee C'"-iuch) thick _piece of plush caq,el .rc.mnanl cover-
limb al a daycare provider's home. A restrahwlg ing the coocretc ftocr. · S~ muc~ the carpel JirsL 
bar held i.n pl.ace by a snap w.u across her waisL with her out:sttetched hands, then with the righc 
She was being pushed by the daycare provider to front side of bet forehead. followed by her ri:ht 
an estima.ted height of 1.S to 1.8 meum (S-6 feet) shoulder. Her grandmother bad been watching the 
when the snap came loose. The child fell from the children play and videoiaped the fall She cried 
swing on its downstrcke, striking her back and after the faJI but was alert and talldng. Her grand-
he.ad on the gta$Sy surface. She was immediately mothe1' wal'kcd/ca.rried her tntO the kitchen, where 
unconscious and apneic but fhcn start~ 10 breathe her modlc:r gave bee a baby analecsic wilb some 
spontaneously. EMS look hr:r to • pcdi.aic hospi- water, which she dra4k. However. approximately S 
w. A er scan indicared a luge left-sided sub- minutes lalCT she vomited and became sniporous. 
dural hematoma. wiui extension to the inu:.rhemi- EMS personnel airlifted her ro a tcniary-carc uni-
9pberic fissure anteriorly and throughout tbe lel\gtb v~nit:y hospit:sl. A CT fcan i~all:d II large tight-
of the fa..lx. The hfflU&loma ...,,$ surgically cvacu- s!ded subdural b~maroma ~~th e~t 0£ ~ 
--- ,----··atea;out-mc·~oped-a:Wign&m~CCfet,tal-edcm;a-c~_n_gbJJ~~ycnUlClc and ffl"l\i;nal SU~~ benu··-·· _ ····-~·--·· 
and died the following day A postmonem exam,. atlon.. (The soft tissue windows for the scan co.:>\d 
narion indicated symmcui~al contusions on the nol be located and. were ~vailablc for review.) 
buttock and m.idline posteriot thorax. consisrenc Th: bcmatom.a was unmedia~ly evacua1.ed. She tc-
wilh impact against a Jiat sw:face; & small. residual maincd c:oma~se ~to~bvely._ develOFd ce,-e.. 
\eft-,i.ded subduTal tlemat.oma.; cerebnl edem:i. ~ edema wadi hcrrunuoa., and was ~oved f~m 
with anoxic encephalopathy~ and unc:al and cere- lm support 36 hours after the fal~. Bala.tend rcllnlll 
be1lar tonsillar herniation. There were no cortical hcm.om:age. not ~ ~~ was docu-
conmsions. merited 1n a fundU5Col,ac CJCaminaUOD pcd'ormed 24 
hours after admission. A postmonem ex.aminatioo 
·-Cue4 
A 2Q-m.onth-old was with other family members 
for a reunion at a public park. She was on me plat-
form ponion of a jungle aym when she fell from 
the side and stIUc:k her heed. oa one or the support 
posts. The pllltfonn W8$ 1.7 meters (67 jneb=) 
above me ground and 1.1 meters (42 inches) above 
the top of the support pom thal. iche itruck.. Only her 
falher saw d1e ac;tOal fall. alrhough there wue a 
number of othCT' people in the immedia~ area. She 
was initially conscious and talking. but wil:bin 5 to 
JO minutes becMne comatose. She was taken to a 
nearby hos~ilal. men transferred u, a tertiary-can: 
facility. A CT scan indicared a tight occipital s,\cun 
fractan: with approximately .4-mm. of gcpression. 
and subuachnoid and subdural hcmoabagc along 
the tentorium and posterior falx. 'Funduscopic e:il-
amiftation indicated extemive bilateral retinal and 
prerednal hemormage. She died 2 days later be-
cause of uncona-ollable increased inuac:ranial pTe5• 
sure. A limited posononem e~amination indic~ted 
1111 iffll)BCt ~iabplcal hcmaloma uvCT"lying the fr;ac-
mrc in the mid occiput. 
. 
,A,. J ~..- NH l'Ddtol.. \111. 2Z, No. I, Mo,ell ZOOI 
confirmed the right frontal scalp impact injury. 
There was a $mall residual right &11bdunl hema-
lOma. :a. right parietal Jobe contusion (secondary to 
die surgi~ inf.B.l'Ventiun). 1$· ccrcbral edema with 
cerebellar tonsillar hemiaoo11. 
Ca.tt 6 
A 26-month-old was .on a playground swing 
being pushed by a 13.ycar-old cousin when b.e fell 
backward 0.9 w 1.8 meti:rs (3-6 feet), stxilwig bis 
head on hard-packed soil. Tbc 13-ye.ar-old •nd sev-
mu odler children saw lhc ran. We was immedi-
ately unconscious and was tabn a, a Jocal cmcr-
gcacy room, then 1raoderred 10 a pediatric hospital. 
A CT~ indicated acute ceiebr.lJ edema and a 
small ~~ut:ll bemamma adjacent 10 the antcnQr 
· inwhemifpb.eric f:ilx~ A !uac.tuscopic examination. 
petfonned 4 hours after admission indicated enen- ·· 
sive bilalcral retinal bcmonilace. vitreau.11 hemor-
rhage: in lhc lefl 1:yc:. ud papWedemL He bad a 
lillbsequent cardiupu\mOl'lary arrest and could not 
be resuscitated. A po.,;tmonetn cx.armnaoon c:c,n-
nnncd the retinal hcmon:ha:e and 1ndicatcd a 'ripl 
parietal scalp impact i.njury bul no c~~rrac-
110
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FATA.L HEAD INJURIES wrrH SHORT-DISTANCE FALLS 
wre. a .. film'' of bilateral iubdural bcmorrb.a.ge, 
~bral edema widl herniation. and focal hemor-
rhage in the right posr.erior midbrain a.nd pons::· .. 
Case7 
This 3-year-old with a hist.QI)' of TAR (thron:i.bo-
cytopenia-absew:it radius) syndTomc was playing 
with otb::r children on playground equipment at his 
school when be stepped through an opening in a 
pbufo.rm. He fell 0.9 meb9'S (3 fecr) ·,o the hard-
packed ground. striking his face. A teacher wi(-
ncssed rbe incident. He was initial}y conM:jous and 
- able co walk. However, approximately 10 minutes 
later be had projectile vomiting and became co-
matose, was taken to a local hospitlll, .. nd ~ub~-
que:nUy lra4Sferrcd co a pediatric hospital. A CT 
scan indicated & smaU subdaral bcmatoma and dif-
~ cercbnl edema with uncal-bemiation, isccord-
ing to the admission history and physical cxamina-
. tion. (The original CT report and semi could not be 
located and were unavailable for Rvicw.) ffis 
platelet count was 24,000/mm', and he was treated 
ease, 
A 4-yaar-old fell appro,dmatcly 2.1 me1CtS (1 
feet) fcom a·playground slide at a state part. land-
ing 01'I the din ground on his bunock., rhen falling to 
his left side, saiking bis bead. TheR was no loss of 
conscioust1C$ll, but hjs family rook_ him. tQ ;,,J«;al 
emergency facility, where an cvaluati.oa was nor-
nual.. However, he began vomitin& and complained 
of left neck and head pain approximately 3 hours 
later. He was taken to a second hospital. where a 
CT scan indicated a large left parietal epida.&Jal 
hemaLOma with a midline shift. He was D"SUI.Sferred 
to a pediatric hospital and the hemfl[()ma was evac-
uated. but he developed malignant cerebral edema 
with righl occipital ud left parietal infatcT.$ and 
was removed ti-om the rcspira.lor 10 days later. A 
posuuonem· uamin:stian indicated a small residual 
epidur:il bcmacoma. mv\ced cerebral edema. bilat· 
en.l cerebellar tonsillM and unca1 'herniation, and 
hypoxic ence.ph:a.lopr&thy. There ~as no identifiable 
skull fracture. 
--~--- _ empirical].Yc-with~~let u.msiusions. althuugll _ he __ Case_ 10 . . . _ _ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ . __ _ _ 
bad no evidence for an expanding extra-axial mass. A 5-ycw:-uld :W-.aS appate.ndy walldng ~ the · 
Resuscitation was di$COntinucd in the ccncrgcncy horizontal ladder of a "monlccy bar," put of an in-
room. tcrconnccnnt system of homemade pl&.yground 
Case 8 
This 3-year-old was at a city park wilh an adult 
neighbor and four other cbildrcll. ag5 6 to 10. She 
wu sranding on me lhird step of a slide \adder 0.6 
mcn:rs (22 iaebes) 11bove the pound when she fell 
forward onto compact din, striking her head. The 
other children but not the ad'i:.ah saw lhc ran. She 
wu crying but did not appear co be seriou,ly io• 
jured. &lld. die neighbor piek£d her up and brought 
her to her parents' home. Approxima.c.ely 15 min-
utes later she began to vomil, ud her mother called 
EMS. She was taken tO a local emergency room, 
rbeA lnnSfcaed to a pediatric hospiial. She waas ini• 
tially lethargic but respoadec1 to byperventilation 
and fflU\nilol; she began lo open her eyes with 
sdmuladon _and co $pontaneouly move all ucicmi-
dcs and was CXNbated. However, sbc c:lcvclopccl 
malipanl cerebral edema on the 5eeond hospital 
day and was rciruub&lCd and hyperventilated but 
died Ebe following day, A postmortem =llfflin.lion 
indicated 3. subpleal bema1oma at rbe vertex of the 
slcuJJ IWIOCialcd with a complex fracture involving 
the left frontal bone and bilateral remporal bona. 
1bae were small epidural and subdur&l hemacomas 
{not idendfiablc on the CT~sc:an). bil:aLcral .. cont.ra-
coup.. COIUU$iom: of tbe Inferior: '"ri'a.ccs of lhc: 
tionlal aad temporal-lobes. and ma.rbd c:erebml 
edema with uncal herniation. 
equipment in his Croat y3rd. when his mother 
looked out one of the windows and saw bim laying 
face down on rhe gt'O'md and not moving. The bor~ 
izonr.al ladder was l.1 metefS (7 feet) above com-
pacted dirt. £MS were called. be wa:s ween to a 
local hospir.al. amd then ttansfened to a pediauic: 
hu$piw, A CT scan indicated a right posterior reni-
pocal line~ fractun: with a small underlying 
epidural hematorDA, a. 5-mm thiclc acute su~ 
hematom:s 1t1ong lbe right temporal U1d parietal 
lobes, and marked rich1-..qded edema with a 10-mni 
midline shifL He was hypervenulated and trcalCd 
widl mannirol. but lhe hematoma continued lO en-
large and -was S1J11ically evacuated. However. be 
dc:velupcd unconlrOUable ~bn1. edema 1111d was 
removed from life support 10 days after du: raan. 
Cascll 
A 6-yeu-ald was on a playground swlng al a pri• 
vate lodge wKh his 14-year-ald sister. His- sillter 
beud a "thump," wncd around, and saw bim on 
the grass-covered packed eann l:leneath the swing. 
-The· act\Jal fall was not witnessed. The seat of -lbc: 
swing was 0.6 mecers (l feet) above du: lfOU"d. 
and the fall db,umc:c could have been nam as high 
as 2.4 meters (8 feet). He was im,ti.ally conscious 
cd ta1kiftc but widun 10 minuLeS became co-
m;nase :md was taken to a lgcsl cmergenc;y room. 
lbcn transferred to_ a tertiary-care hospital. A' CT 
111
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sc:ui indicated a large left frontopilrietal ,ubdurw 
hema[Om11 with cxtensioa into !he anterioT inter• 
hemi~heric fissure :.nd a signific:mt midline shift 
with obliteration of the left lar.er:il venuiclc:. Then: 
------~ no retinal hemorrhag~. He was tratcd :ig-
gressivcfy -Wlth dcxamcthasone aria" bypervenora- -
tion. but there was no surgical interYention. He died 
the following day. 
Case 12 
This 6-yetir•old was at school nnd was sitting on 
the top eT"OKSbar of a .. monkey bm-" a:pl)tOxim.ctcly 3 
meW"S (10 feet) above compacted clay soil when an 
unreJa(C(f noncan:takcr adult saw hun fall from dlc 
crossbar to the gmund. Re ·,anded ftat on his back 
and initially appeared to have the wind knocked nut 
tute, subdund and subaracbnoid hcmorrhaa:e. and a. 
rigbl ccrebraJ hemisphere i.afan..'1.. The infarct in-
cluded the posterior ccn:bral u:rritocy and was 
thought most consi~lCJ'lt with thrombosu or dissec-
tion of <Ii righ1 carond artery chat had a persistent 
fctaf'ongin 01 ilie pos1irfoi cerebral artay. She 
Temained comatose and was zcmovcd from the 
respirator 6 clays after admission. A postmortem 
examination indicated superficial abrasions and 
contusions over lbe scal)ula. a prominent ri~l pari-
etotcmporal iubgaleal hcmalama, and a rigbt pari-
etal sl-ull fractuTe. She had a SO-ml subdunl 
hcmatotmt and cerebral edema wilh global hypoxic 
or isc:he.mic injury ("'respir.tor brain'"). but 1he 
carotid vessels were nom,al. 
of him but wu conscious and alert. He W11S taken to Case 14 
r.bc $chool DW1ic who applied an ice pack: to a con- A 7-year-old was on the playground during 
msioa on the bade of his head. He rested for ap- school hours playing on the horizontal ladder of a 
prcx.im:ately 30 minuces in the nwsc's office and "'monkey bar" when he slipped and fdl 1.2 to 2..4 
wu \,ejn; e$CC>ned back to cws when he suddenly meu:rs (4-8 feet). According to one wimcss, he 
colblpsed. EMS was called. and he was b'an$ported smJclc his forehead on the ban: of the vertical lad· 
__ .·. ·_. - . --- ... -----' 
-'----~,o-a-ped;acncilospitat He-was-comuo~~on-admis"- -- -der;~cc:cmling--to-anodlcz-eyewilness--he-slr\lck-t:bc~~-,-------, ~--_ --- -----
sion. tbc fundi cauld not be visualized, and a head rubber pad covering of tbe asphalt grou.ad.. Tilere 
CT $CaJl wu ina:rpreted as normal. However. a CT arc conflicting sior.ies as to whether be had an bu-
.scan pcrfDffl'led the following morning approx.i- tial Joss of consciomness. However, be walked 
ma1ely 20 hours after the fall indicated diffuse ccre- back to lhe school. and EMS was called because -Of 
bial edema with effacement of the basilar cistc:rns me lJistory of the fall lie was taken to a local hos-
and fourth ventricle. 1bcre was no idcutifiable sub- pita!, where evaluation indicated a Glasgow coma 
dun! hemorrhage or calvarial fnu:ture. He devel- score of IS and a normal er scan except for an OC• 
oped transtent.orial herniation and died 48 hours cipit:Jl S\lbgaleal bemamma. He was Jccpt ovem.\ght 
dt=- the fall. for observation because of tbe possible loss of con-
· Cuell 
l'bis 6-yea:r-old was pla)'in£ on a school play-
ground wida a Sib grade stUdcrn/frlend. She was 
band-cr.,er-baod traversing the awsbar of a "mon-
key bu'~ 2.4 meters (7 feet 10 inches) above the 
,round. with her feet approximately 1 meLer (40 
incbes) above the sunacc. She attempted u, slide 
dDWI\ the pole wben she reached the end of the 
c:rossbar but lost Im- grie and slid quickly to the 
ground. 5llikina 1be compaclcd dut first with hcT 
feet. tben her bunDc'k and 'back. md finally her 
bead. The friend infoi:med lbe scbool principal of 
me incident, but dle child seemed tine and cbere 
was no intcnre:J)tion. She \Vent to a telativc's home 
for after-111:hool ~ __ approximately 30 minutct 
after che fall. waccbed TV for a wiille~ cbcn com-
;plained of • headache and laid down for a nap. 
When het parents anived· at the home la1e:r lbat 
evemn1. 6 boun a!re:r. tbe incident. they discovered 
tbat she was mcohcrcn1 and .. droo!in,." .EMS tranS-
poried her t0 a reniary-care medlcil center. A CT 
scan indicated a right parieto-occipital skull frao. 
sciousness bot was released the following day. He 
was doing homework at. bomc 2 days after lhe: fall 
when bis l(Uldmotber noticed that be was sium-
blin& and had sl\UJ'Cd q,eecb. and she took him 
back to the hosphal. A second CT scan indicated a 
left carotid artery occlusion and \d.l tempoRl and 
parietal lobe infarcts. The. infarctS and subsequent 
edema pro~sscd: be had bramstan bemiadon; 
and be was JCmOYed from life support 3 days lacer 
(S days after the initial fall). A postmorrem. exam;. 
nation indicated iscbemic iAwcls of the left pari-
etal, tcmponl. and ocdpical lobes. acate ces"ebral 
edema widl herniation. and duombosis of lbe left 
-venebral anery. Occlusion of lhe carotid 111ay. 
suspected premortc:m. could not be confirmed. 
CuflS --
This S-ynT-o)d was at a public playground near 
her home with sevenal frieads ·her ap. She was 
h:lngin; by her bands from the .borizaatal laddff of 
a "'rnonlccy bar" with her feet approximately 1. I 
mcms (3.S feel) above dx pound when she at-
tempted a, swing &om !he bars to a nean,y 0.9-
000124 
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merer (34-inch) retaining wall. Sbe landed on the 
top of the wall but then lost her balance and tell to 
the grollnd., either to a hard-packed surface (one 
witness) or to a 5.1-ctn fl-inch) thielc: resilient rob-
ber mat_ (a. second wiU'leSS), striking her back and 
head. She initially cried and complained of a 
headache but continued playing, then later went 
horne. Her D10tbcr said tlm she seemed nonnal and 
went 10 bed at her usual lime. However, when her 
mOlhcr· aied to awaken her at approxi.m.ately 8:30 
die following morning (12 holll'S an=r the fall) she 
- . 
· lost her balance and fell 0.9 tol.8 meteis ~ feel) 
to the asphalt surface, sailing her posterior thoru 
and occipital scalp. She: was immediately uncon- · 
sciou.s and was taken to a tertiary-care hospital 
emergency room, where she was pronounced dead. 
A poi.tmonein·exa.auo.s.ti.0.11 indicated . an occipital 
impact injury usociated with an extensive com-
minuted occipital fr.taure ex.tcndinl inio both mid· 
·dlc cranial fossa and "contra-coup" conmsions of 
both inferior frontal and temporal lobes. 
complained of a headache and went back u, sleep. Case 18 
She awoke at 11 a.m. and complained of a severe This 13-year-old was at a public playground wilh 
beadacbe then became unresponsive and had a a friend. She was sianding on the seat of a swing 
scizuJ;C. EMS took bcr to a nearby hospital. but she with her friend £ealed between her le;s wben she 
died in the emergency room. A posun.onem cxami- 10.~t ber grip and fell badcwards 0.6 to 1.8 meters 
nation indicated a rigl\t temporoparietaJ subdural (2~ feet), sui'king either a concrete retaining wall 
hem.AtOma, extending to the base·of the brain in the adjacent to the playground or a resiliettt S.1-em (2 
mi4dle and pos.terior fossac. with flaucning of the inch) thick .-ubber mat covering the ground. She 
EYri ~ n:m-owt11g of the sulci. (The presence or was hnmediately unconscious and was given emer-
absence of herniation is not described in the au- geucy first aid by a. phy5ician who was oeai'by 
u,psy report.) Theic was no calvarial fracture, and when the fllll occWTed. She was taken lo • nearby 
·----- ----tbere-wu-no-·id.enu6.able ·mjury··in-the-"SuJp-e>t~-- ·11ospital-anct was-pu,posef-ully--.oYing=-all ~Rmi- ----- - -----·--
galca. ties and bad reactive pupils when initially evalu-
Casel6 
A 10-year-old was swinging on a swing at b,i.s 
scho~l'.s playground during recess when the seal de-
tached from the chain and he fell 0.9 to l.S meter. 
(3-5 f ect) to the asplua.lc sutface, striking tbe back of 
bis bud. The other SlUdenlS b11t not the three adult 
pl:ayground supcivisorS saw h.im fall. He remained 
conscious although groggy and w~ curled to the 
school nurse's office, '"'hen: an ice pack was placed 
oo an occipital contaaion. He suddenly lost con-
sciousness approximately JO minurcs luer. and 
EMS toOt bim lo a local ~- He had dtecr£· 
bra1c posturing when initially evaluated. Fundus-
copic e:uminauon indicated exte11sivc bilateral con-
ftueot. and Sldlat~, posterior a.nd peripheral 
prerctinaJ and iubhyaloid bcmorl'hage, A CT scan 
showed a larce acute rigbl ftontoparieta\ subdural 
bcmatoma with 1ranstcntorial bcmiauon. The 
bcmacoma was suq:ically removed, bllt be devel-
oped maligaanc cerebral edema and died IS days law. 
A -posanonem examination iDdicatcd a right paricial 
subaracbnoid AV malformati~ contlpous with a 
sm.D.U amount of n:ndm.1 subdural hemorrhage. _and --
c:;erebnll edema wilh moxie encephalopathy and bet'• 
niarlon. Tbcre w..s no calvarial fracture, 
Case 17 
A 12-ycar-old wu u, ll public plilyground with a 
£istcr and anodler friend and was standinc on the 
seat of a switlg wbca lhc swing began to twist. She 
ated. A CT scan indicued .iAtcrbcmispbaic su1,. 
d.ural tiemormace and ge11eralizcd cerebral edema. 
wbich ptOl:[CSSed rapidly to· brain deach. A post-
mortem examination indicalCCl a linear nonde-
prcssed midJinc occipital skull fracmrc.. subdunl 
hemoirhagc cncnding ta the occiput, contusion of 
the left cuebell:sc '1emispbere. bifroatal '"coacra-
coup"' eontUsions, aad ccn:bnl edema. 
D1SC1JSS10N 
General 
Tnvmatic .brain lJljury (T.81) is c:msed by atan:e 
resulting in either srnin (dcformuioa/unit length) 
or st:reM (force/original cross-sectional area) of the 
scalp. skull. and brain. (35-37). The acent of injwy 
depends not only on the level and duracian of fon:c 
but also on the specific mechanical and geomeaic 
propeme3 of d\e cranial system Llftder Joadi111 
(38-40). Ditferent parts of the slcull and brain~ 
disdact biophysical characteristics. and calaalalin& 
defonnarion and saeu is complu. However. an ap-
plied foice causes the skllll a.od brain to ~ and 
acceleration. the time n:qu.insd 10 rach . peat accel,-
enition. and lhc dWlllion of acceleration may be 
measured at specific locadons (36.41). i'bcsc Jr:ir,c. 
matic parameters do not caUM. the actual brain 
damage but ~ useful far analyzillg TBf because 
they iln: easy tu qusntify. Research m 1·a1 astq 
J1h)'$1cal niodels and animal expenments his ihowo 
that a force resulting in af\l'Ulm: acceteratiOD pro-
"• J Forrvic Med l'fldtot. 11tL Z2, No. I, ~QJ)tJ{, 
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ducts primarily diff°u$e brain damage. whcrcu a ing surface is usually less than S millisca>ods 
force causing exclusivd.y tranislational ~leratio11 (39.59-ol). Experimentally. impaa duration longer 
produce, only fcx:al baia dmn:1ge (36). A fall from than S milliseconds will not: cause a subdutal 
a eountertop or table is often considered to·bc ex- bematoma unless the level of angular acccleracion 
c:lusive.ly translational and therefore assumed inca- is above 1.75 x tOS rad/s1 {61).· A,body in motion 
pable of produ~ing serious injury (3. 7-9). However, wi£ti an angular ac::ccletation of 1.75 X lo' radls'-
sudden impact deceleratiott musr have an angular has a tangential acceleration of 17.500 m/s2 ll 0.1 
vector wJless the force is applied only lhrough the meters (the distance from the midneck. axis of rota-
center of mass (COM). and deformation of the tion to the midbrain COM in lhe Duhaime model). 
,s.kull during impact nuur be ac:companied by a vol- A buma.n cannoc produce this level of acceler.nion 
umc change (cavitation) in the subdunl "space.. by impulse rsh~ .. ) loading (62). 
taDgendal to the applied fon:e (41). 1ne ugula.r AA injury resulcitlg in a subdural hematoma in an 
and deformation factors produce 1CDailc sttains on infant may be causcd by an accidenml fall 
the surface veins and mechanical distonions a£ the (43,44,64). A recent report documented the findings 
brain during impact and may e-a.use a subdural in seven children seen iJI a pediaa-ic hospiw emer-
bematoma without deep white matter injury or even genc:y room after an accldeoral fall of 0.6. IO l .S 
unconsdousnes, (42-44). mclQ'S who bad subdural hcmoabage, no loss of 
Many authors State that a fall from less lhan 3 con.sciousness, &lid no symptoms (44). The cbarac-
meters (10 feet) is ntdy if ever fll.lal, espccil.lly if =isli.:s of the hemorrhage, especially extension 
the distanee is less than 1.5 meters (S feet) - imo the posterior i.ruethcmispberic fissure, have 
(l-6,8,9). The few studies concluding that a short- been U$cd to suggest if not connnn that the injury 
dis.~nce fall may be fatal (22-24.26,27) haw •n was nonaecidcntal (9.62.65-68), Tbc hemorrhage 
··· .·· ·· · - - cri.licl&d bediuse ftfcrall was not w1messed orwu - cxrcndcdlatothepo!teno:natirhemisphenc 6ssure · - -- -- -· 
Ren only by fhe caretaker. However. isolated re- in 5 of the 10 children in this S1Udy ('in whom i:hc 
pons of observed fatal falls and biomcclwucal blood was identifiable on CT or magnetic reso-
analysis using experimental animali,i,. adult human nance scans and tbe scans were available for re-
voluntec:rs. and models indicate the potential for sc- View) and along Ebe ·anlerior falx or anterior intec-
rious bead injury o,: death from u little as a 0.6- hetnispheric fissu1T in an additionw 2 of rhe 10. 
meter (2-COOL) Call (4&-S2). There an: limited 
c.x.perimentaJ studies on infan.ts (cadaver skull frac-
ture) (53,.54) a'I\Cl none on living subadult nonhu-
man primate$, bm the adult deta have been extrap-
olated to youngsters and u.se,d ta develop the 
Hybrid ll/ll1 and Child Restr.iint-Air B~ Interac-
lion CC'RA.B O models (SS) and to propose standard& 
for playground equlpmcnc (56,63). We ~mply do 
DOl blow eitbei k:incmadc: or nonkinemadc limits 
in the peditatric population (57.58). 
Eacb of die f:alls in mis srudy excccdcd cs,ab-
lishcd adu.lt kinematic thel:$1:ao\cb for traumatic 
bnin injury (41,48-S2). Casual anlllysis of (he falls 
suggesu: that most were primarily tnlll$latfomi1. 
However, deformation and iPlteNUJ/ angular :acceler-
ation of die sk:Dll and brain cous~d by the impact 
produce the injwy. Whal happens during Ebe im-
pact, .not during the fan, determines I.be outcome. 
.. $ubdural Hemorrbate _ 
A ""i;h sD'llin" il'f1pact (shon pulec dv.rrarion and 
high ~ for decelemion OOSCt) typical for I fall is 
~ore likely to cause subdural bemorrhscc rhan a 
"tow scram•• impact (long pulse duration and low 
r.i1e for deceleration onset) ~t is typical of a 
motor vehicle accident (42.61). The dL1ration of de-
cd.eration far a bcad-imi,Mct fiall aiainst a nonyield-
L11cid Int~ 
Disruption of the ~cncepbalic and midbrain por-
lions of the reti.c:ul::ar activ.a.tiqg system (RAS) 
causes Ul'consci.ousness (36.69,70). "Shearing .. or 
.. diffuse axcmal" inj\lry (DAI) is thought co be d:ic 
primary biophysic£! mechanism for immediate 
traumatic unconsciousness (3~71). Axonal injury 
bas been coofirmed at atopsy ia pe,son~ wbo bad 
a brief lou of consciousness after a bead injury and 
wbo ian:r died from olber c~. such as coronary 
artccy dise.tsc (72). However. if unconsciousncS5 is 
momentary or brief ( .. coneuSSiOll'') subsequent de-
terioration musr be due to a mechanism other lhan 
DAL Apnea and ca.~holamine release have been 
suggested u signi6can1 factor:s in me ouicome fol-
lowing head injury (73, 74). In *'5dlcion, uie ~ 
aipcw thcol)' o! traumatic unconsciousness states 
d\at -~rimary disnaplion of the RAS wW not occur 
in isolatiOA sad tbat suucmral brainstem dam.ap 
from inerti31 (impulse) or iro.pact (conta<:t) loading mus, be accomp~ni~ by evidence for conical and 
subcortical damage (36). This theory has been vali-
dated by mapietic resonance imaging and CT scans 
in :idults and child~n (75176). Only one of lbc cln"l-
dren lll r.bis smdy (c.ue ~) tiad evidence fnr any 
f.':Omponenl of DAL 111hl child had focal hcmOr-
000126 
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rh,age in the posterior midbnin and pons, thought 
by the pathologist to be prim.uy, although there 
was no skul1 fracture, only "a film"' of ·subdural 
hemorrhage, no {eazs in rhe corpus callul.um, amd 
no ~ODS of rhe cerebral white matter (grossly 
cw micn,acopically). 
The usual cause fQI' delayed deterioration in in-
faats and children is ~bnl edema. whereas in 
adults it is an expatiding extra-axial hematoma 
(77). If l:hc mechanism for delayed dea:riorzllion · 
(eJ.Cept for an expll.Ddiag extra-axial mess) is ve-
oospasm. cerebral edema may be lbe only moJPho-
logic Dl31XC&", The ''talll: and die or deteriorate 
(TADD)" syndrome is well cbarac:teriz.ed io adults 
amination and ha.c: been re.comsnended as pan of 
the evaluation of any pediatric patient with bead 
uawna (89). None or the children in this study bad 
a formal retinal evaluation. and only six had fun-
duscopic ex.aminll.tion documenmd in the medical 
record. Four of the six tmd bilateral retinal bemor-
mage. 
Pn-existing Coodilions 
· Ooe of these children (case 16) bad a suban41• 
noid AV malfonnao.on .dlat contribuicd u, develop-
ment of th~ su bdutal hcmaloma. causing bis death. 
One (cue 7) had TAR syndrome (90), but bis death 
WIU thought to be caused by malignant cen:bnl 
edema not an expanding extra-axial mass. · (78). 1\va reports in the pediatric literature discuss 
TADD, documcntmg 4 fatalities among 1 OS cbil- · 
dren who bad a l,tcid interVal after head injury and Cenbrovucolar Thrombosis 
subsequently deLcriontcd (17,79). Many \)hysic:ian.s Thrombosis Of dissc.r;tion of carotid or vertebral 
believe lhat a lucid ;nterVal ;" an 1,1ltimately fat.a! arteries as ;l cause of delayed deterioration after 
pe~c bead injury is extremely unliJcely or docs - head ~ neck iajwries is docu~entad in bolh adults 
not ~cw unless there is an epidural bematoma and children (91,92). CQe \4 1s the tio;t ~ of a 
.I 
(7,8,11). Twelve cbildrea in lhii study had a lucid death due to ttaumatic cerebrovascular wombosi.li 
··-- ·-·-- ----in~1.:-1cnoncatclatit-witnessca·-9·-0-rmcsc~1:2---c---in·m-infantor--child-Intrmal·-carotid-ancry-tb.J'om-:------ -----
f.:aUs. One child had a epidural bcmncoma. · bosis was suggested ndiogra.phicaJly in an addi-
llednal Bemorrhap 
The majority of publi$hed studies conclude that 
retinal hert1ot'Tha1e.. especially if bilateral and pos-
terior or associaled with retitto~c:hi$is. is hichly 
sui:geslive of. if noc diagnostic for. nonxcidentrt.l 
injury (9,l...,21). Rarely. n:tinal hemonhacc has 
been a..q.oc:iated with an accidental head injury, bul 
. in lhcsc cases the bleeding wa_..; -1,11\ilar.eral (80). I~ is 
also st.ited that mwmaric retinal hemorrhage may 
be die .direct mech111ical effect of violent shDking 
{15). Howner, retinal bemOIThage may be caused 
~ly either by ligati.Ag mo cetVl"31 rctial 
vein or its tributaries or by suddenly increa.cing in-
traeranial prcssw:c (81,82): relin~chisis is the n:-
sull or brca.k.througb bleeding and venous $tasis not 
.. violent shalcing" (1S.83). Any sudde11 lnctease in 
inttaeranial pressure may callk rctiw hemorrhage 
(84-87). Deformation of lhc skull eoif\C,dent to an 
impact nonselective)y increases i.ntracranial pics-
suie. Venospasm · secondary to u-.i.umatic;- brain in-
jury sc:lectively i1QUSeS venous pressure. Either 
mechanism may cause retinal bemorrba1e irrespec-
tive of whet.her die ,tnusma was acc:iOental or in-
flicted. f un.bc:r, retinal 1111d optic nerve sheath bem-
onbagcs assocutled with a tuptUred vascular 
malformation are due tO an increase in venous pies-
sure not exiension of blood aloni; ex1111vascular 
spKes (ll-83,88). Dlla1ed eye e;iu1minalion wilb an 
1ndirecl opbi:ha1moscope ;, lhou;ht tn be more Rn-
,ili'lfe far detecting retinal b\eedLne than routine ex-
tional ck;.aeh tcuc: .13) but could not be confirmed at 
autop")'. However, this child died 6 days after ad-
mission_ to the hospital. and 6brinolysis may have 
removed any evid~cc for tbrombo$1& at me lime 
the autopsy was pctfcmned. 
Limitatiom 
I. Six or lhe 18 falls were not wimessed or were 
. seen only by lhc ;,,dull ~. and it is pos-
sible that ;mother person caused the nonob-
served lojwiC$. · 
2. The ex.act height of th& faU could be detu-
mincd .in ·onty lO cases. The ocheq (1 swi11g 
a.nd J nation~ pl:a.lform) could bave been 
from as little as 0.6 meterS (2 feet) to as much 
as 2.4 meters (8 feet) . 
3. A minimum impact 'Velocity sufficient ID 
cau.,c f:lta.l braicl lnjmy cannot be ,at~ 
from this study. Ltb'Wise. the probability rbfal 
&1l in~ividual fall will have a r.aal OUICOIDC 
cannot be stated because the dambase depends 
on volunuary n:porting and contt"..cwal agree-
ments with selected U.S. SUlle a1enaes. The 
NeiSS sununmies for the sn,dy years esti.-
ma.a:d that there wen: more than 250 dealbs 
due u, head and neck injurii:.'I u11ociallcd witb 
playground equipment, but there uc only 114 
in lhe filu. 'Further. thia ~tudy docs no1 in-
clu~ OU\lt&" no.npl:ayeround equipmen1-ntbced 
rwai Jails. w11:nessed or not witnesScd. in .the 
CPSC dac:ib:i.se (32). 
Alff J" FotttUIC f,fa/ ,..,,,.,,, l,t,I, 22, rlo. P.Q~~I 
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CONCLUSIONS is not uniform ( 4S). This analysis requires awareness 
1. Every fall is a complex event. There must be a. of the shape of the deceleration.curve. knowlcd~ of 
biomechanic;al analysis for any incident in the mecbwcal. properties and geometry of the c;ra-
~hich _the severity of the i.nj~ry appears to be nial system., and comprehension of tbe suess and 
mcons,su:nt wii:b the history. The question is sttai11 charaacristics foe the specific pan of the skull 
not "Can an infant or child be scrious]y in- and brain cha1 soi~ the :round. A purely nnsla-
jurcd or killed from a short-dislmlee fall?"" but tional fall requires that the body is rigid and that the 
rather .. If a chijd fa).}$ (x) meterS and :strikes extcmal fcm:es acting on the body pass only lhrough 
hi.s or her bead on a nonyielding surface. wh~t rhe COM, i.e .. there is no rotational component. A 1-
will bappenT" · metu-tall 3-year-old hanging by her knees from a 
2. Relinal hemorrhage may occur whenever in- hotizonw ladder with tbe veru:x of her skull O.S me-
tracrania.1 pressure exceeds venous pressure or ters above hard-packed earth appro~tes this 
whenever tb.cr.c is venous obsttuction. The model. lf she looses her grip and falls. sinking the 
cbaraeteristic of Lhe bleeding cann0t be used occipital scalp, her impact velocity is 3.l Ill/second. 
to detcrm.ine Ebe ultimate cause. An exeJusively angular fall also requires that the 
3. Axona.l damage is wilikely co be the mecha- body is rigid. In addition. the rowion must be abOUt 
nism for lcrhal injury in ll \ow-ve\ocicy impact a fixed axis or a given point internal or atemal to 
such as !IOm a fall. lhe body, ¥.11d the applied moment and rhc inertial 
4, . CeRbrovascubr thrombosis or dissection moment must be at the identical point or axis. IC Ibis 
muse be con.siden:d in any injllty with appar- sa_me child ~ a 0.5-mcr.cr COM and has a ··matcb-
. -~- _ -·· _ ____ _ _ _ ~~ ~la~d deterioration, and especially in ~tick" f.ul ~.le standing on the _ground. again sa:ik-
onc wm,-ac:i:ieoran11fuc:cor-atcuuusual··ms~--------uigher..occ1put •. b~-1.11~-ve10ci1y.is .. S.42,.radlsec ... _ ··--···· _______ _ 
tribution for cerebral edema. oDd ~changential velocity 5.42 m/:second at irnpacL 
S. A Wl from le$$ Ihm 3 meters (10 feet) in an in- The ~pact velocity ls higher than predicted for an 
fant or c:bild may cause fatal .hcsd inju.ry and cxclu~1vely ~slational orextetn~l-axis an.gular fall 
may oor cause immediaLC symptoms. The iu- . when die applied moment and me inerml moment 
jw:;y may be a,~ociatcd wirh bilatcm. retinal are at a different fixed point (slip and fall) or when 
'bemonhage, and an ossocuued subdllr&l I.he ini.lial velocity is not zero (walloni: or running, 
hematoma may exte.nd into lhe inlerhemi- dlen ttip and fall). and the vec:'tOrs a.re additive. How-
spheric fiss-ure.. A history by the caretakef ,hat cv!r. the head: neck, limb$. and tol'SO do not move 
the child may have fallen cannot be dismissed. uruformly d11n11g a fall because telaove morion oc-
·, curs wilh different velocities and accelerations for 
,'cknowledternenti.: The ~uthor tb:lnks the law en- each component. Calculation of cbe impacl vcl.Ocity 
forcement. emer;eney medical services. and rnedi=l for an actual fall requires solution.~ of diffeiential 
professionals who wiUi.ngly helped bim obtain~ ~i- equations for oach simul~ _,,.,.,1'"·=ona1 and 
MJ ~ records alDd isrvestiptioas: Ida Harper-Brown ... __ 
(1-:hnaal \nfanna1ic,n spec;.lisL) ~ Je11n Kennedy .rowional motion (45). .fwthc:%. ..i.oetti.a1 Dr impulse 
(ScDior CompU:ince Officer) from the U.S. CPSc. w'ho!c loading {whiplash) m1&y cause head accclcr1&tion 
cndmsiascic uaiswace made chi$ ANdy poQ.iblc; Ayvb K. more than twice that of the midbody input force and 
Ommaya. M.D .• ano Werner Gold$milh. Ph.D .. for erid· may be imponint in 11. fall where the initial impact is 
c::a.uy -reviewini tbe ID.BftUScrii,<: Ju E. Lc:csnna. M.D.. 1h i 
ad Faris, A. Bandalc. Pb:O .. for helpful canunenUt: Mau. ~ e ,eel.- bunoclc. back. or shoulder, and the 6nal 
6: Myers, MJ)., and M.icbael B. Plumn. M.D., for re.. il'DpllCt is lo lhe bead (46,47). 
vacw of me ntedical icna;irta $\udicl: Jc:aDDC R.curer md The rrans)arional motion of a rigid body at con-
Kaday. Gonnowski. for patience, humor, and ~ompl1nins snw gravitational accelcralion (9.8 m/S:.) is ca.lcu-
lhe manllSCript: and all cb.e WDilics wbo shared the sto- ltatcd from: 
~ ~ dam sons :md daughters and for whom Ibis work 
Ill ded1c1te(t, 
APPENDIX 
New1onlan mechanics involving cOMtant acceler-
ation m&y be used IO deletmille the impact velocity 
in a pvitational fall. However. COftSW\l accelen,-
ll01l formL&lls canno1 be used to eatculau: me rehi~ 
lions amonc velocit)'. acc:c:leralion, 1111d dlsamc:e 
ttaveled during an i&npacl bcc:ause dle decelcrmion 
F= ma v'1 = 2as V: at 
where F - the sum of allforces a,;ong on the body . 
(newton). m - mass (kg). a - accclc:iatioa (mls2}, 
v = velocity (m/S), s = distance (m), and l =rime($), 
The angular motion of a rigid body about a fixed 
axis at , ;ivcn p0inl or Lhc body unaer· constant 
gravit:itlonal acctleradon (9.8 m/si) ii calc.ulatc.d 
from; 
M • la· 111 .. v'lr a. -Otf~128 
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where M = me applied moment about the COM 
or about the fixed point where the a.xis of rotation is 
located. l = die inertial moment a.bout this same 
COM or fixed point, a. = angular ~leration 
{r3dls2), w = angular velocity (rad/s), r = radius 
· (111):·v"' ·=·-wigenti.al velocity (mis). and a' - .tan-
gential acceleration (ml~). 
'The angu.lac velocity w for a rigid body of length 
L rotating a.bout a fixed point is calculated from: 
~2 = maLl'2 ~ = (1/3) mL2 
where Io == ~ initial inertial moment, w = an-
gular velocity {rad/&), m ...;, ma.q (kg), a = gravita-
tional acc;eleration (9.8 m/sl), and L = length. 
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CASE NO. CV-12~1798 
AFFIDAVIT OF JONATHAN L. 
ARDEN,MD 
Jonathan L. Arden, MD, being duly sworn and upon oath, hereby says: 
1. That I am an MD certified in both anatomic and forensic pathology by the American 
Board of Pathology and licensed to practice medicine in five states. 
2. That I am President of Arden Forensics, PC, a consulting practice in forensic 
pathology and medicine. 
3. That I also hold a part-time appointment as a Forensic Pathologist in the Office of the 
Chief Medical Examiner for the State of West Virginia. 
4 That I have testified more than 700 times, including in this Court in State v. Grove, 
No. CR-2007-768, as ari expert in child abuse, neglect, and issues relating to pediauic deaths. 
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5. That I was requested to review matciials and to provide consultation in th.is 
post-conviction proceeding, Grove v. State, No. CV-12-01798. 
9. Thatl prepared a Report of Consultation dated December 4, 2012. 
l 0. That the Report of Consultation is attached as an exhibit to this affidavit. 
11. That by this affidavit. I affirm that all the factua] statements and conclusions in the 
report are true to the best ofmy knowledge. 
This ends my affidavit. 
Avl:L-~ .--u Jonathan L. Arde~ MD 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO 
~1»1t:me this _l!t_~ of December, 2012. 
2 - AFFIDAVIT OF JONATHAN L. ARDEN, l\ID 
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' 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on December l.5, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document including all attachments to be: 
mailed 
hand delivered 
K-, faxed to 208-799-3073 
to: Nance Ceccarelli 
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
3 - AFFIDAVIT OF JONATHAN L. ARDEN, MD 
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4 December 2012 
Dennis Benjamin, Esq. 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett 
303 W. Bannock, PO Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
Report of Consultation 
JUlflll Nllll;lilliR _ .!U .. , 1_: . ••lR$11:tnJl1 i ... nzp cy . 
Jonathan L. Arden, MD 
Presicknt 
Re: §tace Grove, Post-Conviction Relief 
Dear Mr. Benjamin: 
Introduction 
You have asked me to review materials and to provide consultation in the field of forensic 
pathology, which I have practiced for more than twenty five years. After receiving my MD 
degree from the University of Michigan in 1980, I completed training in anatomic pathology at 
the New York University Medical Center (1980-1983) and in forensic pathology at the Office of 
the Chief Medical Examiner for the State of Maryland (1983-1984); I was certified in both 
anatomic and forensic pathology by the American Board of Pathology in 1985. I am currently 
licensed to practice medicine in five states. I spent most of my career as a government-
employed medical examiner, including nine years with the Office of Chief Medical Examiner for 
the City of New York where I finished as First Deputy Chief Medical Examiner, and more than 
five years as the Chief Medical Examiner of Washington, DC. I am currently president of Arden 
Forensics, PC, a consulting practice in forensic pathology and medicine, and I hold a part-time 
appointment as a Forensic Pathologist in the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner for the State 
of West Virginia. (Full curriculum vitae is attached.) 
I have pursued a special interest in pediatric forensic pathology throughout my career. In 
addition to my own ca·sework investigating deaths of and performing autopsies an children and 
infants, I have ·lectured extensively on child abuse and neglect, the sudden infant death 
syndrome as well as on other aspects of pediatric deaths. I served as Program Chair for the 
Interim Meeting of the National Association of Medical Examiners In February, 1997; the topic of 
the program that I arranged and presented in was child abuse fatalities. I was appointed by 
Governor Pataki to the New York State Domestic Violence Fatality Commission in 1996-1997. I 
was a memt>er of child fatality review teams in New York City and Washington, DC for a total of 
approximately 14 years, and I was a member of the SIDS Community Advisory Council for New 
York City. I have testified in family courts and criminal courts as an expert in child abuse and 
neglect, including issues concerning injuries of living children. 
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I have testified as an expert witness in various state and federal courts, as well as in grand 
juries and depositions, a total of more than 700 times. My fees are not contingent upon the 
outcome of any case in which I consult. 
Case Background and Issues to be Addressed 
I was originally retained in 2008 as a consultant to the defense in ID v. Stace Grove, and I was 
called to testify at trial. In that capacity, I was provided and reviewed materials that included the 
autopsy report for  Martin with neuropathology consul~ation {i.e., brain examination), 
autopsy photographs, microscopic slides from the autopsy, medical records of  Martin 
Including some imaging studies, organ donation records, police investigation reports, narrative 
of Stace Grove, Grand Jury transcript and various interviews. In 2012, I was engaged to consult 
with you regarding the post-conviction relief efforts for Stace Grove. For this current 
consultation, I have again reviewed the materials related to the autopsy and medical care 
including receiving another set of microscopic slides for examination, and I have been provided 
transcripts of my trial testimony and of other medical expert witnesses. 
During all of my consultation in these matters I have also relied upon my education, training and 
experience as a physician, forensic pathologist and a medical examiner. 
The majority of my testimony and opinions offered at trial addressed timing or aging of various 
injuries, especially in relation to the day the child presented clinically and the timing of when Mr. 
Grove had exclusive custody of him. Another pertinent aspect of my testimony was related to 
the assessment of brai-n injuries •.. In this report, I shall discuss various aspects of the autopsy 
examination, the materials that were not made available to me for examination prior to offering· 
t1;1stimony·, my current opinions after reviewing the records again with additional materials that 
were not provided to me before trial, and aspects of the presentation of expert test lmony and 
medical evidence by the prosecution. 
Analysis and Opinions 
The most critical area of my testimony at trial f nvolved estimating ages of various injuries found 
at autopsy, which held serious implications regarding when Mr. Grove had cus1ody of the child 
and exclusive opportunity to have inflicted those injuries. The single most important method I 
employed to arrive at opinions regarding the ages of injuries was microscopic examination. I 
was provided a set of routine microscopic slides from the autopsy including the brain 
examination prior to trial, which did contribute to reaching my opinions and providing testimony. 
However, in addition to the routinely stained slides, selected slides were subjected to special 
stains that highlight specific features that may not be visible (or fully appreciable) In the routine 
stain. One of these Is called an iron stain, which primarily stains certain iron-containing 
chemicals that are formed during the process of healing hemorrhage; positive iron staining 
permits determination of minimal age intervals for Injuries, and may also identify older areas of 
healed injury. The other special stain that was applied to the brain slides was the beta amylold 
precursor protein (APP) stain, which may assist in the Identification and characterization of 
certain types of brain injury (see below). No special slain slides were provided to me for 
examination prior to trial to permit me to examine them Independently, such that I could arrive at 
my own analysis and opinions based (in part) oh that evidence. Instead, I was forced to rely on 
the recorded observations of these slides in the autopsy and neuropathology reports, although I 
· did request that all of the existing microscopic slides be provided to me for examination at the 
time. In the course of this post..convictlon review, I was provided slides from the general 
autopsy in the routine stain and the iron stain, but no slides from the brain examination were 
available to me for this examination. 
2 
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The iron stains are useful at minimum to establish that the process of response to hemorrhage 
has begun, Including chemical breakdown of the oxygen-carrying protein in the red blood cells, 
hemoglobin. !n most circumstances, it requires at least 2-3 days of inflammation and response 
for positive iron staining to become visible microscopically (although in some circumstances it 
may take longer), and the positive Iron staining may persist for much longer (in some ins1ances 
months or even years). The medical examiner who performed the autopsy and authored the 
autopsy report (Dr. Ross) did report that he found positive iron staining in some of the lnjuries 
examined microscopically. I was able to rely on his reported observations as a basis for some 
of my opinions that these were injuries older than the day of clinical presentation of the child 
with his injuries. However, I have now examined the iron stains myself. Aside from confirming 
some ofthefindings recorded by Dr. Ross, I have made additional observations that support 
and extend my opinions on the ages of the injuries. Some of the iron staining that I see is co-
~xistent with the fresher-appearing hemorrhage; this, in conjunction with the inflammatory 
response, indicates that the hemorrhage is In the early stages of response, consistent with the 
opinions I expressed at trial (generally in the ranges of several to five days). Dr. Ross offered 
testimony that the fresher hemorrhage was coincidentally located with the positive iron staining, 
thus representing older and newer injury in the same locations. I disagree with this 
interpretation, which relies on coincidence and fails to synthesize the totality of the findings into 
a unified diagnosis. Moreover, by my re~ntexamination of the iron stains that were not made 
available to·me prior to trial, I have now also found positive iron staining trapped within 
connective tissue (i.e., separate from the visible hemorrhage), which represents the remnants of 
much older, healed bleeding. In other words, the autopsy slides contained evidence not only of 
signtticant aging of the more recent injuries such thatthey were not particularly consistent with 
having been Incurred just prior to clinical presentation (i.e .• when Mr. Grove had custody of the 
child) but also of much older bleeding, reflective of older injuries; this child had been injured at 
some much ear1ier time or times, unrelated to when he was with Mr. Grove. 
Another Important area of my analysis and testimony was the interpretation of the 
neuropathology examination of the brain. This examination was. performed by a consulting 
neuropathologist, Dr. Reichard, in a separate Institution (in New Mexico). Dr. Reichard authored 
a separate neuropathQlogy report that was appended to the autopsy report, and his results were 
incorporated into the final autopsy diagnoses by Dr. Ross. Dr. Reichard missed certain findings 
In his slides, such as the inflammation and early healing in the subdural hemorrhage, that I 
identified and demonstrated photographically at trial; these findings also demonstrated that the 
subdural hemorrhage was actually older than the day of presentation to the hospital (on the 
order of having occurred 3-5 days before death, with some features suggesting as much as 7 
days). Dr. Reichard microscopically identified a laceration of a brain structure (the corpus 
callosum), which I was able to demonstrate photographically at trial (using his routine 
microscopic slides) to be an artifact, i.e., not a real injury: One of the features noted by Dr. 
Ross was a pattern of positive APP staining in the tissue surrounding 1his purported laceration; 
such positive staining would be supportive of his interpretation, the other features that I showed 
consistent with it being an artifact notwithstanding. This pattern of APP staining surrounding a 
localized brain lesion has been termed "penumbra! axonal injury" (PAI), and Dr. Reichard was 
first author on a paper describing APP staining of different forms of axonal injury (including PAI) 
in non-accidental head trauma of children, published In 2003 (see below). I did not have the 
opportunity to examine APP stained slides from the neuropathology examination either prior to 
trial or in the course of this current review. Performing my own independent examination of 
those slides would afford me the opportunity to assess all of the evidence relevant to this critical 
question, and potentially would have allowed me to have rebutted those findings and that 
opinion further at trial, but absent being provided those slides I could not do so. 
3 
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The APP staining also bears on the broader interpretation by the medical experts in this ca:::,e of 
the type and severity of brain Injury that  Martin did or did not sustain. Positive APP 
staining of brain tissue Identifies a type of damage called axonal Injury which may occur in 
several different patterns. These patterns have implications for the mechanisms of causation of 
the axonal injury, including: traumatic axonal injury {as may be seen in non-accidental head 
trauma In children); vascular axonal injury (typically caused by inadequate blood supply and 
oxygen resulting from brain swelling, which may be secondary to many underlying processes, 
both traumatic and not}: and the above-mentioned PAI (seen adjacent to localized brain 
lesions). If axonal injury is present, then its type and severity also relate to the expected clinical 
manifestations, including the rapidity of developing symptoms (a factor in alleged child abuse 
that frequently relates to which person or persons had opportunity to have inflicted the injuries). 
The PAI identified by Or. Reichard (assuming for discussion that it was present) is a localiz~d 
phenomenon, and by his own publication does not imply that more diffuse or widespread axonal 
injury is present. This is significant in this case because diffuse axonal injury does Imply a 
severe brain injury that typically becomes severely symptomatic very rapidly. (On the contrary, 
the type of head Injury that  Martin did have, subdural hemorrhage, may take time to 
accumulate before it presses on the brain, resulting in an interval between injury and clinical 
presentation during which clinical manifestations are minor or absent.) In fact, Dr. Reichard, the 
specialized neuropathologlst, did not diagnose diffuse traumatic axonal injury in 1he brain of 
 Martin. However, Dr. Ross, the medical examiner who had the ultimate responsibility for 
the autopsy, opined at trial that the child did have traumatic axonal injury, effectively 
contradicting (and overruling) the neuropathologist who examined the brain. (Note that Dr. 
Ross did not personally examine the slidesfrom the brain, either the routine or APP stains.) 
Similarly, Dr. Harper, the child abuse pediatrician, testified (well beyond her area of expertise) 
not only about the cause of death, but specmcally that the child did indeed have an intrinsic 
brain injury (suggestive of axonal injury), an opinion contrary to the clinical CT scan and to the 
neuropathology examination. Dr. Harper also disf'flissed the importance of microscopic 
examination in her testimony, not only straying outside her expertise to mislead the jury, but 
also relying on much less accurate clinical indicators, some of which were clearly contradicted 
by the autopsy findings (both gross and microscopic). 
Some of the issues raised above involve evidence that was not provided to me pretrial as the 
defense medical expert (e.g., Iron stains) that would have had a material effect on my opinions 
regarding ages of injuries. Some relate to the misrepresentation of medical evidence to the jury, 
in particular the diagnoses of brain injuries, that held significant implications for the mechanism 
of causation {e.g., axonal injury versus subdural hemorrhage) of head injuries and timing of 
clinical manifestations. The presentation of the interpretation of the neuropathologic findings is 
another issue of concern In this case, given that Dr. Reichard, who actually performed that 
examination and authored that consultation report, was never called to testify to those findings 
and opinions. Had Dr. Reichard provided testimony at trial, several major issues could have 
been explored_.by the defense. These include the significance of the APP staining, in which he 
would likely have testified consistent with his report that the vascular axonal injury pattern 
precluded a diagnosis of traumatic axonal injury, and consistent wi1h his own publication that the 
PAI pattern did not indicate the presence of more diffuse axonal injury; this area would also 
have opened the door to cross-examination that would have exposed the Inconsistencies 
between his opinions and those expressed by both Dr. Ross and Dr. Harper. He could have 
been confronted with the photographic evidence that I produced which was disclosed before 
trial regarding the laceration being an artifact, which would have countered the only positive 
evidence of a primary brain Injury. He could have been further confronted with the evidenc10 I 
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he did not appear at trial, none of these issues was available for explora'tion by the defense at 
trial. 
Conclusion 
All opinions are expressed with reasonable medical certainty. I reserve the right to amend any 
statements or opinions If presented with additional significant information, as well as the right to 
rebut opinions expressed within my areas of expertise. 
Yours truly, 
Arden Forensics, PC 





































Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Nez Perce County, Idaho 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
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STATE OF IDAHO 
Respondent 
FACTS 
CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
-------------- --- ;c1 
Petitioner was convicted of first-degree felony murder and received a life sentence with 22 
years fixed. Petitioner appealed the conviction; on March 25, 2011, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
affirmed the conviction and sentence. On September 12, 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court denied 
Petitioner's Petition for Review. Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and 
accompanying Affidavits in Support of the Petition for Post-Convicti-0n Relief on September 7, 
2012. This brief is in response to that petition and in support of a motion for summary disposition 
filed b Nez Perce Coun 
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APPLICABLE STANDARDS 
An application for post-conviction relief is a special proceeding, civil in nature, which 
allows a person to seek relief from a criminal conviction. Matthews v. State, 130 Idaho 39, 4L _ __" _____ . _____ _ 
(Ct.App.1997); Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454,456 (1991). A post-conviction proceeding is 
commenced by filing an application in the district court in which the conviction occurred. LC.§ 19-
4902. An application must be filed within one year after the time for appeal has expired or after a 
decision on appeal has been issued. Id Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a person 
sentenced for a crime may seek relief upon making one of the following claims: 
(1) That the conviction of the sentence was in violation of the constitution of the United 
State or the constitution or laws of this state; 
(2) That the court;w~ witlioutjuris.m~tiQn to inlp9.s.e s.eI1te11ce;_ 
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law; 
( 4) That there exists evidence of material fact, not previously presented and heard, that 
requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice; 
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation or conditional release was unlawfully 
revoked by the court in which he was convicted, or that he is otherwise unlawfully held 
in custody or other restraint; 
(6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902(b) through (f), Idaho Code, that the 
petitioner is innocent of the offense; or 
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground 
or alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ, 
motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy. 
LC. § 19-4901(a). 
Furthermore, an application for post-conviction relief must contain more than a short and 
plain statement. The application "must be verified with respect to facts within the personal 
knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations 
must be-attached or the application must state why such.supporting evidence is not included with . 
the petition. LC.§ 19-4903." Fenstermaker v. State, 128 Idaho 285,287 (Ct.App.1995). In other 
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words, the petition must present, or be accompanied by, admissible evidence supporting its 
allegations, or the petition will be dismissed. Hoffman v. State, 277 P.3d 1050, 1054 (Ct.App.2012). 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the 
allegations upon-which.his request for .post,,conviction relief is based. I. C. _ § 19,...4907; Stuart.v. __ 
State, 118 Idaho 865, 869 (1990); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,271 (Ct.App.2002). Idaho Code 
§ 19-4906 permits summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief upon motion of a party 
or upon the court's own initiative. "Summary dismissal is permissible when the petitioner's 
evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, 
would entitle the petitioner to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary 
hearing must be conducted." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,561 (2008); Goodwin v. State, 138 
Idaho 269, 271 (Ct,App,2002). Petiti0I1S that are unverifi~cl and concluso:ry m~y b~ dismissed by 
motion for summary disposition. LC. § 29-4906. Conclusory or unverified allegations are 
"insufficient to entitle petitioner to an evidentiary hearing." King v. State, 114 Idaho 442, 446 
(Ct.App.1988). 
ARGUMENTS 
Petitioner fails to meet the requirements ofl.C. §19-4901(a) for Post-Conviction Relief 
because he fails to assert claims that are valid under The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, 
he has failed to support his claims with affidavits or evidence sufficient to provide an issue of 
material fact, and he raises issues that could have been raised on direct appeal but were not. 
Therefore, the petition fails to raise a claim for relief and should be summarily dismissed. 
Petitioner alleges five causes of actions for post-conviction relief. Each cause of action 
.. 
- - ·- - ··-·-- .. - - -· 
addressed individually. 
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1. Whether Petitioner was denied the right to confront witnesses against him when 
State's witnesses testified at trial about tests and results they personally did not 
perform nor had personal knowledge. 
Petitioner asserts that his right to confront witnesses against him was violated when State's 
witness~s.testified_attrial aho11tneu,n>_pathQ\pgytest~- and examin1:1ti9nresu,lts in whichthey neit4.er 
performed nor had personal knowledge; and, the neuropathologist, Dr. Reichard, who performed 
the tests and examination, was not a witness at trial. However, the State's witnesses, Dr. Ross and 
Dr. Harper, were testifying to facts and data of which they were made aware through Dr. Reichard' s 
report. The Idaho Rules of Evidence (I.R.E) provide that an expert witness is one ''who is qualified 
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience training, or education" and "may testify in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
h~lp the trier of fact t()_ unde~s~and the evide11ce or !() detei:mine_ ~ _fact in_ issue; (b) the testimony is 
based on sufficient facts or data; ( c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; 
and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case." I.R.E. 
702. Furthermore, an expert may base his or her opinion testimony on "facts or data in the case that 
the expert has been made aware of ... ". I.R.E 703 (emphasis added). 
In this case, Dr. Ross and Dr. Harper testified as expert witnesses. Furthermore, Dr. Ross 
and Dr. Harper based their respective opinions and testimony on facts and data, about which they 
were made aware from Dr. Reichard's report. 
Petitioner's claim that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he did not have an 
opportunity to confront Dr. Reichard is incorrect and Petitioner's claim should be summarily 
dismissed. 
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2. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct (a) outside the presence of the 
Court during trial, (b) during the state's case-in-chief, (c) during the cross-
examination of Petitioner and ( d) during closing and rebuttal argument. 
Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct in multiple ways: 
• ... first, he projected family photos of the victim prior to the Court going on record, thus. __ . 
exposing the jury to extra-judicial evidence; 
• second, he appealed to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury through the use 
of inflammatory tactics by eliciting testimony of the victim's sister; 
• third, he elicited inadmissible evidence during cross-examination·of Petitioner and Dr. 
Arden; and, 
• finally, comments during his closing and rebuttal arguments constitute conduct 
sufficiently egregious as to result in fundamental error. 
It is generally held that "a conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only 
. when conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental error." State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 
77~ 785 (1997). "Prosecutorial misconductrises to the level of fundamental error when it is 
calculated to inflame the minds of the jurors and arouse passion or prejudice against the defendant, 
or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the 
evidence." Id. (citing, State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 942 (1994)). 
In the first instance cited by the petitioner, the prosecutor was merely setting up the 
projector screen and preparing for his presentation. In the second instance, Petitioner's counsel 
objected to the elicitation of the victim's sister's testimony and the District Court overruled the 
objection allowing the prosecutor's questioning to continue. The act of setting up a presentation is 
perhaps untimely in preparation but cannot be deemed to be calculated to influence the jury. The 
prosecutor had no knowledge that the jury was entering at that exact time. Eliciting testimony from 
the victim's sister following the objections of Counsel and subsequent ruling of the Court is not 
egregious conduct, and does not support a claim of fundamental error resulting from prosecutorial 
misconduct and thus, should be summarily dismissed. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR 
SUM:MARY DISPOSITION - Grove 5 


































. _j ···- =~J 
"'" -·-·-----·-·--.-- .---~--·--c-• .•." .. _. .. - ., 
:c_ __ · .. --· - , . , ___ - -- '---" -
·~ 
As previously stated. a petition for post conviction relief must be supported by affidavits, 
records, or other evidence supporting its allegations. LC. § 19-4903. Petitions that are conclusory or 
unverified may be summarily dismissed. In this instance, Petitioner fails to include any supporting 
eviden.Ge.thatthe prosecutor's conductduring er.ass-examination.of Petitioner and_Dr. Arden was so 
egregious as to. result in fundamental error and are simply conclusory allegations. Therefore, 
Petitioner's claims ofprosecutorial misconduct should be summarily dismissed. 
Furthermore, "prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument will be deemed 
fundamental er_ror only if the comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent 
prejudice could not have been remedied by a timely objection and a ruling from the trial court 
informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded." State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 9 
{Q!.App: 199~). During his closingar~ent_at trial, the prosecutor's comments to thejury and his 
comments regarding Dr. Arden's testimony were not so egregious nor inflammatory that any 
prejudice arising therefrom could not have been remedied by the trial court directing the jury to 
disregard the comments in a timely fashion. Consequently, Petitioner's alleged claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument do not rise to a level of fundamental error and 
thus should be summarily dismissed. 
Finally, Petitioner is precluded from raising issues in a post-conviction petition that could 
have been raised on direct appeal but that Petitioner failed to raise previously. Furthermore, issues 
that could have beeil raised on direct appeal but were not are precluded and cannot be raised in 
post-conviction proceedings. LC.§ 19-4901(b). Petitioner's allegations ofprosecutorial misconduct 
should have been raised on direct appeal. Therefore, Petitioner's claims of prosecutorial misconduct 
are not valid claims for post-conviction relief under LC.§ 19-490l(a) and should be summarily 
dismissed. 
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. 3 . . Whether Petitioner was denied due process when jurors engaged in misconduct by 
allegedly sleeping during the presentation of evidence. 
Petitioner asserts that jurors engaged in misconduct when they were allegedly sleeping 
during the presentation of evidence as various points throughout the trial. A similar issue was 
presented in Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139 (Ct.App.2006). 
Murphy did not identify which day of the five-day jury trial the juror allegedly slept, 
describe the length of time the juror allegedly slept, or explain what testimony or evidence 
the juror allegedly slept through. In the absence of such evidence, there was no showing of 
deficient performance or prejudice. Therefore, it was proper for the court to dismiss this 
clain;i. 
Id. at 150. Petitioner faces similar circumstances in this case. Although Petitioner presents affidavits 
that identify days in which jurors allegedly slept, Petitioner has not presented affidavits, records, or 
other evidence indicating the length of time the jurors allegedly slept nor has Petitioner explained 
- - - - - -· -· 
what testimony or evidence the jurors allegedly slept through. Additionally, one of Petitioner's 
affidavits cannot clearly name the juror that was allegedly sleeping. Lastly, five of the six affidavits 
in support of Petitioner's petition for relief generally allege that jurors were sleeping during 
''various times during the proceedings" and do not indicate specifically which day these jurors 
allegedly slept or what testimony was allegedly slept through. While there is some indication in 
some of the affidavits that reference which testimony jurors allegedly slept through, the allegation 
does not also indicate which jurors were allegedly sleeping through the reference testimony. The 
affidavits are not evidence and are simply non-specific conclusions by audience members watching 
the trial offered in support of Petitioner's allegations. Thus, there is no showing of juror 
misconduct, the allegations are conclusory in nature and without verification. Petitioner's 
allegations of juror misconduct should be summarily dismissed. 
4. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for deficient performance for either 
failing to raise the issue of prosecutorial misconduct or juror misconduct. 
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Next, Petitioner asserts appellate counsel was ineffective for either failing to raise on appeal 
the alleged issue of prosecutorial misconduct or the alleged issue of juror misconduct. "To prevail 
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate both that his attorney's 
performance was deficient, and thathe was thereby prejudiced in the defense of the criminal 
charge." Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 145 (Ct.App.2006); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668,687 (1984). In addition, to show the attorney's performance was deficient "a defendant must 
overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance was adequate by demonstrating "that 
counsel's representation did not meet objective standards of competence." Roman v. State, 125 
Idaho 644,648 (Ct.App.1994). Furthermore, if counsel's performance is proven to be deficient, 
defendant must show that ''there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result 9f the pr9ceedin.g wolJ.ld llav~ be~n different." Striqldan4 44q lJ.S_. at 694. 
Nothing in Petitioner's petition supports an argument that appellate counsel's representation 
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Appellate counsel is a respected member of the 
Idaho State bar with no other sustained or substantiated complaints for ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
Petitioner's argument that Mintun (holding that it cannot be ineffective assistance for 
appellate counsel to fail to raise claims of .fundamental error for the first time on appeal) is 
contrary to Strickland and should be overruled by the Idaho Supreme Court is dispositive. Petitioner 
is arguing for a rule that does not exist. Simply believing that the Mintun decision should be 
overruled because it is contrary to Strickland is not sufficient to establish a claim for relief 
Therefore, Petitioner's claim of ineffective appellate counsel should be summarily dismissed. 
5. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for numerous actions such as failing to 
present an adequate analysis, failing to move for a mistrial, failing to challenge for 
cause a juror, and for rendering deficient performance. 
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Petitioner offers a laundry list of claims that trial counsel was ineffective. However, 
Petitioner fails to support this laundry list of claims with affidavits, records, or other evidence. 
Conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by fact, are insufficient to entitle the Petitioner to an 
_______ eyidentiacy hearing. LC._§ 19-49.03. In this instance; Petitionero1f~rs no factsJo_ support his bare 
and conclusory allegations. Therefore, Petitioner's claims that trial counsel was ineffective should 
be summarily dismissed. 
Furthermore, Petitioner fails to meet the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington for 
purposes of determining whether counsel was ineffective. A court will "not second-guess strategic 
and tactical decisions and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the 
decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law ... " 
. State v. Pay_ne, 146 Idaho 548, 561 (2008);Pratt v. State, 134 Iciah() 581, ?~4(2000). In addition, _ 
"[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within the wide range of 
professional assistance." Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988). 
Petitioner has not shown that any of trial counsel's strategic decisions (e.g., summoning a 
new jury pool, or peremptory challenge of a juror) resulted from inadequate preparation or 
ignorance of the relevant law. Therefore, Petitioner's claims of ineffective trial counsel cannot be 
the basis for his relief and should be summarily dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner fails to meet the requirements ofl.C. §19-490l(a) for Post-Conviction Relief 
because he has failed to support his claims with affidavits or evidence, he fails to assert claims that 
are valid under The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, and he raises issues that could have 
been raised on direct appeal but were not. 
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The State respectfully requests that this Court grant the State's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal because the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact and 
therefore, the petition fails to raise any claims for relief that may be granted under The Uniform 
Po.st-Conviction Procedure Act. 
Na.nei C'eccarelli 
Deputy County Prosecutor 
CERTIFiCATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing, BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION, was hand delivered via court basket to: 
(l} __ hand delivered; or 
(2) hand delivered via court basket, or 
(3) sent via facsimile, or 
(4) X_ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United 
States Mail. 
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
Dennis Benjamin 
Deborah Whipple 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Barlett LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 , 
-ct 
DATED this Ji:... day of Decemper, 2012. 
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C~gal Assistant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
) 
STACEYL. GROVE, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO. CV12-01798 
) 
vs. ) ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
) STATUS CONFERENCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) -
Defendant. ) 
Amended Petition for Post Conviction Relief due: January 4, 2013; and, 
State's response due: February ·12, 2013; and, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Tuesday, the 12th day of February, 2013, at the hour 
of 11:15 AM. Pacific Time in the District Court of the Nez Perce County Courthouse, Lewiston, 
Idaho, is the time and place set for a Telephonic Status Conference in the above-entitled matter with 
THE COURT initiating the call. 
DATED this /t"' day of December, 2012. 
CARL B. KERRICK- District Judge 
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
STATUS CONFERENCE 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC STATUS CONFERENCE 
was: 
~ hand delivered via court basket, or 
___ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this / /'f,,. day of December, 
2012, to: 
Dennis Benjamin -l.+'llV.'f d__ 
P 0Box2772 
Boise ID 83701 
Nance Ceccarelli 
PO Box 1267 
Lewiston ID 83501 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk 
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Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION 





1. Petitioner, Stacey Grove, is currently incarcerated at the Idaho Correctional Institution 
in Orofino, Idaho. 
2. Mr. Grove is serving a sentence imposed by the District Court of the Second Judi~ial. 
District, State ofldaho, County of Nez Perce, the Honorable Carl B. Kerrick, presiding. 
3. The Nez Perce County District Court Number for that case is CR-2007-768. 
4. Mr. Grove was charged with the first-degree murder of  Martin (hereafter 
"  
5. Mr. Grove was represented at trial by attorney Scott Chapman (hereafter "defense 
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counsel"). 
6. The state was represented by the Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney, Daniel 
Spickler (hereafter "prosecutor"). 
7. The jury returned a guilty verdict. 
7.1 A true and correct copy of the Clerk's Record in the criminal case is attached 
as Exhibit A. 
7.2 A true and correct copy of the transcripts of the proceedings in 
the criminal case is attached as Exhibit B. 
7 .3 A copy of the exhibits introduced at trial are attached hereto as Exhibit C. 
8. The district court sentenced Mr. Grove to a life sentence with 22 years fixed. 
9. -Mr. Grove·appealedfrom the judgment and sentence:· 
10. Attorneys Diane Walker and Eric Fredericksen (hereafter "appellate counsel") 
represented Mr. Grove on appeal. 
--------- .::~ __ J 
11. On March 25, 2011, the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction 
and the sentence. State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483,259 P.3d 629 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied 
(September 12, 2011). 
11.1. A copy of the opinion is attached as Exhibit D. 
12. The Supreme Court denied Mr. Grove's Petition for Review on September 12, 2011. 
13. The remittitur issued that same day. 
14. With respect to this conviction, Mr. Grove has not filed any other petitions for 
post-conviction relief. 
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION: 
A. Facts Pertaining to Cause of Action. 
Petitioner was Denied the Right to Confront 
Witnesses Against Him in Violation of the Sixth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article, 1, § 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution (LC.§ 19-4901(a)(l)). 
15. Petitioner re-alleges paragraphs 1-14 above. 
16. Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses was violated when state witnesses testified at 
trial about neuropathology tests and examination results when those witnesses neither performed 
nor had personal knowledge of the neuropathology testing and examination, and when the 
neuropathologist who did perform the tests and examinations was not a witness at the trial. 
16.1. A further con:frontation--elause violation occurred when the autopsy report 
was admitted into evidence at trial. 
17. Dr. Marco Ross is a forensic pathologist. Exhibit B, pg. 892, ln. 20. 
18. Dr. Ross performed the autopsy of  while he was employed at the Spokane 
County Medical Examiner's Office. Exhibit B, pg. 893, ln. 23. 
19. Dr. Ross testified at Mr. Grove's trial. Exhibit B, pg. 892-988. 
20. Dr. Ross's autopsy report was introduced as State's Exhibit 11 at the trial. Exhibit C 
(State's Exhibit 11); Exhibit B, pg. 902, ln. 5. 
20.1. Defense counsel did not object to the introduction of the autopsy report. Id. 
21. Dr. Ross testified that there have been occasions where the Medical Examiner's 
Office would send tissue samples to outside experts for examination and interpretation. Exhibit ___ _ 
B, pg. 900, ln. 21-24. 
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22. In this case, Kyler's brain was sent to Dr. R. Ross Reichard, a forensic 
neuropathologist at the University of New Mexico for examination. Exhibit B, pg. 901, ln. 5-7; 
pg. 928, ln. 18-20 . 
... -- - - --- 23. The results ofthe examination were-included in the autopsy report which was 
admitted as Exhibit 11 at trial. Exhibit B, pg. 901, ln. 1-2. 
24. At trial, Dr. Ross was permitted to testify to Dr. Reichard's findings. Exhibit B, pg. 
928, ln. 21 - pg. 930, ln. 23. 
24.1. Dr. Ross testified that Dr. Reichard reported there were bilateral subdural 
hemorrhages in the brain. Exhibit B, pg. 928, ln. 21-23. 
24.2. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there were bilateral 
"" subarachnoid hemorrhagesinthe brain. ExhibitB;pg: 929, ln: l-2. 
24.3. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported that the brain was swollen. 
Id 
24.4. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there was a laceration in 
the corpus callosum. Id, ln. 3. 
24.5. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there was a hypo-ischemic 
injury to the brain. Id, ln. 5-6. 
24.6. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there were vascular axonal 
injuries to the brain. Id, ln. 10. 
24. 7. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported there were autolytic 
-· . -changes in the brain. Id, ln. 11. 
24.8. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard reported that the subdural 
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hemorrhage and the subachnoid hemorrhages were "acute." Exhibit B, pg. 930, 
In. 3-4. 
24.9. Dr. Ross testified that the significance of a tear in the corpus callosum 
__ reported by Dr. Reichard-is that it-is indicative of a.high dr.,gree of force which 
would render the victim unconscious or nearly unconscious at the time of impact. 
Id, In. 21-23. 
24.10. Dr. Ross also testified that the ·swelling reported by Dr. Reichard indicated 
that the fatal injury occurred sometime immediately before death or within a day 
or two prior to death. Id, In. 6-9. 
24.11. Dr. Ross testified that the degree of hemorrhage in the brain and the tear in 
the corpuscallosumreported by Dr. Reichard would be inconsistent with a fall 
from a kitchen counter onto a linoleum floor. Exhibit B, pg. 936, In. 3-7. 
24.12. Dr. Ross testified that the degree of hemorrhage in the brain and the tear in 
the corpus callosum reported by Dr. Reichard would be consistent with a very 
significant blunt force impact or impacts to the head that would be in excess of 
what would be expected from a fall to the floor. Id., In. 12-17. 
24 .13. Dr. Ross testified that the widespread vascular axonal swelling reported by 
Dr. Reichard was indicative of injury to the axons which could occur as a result of 
blunt force trauma tearing the axons. Exhibit B, pg. 941, ln. 13-18. 
24.14. Dr. Ross also testified that Dr. Reichard noted in his report that there were 
axonal injury changes occurring in the vicinity of.the corpus callosum which 
would be consistent with a shearing injury, in Dr. Ross's opinion. Exhibit B, pg. 
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942, ln. 14-23. 
24.15. Dr. Ross also testified that it was not surprising for Dr. Reichard to report 
axonal injury given that he also reported a laceration or tear in the corpus 
--eallosum .. -Id., at-18-2-J,. -···-·· 
24.16. Dr. Ross repeated his testimony that Dr. Reichard's observation of a tear 
in the corpus callosum shows there was "a very significant force" applied, 
something comparable to a "very high fall" of "a couple of stories or so," or a 
"motor vehicle accident, or inflicted blunt force trauma." Exhibit B, pg. 945, ln. 
5-12. 
24.17. Dr. Ross also testified that the brain injuries reported by Dr. Reichard did 
not result from a single impact Exhibit B, pg. 94 7, ln; 20. 
24.18. Dr. Ross also repeated his testimony that the head injuries reported by Dr. 
Reichard would have caused immediate or near immediate unconsciousness or 
near unconsciousness to  Exhibit B, pg. 948, ln. 23 -pg. 949, ln. 4. 
24.19. Dr. Ross testified that  could not have been engaged in certain 
activities previously described by the state's witness Lisa Nash with the injuries 
reported by Dr. Reichard. Exhibit B, pg. 949, ln. 5 -pg. 95, ln. 15. 
24.20. On redirect examination of Dr. Ross, the prosecutor stated that "in the 
report from New Mexico that the doctor there talked about the loss of clear 
distinction between gray-white junction and generalized gray discoloration." 
Exhibit B, pg. 984, ln. 23 - pg; 985, ln. 2. 
24.21. Dr. Ross explained that finding to show that "brain death has occurred, but 
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there's still ongoing cardiac activity." Id, pg. 985, ln. 3-5. 
24.22. The prosecutor asked Dr. Ross, "Is there anything in your autopsy report or 
in the report from Dr. Reichard that would be inconsistent with those injuries 
-occurring appreximately 48 hours prior to cardiac death?" Id, pg. 9 87, ln. 4-7. ..... -
24.23. Dr. Ross answered, ''No." Id, ln. 8. 
24.24. Dr. Ross relied upon Dr. Reichard's report in his opinions that the cause of 
death was brain swelling and cerebral hemorrhage due to blunt force impact to the 
head, that the manner of death was homicide, and that the fatal injuries could have 
been inflicted approximately 48 hours prior to cardiac death. Id, pg. 987, In. 9 -
pg. 988, In. 8. 
25. Dr. Reichard was never called to testify at trial: 
26. Dr. Ross admitted that he did not do anything with the brain other than to remove it, 
examine its surface and have it sent to Dr. Reichard's laboratory. Exhibit B, pg. 951, ln. 23 - pg. 
952, ln. 7. 
27. Dr. Ross admitted he did not prepare the brain tissue slides or inspect the brain 
internally. Exhibit B, pg. 952, ln. 10-12. 
28. Dr. Ross admitted he did not observe the corpus callosum laceration. Exhibit B, pg. 
956, ln. 10-15. 
29. Dr. Ross admitted that he did not observe the global hypo-ischemic brain injury. 
Exhibit B, pg. 956, ln. 18 - pg. 957, ln. 7. 
30. Dr. Ross admitted he did not examine any of the original slides orrecuts of the brain 
tissue. Exhibit B, pg. 959, ln. 10-15. 
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31. Dr. Ross testified that he did not recall whether he had seen any photographs taken of 
the brain by Dr. Reichard. Id, In. 23-25. 
32. The introduction of Dr. Reichard's report and Dr. Ross's testimony about Dr. 
Reichard-'-s examination of the brain and his interpretation-of the meaning of those findings -
violated Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions. 
33. Dr. Ross also testified about hemorrhages which he did not observe but were 
reported "by the surgeon who did the transplant surgery," in the retroperitoneal areas and the 
psoas muscles. Exhibit B, pg. 938, ln. 20-23. 
34. That surgeon did not testify at trial. 
35. That testimony from Dr. Ross also violated Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses. 
36. The testimony of Dr. Donald Chin; which referred to the autopsy report, which in - --
turn contained Dr. Reichard's observations, findings and conclusions, violated Mr. Grove's right 
to confront witnesses. 
36.1. Dr. Chin testified that based "on what I've read on this autopsy report is the 
most brutal case ... I've ever seen." Exhibit B, pg. 851, ln. 5-6. 
37. The testimony of Dr. Jay Hunter which referred to Dr. Reichard's observations, 
findings and conclusions violated Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses. 
37.1. While Dr. Hunter admitted that he is "not a pathologist," he testified that, 
''this child on autopsy, had ... a fair amount of subarachnoid hemorrhage" that 
"should have produce[d] immediate symptoms," such as "unconsciousness," 
given the degree of injury described by Dr. Reichard. Exhibit B, pg. 87 4, 1n. 24 -
pg. 875, In. 22. 
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37.2. Dr. Hunter also testified that the defense version of the events on the 
evening prior to Kyler's hospitalization would be "virtually impossible" given the 
injuries described by Dr. Reichard. Exhibit B, pg. 876, ln. 11-20. 
37.3. Dr. Hunter repeatedthattest-imon:y during the state's.redirect examination.-
Exhibit B, pg. 886, ln. 18-24. 
38. The testimony of Dr. Deborah Harper which referred to Dr. Reichard's observations, 
findings and conclusions violated Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses. 
38.1. Dr. Harper testified that she had the autopsy report from Dr. Ross, which 
contains the observations, findings and conclusions of Dr. Reichard, and which 
was introduced at trial as State's Exhibit 11. Exhibit B, pg. 1031, In. 19-20. 
- 382; Dr. Harper used that report, among otherthings, to reach her opinion as to 
the cause of death, i.e., the brain injury. Exhibit B, pg. 1032, In. 3-10. 
38.3. Dr. Harper also testified that based upon the injuries described by Dr. 
Reichard,  "would have been unconscious or semi-conscious." Exhibit B, 
pg. 1033, In. 17-18. 
38.4. Dr. Harper also testified that in her experience, the extent of the brain injury 
described by Dr. Reichard was unusually severe. Exhibit B, pg. 1034, In. 2-21. 
38.5. Doctor Harper also testified that the defense version of the events on the 
evening prior to Kyler's hospitalization would be "not consistent" given the 
injuries described by Dr. Reichard. Exhibit B, pg. 1036, In. 7-20; pg. 1037, In. 
20-24. 
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39: Trial counsel did not object to any of this testimony. 
.,r:·, ,_-:·:> .. -:...-., 
40. The failure to object was not a strategic decision on the part of trial counsel. 
41. These violations of Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses were not harmless error. 
-- - , -- - - 4-2-, The Court of Appeals <lid not-pe-nnit-Mr. Grove to raise this issue-for the ;firsttime on 
appeal. State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 259 P .3d 623 (Ct. App. 2011 ), review denied. 
B. Why Relief Should be Granted. 
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that, "[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with witnesses against him." 
The Supreme Court has held "that this bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal and 
state prosecutions." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965). Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho 
· Constitution similarly guarantees -a criminaldefendant the right to -"appear and defend in person." -
In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held 
that testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial are admissible only where declarant is 
unavailable and where defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 541 U.S. 
at 59. Here, the statements of Dr. Reichard and others were introduced at trial without a showing 
of unavailability or a prior opportunity to cross-examine. 
Further, the testimony was undoubtedly testimonial in nature. The determination of 
whether evidence is testimonial requires the court to consider the purpose behind the 
Confrontation Clause. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 143, 176 P.3d 911,915 (2007). The 
Supreme Court noted in Crawford, supra, that "the principal evil at which the Confrontation 
Clause was directed was the civil-law mode ofcriminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex 
parte examinations as evidence against the accused." Hooper, 145 Idaho at 143, 176 P.3d at 915, 




quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50 . 
. The Hooper Court analyzed the guidelines set forth by the United States Supreme Court 
in determining what constitutes testimonial statements: First, the Court looked to Webster's 
dictionary definition of "testimony_')-frem-1828; i,e.-/'[ a] rolemn declaration or affim1ation made 
for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. Next, the Court 
listed three formulations of "core" testimonial statements: (1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its 
:functional equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony 
that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants 
would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially;" (2) "extrajudicial statements ... contained in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;" 
a,n:d (3 )"statements thatwere made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted). Dr. Reichard's report and its incorporation into 
Dr. Ross's autopsy report clearly fits within the definition of "core" testimonial statements. See, 
Bullcomingv. New Mexico, -U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 2716-17 (2011); Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 310 (2009). 
The unconstitutional admission of the evidence cannot be found to be harmless. Here, the 
Court of Appeals in the direct appeal noted the importance of Dr. Reichard's evidence to the 
state's case: 
Initially, we clarify that the crux of this issue affects the central disputed question 
in this case-when the injuries which ultimately caused K.M.'s death occurred and 
whether it was likely thatK.M. would have lost consciousness and/or shown 
severe symptoms immediately after the injuries were inflicted. In other words, did 
the injuries occur on the morning that K.M. lost consciousness-and was alone 
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with Grove--or several days prior, when it was undisputed that the injuries could 
not have been inflicted by Grove because he was not alone with K.M. In this 
regard, important to the state's theory of the case that Grove caused the fatal 
injuries on the morning of July 10 was the conclusion of Dr. Reichard, based on 
his microscopic examination ofK.M.'s brain, that K.M. had suffered a laceration 
of the corpus callosum, which would have likely caused immediate loss of 
--- - - -- ------ -- - -consciousness, thereby-imp-licating-Grove as.-th€:~eause-ofK.M.'sinjuries during-
the 36-45 minute period of time during which he was alone with K.M. Grove 
points out that both Dr. Ross and Dr. Harper recited Dr. Reichard's observations 
in this regard, as gleaned from the autopsy report, as neither was present during 
the autopsy nor conducted their own microscopic analysis, and relied on these 
observations in forming their respective opinions that K.M.' s injuries had been 
inflicted on July 10. 
By contrast, Grove's expert, Dr. Arden, testified that he did not agree with Dr. 
Reichard that a laceration was present and that the anomaly was the result of 
handling of the brain after death. He also offered his opinion, after examination of 
the microscopic slides, that K.M.'s injuries had been inflicted at least three days 
prior to death (thus absolving Grove of having caused them) and that they would 
not have necessarily resulted in immediate loss of consciousness. 
State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483,490,259 P.3d 629,636 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied (Sept. 12, 
2011). In light of the central importance of the evidence from Dr. Reichard, the state cannot 
meet the burden of proving its unconstitutional admission was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) ("[W]e hold ... that before a federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner was Denied a Fair Trial and Due 
Process of Law in Violation of Idaho Constitution 
Art. I,§ 13 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution by the Multiple 
Instances of Prosecutorial Misconduct (LC.§ 19-
4901(a)(J)). 
A. Facts Pertaining to .Cause of Action. 
4 3. Petitioner re-alleges paragraphs 1-4 2 above. 
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44. The prosecutor committed misconduct outside the presence of the Court during trial. 
44.1. During the trial, but prior to the Court going on the record, the prosecutor 
projected family photos of  onto the court room screen while the jury entered 
the courtroom. ~--:---: -.:._: ... .,__-...... ~- •-;:·---~ ~- -
44.2. The family photos would then be interchanged with the autopsy 
photographs. 
44.3. Affidavits of witnesses to this misconduct are being filed in support of this 
Petition. 
44.4. The prosecutor's actions exposed the jury to evidence outside the presence 
of the Court, invoking sympathy for  and his biological family and arousing 
passion and prejudice against Mt; Grove. 
44.5. Defense counsel did not draw this behavior to the attention of the Court, ask 
that the prosecutor be ordered to desist or move for a mistrial. 
45. The prosecutor committed misconduct during the state's case-in-chief. 
45.1. The prosecutor called  Bandel, the sister of  as a witness. 
Exhibit B, pg. 823, ln. 25 - pg. 824, ln.l. 
45.2. Defense counsel objected noting that  was a child and arguing that 
the prosecutor's purpose in calling her was "obviously ... just to impassion or 
inflame the jury" and he expected  to testify that when she last saw her 
brother "he was lying on his mother's bed, and she gave him a hug and kiss and he 
said good bye:" Exhibit B; pg. 821, ln. 24 - pg. 822, ln. 8. 
45 .3. In response, the prosecutor told the Court that his purpose in calling  
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was to elicit evidence regarding the "condition of  Martin on the morning of 
July 101\" and argued that he only had Lisa Nash and  to provide evidence 
on that topic. Exhibit B, pg. 822, ln. 17-23. He stated, "I'm entitled to ask her 
. what ·she .recalls that morning, what -she-recalls of the physical condition of her-.'. . ,-····-- . 
brother the last time she saw him." Exhibit B, pg. 823, ln. 1-3. 
45.4. The Court overruled defense counsel's objection "based on the argument 
made by Mr. Spickler on behalf of the State." Exhibit B, pg. 823, ln. 8-9. 
45.5. Mr. Spickler then elicited testimony from  that she was a "[p]retty 
strong little girl," that she said "bye" to  before she left that morning, gave 
him a kiss and a hug and that she never saw her "brother again after that." Exhibit 
B, pg. 825; ln. 22; pg. 826, ln; 15"18;·pg. 827, ln. 16"17. 
45.6. That testimony, elicited by the prosecutor from  went beyond what 
the prosecutor told the Court he would elicit and it had the effect of inflaming the 
passions and prejudices of the jury and encouraging the jury to convict Mr. Grove 
for reasons other than the relevant evidence. 
45.7. Defense counsel failed to object that the prosecutor's actual questioning of 
 went beyond what he had represented to the Court and was inadmissible. 
45.8. During Detective Birdsell's testimony, photographs taken inside the Nash 
trailer approximately a month after  s death were admitted. Exhibit B, pg. 
996, ln. 19 - pg. 997, ln. 23; Exhibit C (State's Exhibits 4, 5 and 6) . 
. 45.9. The photos wereinflammatory because they included a large display of 
sympathy cards sent to Lisa Nash. 
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45.10. These photographs were inadmissible under IRE 403 as the danger of 
unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value. 
46. The prosecutor committed misconduct in his cross-examination of Mr. Grove where 
-the prosecutor characterized Mr. G.r-0v-e~s sw0mtestimony-asthe "story you told, which-.is.,'-~the--- ,- _ --
story you need the jury to believe" and then opined that "some things ... just don't really make 
sense." Exhibit B, pg. 1113, In. 8-11. 
47. In his cross-examination of Dr. Jonathan Arden, the prosecutor suggested by a 
question that Dr. Arden was "on a special mission here, which is to provide such evidence as you 
might that would support the defense's case[.]" Exhibit B, pg. 1321, ln. 18-20. 
48. The prosecutor committed misconduct during the cross-examination of Mr. Grove. 
48.1. The prosecutor cross;,_examined Mr. Grove about the factthat Mr. Grove 
was behind on child support to his biological son, a fact both irrelevant and 
unfairly prejudicial. Exhibit B, pg. 1115, In. 21-24. 
48.2. During the cross-examination of Mr. Grove, the prosecutor asked Mr. 
Grove when he had been prescribed Ativan and whether the prescription "was a 
result of [his] emotional state Friday[.]" Exhibit B, pg. 1120, ln. 9-12. 
48.3. This questioning went beyond the Court's procedure at the time of the 
medical recess, which only informed the jury that "an unforeseen medical 
situation has arisen which affects our ability to proceed with trial today" and did 
not mention Mr. Grove or the nature of the medical situation. Exhibit B, pg. 
-1067, ln. 3~S..-- :, .. ---
49. The prosecutor committed misconduct during closing and rebuttal argument. 
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49 .1. The prosecutor misstated the def-ense position regarding preexisting head 
injury, saying that the defense was that there was "some long-term brain injury." 
Exhibit B, pg. 1419, In. 6-10. 
-- :: ,,=>---,------49.2. The prosecutor0 -called-Dr. Arden:s--testimony about the absence of a tear in 
the corpus callosum "a bit of smoke and mirrors to get you confused." Id, pg. 
1426, In. 16-18. 
49.3. The prosecutor suggested without supporting evidence that Dr. Arden's 
"financial position" leads him to decide what cases he can take. Id, pg. 1429, In. 
8-9. 
49.4. The prosecutor testified that a "colleague" said that Dr. Arden's answers 
during cross'-examination were slippery as an ice cube and the prosecutor opined 
that the doctor ''was stretching things." Id, pg. 1430, In. 4-8; pg. 1461, In. 11. 
49.5. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "[c]are takers 
kill little babies all the time." Id, pg. 1460, In. 5-6. 
49 .6. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "[p ]arents kill 
babies all the time." Id, ln. 6-7. 
49. 7. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "there are 
literally thousands of [similar] incidents in any given span of time[.]" Id., In. 8-
10. 
49.8. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that he believed 
that "our local paper has probably shown ... probably six more of these cases 
since - since this one started." Id, ln. 11-14. 
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49.9. The prosecutor misstated for a second time Dr. Arden's testimony about 
head injuries. Id., pg. 1462, In. 18-19. 
49.10. The prosecutor argued that "Dr. Ross had the unenviable task of taking 
Kyler's body.apart·pieee-ey pieGe[.-1" Id, pg.1464, In. 24-25a--_:, 
49 .11. The prosecutor implied that he had evidence not presented at trial that Mr. 
Grove had previously been "violent with  Exhibit B, pg. 1430, ln. 15-21. 
49.12. The prosecutor argued that "we don't want to let a murderer go free." Id, 
pg. 1466, ln. 9. 
49 .13. The prosecutor told the jury that he did not call  s biological father as 
a witness "because my medical experts unanimously, to no exception, said he 
could not have done it:" Id, pg.1477, In. 18-20. -
49 .14. The prosecutor argued without supporting evidence that the 
emotional breakdown of Mr. Grove at trial showed that Mr. Grove had a 
different kind of "emotional breakdown, an instantaneous fit of anger, that 
morning that resulted in these injuries[.]" Id, pg. 1458, ln. 16-18. 
50. Defense counsel did not object to any of the misconduct alleged in paragraphs 47-49. 
51. The failure to object was not a strategic decision on defense counsel's part. 
52. Had defense objected, the objections would have been sustained. 
53. In addition, the Court would have given curative instructions to the jury. 
54. Further, defens~ motions would have alerted the prosecutor that his misconduct 
would be challenged, which would have prevented some or all of the subsequent misconduct .. : ~'--
5 5. Had a motion for a mistrial been made based upon the totality of prosecutorial 







misconduct, the motion would have been-granted. 
56. This prosecutorial misconduct was not harmless error. 
57. The unobjected-to prosecutorial misconduct could not have been raised on appeal. 
------- -,-Statev. Perry, 15-01daho2091-2-26,-245--P-;34-961-;978 (2010). 
B. Why Relief Should be Granted. 
The due process clauses of Art. 1, § 13, of the Idaho Constitution, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment ensure, at a minimum, "that criminal trials shall be fundamentally fair." 
Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19,576 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1978). Further, "[i]t is the 
duty of a prosecuting attorney to see that the accused has a fair and impartial trial." State v. 
Spencer, 74 Idaho 173, 183,258 P.2d 1147, 1153 (1953) (emphasis added) (finding that the 
-prose-cutor'smisconductwarranteda new trial). In this case; as demonstrated above, the -
prosecutor grossly violated his duty to ensure fairness at every stage of the trial proceedings. 
- ---- --- - -- ..... ; 
He exposed the jury to extra-judicial evidence. He appealed to the emotions, passions 
and prejudices of the jury through the use of inflammatory tactics. And he elicited inadmissible 
evidence both in direct and cross-examination of witness. 
Further, his closing and rebuttal arguments are replete with misconduct. "Closing 
argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of fact in a criminal 
case .... [t]o enlighten the jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence." State 
v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal quotations omitted). 
Therefore, "[t]he prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to appeal to the prejudices of 
the jury,"- ABAStandards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Functions §-3-5;8(3d .. 
ed.1993 ). The prosecutor is charged with the dual task of ensuring that the government's case is 
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presented "earnestly and vigorously, using every legitimate means to bring about a conviction, 
but also to see that justice is done and that every criminal defendant is accorded a fair trial." 
State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,449, 816 P.2d 1002, 1006 (Ct. App.1991). Therefore, it is . 
improper for-a prosecutor-to appeal-to-the emotions, passion or prejudice of thej-ury through-the. .... 
use of inflammatory tactics. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87, 156 P.3d at 588. Here, however, the 
prosecutor appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury, misstated the evidence, used 
inflammatory language in reference to defense witnesses, argued evidence not presented at trial, 
and misrepresented the state's burden of proof. This was clear and repeated misconduct. 
The effect of the prosecutor's misconduct requires the granting of the petition. "The 
cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself 
might be har.mless; but wherra:ggregated show the absence·of a fair trial in contravention of the· -
defendant's right to due process." State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 21, 189 P.3d 477, 483 (Ct. 
App.2008). Thus, it is the cumulative effect of the misconduct engaged in here that should be 
considered. Id. Considering all the misconduct, it is clear that the state cannot meet its burden of 
proving its misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as required by Chapman v. 
California, supra. 
TIDRD CAUSE OF ACTION: 
A. Facts Pertaining to Cause of Action . 
Petitioner was Denied Due Process and the Rig/it 
to Jury Trial in Violation of Idaho Constitution 
Art I,§§ 7 and 13 and the Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution 
(J.C.§ 19-4901(a)(l). 
•. _- 58-:_.Petitioner re-alleges paragraphs 1-57.above. 
59. Petitioner was denied his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and 
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jury trial when jurors repeatedly slept during the presentation of evidence. 
59 .1. Affidavits of individuals who witnessed jurors sleeping during trial 
testimony are being filed in support of this Petition. 
-~"-~·'""- ---··· -59 ,2; ---The witness'-s affidavits are- confirm ea by,thetrial transcript which -show th~- -- -
Court was required to take several unplanned recesses because jurors repeatedly 
fell asleep during the presentation of the evidence. Exhibit B, pg. 921, ln. 16 - pg. 
922, ln. 6; pg. 983, ln. 9-13; pg. 1351, ln. 19-25. 
60. Sleeping jurors cannot independently evaluate the evidence and function as the 
constitution requires. 
61. This issue could not have been raised on appeal under State v. Perry, supra, because 
defense coun:sel'did notobject to the sleepingjurors or make a motion for mistrial. 
62. This error was not harmless. 
B. Why Relief Should be Granted. 
A juror's inattentiveness, by sleeping during witness testimony, may constitute 
misconduct. State v. Strange, 147 Idaho 686,689,214 P.3d 672,675 (Ct. App. 2009). See e.g., 
State v. Majid, 914 N.E.2d 1113, 1115 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (Numerous instances of jurors' 
sleeping during murder trial, including during eyewitness testimony, violated defendant's right to 
due process and constituted plain error). "[A] juror who sleeps through much of the trial 
testimony cannot be expected to perform his duties.'' Id, citing United States v. Smith, 550 F .2d 
277,285 (51h Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 434 U.S. 841 (1977); United 
•- States v. Cameron, 464 F.2d 333,335 (3rd Cir. 1972). . --
"Due process mandates that the defendant is entitled to have a jury hear and evaluate the 
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evidence," id., and the jurors in this case were instructed by the Court "to decide the facts from 
all the evidence in the case." Exhibit B, pg. 1399, In. 24-25 (emphasis added). The repeated 
instances of sleeping by one or more jurors, especially given they were sleeping during the 
,c,ritical·medical testimony ofDrs.Ross and Ar-den;cd0nie4-Mr. Grove his state.and-federal- --
constitutional rights to a jury trial and due process. 
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner was Denied the Effective Assistance of 
Counsel on Appeal in Violation of Idaho 
Constitution Art. I, § 13 and the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution (J.C.§ 19-490J(a)(J)). 
A. Facts Pertaining to Cause of Action. 
63. Petitioner re-alleges paragraphs 1- 62 above. 
64. · Alternative argument: If the Court determines thaHhe prosecutorial misconduct 
issue raised in the Second Cause of Action could have been raised on direct appeal, Petitioner 
alleges that it was therefore deficient performance for appellate counsel to fail to raise that issue. 
64.1. Had appellate counsel raised the issue on appeal, the conviction would have 
been reversed by the appellate court. 
65. Alternative argument: If the Court determines that the juror misconduct issue raised 
in the Third Cause of Action could have been raised on direct appeal, Petitioner alleges that it 
was therefore deficient performance for appellate counsel to fail to raise that issue. 
65.1. Had appellate counsel raised the issue on appeal, the conviction would have 
been reversed by the appellate court. 
·· -B. Why Relief Should be Granted. 
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the 
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Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has 
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the 
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). The Equal Protection and Due Process 
-~·~'-a,.:·Clauses-efthe Fourteenth Amendment guarantee::the-.right-to counsel on-.appeal.-Douglas.v. ,-- ... 
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). This right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance 
of that counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,396 (1985). Idaho law also guarantees a criminal 
defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; LC. § 19-852. 
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or 
federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984), standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's 
performance· was· deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance; 
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Stricklandv. Washington, 466 
U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a 
different result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id. 
An ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is judged under the standards set forth in 
Strickland. See e.g., Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656,658, 168 P.3d 40, 42 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Petitioner draws the Court's attention to the fact that Mintun holds that it cannot be 
ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail to raise claims of fundamental error for the frrst 
time on appeal. Id. (Petitioner disagrees and believes the Mintun bright-line rule is contrary to 
Strickland and should be overruled by the Idaho Supreme Court.) Right or wrong, the rule is 
based in part upon a concern that the record. on appeal might notbe "complete enough to allow 
appellate examination of all the factors that must be considered on such a claim." Id. Thus, the 
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Court of Appeals decided to leave such issues "for presentation in a post-conviction proceeding, 
where an adequate record could be developed." Id. Moreover, "the allowance of this type of 
claim for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is ordinarily not necessary to protect a 
___ ,.c'""--···,,, ·defendant's tights because the defenclant.eanb-rmg the-same claim:.ofimpropriety-in the trial- -- ----- -- -
proceedings as a claim of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel for failing to object to the 
alleged error in the trial court." Mintun, 144 Idaho at 662, 168 P.3d at 46. 
In this case, Mr. Grove has raised claims ofprosecutorial misconduct and the deprivation 
of the right to jury trial, which were not objected to below. Mr. Grove does not believe appellate 
counsel could have raised those issues on direct appeal under State v. Perry, supra, as was the 
case with his confrontation clause claim. Thus, he can raise all those issues in this Petition, both 
as direcfclaifus and as aspects of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim alleged below. 
See e.g., DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603-604, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152-53 (2009) (deprivation 
of the right to testify raised as direct constitutional violation) with Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 
469, 476, 224 P.3d 536, 543 (Ct. App. 2009) (deprivation of the right to testify raised as an 
aspect of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim). If the Court disagrees and holds that 
Claims Two or Three could have been raised on appeal and thus cannot be raised now, it should 
then grant relief due to the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as the rationale behind the 
Mintun rule would no longer be applicable. In either case, trial counsel's failure to make proper 
objections at trial to the errors above are all incorporated into the ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claim alleged below. 
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-FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Petitioner was Denied the Effective Assistance of 
Counsel at Trial in Violation of Idaho 
Constitution Art. I, § 13 and the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution (J.C.§ 19-4901(a)(J)). 
-- -_-- .. ,, ----A~ Facts-Pertaining to Cause-oJ-Ac:tion.-~-- -:·---.-- -- - - . 
66. Petitioner re-alleges paragraphs 1-65 above. 
67. Defense counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to present an adequate 
analysis to support his pretrial motion to allow the admission of alternate perpetrator evidence. 
67 .1. The failure to present an adequate analysis resulted in the District Court 
denying admission of that evidence - evidence which was crucial to the defense 
and the lack of which was prejudicial. 
···68; Defense counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to move.for a mistrial or 
for the summoning of a new jury pool after a potential juror made statements in voir dire that 
polluted the entire jury pool. 
68.1. The potential juror stated in front of all the potential jurors that he worked 
in the funeral business and he knew the police officer witnesses Greene and Petrie 
well, both from their work investigating cases that came through the funeral 
home, and through their work for his wife who was the city manager, and that they 
are very credible. Exhibit B, pg. 155, ln. 13-14. 
68.2. He also stated he had worked in the funeral business for a long time and 
seen "these situations" before and did not have a lot of empathy except for the 
victims. Id., pg. 155, ln.21 -pg. 156,ln;.2; 
68.3. The failure to object and move for a cautionary instruction or for the 
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summoning of a new jury pool prejudiced Petitioner. 
69. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to challenge for cause or 
peremptorily challenge Juror #5 (Loetscher) after voir dire revealed that he worked at St. 
j ~:· .... ·: .. ::_. ___ :: .. : .......... :] . 
Joseph's Hospital and knewof','_j-ust,-abouteveryone on-the[state's witness list],. ,-particularly ,,=_:-
the ER doctors that was listed there." Exhibit B, pg. 144, In. 14-19. 
69.1. Juror #5 became the presiding juror. Exhibit B, pg. 1471, In. 19-22. 
70. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to assert Petitioner's state and 
federal constitutional rights to confrontation (Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13, United States Const. 
Amendments 6 and 14) and by failing to make proper evidentiary objections. 
70.1. During trial, state's witnesses, i.e., Nash, Chin, Harper, Hunter and Ross, 
- repeatedly testified to the contents of the autopsy report whicn contained · 
information from Dr. Reichard. 
70.2. Dr. Reichard's information was the state's only basis of proof for the nature 
of head and alleged brain injuries, the only basis for testimony as to the timing of 
the head and alleged brain injuries, and the only basis for the state's claim that 
 had suffered a tear to the corpus callosum and axonal shearing. 
70.3. However, the state did not present the testimony of Dr. Reichard in 
violation of the state and federal constitutional rights of confrontation. 
70.4. Petitioner was prejudiced because had counsel objected on confrontation 
grounds, the state would have had no testimony as to any head or alleged brain 
injuries and the timing of those injuries and thus., could not have obtained a 
conviction. 
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70.5. In response to the defense motion for acquittal or in the alternative a 
new trial, the state argued that Dr. Reichard was the one person who 
actually examined the brain and therefore was a more credible witness 
· than Dr>Arden,~E:,mibitB, pg., 14~6,-cln-,6-1S.----· · 
70.6. Prosecutor Spickler said in discounting Dr. Arden's testimony, 
" ... [Dr. Arden] was trying to contradict the findings of an expert in New 
Mexico who actually had the brain and actually took a look at the brain in toto, as 
opposed to one or more slides." Exhibit B, pg. 1486, In. 8-12. 
70.7. Defense counsel failed to object to the testimony from Dr. Chin 
which referred to Dr. Reichard's report. 
70.8. · Defense counsel failed to object to the testimony from Dr. Hunter -
which referred to and relied upon Dr. Reichard's report. 
· 70.9. Defense counsel failed to object to the testimony from Dr. Harper 
which referred to and relied upon Dr. Reichard's report. 
70.10. The testimony ofDrs. Chin, Hunter, Harper and Ross which 
related the findings of Dr. Reichard, were inadmissible under IRE 703 as 
well as the confrontation clause. 
7 0 .11. Had Dr. Reichard provided testimony at trial, several major issues could 
have been explored by the defense. These include the significance of the APP 
staining, in which he would likely have testified consistent with his report that the 
-vascular axonal injury pattern=-pn~cluded a diagnosis of traumatic axenal injury, 
and, consistent with his own publication, that the PAI pattern did not indicate the 
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presence of more diffuse axonal injury. Had his testimony been to the contrary, 
he could have been impeached with his own report and publication. 
70 .12. In addition, defense counsel could have exposed the inconsistencies 
betweenDr. Reiehard's opim0ns-and-those expressed by both Dr. Ross and Dr..,_"c- -- .·. 
Harper. 
70.13. Dr. Reichard also could have been confronted with the photographic 
evidence that Dr. Arden produced regarding the brain laceration being an artifact, 
which would have countered the only positive evidence of a primary brain injury. 
70.14. Dr Reichard could also have been confronted with the evidence Dr. Arden 
produced concerning the age of the subdural hemorrhage, which contradicted his 
71. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to hearsay testimony 
from Lisa Nash regarding the autopsy report contents. 
71.1. At trial, Lisa Nash testified that she was told that  had blood in his 
brain that could not be removed. She did not identify who told her this and the 
testimony was admitted without limitation including for the truth of the matter 
asserted. Exhibit B, p. 755, ln. 16-25. 
71.2. Defense counsel did not object on hearsay grounds. Had counsel objected, 
the objection would have been granted. 
71.3. The failure to object prejudiced Petitioner because, as noted above, had 
. co.unsel asserted Petitioner's constitutional confrontation rights, the state would 
have had no proof of cause of death other than Ms. Nash's hearsay testimony. 
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Without that testimony, Petitioner would not have been convicted. 
72. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to the testimony of Steve 
Stocking, a paramedic, that Petitioner was too calm in his opinion when the paramedics arrived 
in response todhe -9-1 l call. Exhibit B,'-pg_ -83-8, ln,--22, -
72.1. Mr. Stocking was not a psychologist or psychiatrist and had no 
qualifications as an expert on the appropriate reactions in a crisis. 
72.2. His opinion regarding Petitioner was not relevant (IRE 401 and 402) and 
did not fall within the scope of admissible opinion testimony by a lay witness 
(IRE 701) because it involved specialized knowledge of the appropriate reaction 
of people in crisis. 
73. Defense counsel's performance was deficient-because he failed to object to Dr. 
Chin's testimony that there was "no way we would have missed any of the[] injuries" described 
in the autopsy report. Exhibit B, pg. 851, ln. 5-6. 
73.1. Defense counsel failed to cross-examine Dr. Chin on this claim even 
though, according to Dr. Ross, some of the injuries in autopsy were old enough 
that they did exist when he saw  specifically, Dr. Ross testified that the 
injury to the left thigh and the injuries on the back were older. Exhibit B, pg. 978, 
In. 23 - pg. 979, ln.17; pg. 987, ln. 9-20. 
74. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. 
Chin's testimony that what he "read in this autopsy report is the most brutal case" he had ever 
seen. Exhibit B, pg. 851, ln. 6-'.J. - --
74. l. This testimony was not relevant under IRE 401 and 402. 
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74.2. This evidence was unfairly prejudicial under IRE 403. 
75. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. 
Hunter's testimony that subarachonoid hemorrhage has to have immediate symptoms. Exhibit B, 
pg.-874~~Jn. 24. - pg. 875, ln. 22 .. - 0 ~--- - .- - - _,_ -- - "' .. _-:..···.:"'_-_ 
75.1. There was insufficient foundation for that testimony as Dr. Hunter admitted 
that he is not a pathologist. Exhibit B, pg. 874, ln. 24-25. 
76. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. 
Hunter's testimony that  was either "ejected from an automobile" or "was beaten very 
severely." Exhibit B, pg. 871, In. 12-14. 
76.1. There was insufficient foundation for Dr. Hunter to give this opinion. 
77: Defense-counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. 
Hunter's testimony that a short fall "is rarely, rarely likely to produce any kind of significant head 
injury or bleeding" and then failed to impeach that testimony. Exhibit B, pg. 888, In. 16-20. 
77 .1. This evidence was inadmissible because there was no foundation for 
his opinion. 
77.2. Dr. Hunter's opinion could have been impeached with medical research 
published in peer-reviewed medical journals. 
77.3. That an affidavit with medical journal articles documenting the possibility 
of serious head injury from short falls will be filed in support of this Petition. 
78. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. 
Hunter's opinion, stated without any qualification as an expert, that  had sure signs of 
shaken baby syndrome. Exhibit B, pg. 869, ln. 4-16. 
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79. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. 
Ross's testimony that, although he did not see certain hemorrhages in the psoas and 
retroperitoneal areas, he was told about them by the transplant surgeon. Exhibit B, pg. 93 8, ln. 
20-23. 
· . ..:._ ·-· --··· 
79 .1. That testimony is inadmissible hearsay and violates the confrontation 
clause. 
80. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to the 
foundation for Dr. Ross's testimony regarding the head and alleged brain injuries because Dr. 
Ross also testified that he had never viewed any of the slides or recuts himself. Exhibit B, pg. 
959, In. 10-15. 
81. Defense counsel's performance was. deficient because he failed to object to Dr. 
Ross's testimony that Dr. Reichard's observation of a tear in the corpus callosum shows there 
was "a very significant force" applied, something comparable to a "very high fall" of "a couple of 
stories or so," or a "motor vehicle accident, or inflicted blunt force trauma." Exhibit B, pg. 945, 
ln. 5-12. 
Harper. 
81.1. That testimony violates the confrontation clause. 
81.2. That testimony is not admissible under IRE 703. 
81.3. There was no foundation for Dr. Ross's opinion about the amount of force. 
82. Counsel rendered deficient performance in regard to the testimony of Dr. Deborah 
. . 8~.l: Gounsel failed to object or move to strike when Dr. Haiyer vouched for th~ . 
abilities of state's witness Dr. Ross. Exhibit B, pg. 1031, In. 12-14. ("Dr. Ross, 
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I'm sorry to say, is no longer our - in our Medical Examiner's Office, because he 
is a super clinician.") 
82.2. Counsel failed to object to irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial testimony 
regarding the estimcited forc_e needed to inflict the injuries, comparing it to the 
force of being hit by a car, or being dragged behind a horse, or having a horse step 
on Kyler's abdomen, or being hit by a baseball bat, even though there was no 
foundation showing she could accurately make such estimates of force. Exhibit 
B, pg. 1034, In. 7-21. 
83. Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to the admission of 
photographs taken a month after Kyler's death, which included many sympathy cards sent to the 
familY·--
83.1. During Detective Birdsell's testimony, photographs taken inside the Nash 
trailer approximately a month after Kyler's death were admitted. Exhibit B, pg. 
996, In. 19 - pg. 997, In. 23; Exhibit C (State's Exhibits 4, 5 and 6). 
83 .2. The photos were inflammatory because they included a large display qf 
sympathy cards sent to Lisa Nash. 
84.3. If counsel had objected, the photographs would have been excluded under 
IRE 403 as the danger of unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value. 
84. Counsel rendered deficient performance in not moving to exclude any reference by 
any witness to the brain autopsy because no valid chain of custody for the brain was presented. 
.. 84J. The state. failed to present any evidence that the brain examined at the 
pathology laboratory in New Mexico was Kyler's brain. 
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85. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to move to strike the 
prosecutor's comments after his objection to prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination 
was sustained. Exhibit B, pg. 1113, ln. 12-13. 
85.1. In his cross-:exarpination of Mr. Grove, the prosecutor characterized Mr. 
Grove's sworn testimony as the "story you told, which is "the story you need the 
jury to believe" and then opined that "some things ... just don't really make 
sense." Exhibit B, pg. 1113, ln. 8-11. 
85.2. Defense counsel's objection was sustained, but counsel did not ask that the 
comments be stricken or that the jury be instructed to disregard the comments. Id. 
86. Defense counsel's performance was deficient when he failed to object to the 
prosecutor asking Mr. Grove when he had been prescribed A ti van and_ whether the prescription 
"was a result of [his] emotional state Friday[.]" Exhibit B, pg. 1120, ln. 9-12. 
86.1. This questioning went beyond the Court's procedure at the time of the 
medical recess, which only informed the jury that "an unforeseen medical 
situation has arisen which affects our ability to proceed with trial today" and did 
not mention Mr. Grove or the nature of the medical situation. Exhibit B, pg. 
1067, ln. 3-5. 
87. Defense counsel's performance was deficient for failing to object to the prosecutor 
attempting to impeach Dr. Arden with alleged "gross mismanagement" when he was the Medical 
Examiner in the District of Columbia. Exhibit B, pg. 1382, ln. 6 - pg. 1388, ln. 12. 
87 .1. These allegations of administrative errors and allegations of sexual 
harassment were irrelevant under IRE 401 and 402 because they did not 
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impeach Dr. Arden's medical testimony. 
87.2. The allegations' unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value 
and were inadmissible under IRE 403. 
87 .3. The allegations were not admissible under IRE 404, nor did the state 
give any notice of its intent to use the evidence to the extent it claims the 
evidence was admissible under IRE 404(b ). 
88. Defense counsel's performance was deficient for failing to attempt to rehabilitate Dr. 
Arden on re-direct examination. 
89. It was deficient performance for defense counsel to fail to introduce photographs of 
 taken at St. Joseph's Hospital soon after he arrived in an ambulance. 
89. l. The photographs show no redness or bruising andtherefore _a.rein consistent 
with the state's theory that Mr. Grove had just brutally beaten  
89.2. The photographs will be filed with the Court under separate cover. 
90. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to move for a mistrial 
after many jurors fell asleep during the testimony. See e.g., Exhibit B, pg. 921, ln. 16 - pg. 922, 
ln. 6; pg. 983, ln. 9-13; pg. 1351, ln. 19-25. 
91. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he introduced evidence in the 
direct examination of Mr. Grove regarding the bad relationship between Mr. Grove and his son 
Alex. Exhibit B, pg. 1074, ln. 1-24. 
91.1. This evidence could have been kept out by filing a motion in limine 
as it is both irrelevant and inadmissible. other acts evidence. 
92. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to the 
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prosecutor questioning Mr. Grove about the fact he was behind on child support. Exhibit B, pg. 
1115, ln. 21-24 
92.1. This evidence could have been kept out by filing a motion in limine as it is 
both irrelevant and inadmissible other acts evidence. 
93. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to question 
paramedic David Chenalt about Lisa Nash's reaction to Kyler's injury. 
93.1. Mr. Chenalt could have testified that Ms. Nash's behavior was "the most 
bizarre reaction we've ever seen for especially a kid call." See Grand Jury Tr. p. 
214, ln. 5 - pg. 217, ln. 15. 
93 .2. The fact that defense counsel allowed the prosecutor to elicit evidence from 
a paramedic that Mr. Grove's affect was '~oo calm," whilefailing to bring ouL 
evidence from a paramedic that Lisa Nash's affect was "the most bizarre reaction 
we've ever seen" demonstrates the absence of a strategy regarding this type of 
evidence. 
93.3. The Grand Jury Transcript is not attached hereto as it is a confidential 
document. 
93.4. Mr. Grove asks the Court to take judicial notice of the Grand Jury 
Transcript pursuant to IRE 201(d). 
94. Defense counsel's performance during closing argument was deficient because he 
failed to argue that the state had failed to carry its burden of proof because Dr. Reichard did not 
testify and the other doctors had no foundation for their opinions ofwhentheinjury happened,. 
95. Defense counsel's performance during the state's closing and rebuttal arguments was 
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deficient because he failed to object to multiple instances of misconduct by the prosecutor. 
96. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to move for a mistrial 
after the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments. 
97. Defense counsel rendered deficient performance in the presentation of the ex12ert ______ _ 
testimony of Dr. Jonathan Arden. 
97.1 Dr. Arden requested that defense counsel provide him with all 
existing microscopic slides for examination prior to trial. 
97.l(a) Defense counsel did not comply with that 
request and did not provide any special stain slides, 
including iron stains, to Dr. Arden for review. 
97.l{b)Those slides existed and have beenprovided 
to Dr. Arden for review in connection with this 
post-conviction petition. 
97.l(c) Had defense counsel provided the iron stain 
slides to Dr. Arden prior to trial, Dr. Arden could 
have testified to his observations of the slides which 
would have both confirmed and extended his 
testimony on the ages of the injuries sustained by 
97. l(d) Upon his review of the iron stains slides, in 
preparation for this post-conviction action, Dr._ 
Arden was able to confirm some of the findings 
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recorded by Dr. Ross. 
97. l(e) Dr. Arden was also able to make some 
additional observations that support and extend his 
(Pr.Arden's) opini_on on fu.~ ages of the injuries. _ ... 
97.l(f) Some of the iron-staining is co-existent with 
the :fresher-appearing hemorrhage; this in 
conjunction with the inflammatory response, 
indicates that the hemorrhage is in the early stages 
of response. 
97 .1 (g) This observation is consistent with and 
strengthens the _opinion offered by Dr. Ardenthat 
the injuries sustained by  had occurred several 
days to five days prior to death. 
97 .1 (h) Dr. Ross testified that the fresher 
hemorrhage was coincidentally located with the 
positive iron staining, thus representing older and 
newer injuries in the same locations. 
97.l(i) Dr. Arden disagrees with this interpretation, 
which relies on coincidence and fails to synthesize 
the totality of the findings into a unified diagnosis. 
97.lG) Based upon Dr. Arden's post-trial_ 
examination of the iron stains, he has found positive 
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iron staining trapped within connective tissue (i.e., 
separate from the visible hemorrhage), which 
represents the remnants of much older healed 
bleeding. 
97.l(k) Had Dr. Arden been allowed to review the 
iron stains prior to trial, he could have testified that 
the iron stain autopsy slides contain evidence not 
only of significant aging of the more recent injuries 
such that they were not particularly consistent with 
having been incurred just prior to clinical 
presentation, {i.e., whenStace;y Grove was with 
 but also of much older bleeding, reflective of 
older injuries. 
97 .1 (I) Had Dr. Arden been allowed to review the 
iron stains prior to trial, he could have testified that 
 had been injured at some much earlier time or 
times, unrelated to when he was with Stacey Grove. 
_____ _j 
98. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to provide slides 
from the brain examination to Dr. Arden for the doctor's examination prior to trial. 
98.1. Dr. Arden did not have the opportunity to examine APP 
stained slides from the neuropathology examination prior to trial. 
98.2. He has not been able to review the slides since the trial. 
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98.3. Performing his own independent examination of the APP stained 
slides prior to trial would have afforded him the opportunity to assess all 
of the evidence related to penumbral axonal injury and potentially would 
have allowed him to have rebutted Dr. Ross's opinion that there was a 
laceration of the brain structure, but absent being provided those slides he 
could not do so. 
98.4. Petitioner will seek discovery of these slides. 
99. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to point out the 
differences between Dr. Reichert's report and the state witnesses' conclusions drawn from that 
report. 
99. L The PAiidentified by Dr. Reichard {assumingfm discussion that it was _ 
present) is a localized phenomenon and, by his own publication, does not imply 
that more diffuse or widespread axonal injury is present. 
99 .2. Dr. Reichard did not diagnose diffuse traumatic axonal injury in the brain of 
 Martin while Dr. Ross opined at trial that the child did have traumatic 
axonal injury. 
99.3. Counsel failed to cross-examine Dr. Ross on this disagreement with Dr. 
Reichard, the neuropathologist who examined the brain, or get Dr. Ross to admit 
that he had not personally examined the slides from the brain, either the routine or 
APP stains. 
99.4. Counsel failed to cross-examine Dr. Harper, the pediatrician, when she 
testified that the child had an intrinsic brain injury (suggestive of axonal injury), 
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Grove. 
an opinion contrary to the clinical CT scan and to the neuronathology 
examination. 
100. The cumulative effect of defense counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Mr. 
B. Why Relief Should be Granted. 
In analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court should not look to 
each example of deficient performance and determine whether it was prejudicial. Instead, the 
Court should consider all the deficient performance and then determine whether the cumulative 
effect was prejudicial. See, Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520,527,927 P.2d 910, 917 (Ct. App. 
1996) and Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24, 32, 878 P.2d 198,206 (Ct. App.1994). As the Ninth 
Circuit has explained, "Separate errors by counsel ... should be analyzed together to see whether 
their cumulative effect deprived the defendant of his right to effective assistance. They are, in 
other words, not separate claims, but rather different aspects of a single claim of ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel." Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2003). 
As set forth above, there is a reasonable probability of a different result had defense 
counsel's performance not been deficient. Crucial state's evidence would have been excluded, 
exculpatory defense evidence would have been presented, and egregious prosecutorial 
misconduct would have been prevented or resulted in a mistrial, or a mistrial would have been 
granted due to juror misconduct. Accordingly, this Court should grant the Petition. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF: Petitioner Requests the Following Relief: 
A. That the judgment be vacated and anew trial be granted; and/or 
B. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper. 
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Respectfully submitted this A\ day of December, 2012. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT L P 
D-e., JJ.M«4 '-"'._ 
Dennis Ben}amin ' Deborah Whipple 
Attorneys for Stacey Grove 
VERIFICATION OF PETITION 
I, Stacey Grove, being duly sworn under oath, state: 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME 
thisiX'B day of~ , 20 l :2.. 
? ~ 
(~~~a~-~e:::::_ 
Not -- ublic for the St of Idaho 
Residing at: L'>f..c> 14,fo~ 
My commission expires:c:::jdq ;}& oJ..0/J 
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Respectfully submitted this __ day of December, 201-2. 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorneys for Stacey Grove 
Deborah Whipple 
VERIFICATION OF PETITION 
I, Stacey Grove, being duly sworn under oath, state: 
I know of the contents of the foregoing Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and that the 
matters and allegations set forth are tme and co1Tect to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
J 
Not ublic for the St e ofldaho 
Residing at: ..... J..e=',l"-''1"_.._t~_·-'--'-~....,_--
My commission expires: ;)tdy 24- .21)/ 1 
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CASE NO. CV2012-0001798 
ANSWER and AMENDED MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
AND DISMISSAL and TO SET FOR 
HEARING 
COMES _NOW, Respondent, State of Idaho, by and through its attorney of record, 
NANCE CECCARELLI, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Nez Perce County, Idaho, and reiterates 
its motion to this Court for Summary Disposition and Dismissal of Petitioner's Application for_ 
Post-Conviction Relief and Petitioner's AMENDED Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as it 
presents no genuine issues of material fact, raises issues decided in other appeals or more 
properly should have been raised elsewhere, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted, and, the Respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Idaho Code § 
19-4906(c). 
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The Respondent, State of Idaho, further answers the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
and the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief as follows: 
1. Respondent denies all allegations not specifically admitted or otherwise answered. 
2. Respondent admits allegations contained in paragraphs 1-15. 
A. Petitioner's First Cause of Action: 
3. Respondent denies the allegations in paragraphs 16 and 16.1. 
4. Respondent admits the allegations in paragraphs 17 through 23. 
5. Respondent denies allegations paragraph 24 (and sub-paragraphs 24.1-24.24) 
except Respondent admits that Dr. Ross testified as an expert witness, pursuant to 
IRE 702 & 703. 
6. Respondent aqmits the allegations in paragraphs 25-31. 
7. Respondent denies the conclusory allegation in paragraph 32. 
8. Respondent denies the allegation made in paragraph 33 except Respondent admits 
that Dr. Ross testified as an expert witness, pursuant to IRE 702 & 703. 
9. Respondent admits the allegation in paragraph 34. 
10. Respondent denies the conclusory allegation in paragraph 35. 
11. Respondent denies the conclusory allegation made in paragraph 36 (and sub 
paragraph 36.1) except Respondent admits that Dr. Chinn testified as an expert 
witness, pursuant to IRE 702 & 703. 
12. Respondent denies the conclusory allegation made in paragraph 37 (and sub 
paragraphs 37.1 through 37.3) except Respondent admits that Dr. Hunter testified 
as an expert witness, pursuant to IRE 702 & 703. 
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13. Respondent denies the conclusory allegation made in paragraph 38 (and sub 
paragraphs 38.1 through 38.5) except Respondent admits that Dr. Harper testified 
as an expert witness, pursuant to IRE 703. 
14. _ Respondent admits the.allegation i1LparagraphJ9. 
15. Respondent denies the allegation in paragraph 40. 
16. Respondent denies the allegation in paragraph 41. 
17. Respondent denies the allegation in paragraph 42, except the Respondent admits 
that the Court of Appeals denied appellate review of Mr. Grove's case as a whole. 
A. Why the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal should be granted with respect to 
Petitioner's First Cause ofAC!ti9n. 
While there is no doubt that the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause is the 
"bedrock procedural guarantee" (Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965)) applicable in all 
criminal prosecution and the Idaho Constitution provides a similar guarantee, as Petitioner points 
out; in the case at hand, the testimony of expert witnesses for the State (pursuant to IRE 702 & 
703) was in-person and available at trial for defense counsel to object to the opinions or the basis 
of the expert's opinions and inferences. The Idaho Rules of Evidence (I.R.E) provide that an 
expert witness is one "who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience training, or 
education" and "may testify in the form of an opinion, or otherwise, if: (a) the expert's 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; ( c) 
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and ( d) the expert has reliably 
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case." I.R.E. 702. Furthermore, an expert 
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may base his or her opinion testimony on "facts or data in the particular case" that "may be 
perceived by or made known to" the expert. I.R.E 703 (emphasis added) 
Unlike the Crawford analysis of three formulations of "core" testimonial statements, the 
State's medical witnesses offered experLopinions_based_on an analytical report of examination. 
Petitioner's witness at trial, Dr. Arden, provided an opposing opinion presumably based on 
similar reports, analyses, or perhaps his own examinations. 
Petitioner asserts that his right to confront witnesses against him was violated when 
State's medical witnesses testified at trial about neuropathology analyses and examination 
results they did not personally perform; and, the neuropathologist, Dr. Reichard, who 
performed analyses and examination, was not a witness at trial. However, the State's witnesses 
opined based on facts and data of which they were made aware through Dr. Reichard's report, 
as allowable under I.R.E. 702 and 703. 
Petitioner's claim that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he did not have 
an opportunity to confront Dr. Reichard is irrelevant and improper in that Dr. Reichard, through 
written analysis in the form of a report of examination, merely provided facts and data that 
formed the basis of expert opinions. Petitioner had sufficient opportunity to object to any 
improper testimony, had ample opportunity to cross-examine all witness offered by the State, 
and presented similar medical expert testimony that served to support Petitioner's defense theory 
of the case. 
Petitioner's First Cause of Action should be summarily dismissed. 
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B. Petitioner's Second Cause of Action. 
18. Respondent re-stat~s all responses to allegations in paragraphs 1-42 in the Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief and the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
. . .19_. Respondent denies_ the c_onclusory .. allegations in paragraphs 44 through 49. 
20. Respondent neither admits nor denies the allegation in paragraph 50. 
21. Respondent denies the conclusory allegation in paragraph 51. 
22. Respondent denies the conclusory allegations in paragraphs 52 through 57. 
B. Why the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal should be granted with respect to 
Petitioner's Second Cause of Action. 
Petitioner asserts thc!-:t the prosecutor committ~ !D.isconduct m multipl~ ways: 
• first, he projected family photos of the victim prior to the Court going on record, 
thus exposing the jury to extra-judicial evidence; 
• second, he appealed to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury through 
the use of inflammatory tactics by eliciting testimony of the victim's sister; 
• third, he elicited inadmissible evidence during cross-examination of Petitioner and 
Dr. Arden; and, 
• finally, comments during his closing and rebuttal arguments constitute conduct 
sufficiently egregious as to result in fundamental error. 
It is generally held that "a conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct 
only when conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental error." State v. Porter, 130 
Idaho 772, 785 (1997). "Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error when 
it is calculated to inflame the minds of the jurors and arouse passion or prejudice against the 
defendant, or is so inflammatory that the jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors 
outside the evidence." Id (citing, State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 934, 942 (1994)). 
The allegations presented by the Petitioner attempt to create a cumulative effect of 
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misconduct from voir dire through verdict by the prosecutor without providing any evidence of 
:fundamental unfairness. In addition, nothing articulated was so egregious or inflammatory that 
any consequential prejudice could not have been remedied during the trial or through curative 
instructions to thejury if.Petitioner_an.dhis_defens.ecounseldeemed those incidents (as cited _______ ,, .. _____ _ 
above) material at the time. State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 9 (Ct.App.1995). 
Petitioner's trial counsel had sufficient opportunity to bring to the Court's attention any 
bad acts or misconduct by the prosecutor. Petitioner's trial counsel had sufficient opportunity 
to object to any improper testimony. Petitioner's trial counsel had sufficient opportunity to 
move for a mistrial. Petitioner's trial counsel had sufficient opportunity to request curative 
instructions. 
The petition does not provide apreponderap.ce of evidence of prosecutorial misc011duct, 
but rather an opinion and series of suppositions made as if prosecutorial misconduct were 
already determined to have occurred. A petition for post conviction relief must be supported 
by affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations. LC. § 19-4903. Petitions 
that are conclusory or unverified may be summarily dismissed. In this instance, Petitioner 
makes conclusory allegations as to the prosecutor's conduct and fails to include any supporting 
evidence that the prosecutor's conduct was sufficiently egregious as to result in :fundamental 
error. In addition, the Petition further makes allegations of expected results if the trial court 
had heard objections from defense counsel or if the appellate court(s) reviewed. 
Petitioner's claims ofprosecutorial misconduct should be summarily dismissed. 
--- ANSWER and -- --- --
AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSTION AND DISMISSAL 
and TO SET FOR HEARING 6 
187
. : ~ ' 
C. Petitioner's Third Cause of Action. 
23. Respondent re-states all responses to allegations in paragraphs 1-57 in the Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief and the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
24_ _ . Respondent denies the allegations and. conclusions. made in_paragraph 59 and. sub:: _. 
paragraph 59.2, except Respondent admits the allegation in sub-paragraph 59.1. 
25. Respondent has insufficient information with which to admit or deny the 
allegations of paragraph 60. 
26. Respondent admits the allegation in paragraph 61. 
27. Respondent denies the allegation in paragraph 62. 
C. )Vhy _the State's Motion for S11mmary Dismissal should _be granted witb :respect t() 
Petitioner's Third Cause of Action. 
Petitioner asserts that jurors engaged in misconduct when they allegedly slept during 
the presentation of evidence at various points throughout the trial. A similar issue was 
presented in Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139 (Ct.App.2006). 
Murphy did not identify which day of the five-day jury trial the juror allegedly slept, 
describe the length of time the juror allegedly slept, or explain what testimony or 
evidence the juror allegedly slept through. In the absence of such evidence, there was 
no showing of deficient performance or prejudice. Therefore, it was proper for the court 
to dismiss this claim. 
Id. at 150. 
Petitioner faces similar circumstances in this case. Although Petitioner presents 
affidavits that identify days in which jurors allegedly slept, Petitioner has not presented 
affidavits, records, or evidence indicating the length of time the jurors allegedly slept nor has 
Petitioner explained what testimony or evidence the jurors allegedly slept through. 
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Additionally, one of Petitioner's affidavits cannot clearly name the juror that was allegedly 
sleeping. Lastly, five of the six affidavits in support of Petitioner's petition generally allege 
that jurors were sleeping during "various times during the proceedings" and do not indicate 
specifically. which day these jurors.allegedly slept or what testimony was allegedly slept 
through. While there is some indication in some of the affidavits that reference which 
testimony jurors allegedly slept through, the allegation does not indicate which jurors were 
allegedly sleeping through the referenced testimony. Further, all of these individuals now 
moved to provide affidavits in support of the Petitioner had sufficient opportunity to bring this 
to the attention of Petitioner and trial counsel at a time wherein the issue could have been 
raised to the attention of the Court. Alternatively, this is an issue more properly brought to the 
attentioµ of the appellat~ collfts. 
The affidavits are simply non-specific conclusions by audience members watching the 
trial now offered in support of Petitioner's allegations of juror misconduct without any 
verification. Thus, there is not a preponderance of evidence showing of juror misconduct. 
Petitioner's allegations of juror misconduct should be summarily dismissed. 
D. Petitioner's Fourth Cause of Action. 
28. Respondent re-states all responses to allegations in paragraphs 1-63 in the 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief. 
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. 29. Respondent has insufficient information upon which to admit· or deny -the 
allegation in paragraph 64, except Respondent denies the allegation of deficient 
performance of appellate counsel and the conclusory allegation in sub-paragraph 
30. 
64.1. 
Respondent has insufficient information upon which to admit or deny the 
allegation in paragraph 65, except Respondent denies the allegation of deficient 
performance of appellate counsel and the conclusory allegation in sub-paragraph 
65.1. 
D. Why the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal should be granted with respect to 
Petitioner's Fourth Cause of Action. 
Petitioner asserts in the alternative that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to 
raise on appeal either the alleged issue of prosecutorial misconduct or the alleged issue of juror · 
misconduct. In addition, Petitioner asserts a conclusory result based solely on appellate 
counsel raising either issue on appeal. 
"To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must demonstrate 
both that his attorney's performance was deficient, and that he was thereby prejudiced in the 
defense of the criminal charge." Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 145 (Ct.App.2006); 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In addition, to show the attorney's 
performance was deficient, "a defendant must overcome the strong presumption that counsel's 
performance was adequate by demonstrating ''that counsel's representation did not meet 
objective standards of competence." Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,648 (Ct.App.1994). 
Furthermore, if counsel's performance is proven to be deficient, defendant must show that 
-ANSWER and-- · -- -- -- --- --- -
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"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result.of the 
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 446 U.S. at 694. 
Nothing in Petitioner's petition supports an argument that the appellate counsel 
representation fell below an objective standard ofreasonableness. The particular attorneys 
who represented Petitioner are respected members in good standing of the Idaho State Bar and 
experienced in appellate work. 
Petitioner's argument that Mintun (holding that it cannot be ineffective assistance for 
appellate counsel to fail to raise claims of fundamental error for the first time on appeal) is 
contrary to Strickland and should be overruled by the Idaho Supreme Court is dispositive. 
Petitioner is arguing for a rule that does not exist. Simply believing that the Mintun decision 
should be oyerruled because it is contrary to Strickland is not suffic;ient to establish a claim for 
relief. 
Petitioner's claim of ineffective appellate counsel should be summarily dismfased. 
E. Petitioner's Fifth Cause of Action. 
31. Respondent re-states all responses to allegations in paragraphs 1-66 in the Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief and the Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. 
32. Respondent denies the allegations in paragraphs 67 through 69, except 
Respondent admits the allegation in sub-paragraph 69.1 
33. Respondent denies the allegations in paragraphs 70 through I 00, excepting certain 
portions of sub-paragraphs in which Respondent has insufficient information 
upon which to admit or deny allegations or conclusions contained therein. 
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E. Why the State's Motion for Summary Dismissal should be granted with respect to 
Petitioner's Fifth Cause of Action. 
Petitioner offers a laundry list of claims that trial counsel was ineffective. However, 
Petitioner fails to support this laundry list of claims with affidavits, records, or other evidence. 
Conclusory allegations unsubstantiated by fact, are insufficient to entitle the Petitioner to an 
evidentiary hearing. LC. § 19-4903. In this instance, Petitioner offers no facts to support his 
bare and conclusory allegations. Rather, Petitioner offers suppositions of inaction as opposed 
to documented ineptness by trial counsel. Petitioner asserts errors that may just as easily be 
defined as trial tactics. Petitioner further indicates that the Court should string together this list 
of errors and determine a prejudicial effect. 
That trial counsel is anexperienced crirnin.al defense attorney and litigato,r in good 
standing seems to bear no weight in Petitioner's 20-20 hindsight review. Also, not mentioned 
is the fact the Petitioner was competent to stand trial, fully able and capable to assist trial 
counsel in his own defense, and presumably participated fully in the strategies and decision-
making throughout the course of the trial. As is customary in criminal cases in general and in 
this case specifically, trial counsel and defendant prepared and presented to the jury a theory of 
their defense, offered evidence and witnesses to support that theory. Together, the trial counsel 
and client made decisions, strategic and tactical, throughout the conduct of the case. Th.ere is 
nothing offered in the Petition or Amended Petition that demonstrate by a preponderance of 
evidence, that Petitioner, by and through his trial counsel, was unable to present his entire case 
and defense to the jury; or, th.at Petitioner, by and through his trial counsel, was prejudiced by 
performance that was deficient. 
Furthermore, Petitioner fails to meet the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington 
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for purposes of determining whether counsel was ineffective. A court will "not second-guess 
strategic and tactical decisions and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction 
relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of 
. the relevant law ... " State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561(2008); Prattv. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
584 (2000). In addition, "[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within 
the wide range of professional assistance." Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988). 
Petitioner has not shown that any of trial counsel's strategic decisions resulted from 
inadequate preparation or ignorance of the relevant law. Therefore, Petitioner's claims of 
ineffective trial counsel cannot be the basis for his relief and should be summarily dismissed. 
F. Conclusion. 
- -· 
The Petitioner bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the 
allegations upon which his request for post-conviction relief is based. LC. § 19-4907; St~art v. 
State, 118 Idaho 865,869 (1990); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,271 (Ct.App.2002). 
Petitioner 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 permits summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction 
relief upon motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. "Summary dismissal is 
permissible when the petitioner's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if 
resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle the petitioner to the requested relief. If such a 
factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted." State v. Payne, 146 
Idaho 548, 561 (2008); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271 (Ct.App.2002). Petitions that are 
unverified and conclusory may be dismissed by motion for summary disposition. LC.§ 29-
4906. Conclusory or unverified allegations are "insufficient to entitle petitioner to an 
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evidentiary hearing." King v. State, 114 .Idaho 442, 446 (Ct.App.1988). 
The State respectfully requests that this Court grant the State's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal because the Petition and the Amended Petition fail to: 
• meet the statutory requirements to properly support claims with evidence; and, 
• assert claims not valid under The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act; and, 
• raise issues that could and more properly should have been decided on direct appeal 
but were not raised; and, 
• demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact; and. therefore, 
no relief may be granted under The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. 
Alternatively, Respondent requests that this matter be set for hearing at a time 
convenient for the Court. 
DATED this 4th day of February 2013. 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE -
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND DISMISSAL AND TO SET FOR 
HEARING was 
_Jl) ~d delivered, o . ~VVv~-?-:~~,cf 
(2) __ hand delivered via court basket, or 
(3) __ sent via facsimile, or 
( 4) __ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United 
States Mail. 
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
Dennis Benjamin 
Deborah Whipple 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Barlett LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
! J/2_ 
DATED this (f; day of February, 2013. 
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CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
PETITIONER'S RENEWED 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSIDON 
Petitioner, Stacey Grove, asks the Court to grant summary disposition in his favor and 
grant the relief requested in his Petition. There is good cause to grant the motion because even 
.considering the Respondent's Answer and Amended Motion for Summary Disposition. and 
Dismissal filed February 6, 2013, and construing the Amended Petition and Answer most 
favorably to the Respondent, Petitioner has established that he is entitled to relief as a matter of 
law. 
This Motion is made pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906( c). It is supported by the affidavits 
already filed herein as well as the allegations and arguments made in the Amended Petition.. See 
1 • PETITIONER'S RENEWED MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
196
re:.:--:-:--~ 
--- ·.'.·" ·,'._~- . ___ ._ .. _ .. ---· --···. .J ; _~<- ----- ·. -<. -- --- -----~ 




Amended Verified Petition, p. 10-12 (argumentreganling confrontation clause claim); p. 18~19 
( argument regarding prosecutorial misconduct claim); p. 20-21 ( argument regarding juror 
misconduct claim); p. 21-23 (argument regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
claim); and p. 39 (argwnent regarding the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim). 
Petitioner will :further support this Renewed Motion with a Memorandum of Law to be 
filed pursuant to the schedule to be established by this Court at the status conference set for 
February 12, 2013. 
Respectfully submitted this ~day of February, 2013. 
iJdud !dluj; ! 
Deborah Whipple 
Attorneys for Stacey Grove 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on February~ 2013, I caused a true and corr~ct copy of the foregoing 
document to be: 
X mailed 
hand delivered 
~ emailed to nancececcarelli@co.nezperce.id.u.s 
to: Nance Ceccarelli 
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
~\lf;;. 
Dennis Benjamin 
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CASE NO. CV12-01798 
ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS 
AND ARGUMENT 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent, 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1) Petitioner's Response to State's Motion for Summary Disposition and Petitioner's 
Brief in Support of Petitioner's Renewed Motion for Summary Disposition due on or 
before March 15, 2013; 
2) State's Reply Brief in Support ofits Motion for Summary Disposition and State's 
Response to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition due on or before March 
29, 2013; 
ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS 
AND ARGUMENT 1 
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3) Petitioner's Reply Brief in Support of Petitioner's Renewed Motion for Summary 
Disposition due on or before April 12, 2013; 
4) Oral argument shall take place before the above-entitled Court in the Courtroom 
of the Nez Perce County Courthouse on April 30, 2013, commencing at 1 :30 p.m~ 
DATED this 12 f'day of February, 2013. 
G-e(ib r? 
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS AND 
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Boise, Idaho 83701 
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CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN 
RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION AND 
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S 
MOTION 
Petitioner, Stacey Grove, submits the following opposition to the state's motion to grant 
summary disposition and in support of his motion for summary disposition. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In proceedings under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, the applicant has the 
burden of eventually proving the allegations which entitle him to relief by a preponderance of the 
evidence. However, until the allegations contained in a verified application for post-conviction 
relief are controverted by the state, they must be deemed to be true for the purpose of 
determining if an evidentiary hearing is to be held. A motion to dismiss, unsupported by 
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affidavits, depositions or other materials does not controvert the allegations in the petition. 
Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975). Thus, at this point, the state's 
motion for summary disposition, which is unsupported by any evidentiary material, has not 
controverted any of the allegations in-the Amended Petition.- Id.-
Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief when 
they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or do not justify relief as a 
matter oflaw. This Court may summarily grant an application for post-conviction relief only 
when it appears from the pleadings and the record that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw, but may not grant a motion to 
dismiss a petition when, reviewing the facts in a light most favorable to the petitioner, the 
allegations would entitle the petitioner to relief. The standard to be applied to a trial court's 
determination that no material issue of fact exists is the same type of determination as in a 
summary judgment proceeding. Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,321,900 P.2d 795, 797 
(1995), citing Kraftv. State, 100 Idaho 671,674,603 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1979). 
In this case, the state has failed to meet its burden of showing that Mr. Grove would not 
be entitled to relief if his allegations are true. Thus, summary disposition in its favor should not 
be granted. At the same time, it has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the 
truth of Mr. Grove's allegations. Consequently, summary disposition in his favor should be 
granted. 
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IT.ARGUMENT 
A. Mr. Grove's Right to Confront Witnesses Against Him was Violated 
1. Legal background 
I --· 
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause-provides that, "In all crin?-inal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with witnesses against him." 
The Supreme Court has held "that this bedrock procedural guarantee applies to both federal and 
state prosecutions." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965). Article 1, § 13 of the Idaho 
Constitution similarly guarantees a criminal defendant the right to "appear and defend in person." 
The U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), 
significantly altered Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause analysis prior to the trial in this 
case; The Crawford Court held that testimonial statements of witnesses absentfrom trial are 
admissible only where the declarant is unavailable and where defendant had a prior opportunity 
to cross-examine the witness. 541 U.S. at 59. As to the definition of ''testimonial," the Court 
first looked to an early dictionary definition of "testimony," i.e., "A solemn declaration or 
affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." 541 U.S. at 51, quoting 
l·N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828). In addition, the Court 
listed three "core" testimonial statements: (1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional 
equivalent-that is, material such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the 
defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would 
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially;" (2) "extrajudicial statements ... contained in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;". 
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and (3) "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted). This, however, is not an exclusive list of 
''testimonial" evidence. Id. 
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), followed Crawford. There, the United States 
Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from 
other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to 
the Confrontation Clause." Therefore, the threshold question in Confrontation Clause analysis is 
whether the statement is testimonial. If it is, the evidence may be admitted only if the witness is 
unavailable to testify and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the wi1ness. 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 821. 
The Idaho Supreme Court first applied the new confrontation clause analysis in State v. 
Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 911 (2007), the year prior to the trial in Mr. Grove's case. It 
synthesized Crawford and Davis and stated that a statement is testimonial ''when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution, unless made in the course of 
police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating the primary purpose of the 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency." 145 Idaho at 144, 
176 P.3d at 916. The Hooper Court found that a forensic interview of a child witness was 
testimonial. "[S]ince the purpose of a forensic interview is to collect information to be used in a 
- criminal-Prosecution, andth:ereis a clear connection between the police and the STAR Center, 
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the interview was the functional equivalent of a police interrogation. Thus, it is testimonial under 
Crawford and Davis, and inadmissible unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a 
prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness." 145 Idaho at 142-143, 176 P.3d at 914-15. 
--The confrontation-Clause error is.subjected to a heightened harmless error test As the 
Hooper Court wrote, "Whether a conviction for a criminal offense should stand when a state has 
failed to accord a constitutionally guaranteed right is a federal question. Before a federal 
constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The test for harmless error is whether a reviewing court can 
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result without the 
admission of the challenged evidence." 145 Idaho at 146, 176 P.3d at 918, citing Chapman v. 
-- State of California, 386 U.S.18, 24 (1967). 
2. Why relief should be granted to Mr. Grove 
Mr. Grove's right to confront Dr. Reichard was violated at trial. This Court should grant 
summary disposition in his favor and order a new trial because there. is not a genuine issue of 
material fact and the facts established prove the cause of action. 
a. The facts alleged by Mr. Grove have not been controverted by the state 
As to the factual background, the state has admitted many of the factual allegations 
establishing the cause of action in the Amended Petition. See Answer (admitting ,r,r 1-15, 17-23, 
25-31, and 34). In addition, the state has admitted in relevant part ,r,r 36-38. Id. The allegations 
contained in ,r,r 24 (including subparts 1-24), 32-33, 36.1, 37.1, 37.2, and 38.1-38.5, while denied 
- by the state, are all--eonclusively pr-oven as true by the transcript of the ·criminal trial, of whichthe~'-· - ____ _ 
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Court has taken judicial notice. Each of the allegations denied by the state listed above, contain a 
citation to the portion of the trial transcript which establishes the claim. Thus, the mere fact that 
the state has denied a factual allegation which is conclusively proven by the trial transcript does 
- , - ,~_ 0 :aot-raise a genuine iss:ue of material-fact, -esp€cially as the state has not made _a claim-that the _ 
transcript does not accurately represent the trial proceedings. See Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 
834, 838, 172 P .3d 1109, 1113 (2007) ("Allegations contained in the application are insufficient 
for the granting of relief when ... they are clearly disproved by the record of the original 
proceedings[.]"), quoting Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518,523, 164 P.3d 798,803 (2007); see 
also McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567,570,225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010).1 
b. The state's legal analysis of the claim is without merit 
The facts alleged establish a confrontation clause violation. The state, however, argues 
that the disputed evidence was admissible under I.RE. 702 and 703 and thus, there was no 
confrontation clause violation. See Answer and Amended Motion for Summary Disposition and 
Dismissal (hereinafter "State's Motion"), pg. 3-4. As set forth below, there are at least two 
problems with the state's analysis. 
First, the fact that evidence may be admissible under the rules of evidence does not 
necessarily make it admissible under the confrontation clause. As stated by the Idaho Supreme 
Court, "The hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause have similar policy objectives. 
1 Although the question was not directly presented in any of the cases cited, it logically 
follows that if facts alleged by the petitioner which are conclusively disproved by the record are 
insufficient for the granting of relief, then allegations denied by the state yet clearly proved by the 
___ -- record are insufficient for the granting of relief in the state's favor. See also Cooper v, 8_tqf.g, :,_ -- _ 
supra. (A motion to dismiss, unsupported by affidavits, depositions or other materials, does not 
controvert the allegations in the petition. ) 
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However, they are not coextensive. Some out-of-court declarations which are admissible under 
hearsay exceptions may violate confrontation rights." State v. Wright, 116 Idaho 382, 384-85, 
775 P.2d 1224, 1226-27 (l989)judgment affdwhile overruled on different grounds, 497 U.S. 
-'~--~ ·- -----805(1990} An--0-xampleofthis-i-s-Brutenv, United-States, 391 U.S.,-123 (1968), (where the prior_, ... - ,_ .. ,,. 
admissions of a co-defendant were held to be not admissible against defendant under the 
confrontation clause when the co-defendant was not available to be cross-examined). In this 
regard, the United States Supreme Court noted that ''we have more than once found a violation of 
confrontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably 
recognized hearsay exception." California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970), citing Barber 
v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) and Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). Consequently, this 
aspect of the state's argument in support of its Motion is squarely foreclosed by controlling Idaho 
and United States Supreme Court precedent. 
Second, the evidence was not fully admissible under the rules of evidence. Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 703 states that: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the 
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in 
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts 
or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the 
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their 
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially 
outweighs their prejudicial effect. 
(Emphasis added). The purpose of the italicized portion of the rule was to ensure that I.R.E. 703 
not be BSe-d:as·ameans to avoid the prohibition on hearsay. State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, , 
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426-27, 224 P.3d 485, 493-94 (2009). "Some Idaho courts have allowed inadmissible evidence to 
come in through an expert who testifies on direct about what he or she relied on in forming the 
opinion and this has been a back door for getting this evidence in the record." Idaho Rule of 
Evidenee-JQ3"~'setves,to-prevent an- expert witness from serving-as a conduit for the intr:oduotion --s -:---- ~ -. 
of otherwise inadmissible evidence." Id. Professor D. Craig Lewis states that, "Properly applied, 
this rule allows the expert to state an opinion based on inadmissible evidence and to indicate the 
general nature of the sources on which the expert has relied, but not to disclose, directly or 
indirectly, the contents of the sources on direct examination unless they are otherwise admissible, 
or the court makes the required balancing determination." D. Craig Lewis, Idaho Trial Handbook 
§ 16:9 (2d ed.). · 
- fu the present case, the Court did not make a finding that Dr; Reichard's report was 
, 
admissible because its probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the other experts' opinions 
substantially outweighed its prejudicial effect, nor was it admitted for the limited purpose of 
evaluating the other doctors' opinion, and it is plain that the testimony was not offered for this 
limited purpose. Rather, the state clearly relied upon the hearsay evidence contained in Dr. 
Reichard' s report for the purpose of demonstrating the truth of the matter asserted therein. 
Accordingly, the various doctors' testimony as to hearsay received from Dr. Reichard was not 
admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 703. State v. Watkins, supra. 
c. The evidence was "testimonial" 
Dr. Reichard's report and the hearsay testimony about its specific contents by other 
doctors-dearly fits within the definition of"core" testimonial statements under.Crawford,.supra, : .... 
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arid its prodigy. The United -States Supreme Court applied Crawford in Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309-310 (2009), and held that the state's use of a forensic 
laboratory report to prove that seized cocaine was of a certain quality and quantity violated the · 
· Confr-ontation Glause because-no live witness competenU.otestify to the truth of;the statement-s--- -
made in the report was available for cross-examination. In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, - U.S. 
--, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011 ), the defendant was arrested after failing field sobriety tests and 
refusing a breath test. Bullcoming was arrested and required to give a blood sample to determine 
his blood-alcohol concentration ("BAC"). The blood sample was ·sent to the New Mexico 
Department of Health, Scientific Laboratory Division, where a forensic analyst signed a 
"certificate of analyst," part of a standard form titled "Report of Blood Alcohol Analysis," 
recording Bullcoming's BAC as 0.21 grams per hundred milliliters of blood. ·Bullcoming was 
then charged with aggravated driving under the influence. At trial, the prosecutor introduced the 
report and certificate of analyst into evidence as a business record. However, the forensic analyst 
who authored the report did not testify at trial and was not otherwise subject to 
cross-examination. Instead, the prosecutor called as a witness a scientist from the same 
laboratory who had not signed the Report of Blood Alcohol Analysis, and neither participated in 
nor observed the test on Bullcoming's blood sample. The testifying scientist was, however, 
familiar with blood-alcohol analysis and the laboratory's testing protocols. Bullcoming, 131 
S.Ct. at 2706-12. 
The United States Supreme Court held that the Report of Blood Alcohol Analysis was 
··- -- -'~estim-0nial" and therefore within the ambitofthe Confrontation Clause underMelendez,...,..Diaz. 
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Id. at 2716-17. It said-that "[a] document created solely for an 'evidentiary purpose,' ... made 
in aid of a police investigation, ranks as testimonial." Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2717, quoting 
Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532.). Bullcoming also clarified that the "surrogate testimony" of 
- 0 ~ithe-substitute-witness-!'does not meet the constitutional :requirement [of cross.".'examination.l- .The :-
accused's right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the certification, unless that analyst 
is unavailable at trial, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that 
particular [analyst]." Id. at 2710.2 
Pursuant to the authority above, Dr. Reichard's report was testimonial evidence and the 
report and the hearsay testimony about it was not admissible absent a showing of both Dr. 
Reichard's unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination, neither of which was 
present here. In fact, the admission of autopsy reports have been held to violate the confrontation 
clause by the federal courts and several state courts. The United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit applied Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming in United States v. Moore, 
651 F.3d 30, 72-73 (D.C. Cir. 2011) cert. granted in part, 132 S. Ct. 2772 (U.S. 2012) and cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 2772 (U.S. 2012) and affd in part sub nom. Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. · 
714 (2013), and found the admission of an autopsy report was error. In Smith, the government 
2 At the time of Mr. Grove's 2008 trial, the United States Supreme Court had decided 
both Crawford (2004) and Davis (2006). Moreover, both Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming apply 
here because both are simply applications of the rule first announced in Crawford. But, even if 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming could be read as announcing a new rule of criminal procedure, 
they would still apply here because they were both decided prior to the conclusion of Mr. 
Grove's direct appeal and "decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court announcing a new rule apply to 
.. ···- __ ... . all criminal cases still pending on direct review.:' Rhoades-v. State, l42Jdahol30, J39, 233 
P.3d 61, 70 (2010). Melendez-Diaz was decided in2009 and Bullcoming was decided on June 
23, 2011. The remittitur in Mr. Grove's direct appeal was not issued until September 12, 2011. 
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called Dr. Jonathan Arden as a witness. At that time, Dr. Arden was the ChiefD.C. Medical -
Examiner. He was later a defense witness in the criminal trial here. Dr. Arden testified to the 
contents of approximately 30 autopsy reports authored by other medical examiners in his office, 
· · ·c-----'-' 0 ,,-- but·he·neither performed nor- observed the ,auiopsies.:and his-signature,.did-.notcappear-011 any.of -. 
the reports. The autopsy reports were admitted into evidence over a defense confrontation clause 
objection. The Circuit Court found that the autopsy reports were testimonial for purposes of the 
Confrontation Clause. Moore, 651 F.3d at 72 ("The government's attempts to avoid the 
Confrontation Clause, on the grounds that the autopsy reports rank as non-testimonial ... are 
foreclosed by Bullcoming.") Accord, State v. Davidson, 242 S.W.3d 409,417 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2007); Martinez v. State, 311 S.W.3d 104, 111 (Tex. Ct. App. 2010); see also, State v. Freeman, 
-- 2012 WL 1656975 (Tenn. Court ofCriminalAppeals May 9;·2012} review denied (October 17,-
2012). 
Dr. Reichard's brain pathology report admitted in this case was testimonial because it fit 
into the first and third of the three types of"core" testimonial statements: it was the type of 
pretrial statement ''that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially''; and it 
was a statement that was "made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness 
reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial." Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted). If anything, Dr. Reichard's report is a clearer 
example of testimonial evidence than the autopsy reports found to be testimonial in Moore v. 
United States, State v. Davidson, Martinez v. State, and State v. Freeman. First, Dr. Reichard is a 
forensic neuropathologist, Exhibit B, pg. 910, ln. 5-7, and as Medical Examiner for the State of 
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New Mexico, his findings were no doubt regularly used in criminal prosecutions. Dr. Ross 
explained that the medical examiner's office in New Mexico had a "forensic function." Exhibit 
B, pg. 953, In. 1-7. Dr. Ross also testified that he decided to send the brain to Dr. Reichard 
---<~-~-- --,-- -- ,rbecausethe-case involved an infant with4-blunt-fore© injury, ExhibiiB,-:pg.,927,-ln.-25-~pg~928, --- --
1n. 20, again a clear indication that suspected criminal activity was being investigated and that 
Dr. Reichard's report was part of that investigation. Consequently, Dr. Reichard's report 
contained testimonial evidence which was not admissible under the confrontation clause because 
the state never called Dr. Reichard to testify. 
The unconstitutional admission of the evidence cannot be found to be harmless. Indeed, 
the state does not raise a harmless error argument in its motion for summary disposition. The 
state's failure to raise a harmless error argument is sensible because any such argument would be 
disingenuous in light of the heavy emphasis the state put on Dr. Reichard' s testimony at trial. 
(Dr. Ross's testimony regarding the testimonial statements of Dr. Reichard are set forth in ,r 24.1 
-24.24 in the Amended Petition. Dr. Hunter's testimony regarding the testimonial statements of 
Dr. Reichard are set forth in ,r 37.1-37.3. Dr. Harper's testimony regarding the testimonial 
statements of Dr. Reichard are set forth in ,r 38.3-38.5.} During closing arguments, the state 
argued, "if you believe the opinions of the State's witnesses, then the only person who had the 
opportunity to inflict these injuries was the defendant sitting before you." Exhibit B, pg. 1415, 
In. 17-20. What the prosecution was referring to was the finding in Dr. Reichard's report that 
there was a tear in the corpus callosum, which was indicative of a high degree of force which 
would have rendered  unconscious or nearly unconscious-at the time of impact. Exhibit B, 
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pg. 930, ln. 21-23. Since,  was not unconscious at the time Lisa Nash left the house to go to 
work, Dr. Reichard's testimonial statements were the key in establishing the state's time line 
which pointed to Jv.fr. Grove as the only person who could have inflicted the fatal injury. 
,-- -The Court of Appeals inthe-:dir.ect..appeal noted.the_lmp.ortance ofDr. Reichard's. 
evidence to the state's case: 
Initially, we clarify that the crux of this issue affects the central disputed question 
in this case-when the injuries which ultimately caused K.M.' s death occurred 
and whether it was likely that K.M. would have lost consciousness and/or shown 
severe symptoms immediately after the injuries were inflicted. In other words, did 
the injuries occur on the morning that K.M. lost consciousness-and was alone 
with Grove-or several days prior, when it was undisputed that the injuries could 
not have been inflicted by Grove because he was not alone with K.M. In this 
regard, important to the state's theory of the case that Grove caused the fatal 
injuries on the morning of July 10 was the conclusion of Dr. Reichard, based on 
his microscopic examination ofK.M.'s brain, that K.M. had suffered a laceration 
of the-·corpus callosum, which would have likely caused immediate loss of 
consciousness, thereby implicating Grove as the cause ofK.M.'s injuries during 
the 36-45 minute period of time during which he was alone with K.M. Grove 
points out that both Dr. Ross and Dr. Harper recited Dr. Reichard's observations 
in this regard, as gleaned from the autopsy report, as neither was present during 
the autopsy nor conducted their own microscopic analysis, and relied on these 
observations in forming their respective opinions that K.M.' s injuries had been 
inflicted on July 10. 
By contrast, Grove's expert, Dr. Arden, testified that he did not agree with Dr. 
Reichard that a laceration was present and that the anomaly was the result of 
handling of the brain after death. He also offered his opinion, after examination of 
the microscopic slides, that K.M.'s injuries had been inflicted at least three days 
prior to death (thus absolving Grove of having caused them) and that they would 
not have necessarily resulted in immediate loss of consciousness. 
State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 490, 259 P.3d 629, 636 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied (Sept. 12, 
2011). In light of the central importance of the evidence from Dr. Reichard, the state does not 
argue harmless error and cannot meetthe burden of.proving the unconstitutional admission of _ 
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-testimonial evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 
18, 24 (1967) ("[W]e hold ... that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the 
court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). 
-·--, --~- -- ·--Finally, the state's -argument-that Mr.: Grovec:~haci.s-ufficient-0pportunity to object to any_ 
improper testimony," State's Motion, pg. 4, is not persuasive because the fact that defense 
counsel failed to make proper evidentiary and confrontation clause objections does not nullify or 
excuse the constitutional error. In fact, the state's argument simply goes to prove that defense 
counsel's performance was deficient under Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668 (1984), but 
that is a different and separate cause of action which is addressed in Section E below. 
d. Conclusion 
--... ::J - --
As Mr. ·-Grove has presented uncontroverted ·evidence· of a confrontation clause violation· 
and the state cannot show the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court should 
deny the state's motion, grant Mr. Grove's motion for summary disposition, and order a new trial 
B. The Misconduct by the Prosecutor Deprived Mr. Grove of a Fair Trial 
1. Legal background 
The due process clauses of Art. 1,-§ 13, of the Idaho Constitution, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment ensure, at a minimum, "that criminal trials shall be fundamentally fair." 
Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 99 Idaho 18, 19,576 P.2d 1052, 1053 (1978). Further, "[i]t is the 
duty of a prosecuting attorney to see that the accused has a fair and impartial trial." State v. 
Spencer, 74 Idaho 173,183,258 P.2d 1147, 1153 (1953)(emphasis added)(findingthatthe 
prosecutor-'s misconduct.warranted a new trial-)_: .. The prosecutoris charged with the dual task of 
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ensuring that the government's case is presented "earnestly and vigorously, using every 
legitimate means to bring about a conviction, but also to see that justice is done and that every 
criminal defendant is accorded a fair trial." State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,449, 816 P.2d 
100-2;-1-006 {Ct. App. -199-1); -Th€refoce, .it is improper f.or-a-prosecutor to appeal.to the emotions, -·."~< _ .. ,-- -~, _ 
passion or prejudice of the jury through the use of inflammatory tactics. State v. Phillips, 144 
Idaho 82, 87, 156 P.3d 583, 588 (Ct. App. 2007). 
2. Why relief should be granted to Mr. Grove 
While the state has denied the allegations in its Answer, it has not offered any proof that 
the prosecuting attorney did not engage in the acts alleged in ,r 41-49 and the subparts thereof. 
Nor could it in large part, as most of the allegations are conclusively proved by the record in the 
-criminal case pursuant to Hauschulz·v.State; supra and Workman-v. State, supra:· The only··· 
exceptions are the allegations that Mr. Spickler exposed the jury to prejudicial extra-judicial 
evidence found in ,r 44.1-44.2. These allegations, however, are supported by the affidavits of 
Craig Stamper, Karen Stamper, Stacey Grove, Deborah Grove and Stevie Grove previously filed. 
As there is no affidavit from Mr. Spickler denying the allegations, there is no genuine question of 
whether this instance of misconduct occurred either. 
a. The prosecutor exposed the jury to extra-judicial evidence 
During the trial, but prior to the Court going on the record, the prosecutor projected 
family photos of  onto the court room screen while the jury entered the courtroom. He then 
interchanged the family photos with the autopsy photographs. Thus, the prosecutor exposed the 
jury to evidence outside the presence .ofthe Court; invoking sympathy for  and. his .. 
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biological family and arousing passion and prejudice against Mr. -Grove. This was prosecutorial 
misconduct which amounted to fundamental error. "Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level 
of fundamental error when it is calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse prejudice or 
· ·----·passion-·againstthe"defendant,-orisso inflammatory-thatthejurors may be influenced to- .. , ... -=>-. ,-- 0 -- - • 
determine guilt on factors outside the evidence." State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 18, 189 P.3d 477, 
480 (Ct. App. 2008), citing State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 715, 85 P.3d 1109, 1114 (Ct. 
App.2003). 
b. The prosecutor violated this Court's order in limine 
At trial, the prosecutor called  Bandel, the sister of  as a witness. Defense 
counsel objected noting that  was a child and arguing that the prosecutor's purpose in 
calling her was "obviously ... just to impassion or inflame the jury'' and he·expected-  to 
testify that when she last saw her brother "he was lying on his mother's bed, and she gave him a 
hug and kiss and he said good bye." Exhibit B, pg. 821, ln. 24 -pg. 822, In. 8. In response, the 
prosecutor told the Court that his purpose in calling  was to elicit evidence regarding the 
"condition of  Martin on the morning of July 10th," and argued that he only had Lisa Nash 
and  to provide evidence on that topic. Exhibit B, pg. 822, ln. 17-23. He stated, "I'm 
entitled to ask her what she recalls that morning, what she recalls of the physical condition of her 
brother the last time she saw him." Exhibit B, pg. 823, ln. 1-3. The Court overruled defense 
counsel's objection "based on the argument made by Mr. Spickler on behalf of the State." 
Exhibit B, pg. 823, In. 8-9. Mr. Spickler then elicited testimony from  that she was a 
· "[p ]retty strong little girl,'' that she-said :'bye" to  before she left that morning, gave.hima 
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kiss and a hug and that she never saw her "brother again after that." Exhibit B, pg. 825, In. 22; 
pg. 826, In. 15-18; pg. 827, In. 16-17. Thus, the prosecutor elicited highly prejudicial testimony 
in violation of this Court's order in limine. (Set forth at Amended Petition ,r 45.1-45.7.) 
· ·· That-testimony went beyondwhat the pFosecutor told-the Court he would elicit-aadJ.t-had-
the effect of inflaming the passions and prejudices of the jury and encouraging the jury to convict 
Mr. Grove for reasons other than the relevant evidence. Accordingly, it was misconduct as a 
prosecutor may not intentionally seek to admit evidence the court has previously ruled excluded. 
''Violation of a district court order governing the presentation of evidence may constitute 
misconduct." State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679,684,227 P.3d 933,938 (Ct. App. 2010) 
(misconduct to ask about defendant's alleged possession of drugs which had been excluded pre-
- trial); State v: Martinez, 136 Idaho 521; 37 P.3d-18 (Ct. App:200I)(prosecutoriatmisconductin 
eliciting a statement from the victim that had been excluded from the preliminary hearing and 
attempting to elicit the contents of a doctor's report which had previously been ruled 
inadmissible); State v. Agundis, 127 Idaho 587,903 P.2d 752 (Ct. App. 1995) (prosecutorial 
misconduct in eliciting hearsay evidence after the district court had sustained the defendant's 
objection to this questioning); State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 572, 165 P.3d 273,286 (2007) 
(prosecutorial misconduct to raise issue on examination after court had instructed prosecutor to 
alert the court beforehand so it could make a ruling on admissibility). 
c. The prosecutor admitted highly prejudicial andimproper photographs of the 
many sympathy cards sent to  'smother 
During Detective Birdsell's testimony, photographs taken inside the Nash trailer 
approximately a month after Kyler's death were admitted. Exhibit B, pg. 996, In. 19 -pg. 997, 
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ln. 23; Exhibit C (State's Exhibits 4, 5 and 6). These-photos were unfairly prejudicial and highly 
inflammatory because they included a large display of sympathy cards sent to Lisa Nash. 
It was prosecutorial misconduct to introduce these photographs because they had the effect and 
were.intend@<lto arose sympathy-towar-d-Kyl.er~sbiok>gicalparents and inflam~ th~_passionofthe _ 
jurors against Mr. Grove. 
The above was prosecutorial misconduct because "[a]ppeals to emotion, passion, or 
prejudice of the jury through the use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible. State v. Eldred, 
148 Idaho 317, 320, 222 P.3d 1011, 1014 (Ct. App. 2009). See also State v. Raudebaugh, 124 
Idaho 758, 769, 864 P.2d 596, 607 (1993). 
d The prosecutor's cross-examination of Mr. Grove was improper 
T'heprosecutor committed misconduct during the cross.c-examination of Mr. Grove:- First, 
he cross-examined Mr. Grove about the fact that Mr. Grove was behind on child support to his 
biological son, a fact both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. Exhibit B, pg. 1115, ln. 21-24. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has written, "An accused in a criminal prosecution is entitled 
to a trial upon competent, relevant evidence; evidence which at least tends to establish his guilt 
or innocence; and evidence which has no such tendency, but which, if effective at all, could only 
serve to excite the minds and inflame the passions of the jury should not be admitted." State v. 
Wilson, 93 Idaho 194, 196-98, 457 P.2d 433, 435-37 (1969), quoting State v. Fleming, 154 
N.W.2d 65, 66 (Neb. 1967). This is so because "[a] fundamental principle of criminal law is that 
where the offen_se charged 'is of itself sufficient to inflame the minds of the average person, it is 
required that there be rigorous insistence upon observance of the rules of the admission of 
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evidence'." Id., quoting People v. Jones, 42 Cal.2d 219,266 P.2d 38 (1954). "However, 
reception at trial of irrelevant and immaterial evidence, which serves no probative function, but 
serves only to inflame the minds and passions of the jury to the prejudice of the defendant is 
-- ---->roversible-error;"-Id- TheidahoSupremeGomt in-Wilson held that evidence~of-,';{t-]he-degree on ,---+~- ---,-·-
pain suffered by a young virgin upon being raped, as opposed to the feelings of a bride when first 
experiencing intercourse with her husband," was patently inadmissible and reminded the 
prosecutor that he was only "entitled to hit as hard as he can above, but not below, the belt." Id, 
quoting State v. Rollo, 351 P.2d 422, 426-427 (Or. 1960). It went on to list several other 
"examples of irrelevant, immaterial and inflammatory material, the admission of which into 
evidence was held to be reversible error," including: 
Evidence that defendant, -accused of Mann Act Violation, failed to file income tax 
returns; evidence that defendant, accused of murder, was a deserter from the army; 
evidence that defendant, accused of arson, had been treated for venereal disease; 
evidence that defendant, accused of murder, while in the army offered a friend 
$500.00 to shoot him in the foot in order to avoid :frontline duty; evidence, in 
prosecution for 'Malicious shooting at and wounding another with intent to kill,' 
of victim's prognosis for recovery and future ability to perform manual labor; 
evidence, in rape prosecution, that victim was pregnant as a result of the rape; 
evidence, in murder prosecution, that victim was married and a parent; evidence 
that married defendant, accused of murdering wife's friend, had been seen with 
other women[.] 
93 Idaho at 198, 457 P.2d at 437. 
The evidence about Mr. Grove's child support arrears fits squarely into the Idaho 
Supreme Court's list of examples of "irrelevant, immaterial and inflammatory material" and it 
was misconduct for the prosecutor to elicit such testimony because it had no such tendency to 
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prove the charge and "could only serve to excite the minds and inflame the passions of the 
jury[.]" Id. 
The prosecutor also committed misconduct when he asked Mr. Grove when he had been 
- : : "·'""~c..,--,----pr-escribed Ativan....and-whether the-prescription ''wa-s a result of [his] emotional st-ate Friday[.]::_<,.·_:- -<-"· ·""'-
Exhibit B, pg. 1120, ln. 9-12. This questioning went beyond the Court's procedure at the time of 
the medical recess, which only informed the jury that "an unforeseen medical situation has arisen 
which affects our ability to proceed with trial today'' and did not mention Mr. Grove or the nature 
of the medical situation. Exhibit B, pg. 1067, In. 3-5. Further, the answer to the question was 
totally irrelevant, yet highly prejudicial to Mr. Grove. 
The prosecutor also committed misconduct in his cross-examination of Mr. Grove when 
· he characterized Mr. Grove 's-swom testimony·as the "story you told, which is -"the story you 
need the jury to believe" and then opined that "some things ... just don't really make sense." 
Exhibit B, pg. 1113, ln. 8-11. Counsel should not interject his personal opinion and beliefs about 
the credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of the accused. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 
82, 86, 156 P.3d 583,587 (Ct. App. 2007); citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,280, 77 P.3d 
956, 969 (2003); State v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 110-11; 594 P.2d 146, 148-49 (1979); State v. 
Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160,169,983 P.2d 233,242 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 
69, 951 P.2d 1288, 1296 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14,909 P.2d 624,632 (Ct. 
App. 1995); State v. Ames, 109 Idaho 373,376, 707 P.2d 484,487 (Ct. App. 1985). The 
prosecutor's characterization of Mr. Grove's testimony as a "story you need the jury to believe" 
and that "some things .. .just don't really make sense" are mere assertions of his personal .. --
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opinions and belief in Mr. Grove's guilt and to the lack of credibility of Mr. Grove's testimony, 
and thus was misconduct. 
e. The prosecutor's cross-examination of Dr. Arden was improper 
,.0~~-- ·-· :--- -----, - . _ .. ,. , ,The.same-type of misconduct was- committed when the.prQsecutorstated in his cr_g_s_~,:-,--- -_-:-- _ , .. 
examination of Dr. Jonathan Arden, that the doctor was "on a special mission here, which is to 
provide such evidence as you might that would support the defense's case[.]" Exhibit B, pg. 
1321, ln. 18-20. The prosecutor's personal evaluation of motives (unsupported by any 
a~issible evidence) and disparagement of Dr. Arden's credibility was misconduct. State v. 
Phillips, supra and cases cited therein. 
f The prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments were replete with 
improprieties 
"Closing argument serves to sharpen and clarify the issues for resolution by the trier of 
fact in a criminal case .... [t]o enlighten the jury-and to help the jurors remember and interpret the 
evidence." State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583,587 (Ct. App. 2007) (internal 
quotations omitted). Therefore, "[t]he prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to 
appeal to the prejudices of the jury." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and 
Defense Functions§ 3-5.8 (3d. ed.1993). While both sides in a trial have traditionally been 
afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury, "[t]his latitude is not boundless, 
however, and it is impermissible to appeal to the emotion, passion, or prejudice of the jury 
through the use of inflammatory tactics." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 266-67, 233 P.3d 
190, 197-98 (Ct. App. 2010), citing State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20-21, 189 P.3d 477, 482-83 
(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007) 
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("Considerable latitude, however, has its limits, both in matters expressly stated and those 
implied."). A prosecutor exceeds the scope of this considerable latitude ifhe or she "attempts to 
secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the 
·-------' -" evidence-cadmitted,during trial,- including. reasonable inferew.es-thatmayhe drawn.fromJhaL ... ,, 
evidence." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
Idaho Supreme Court has long held that the limits on permissible closing argument apply 
most stringently to a prosecuting attorney: 
A prosecuting attorney is a public officer, "acting in a quasi judicial capacity." It 
is his duty to use all fair, honorable, reasonable, and lawful means to secure the 
conviction of the guilty who are or may be indicted in the courts of his judicial 
circuit. He should see that they have a fair and impartial trial, and avoid 
convictions contrary to law. Nothing should tempt him to appeal to prejudices, to 
pervert the testimony, or make statements to the jury, which, whether true or not, 
have not beenproved: The desire for success-should never induce him to endeavor --
to obtain a verdict by arguments based on anything except the evidence in the 
case, and the conclusions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the 
same .... 
It will be observed from the foregoing authorities that the courts do not look with 
favor upon the action of prosecutors in going beyond any possible state of facts 
which can be material as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant in a particular 
case for which he is upon trial. Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of 
the machinery of the court, and that they occupy an official position, which 
necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their statements, action, and 
conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they will give 
to counsel for the accused. It seems that they frequently exert their skill and 
ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, and generally in 
so doing they transgress upon the rights of the accused. It is the duty of the 
prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent 
evidence is submitted to the jury, and above all things he should guard against 
anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors, and tend to hinder them 
from considering only the evidence introduced. 
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State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44, 71 P. 608, 609-11 (1903). See also, State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 
934, 942, 877 P.2d 905, 913 (1994); State v. Givens, 28 Idaho 253, 268, 152 P. 1054, 1058 
(1915). 
C.:·-C_ ---Here,theprosecutor committed multiple instances-.ofmisconduct.during closinga,nd .. 
rebuttal argument. He misstated the defense position regarding pre-existing head injury, saying 
that the defense was that there was "some long-term brain injury." Exhibit B, pg. 1419, ln. 6-10. 
The prosecutor misstated for a second time Dr. Arden's testimony about head injuries. Id., pg. 
1462, ln. 18-19. And, the prosecutor suggested without supporting evidence that Dr. Arden's 
"financial position" leads him to decide what cases he can take. Id, pg. 1429, ln. 8-9. It is 
improper for a prosecutor to misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence. State v. Raudebaugh, 
124 Idaho 758,769, 864 P.2d 596, 607 (1993); State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166, 610 P.2d 
522, 525 (1980); State v. Tupis, 112 Idaho 767, 771-72, 735 P.2d 1078, 1082-83 (Ct. App. 1987); 
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007). 
The prosecutor stated in argument that a "colleague" said that Dr. Arden's answers during 
cross-examination were slippery as an ice cube and the prosecutor opined that the doctor "was 
stretching things." Id, pg. 1430, ln. 4-8; pg. 1461, ln. 11. This violated the prohibition against 
using inflammatory words employed in describing a witness or defendant as well as the 
prohibition against arguing facts not presented in trial. State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 507, 
988 P.2d 1170, 1181 (1999); State v. Kuhn, 139 Idaho 710, 715-16,'85 P.3d 1109, 1114-15 (Ct. 
App. 2003). 
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The prosecutor implied that he had evidence not presented at trial that Mr. Grove had 
previously been "violent with  Exhibit B, pg. 1430, ln. 15-21. The prosecutor told the 
jury that he did not call Kyler's biological father as a witness "because my medical experts 
-- --°'"-'·' 1:manimously, to no exception, said he could nothav-e.-done-it" Id, pg. 1A77,Jn.J8:-20-. .The __ _ __ _ 
prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "[ c ]are takers kill little babies all the 
time." Id, pg. 1460, ln. 5-6. The prosecutor argued without supporting evidence that the 
emotional breakdown of Mr. Grove at trial showed that Mr. Grove had a different kind of 
"emotional breakdown, an instantaneous fit of anger, that morning that resulted in these 
injuries[.]" Id, pg. 1458, ln. 16-18. And the prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence 
that "[p ]arents kill babies all the time," that ''there are literally thousands of [similar] incidents in 
any given span of time" and that "our local paper has probably shown ... probably six more of -
these cases since - since this one started." Id, ln. 5-14. The authority is clear that it is 
misconduct for the prosecutor to refer to facts not in evidence. "It is plainly improper for a party 
to present closing argument that misrepresents or mischaracterizes the evidence." State v. 
Troutman, 148 Idaho 904,911,231 P.3d 549,556 (Ct. App. 2010); see also Griffiths, 101 Idaho 
at 166, 610 P.2d at 525; State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521, 525, 37 P.3d 18, 22 (Ct. App. 2001); 
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. 
Appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics 
are impermissible. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho at 769, 864 P.2d at 607; State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 
891, 898, 792 P.2d 916, 923 (1990); State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839,844,655 P.2d 46, 51 
(1982); Griffiths, 101 Idaho at 168, 610 P.2d at 527. Yet, the prosecutor attempted to invoke 
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sympathy for his expert witness and  by arguing that "Dr. Ross had the unenviable task of 
taking Kyler's body apart piece by piece[.]" Id, pg. 1464, In. 24-25. And he argued that "we 
don't want to let a murderer go free." Id, pg. 1466, In. 9. However, "[u]rging the jury to render a 
·· ~.:::.. . .,-.-,:_:---~i,~verdiet-basecl on factors other thanthe,evide1=1ee--and-jury instructions-; such as,sympathy for the ___ ... -
victim, has no place in closing arguments." State v. Felder, 150 ldaho 269, 275, 245 P.3d 1021, 
1027 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570, 576, 181 P.3d 496,502 (Ct. App. 2007) 
Here the prosecutor appealed to the passions and prejudices of the jury, misstated the 
evidence, used inflammatory language in reference to defense witnesses, argued evidence not 
presented at trial, and misrepresented the state's burden of proof by denigrating the presumption 
of innocence with his argument that it was as bad to let a "murderer go free" as "convicting an 
·1rmocent man." Jd:;pg:1466~ In. 6-9: To the contrary, the burden ofproofrequirementis the 
contitutionally required "fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to 
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,371 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
Although it is manifest from the many instances of misconduct and the egregiousness of 
the individual instances that the prosecutor was intentionally engaging in what he knew to be 
improper behavior, it is not necessary for this Court to find intentional misconduct in order to 
find prosecutorial misconduct. The "decisions of th[ e United States Supreme] Court demonstrate 
that the touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged prosecutorial misconduct is the 
fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 
102 S. Ct. 940,947 (1982}. Whether.or not the prosecutorJmew-his actions were misconduct is 
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not relevant to this analysis. Mr. Grove's right to a fair trial was violated irrespective of the 
intent of the prosecutor. 
g. The error is not harmless 
· '" :--.. ~,i.- - " --- -- - - · · ---The-effect-of the prosecutor?-.s-~misoonduot-requires ~granting ofthe petition.-.:~The 
cumulative error doctrine refers to an accumulation of irregularities, each of which by itself 
might be harmless, but when aggregated show the absence of a fair trial in contravention of the 
defendant's right to due process." State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 21, 189 P.3d 477,483 (Ct. App. 
2008). Thus, it is the cumulative effect of the misconduct engaged in here that should be 
considered. Id. 
The evaluation of the cumulative effect of the misconduct is a legal determination. Thus, 
Mr. Grove is not required to present "supporting evidence thatthe prosecutor's conduct was 
sufficiently egregious as to result in fundamental error," as argued by the state. State's Motion, 
pg. 6. Instead, the Court must consider all the misconduct, established by the trial record and 
affidavits, and then make a legal determination as to whether Mr. Grove is entitled to relief. 
Considering all the misconduct, it is clear that the state cannot meet its burden of proving its 
misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as required by Chapman v. California, 
supra. 
Finally, the state makes a variation on an argument made in its confrontation clause 
argument: That ''trial counsel had sufficient opportunity to bring to the Court's attention any bad 
acts or miscondµct by the prosecutor." State's Motion, pg. 6. But again, that argument proves 
too much, at least from the state's point of view. Mr. -Grove agrees that defense counsel's 
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performance was deficient because he failed to object to any of the many instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct. Defense counsel should have objected to the prosecutor eliciting 
highly prejudicial testimony in violation of this Court's order in limine. (Set forth at Amended 
- --- --------- .. <::.I 
--- ·· ,, ··-- -· -- P-etitien 14S .1-45. 7;) He should4iave.-obj€Gted-to the highly -prejudicial and improper.- -- - - . 
photographs of the many sympathy cards sent to Kyler's mother. (Set forth at Amended Petition 
145.8-45.10.) He should have objected to the improper cross-examination of his client. (Set 
forth at Amended Petition 146 and 48.1-48.3.) He should have objected to the improper cross-
examination of his sole defense expert witness. (Set forth at Amended Petition 1 4 7.) And he 
should have objected to the multiple instances ofprosecutorial misconduct set forth in the 
Amended Petition at 149.1-49.14. But all the state's argument in this regard proves is that, in 
· addition to a due process violation based upon prosecutorial misconduct, Mr; Grove was also 
deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, supra. 
That cause of action is addressed in Section E below. 
h. Conclusion 
As Mr. Grove has presented uncontroverted evidence ofprosecutorial misconduct and the 
state cannot show the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court should deny the 
state's motion, grant Mr. Grove's motion for summary disposition, and order anew trial. 
C. Juror Misconduct Deprived Mr. Grove of a Fair Trial 
1. Legal background 
A juror's inattentiveness, by sleeping during witness testimony, may constitute 
misconduct; State v. Strange.,.147Idaho 686.,-68.9~,214 P.3d672; 675 (Ct. App. 2009). See e.g.,_ 
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State v. Majid, 914 N.E.2d 1113, 1115 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (Numerous instances of jurors' 
sleeping during murder trial, including during eyewitness testimony, violated defendant's right to 
due process and constituted plain error). "[A] juror who sleeps through much of the trial 
-- · testimony cannot be expectedt&perform his-duti.-es!-':.cJd,':e-iting-United States v, -Smith, 550 F.2d.- --, ,:c= __ , .. _ .. ,.._ 
277, 285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 434 U.S. 841 (1977); United 
States v. Cameron, 464 F.2d 333,335 (3rd Cir. 1972). "Due process mandates that the defendant 
is entitled to have a jury hear and evaluate the evidence," State v. Majid, supra, that is why the 
jurors in this case were instructed by the Court ''to decide the facts from all the evidence in the 
case." Exhibit B, pg. 1399, ln. 24-25 ( emphasis added). The repeated instances of sleeping by 
several of the jurors, especially given they were sleeping during the critical medical testimony of 
· Drs. Ross and Arden, denied Mr: Grove his state and federal constitutional rights to a jury trial 
and due process. 
2. Why relief should be granted to Mr. Grove 
a. The uncontroverted evidence shows juror misconduct 
Several affidavits of individuals who witnessed jurors sleeping during trial testimony 
have been filed in support of this Petition. Stevie Grove, Deborah Grove, Lynette Walton, Jack 
Grove and Carol Grove were all present in the courtroom during the criminal trial proceedings 
and they observed the following five jurors sleeping during court at various times during the 
proceedings: Casey Neuman, Mike Keller, Cynthia Barrett, Greg Lind and James Yates. They 
observed jurors sleeping during the testimony of Dr. Marco Ross on July 22, 2008, during the 
testimony-of Dr. Deborah Harper on July24/6008, and during the testimony ofDr;-Jonathan 
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Arden on July 29, 2008. Further, all saw that "[ o ]ne juror, Mike Keller, was so soundly asleep 
that his head was resting against the back wall during Dr. Ross's testimony." Affidavit of Carol 
Grove, pg. 2; Affidavit of Lynette Walton, pg. 2; Affidavit of Jack Grove, pg. 2; Affidavit of 
- - -- - -- •· · - -Deborah Grove,-pg>2~i Affidavit of Stevie Gt-ove-,-pg;- 2~ ---- ----- - ••··-:-------,:-·:··.;.,-.T-::,.-:: 
Their observation of Juror Keller sleeping with his head resting against the back wall is 
corroborated by Craig Stamper who stated that "during the testimony, t twice observed a juror in 
the back row sleeping [and] [t]hat this sleeping juror leaned back to rest his head on the wall as 
he slept." Affidavit of Craig Stamper, pg. 1. Lori Stamper observed a juror, either Michael 
Keller or Kendall Loetscher (the presiding juror) in the back row sleeping. Affidavit of Lori 
Stamper, pg. 1. Karen Stamper stated in her affidavit that she saw jurors sleeping. 
Further, the witness's affidavits. ate confirmed by the trial transcripts which show the Court was 
required to take several unplanned recesses because jurors repeatedly fell asleep during the 
presentation of the evidence. Exhibit B, pg. 921, ln. 16 -pg. 922, ln. 6; pg. 983, ln. 9-13; pg. 
1351, ln. 19-25. 
While the state has denied the allegations, it has not offered any proof that the jurors were 
not asleep as alleged in the Amended Petition and the supporting affidavits. As there is no 
affidavit from Mr. _Spickler or other witness denying the allegations, there is no genuine question 
of whether this instance of juror misconduct occurred. Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho at 545,531 
P.2d at 1190. 
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b. The state 's arguments are without merit 
Confusingly, the state complains that the affidavits are from "audience members" 
''without any verification." State's Motion, pg. 8. However, the state offers no reason why 
" di .b " . ·bs d ify th . . . th · - · au· ence·mem·ers-.arenotas competentto-co erve-an .test . as epartic1pantsm e_,a._>------.c<· 
courtroom proceedings. Further, all the affidavits are ''verified" in the legal sense that they are 
sworn to under oath. See, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/verify. The affidavits also are 
verified in the conversational sense that they establish the truth, accuracy, or reality of the claim 
because there are six witnesses who all saw Casey Neuman, Mike Keller, Cynthia Barrett, Greg 
Lind, and James Yates asleep during the testimony ofDrs. Ross and Arden. Further, those six 
affidavits are corroborated by two other witnesses and the trial transcript. 
Next, the state cites to Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho.139; 150, 139 P.3d 741, 752 (Ct.App. 
2006), to argue that there was no due process violation, State's Motion, pg. 7, but that case is 
easily distinguishable. In Murphy, the claim brought in post-conviction was that "trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to move to strike a juror who allegedly had fallen asleep at trial." 143 
Idaho at 150, 139 P.3d at 752. However, "Murphy did not identify which day of the five-day jury 
trial the juror allegedly slept, describe the length of time the juror allegedly slept, or explain what 
testimony or evidence the juror allegedly slept through. In the absence of such evidence, there 
was no showing of deficient performance or prejudice." Id. 
By contrast, the claim in this cause of action is that Mr. Grove's due process rights were 
violated by the sleeping jurors, thus he does not need to show either deficient performance, nor 
prejudice to prevail here. (The -effect of Murphy on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is 
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set forth in Section E below.) To the contrary, since Mr. Grove has shown a due process 
violation, i.e., the five jurors sleeping, the state has the burden of proving the constitutional error 
is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California; supra. Thus, the state's 
! L 
······ eom:plaintthatMr; Grove "hasnotpr-es©nt-ed-affida:vits, records or evidence indicating-th'? (ength .. 
of time the jurors allegedly slept nor has Petitioner explained what testimony or evidence the 
jurors allegedly slept through," State's Motion, pg. 7 (emphasis in original), is not germane here 
because those facts go to the harmless error question. It is the state's burden to prove that the 
jurors did not sleep through any important evidence. In any case, unlike Murphy, the affidavits 
do identify which day of the jury trial the jurors slept and further note that they slept during the 
testimony of the two most important medical witnesses in the case, Drs. Ross and Arden. 
· Defense counseltestified that he was cross-examining Dr. Ross when he was told by his ·· 
paralegal that a juror was asleep. Defense counsel said that he was "laying foundation for Dr. 
Arden's testimony" during his cross-examination of Dr. Ross and that doing so ''was an 
important thing to do." Depo., pg. 68, ln. 12 - pg. 69, ln. 23. 
The state also argues that there was "sufficient opportunity to bring this to the attention of 
the Petitioner and trial counsel at a time wherein the issue could have been raised to the attention 
of the Court." State's Motion, pg. 8. However, trial counsel admitted that he noticed jurors 
falling asleep and that, in one instance, his paralegal alerted him to that fact. Depo., pg. 66, ln. 
22 - pg. 67, ln. 2. While it was ineffective assistance for defense counsel to fail to ask for a 
mistrial after he noticed the sleeping jurors, that ineffectiveness does not alter the fact that the 
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misconduct of the jurors also deprived Mr. Grove-of bis rights to a jury trial and due process of 
law. 
Finally, the state argues th.at ''this is an issue more properly brought to the attention of 
·• -appellate~court," State's MGtion, pg.-8,-butdoes-not-support-that argument with.any-citation to - -- . 
authority. That is no surprise because, in fact, this issue could not have been raised upon appeal 
because there was no record made of the jurors sleeping at the time of trial, nor did defense 
counsel make a motion for mistrial based upon the juror misconduct. Under State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209,226,245 P.3d 961,978 (2010), "where an error has occurred at trial and was not 
followed by a contemporaneous objection, such error shall only be reviewed where the defendant 
demonstrates to an appellate court that one of his unwaived constitutional rights was plainly 
violated~" Here, of course, it was not possible for Mr. Grnve to raise ihis issue for the first time 
on appeal because the criminal court record does not demonstrate that any of the jurors were 
sleeping. As Mr. Grove's appellate counsel Diane Walker states in her affidavit, "[t]he juror 
misconduct issue raised in the Third Cause of Action could not have been raised on direct appeal 
because trial counsel did not draw the misconduct to the Court's attention or ask the Court to 
take any action about it, and there was no definitive evidence in the record that jurors had been 
sleeping during trial testimony." Affidavit of Diane Walker, pg. 2. See also Affidavit of Eric 
Frederickson, pg. 2. Thus, the state's argument that the issue should have been raised on appeal 
is plainly incorrect. 
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As Mr. Grove has presented uncontroverted evidence of juror misconduct and the state 
cannot show the error was harm.less beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court should deny the state's 
motion, grant Mr. Grove's motion for summary disposition, and order a new trial. 
· ,_,=_~,~». 0 -:J'ltelneffective Assistance <>fAppellate--CounselClaim . -~·- !.-:-·,._' -;: -~-· .. -, .. 
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has 
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the 
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932). The Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee the right to counsel on appeal. Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). This right to counsel includes the right to effective assistance 
of that counsel Evittsv. Lucey; 469 U:S: 387, 396 (1985). The-Idaho Constitution also 
guarantees a criminal defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; LC. § 19-852. 
In general, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or 
federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984), standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's 
performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional performance; 
and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. at 689. The prejudice prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a 
different result would have been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id. 
Courts will not attempt to second-guess trial counsel's strategic decisions unless those decisions 
are made upon the basis of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other .. 
33 • PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION AND IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION 
233
·;:\ 
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho at 145, 139 P.3d at 
747. An ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is judged under the standards set forth 
in Strickland. See e.g., Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656,658, 168 P.3d 40, 42 (Ct. App. 2007). 
Th • • • +1... Lr.• • th ·1 d" • thi e stateargues-m,1tsmotioncw.at-1v.tmtunr~qurres - e courUo.summan y. 1snnss ._ S:.~_--.<--
claim because that case holds that it cannot be ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail 
to raise claims of fundamental error for the first time on appeal. State's Motion, pg. 10. Yet, at 
the same time it argues that the Juror Misconduct claim should have been raised on appeal and 
asks the Court dismiss on that basis. State's Motion, pg. 8, 1_3.3 · The state, however, cannot have 
it both ways. If appellate counsel should have raised the Juror Misconduct claim on appeal, then 
it was ineffective assistance of appellate counsel to fail to do so. The correct answer, however, is 
that the Juror Miscnnduct claim could not have been raised on appeal, even as fundamental error, 
under State v. Perry, supra, as explained in the affidavits of appellate counsel Eric Frederickson 
and Diane Walker. 
As appellate counsel could not have raised the Juror Misconduct issues on direct appeal, 
Mr. Grove can raise it in this Petition, both as a direct claim and as a part of the Ineffective 
Assistance of Trial Counsel claim alleged below. See e.g., DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 
603-604, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152-53 (2009) (deprivation of the right to testify raised as direct . 
constitutional violation) with Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469,476,224 P.3d 536, 543 (Ct. App. 
2009) ( deprivation of the right to testify raised as an aspect of an ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claim). However, if the Court adopts the state's argument that the Juror Misconduct 
.. ··. -- -~-- -
3 It does not raise that argument as to the Confrontation Clause, Prosecutorial 
Misconduct or Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel claims. 
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claim should have been raised on direct appeal, notwithstanding Mintun and Perry, Mr. Grove 
reserves the right to assert the Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel claim in the 
alternative. 
· .· E.- Mr. -Grtwe-was.Dep1ived ojthe-EffectiveAssistance of Xr.iafCaunsel . 
1. Legal background 
The legal standard for evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim was set forth 
in Section D above. 
2. Why the state's motion should be denied 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 7(b)(l) requires that "[a]n application to the court for 
an order shall be by motion which ... shall state with particularity the grounds therefor[.]" See 
- Saykhamchone v: State;·-127 Idaho at 322; 900 P;2d at-798 (1995)-(applying-ruletopost- - - - · - - - - --- -- -
conviction proceedings). The Court of Appeals wrote in Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 818, 
892 P .2d 488, 493 (Ct. App. 1995): 
It is clear that in summary judgment proceedings the nonmovant is required to 
respond only to alleged grounds for summary judgment asserted by the moving 
party. The nonmovant need not address any aspect of the nonmovant's case that 
has not been challenged by the opposing party's motion .... In Mason [ v. Tucker 
and Associates, 125 Idaho 429, 871 P.2d 846 (Ct. App. 1994)], we emphasized 
the necessity of notice of the grounds for a motion in order to afford the 
nonmovant an opportunity to address the issues raised and present evidence and 
legal argument directed to those issues. 
See also, DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,601,200 P.3d 1148, 1150 (2009) (Rule 7(b)(l) 
requires grounds be stated with ''reasonable particularity"), citing Patton v. Patton, 88 Idaho 288, 
292, 399 P.2d 262, 264-65 (1965). Here the state's motion asserts vague and general objections 
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and defenses to this cause of action without tying objections to a particular part of the claim, 
which has several sub-parts, and thus does not satisfy the reasonable particularity requirement. 
With regard to the specific arguments made, the state first makes the remarkable claim 
thaIMtGrove'lias.failed to· supp.off Iiis ''claims witli affiaavits;recotds or othet~vidence,"" 
State's Motion, pg. 11, apparently overlooking the record of the trial proceedings, which 
establish the factual basis for most of the claims, which largely consist of errors of omissions at 
trial, the deposition of Mr. Chapman (which the state attended and participated in, but which was 
not transcribed until after the state's motion was filed) and the ten affidavits containing facts in 
support of the claims already filed. Thus, Mr. Grove has done far more than make "bare and 
conclusory allegations." State's Motion, pg. 11. The failure to object to inadmissible evidence 
and prosecutorial misconduct is conclusively shown-by the absence of a proper and timely 
objection in the record of the trial proceedings. Further, one aspect of the prosecutorial 
misconduct and the juror misconduct is shown by the many affidavits filed in support of Mr. 
Grove's petition. 
Next, the s~te's observation that "trial counsel is an experienced criminal defense 
attorney and litigator in good standing" is irrelevant. The United States Supreme Court has said 
that the duty of the defense lawyer "is to make the adversarial testing process work in the 
particular case." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added). Thus, it is 
defense counsel's specific performance in Mr. Grove's case which matters, not his body of work 
over a career or his reputation. The purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth 
Amendment is not to castigate the lack of diligence or talent of the mediocre lawyers or to lionize 
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the career accomplishments of the best lawyers. "The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal 
defendants receive a fair trial." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
The state's Motion also observes: ''Petitioner further indicates that the Court should string 
_,~-"fogetlier this1ist of errors and defonnirie a prejtiillcraleffect."- Id, pg. 11. To the extent this 
observation is intended as an argument that the cumulative error doctrine should not apply, it is 
unsupported by citation to authority or analysis. Further it fails to acknowledge either Boman v. 
State, 129 Idaho 520, 527, 927 P.2d 910, 917 (Ct. App. 1996) or Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24, 
32, 878 P.2d 198,206 (Ct. App. 1994), both of which have been previously cited and which 
recognize the cumulative error doctrine in cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims. Nor does the state address Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2003), where 
th~-Circuit Court explained that "[ s ]epara.te errors by counsel. .. should be analyzed togetlier fo 
see whether their cumulative effect deprived the defendant of his right to effective assistance. 
They are, in other words, not separate claims, but rather different aspects of a single claim of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel." Thus, the state's assertion must fail. 
The state also argues that "Petitioner was competent to stand trial, fully able and capable 
to assist trial counsel in his own defense," State's Motion, pg. 11, as if that makes a difference 
here. There is no rule that a competent defendant is not entitled to a competent defense attorney, 
nor is there a requirement that a criminal defendant provide "effective assistance of client" in 
order to receive the benefits of the Sixth Amendment. It is so well-established that it should go 
without saying that it was not up to Mr. Grove to understand the rules of evidence and how the 
- ··---··Confrontation Clause affects the admission of evidence. It was not up to him to properly prepare 
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the defense expert witness for trial testimony, present evidence in his favor, or to properly cross-
examine the state's witnesses. It was not up to him to object during trial to the prosecutorial 
misconduct. In fact, had Mr. Grove tried to insert objections into the trial, the court would have 
~ .. - -- -reminded him that he was represented by counsel: -Hacfhe -persisted~-he could have then been 
removed from the courtroom. See, fllinois v. Allen, 391 U.S. 337 (1970). And it was not up to 
him to make a motion for mistrial for juror misconduct after he alerted his attorney that several 
jurors had fallen asleep. There would be no need for the right to counsel at all, if being 
competent, fully able and capable to assist trial counsel were enough. But as the United States 
Supreme Court has written: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not 
_ ~om-i:m~he11cl th~ right_ toJ:>e hewd_ 1Jycc:>.W1$~L_ Eveµ_tli~_i_pt1::)lig~gt aml. _ 1::4u,~at~d~ 
layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with 
crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the 
indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left 
without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and 
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or 
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to 
prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding 
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though 
he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how 
to establish his innocence. 
Gideon v, Wainwright, 312 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963), quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932). The state's argument in this regard has been rejected for nearly 50 years,4 
and has no force in either logic or law. 
The state's motion should be denied and Mr. Grove's motion should be granted as 
explained below. 
4 The fiftieth anniversary of the Gideon decision is March 18, 2013. 
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3. Why relief should be granted to Mr. Grove 
Mr. Grove has shown that defense counsel rendered deficient performance in 
several instances and the state has not controverted bis evidence. The effect of these errors both 
individually and cumulatively merit the granting of relief. 
a. Counsel's performance was deficient during voir dire 
The American Bar Association's Standards Relating to the Defense Function are a 
starting point for determining whether counsel's actions were objectively reasonable. State v. 
Larkin, 102 Idaho, 231,233,628 P.2d 1065, 1067 (1981). ABA Defense Function Standard 4-
7.2(a) states that defense counsel should prepare prior to trial to discharge effectively counsel's 
function in jury selection "including the raising of any appropriate issues concerning the method 
by which the jury panel was selected[.]" 
In this case, defense counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to move for a 
mistrial or for the summoning of a new jury pool after a potential juror made statements in voir 
dire that polluted the entire jury pool. That potential juror stated in front of all the potential 
jurors that he worked in the funeral business and he knew the police officer witnesses Greene and 
Petrie well, both from their work investigating cases that came through the funeral home, and 
through their work for his wife who was the city manager, and that they are very credible. 
Exhibit B, pg. 155, In. 13-14. He also stated he had worked in the funeral business for a long 
time and seen "these situations" before and did not have a lot of empathy except for the victims. 
Id., pg. 155, ln. 21 -pg. 156, In. 2. These comments were prejudicial because they had the effect 
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of unfairly bolstering the credibility of the state's witnesses and engendering sympathy for 
 s biological parents. 
That counsel should have moved for a mistrial or the summoning of a new jury pool is 
illustrated by United States V. Mach, 137F.3d 640 (9th Cif"1997): Mach presented a situation 
quite similar to that in this case. Mach was on trial for sexual conduct with a minor. The first 
prospective juror to be questioned in voir dire stated that as a social worker with the state, she 
would have a difficult time being impartial given her line of work and that sexual assault had 
been confirmed in every case in which one of her clients reported an assault. The court engaged 
in further questioning of the potential juror warning her that she needed to decide the case on the 
evidence. Mach moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the entire panel had been tainted. The 
state court did not grant the motion, but did strike the potential juror for cause. Mach was 
convicted. The Ninth Circuit granted habeas relief. The Court held that given the nature of the 
potential juror's statements, the certainty with which they were delivered, the years of experience 
that led to them, the Court would presume that at least one juror was tainted and entered into 
deliberations with the conviction that children never lie about sexual abuse. 
In Mr. Grove's case, the potential juror's statements, like those in Mach, vouched for the 
state's witnesses and were based upon professional experience and observations. As in Mach, a 
presumption that the potential juror's statements tainted the entire jury pool is warranted and the 
failure to move for a mistrial or the summoning of a new panel was objectively unreasonable 
representation by defense counsel. 
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Counsel also rendered deficient performance in failing to challenge for cause or 
peremptorily challenge Juror #5 (Loetscher) after voir dire revealed that he worked at St. 
Joseph's Hospital and knew of"just about everyone on the [state's witness list] ... particularly 
the ER doctors that was Iisteathere." Exhibit B, pg:"144, ltL 14-19. Mr. Grove was prejudiced 
because Juror #5 became the presiding juror. Exhibit B, pg. 1471, In. 19-22. 
b. Counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to make a 
confrontation clause objection 
Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to assert Petitioner's state and federal 
constitutional rights to confrontation (Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 13, United States Const. 
Amendments 6 and 14) and by failing to make proper evidentiary objections. During trial, state's 
autopsy report which contained information from Dr. Reichard. See Amended Petition, pgs. 3-9. 
However, the state did not present the testimony of Dr. Reichard in violation of the state and 
federal constitutional rights of confrontation. Had defense counsel objected on confrontation 
grounds, that evidence would have been excluded by the Court as argued in Section A above. 
There was no conceivable strategic purpose to fail to object to the inadmissible hearsay 
testimony which also related Dr. Reichard's testimony in violation of the confrontation clause. 
Defense counsel, Scott Chapman, was deposed as part of this case. Mr. Chapman testified that 
he was not the sort oflawyer who was shy about voicing an objection, if he thought it was 
appropriate and that, generally speaking, he is not hesitant to do so, especially ifhe believes the 
objection would make a difference. Deposition of Scott Chapman (''Depo"), pg. 10, ln. 4-17. At 
the same time, Mr. Chapman stated that since one can never be sure that an objection will be 
41 • PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION AND IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION 
241
J __ .. • •• ·.: ..... • •. ,. · ... · .... 1 
sustained, there is an advantage in litigating important matters pre-trial. Depo., pg. 12, In. 15 -
pg. 13, In. 6. 
In the deposition, Mr. Chapman stated that he did not object to the introduction of Dr. 
Ross's autopsy repoff(which contained Dr. Reichard,.s report) because "[t]here wasn't anything ··· -· 
in that autopsy report that didn't work with ... what my ... thrust of the case was going to be." 
Depo., pg. 18, In. 10-23. He described the thrust of the defense as follows: "That the injuries that 
occurred to  were inflicted at a time when Stace was not around or with the child in any 
fashion that it could have happened." Id However, he admitted that there was, in fact, evidence 
in Dr. Reichard's report which undermined the thrust of his case. Depo., pg. 19, In. 10-13. He 
then explained, 
··- ---------····---· ~ 
[E]ven though there was evidence that was contrary to our position, I had what I 
believed to be evidence that his findings weren't totally correct, if you will. And 
as such we had - a number of doctors were relying on that autopsy report, 
including Reichard's report, and I felt that Dr. Arden would, in large degree, poke 
enough holes in that to make reliance on that report misplaced. 
Also had to, I guess, take into consideration the possibility that Dr. Reichard could 
have been made a witness and come to testify and then have him and Arden sitting 
there at opposing positions. 
Depo., pg. 19, In. 17 -pg. 18, ln. 5. 
This decision, however, was objectively unreasonable and was also based upon ignorance 
of the relevant law. First, it is objectively unreasonable to allow the avoidable admission of 
damaging evidence upon the belief that one possesses counter-evidence which is only capable of 
'poking holes' in that evidence. That is tantamount to a strategy in a gun fight to allow 
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oneself to be shot on the belief that the medic has sufficient skill and supplies to keep you from 
dying of the wound. That plan does not further your goal of winning the gun fight and it is 
objectively better to not be shot, just as it is objectively better to avoid the admission of the 
evidence altogether rather than allow it iii-with the hope that the jury might find reliance on the 
evidence ''misplaced." In fact, defense counsel conceded that Dr. Reichard's conclusions were 
harmful to the defense theory of the case and agreed that Dr. Reichard's conclusion about the tear 
in the corpus callosuni, if believed, showed that his ''theory of the case was impossible." Depo., 
pg. 28, ln. 22-25. He also admitted that Dr. Reichard's conclusion about the tear in the corpus 
callosum was "particularly damaging to the thrust of [his] defense" and agreed that [ f]rom a 
strategic point of view, it would have been better for [his] theory of the case to keep this evidence 
out if [he] could." Depo. pg. 21, ln. 1-3 ("particularly damaging"); pg. 22, ln. 21-25 ("strategic 
point of view"). 
Further, the decision to not object was not consistent with the trial strategy and appears to 
have been caused by defense counsel's lack of understanding of the relevant law. Defense 
counsel could not say whether he was familiar with the Crawford confrontation clause case at the 
time of the trial. Depo., pg. 37, ln. 5 - pg. 38, ln. 9. Further, he described the holding in 
Crawford as, "[t]hat there was a confrontation right that trumps hearsay exceptions." Depo., pg. 
3 7, ln. 9-12. Further, he admitted, that the testimony about the particulars of Dr. Reichard' s 
report was inadmissible under I.RE. 703. And counsel did not testify that he made a strategic 
decision to not make an I.RE. 703 objection to testimony about the facts and data in Dr. 
Reichard's report. Depo., pg. 31, ln. 15 - pg. 32, ln. 24. 
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As to the concern that Dr. Reichard might be called to testify, that was true whether 
defense counsel objected to the evidence being admitted or not. However, it is highly unlikely 
that Dr. Reichard would have suddenly been called from New Mexico to testify, if the state 
hadn't pfa.rined for that in advance: 1n this respect, it is far more likely that the evidence ·would 
have been excluded with a timely trial objection and that the state would not be able to produce 
Dr. Reicherd to testify on such short notice. Further, as will be discussed below, there were 
specific advantages to having Dr. Reichard testify and be cross-examined, rather than have others 
interpret (and misinterpret) his report. However, defense counsel was not aware of these 
advantages, possibly because he never spoke to Dr. Reichard prior to trial. Depa., p. 28, ln. 3-5. 
Counsel said he believed speaking to Dr. Reichard ''wasn't necessary'' given his theory of the 
·- .. -· ---- --- -- -· -·--·-·--·-···-- ·· · --····· ·-· -· 
case. Depo., pg. 28, ln. 21. Note that this failure to investigate and prepare with regard to Dr. 
Reichard was itself objectively unreasonable performance. ABA Defense Function Standard 4-
4.1 (a) states that counsel should "explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the 
case" and make "efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution[.]" See 
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374,383 (2005). See also, Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 
(2003), stating, ' "[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable" 
only to the extent that "reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on 
investigation"' (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690-691). 
Petitioner was prejudiced because had counsel objected on confrontation grounds, the 
state would have had no testimony as to any head or alleged brain injuries and the timing of those 
injuries and thus, could not have obtained a conviction. Dr. Reichard's information was the 
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state's only basis of proof for the nature of head and alleged brain injuries, the only basis for 
testimony as to the timing of the head and alleged brain injuries, and the only basis for the state's 
claim that  had suffered a tear to the corpus callosum and axonal shearing. 
the.state used Dr. Relchard's testimony to great effect during the entire trial. For 
example, in response to the defense motion for acquittal or in the alternative a new trial, the state 
argued that Dr. Reichard was the one person who actually examined the brain and therefore was a 
more credible witness than Dr. Arden. (Prosecutor Spickler said in discounting Dr. Arden's 
testimony, that he ''was trying to contradict the findings of an expert in New Mexico who 
actually had the brain and actually took a look at the brain in toto, as opposed to one or more 
slides." Exhibit B, pg. 1486, ln. 8-12.) 
Moreover, had Dr. Reichard provided testimony at trial, several major issues could have 
been explored by the defense. These include the significance of the APP staining -- he would 
likely have testified consistently with his report that the vascular axonal injury pattern precluded 
a diagnosis of traumatic axonal injury, and, consistently with his own publication, that the PAI 
pattern did not indicate the presence of more diffuse axonal injury. Had his testimony been to the 
contrary, he could have been impeached with his own report and publication. In addition, 
defense counsel could have exposed the inconsistencies between Dr. Reichard's opinions and 
those expressed by both Dr. Ross and Dr. Harper. In particular, both Drs. Ross and Harper 
claimed that Dr. Reichard's report contained conclusions about the nature of the injury and its 
consequences which the report did not contain. Dr. Reichard could have clarified for the jury 
that Drs. Ross and Harper did not understand the report and were drawing false conclusions from 
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it. Dr. Reichard also could have been confronted with the photographic evidence that Dr. Arden 
produced regarding the brain laceration being an artifact, which would have countered the only 
positive evidence of a primary brain injury. Confronted with that evidence, Dr. Reichard likely 
-·would have agreed thaf the laceration was or could have been an artifact. Either outcome would 
have led to the state being unable to prove its time line and therefore Mr. Grove's guilt by proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Dr. Reichard could also have been confronted with the evidence Dr. 
Arden produced concerning the age of the subdural hemorrhage, which contradicted his report. 
See Report of Consultation attached to the Affidavit of Dr. Arden. 
c. Counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to make a hearsay 
objection to the Reichard testimony 
Further, the testimony ofDrs. Chin, Hunter, Harper and Ross which r~lated. the facts and 
data in Dr. Reichard's report, was inadmissible under IRE 703. That rule states, in relevant part, 
that: "Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the 
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in 
assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect." 
Thus, the evidence, in addition to violating the confrontation clause was also inadmissible under 
the rules of evidence. See argument at pages 7-8 above. 
d. Counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to make 
a hearsay objection to the Nash testimony 
Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to hearsay testimony from 
Lisa Nash regarding the autopsy report contents. At trial, Lisa Nash testified that she was told 
that  had blood in his brain that could not be removed. She did not identify who told her 
46 • PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN RESPONSE TO STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION AND IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S MOTION 
246
:,'j ,.-- •--
this and the testimony was admitted without limitation including for the truth of the matter 
asserted. Exhibit B, p. 755, ln. 16-25. Defense counsel did not object on hearsay grounds. Had 
counsel objected, the objection would have been granted. The testimony was plainly an out-of-
court statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted and is quintessential hearsay under 
I.R.E. 801(c). At the deposition, defense counsel agreed the statement was hearsay and could not 
say why he failed to object. Depo., pg. 77, ln. 1-19. 
e. Counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to make a 
foundation or relevancy objection to the Stocking testimony 
Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to the testimony of Steve 
Stocking, a paramedic, that Mr. Grove was too calm in his opinion when the paramedics arrived 
___ in response to the 91LcaU. Exhibit B, pg.838, ln. 22._ Mr. St9c~gwa.s_n,ota p~cliolC>gis_t or 
psychiatrist and had no qualifications as an expert on the appropriate reactions in a crisis. 
His opinion testimony was not relevant under I.R.E. 401 and 402, was unfairly prejudicial under 
I.R.E. 403 and did not fall within the scope of admissible opinion testimony by a lay witness 
under I.R.E. 701 because it involved specialized knowledge of the appropriate reaction of people 
in crisis. See Bloching v. Albertson's, Inc., 129 Idaho 844, 846, 934 P.2d 17, 19 (1997) 
("[A ]court should disregard lay opinion testimony relating to the cause of a medical condition, as 
a lay witness is not competent to testify to such matters.") See also State v. Missamore, 119 
Idaho 27, 32, 803 P .2d 528, 533 (1990) (lay opinion testimony about mental state of defendant 
held inadmissible). Defense counsel admitted that the testimony was not relevant and made Mr. 
Grove appear to be uncaring about Kyler's condition. He could not think of why he did not 
object to that testimony. Depo., pg. 78, ln. 2-20. 
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f Counsel's cross-examination of Dr. Chinn was deficient 
Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Chin's 
testimony that there was "no way we would have missed any of theO injuries" described in the 
autopsy report. Exhibit B, pg. 851, ln. 5-6. Defense counsel failed to cross-examine Dr. Chin on 
this claim even though, according to Dr. Ross, some of the injuries in autopsy were old enough 
that they did exist when he saw  specifically, Dr. Ross testified that the injury to the left 
thigh and the injuries on the back were older. Exhibit B, pg. 978, ln. 23 - pg. 979, ln.17; pg. 987, 
ln. 9-20. Defense counsel could not think of a reason why he did not cross-examine Dr. Chin 
with Dr. Ross's statements. Depo., pg. 79, ln. 9-13. 
Defense counsel's performance was also deficient because he failed to object to Dr. 
Chin's testimony that what he "read in this autopsy report is the most brutal case'; he had ever 
seen. Exhibit B, pg. 851, In. 6-7. This testimony was not relevant under I.RE. 401 and 402 and 
served only to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury. Thus, to the extent it had any 
probative value, it was inadmissible as unfairly prejudicial under I.RE. 403. Defense counsel 
testified that he did not know why he failed to object to that testimony and could not think of any 
advantage to the defense for the jury to hear that testimony. Depo., pg. 30, ln. 3-9. 
g. Counsel's cross-examination of Dr. Hunter was deficient 
Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Hunter's 
testimony that subarachonoid hemorrhage has to have immediate symptoms. Exhibit B, pg. 874, 
ln. 24 -pg. 875, In. 22. There was insufficient foundation for that testimony as Dr. Hunter 
admitted that he is not a pathologist. Exhibit B, pg. 874, ln. 24-25. 
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Further defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. 
Hunter's testimony that  was either "ejected from an automobile" or "was beaten very 
severely." Exhibit B, pg. 871, ln. 12:-14. Again, there was insufficient foundation for Dr. Hunter 
to give fuis opinion. 
Defense counsel's performance was also deficient because he failed to object to Dr. 
Hunter's testimony that a short fall "is rarely, rarely likely to produce any kind of significant head 
injury or bleeding" and then failed to impeach that testimony. Exhibit B, pg. 888, In. 16-20. 
Ibis evidence was inadmissible because there was no foundation for this opinion. Further, Dr. 
Hunter's opinion could have been impeached with medical research published in peer-reviewed 
medical journals. See Plunkett, J., "Fatal Pediatric Head Injuries Caused by Short-Distance 
Falls," The American Journal of Forensic Medicine and Pathology, Vol. 22, No. 1 (March 2001) 
(attached to the Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin previously filed). The author of that article, John 
Plunkett, M.D., a forensic pathologist, documented 18 cases of fatal head injuries where an infant 
had fallen 3 meters or less. "The author concludes that an infant or child may suffer a fatal head 
injury from a fall ofless than three meters (10 feet). The injury may be associated with a lucid 
interval and bilateral retinal hemorrhages." Exhibit A, pg. 1 In this case, there was testimony 
that  had both bilateral retinal hemorrhages and a possible lucid interval. And this 2001 
study was readily available to defense counsel at the time of the trial. 
Defense counsel's performance was also deficient because he failed to object to Dr. 
Hunter's opinion, stated without any qualification as an expert in the area, that  had sure 
signs of shaken baby syndrome. Exhibit B, pg. 869, ln. 4-16. 
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h Counsel's cross-examination of Dr. Ross was deficient 
Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Ross's 
testimony that, although he did not see certain hemorrhages in the psoas and retroperitoneal 
areas, he was told about them by the transplant surgeon: Exhibit B, pg. 938, In. 20-23. That 
surgeon did not testify at trial. His statements to Dr. Ross, however, were simply admissible 
hearsay and defense counsel was ineffective for failing to make a timely objection. Defense 
counsel admitted that this testimony was hearsay and could not say why he failed to object. 
Depo., pg. 81, In. 17-23. He also admitted this evidence was damaging to his theory of the case 
and supported the state's version of the events. Depa., pg. 88, In. 4 -pg. 24. 
This evidence, as it turned out, was very important in the state's case. The testimony at 
trial from the state's doctor witnesses was that those injuries would have been very painful to 
 The state used that testimony to argue that Mr. Grove must have cause those injuries 
because  was not showing signs of internal distress or pain when Lisa Nash left for work: 
They all testified that, at a minimum, having sustained the belly injuries, let's call 
them, he would be in extreme pain. He wouldn't be able to eat, he wouldn't be 
able to run around, wouldn't be able to play with his sister, wouldn't be able to sit 
up and watch television on Monday morning. 
Moreover, there's no testimony whatsoever that at any time  behaved like he 
had received those abdominal injuries. No testimony from the defendant, no 
testimony from his mother, no testimony from the grandparents, from anyone, that 
at any time, whether it's healing or not healing, did he behave like he suffered 
those severe, severe injuries. 
Exhibit B, pg. 1418, In. 19-24; pg. 1419, In. 21 - pg. 1420, In. 2. This argument would not have 
been available to the state had a proper hearsay objection been made by defense counsel. 
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Counsel rendered deficient performance in not moving to exclude any reference by any 
witness, including Dr. Ross, to the brain autopsy because no valid chain of custody for the brain 
was presented. The state failed to present any evidence that the brain examined at the pathology 
laboratory in New Mexico was Kyler's brain. -
Defense counsel's performance was also deficient because he failed to object to the 
foundation for Dr. Ross's testimony regarding the head and alleged brain injuries because Dr. 
Ross also testified that he had never viewed any of the slides or recuts himself. Exhibit B, pg. 
959, ln. 10-15. 
Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Ross's 
testimony that Dr. Reichard's observation of a tear in the corpus callosum shows there was "a 
very significant force" applied, something comparable to a ''very high fall" of "a couple of stories 
or so," or a "motor vehicle accident, or inflicted blunt force trauma." Exhibit B, pg. 945, ln. S-
12. First, as noted above, that testimony violates the confrontation clause. Further, that 
testimony is not admissible under I.RE. 703 because there was no foundation for Dr. Ross's 
opinion about the amount of force needed. 
Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to point out the 
differences between Dr. Reichert's report and the state witnesses' conclusions drawn from that 
report. In particular, the PAI identified by Dr. Reichard (assuming for discussion that it was 
present) is a localized phenomenon and, by his own publication, does not imply that more diffuse 
or widespread axonal injury is present. Dr. Reichard did not diagnose diffuse traumatic axonal 
injury in the brain of  Martin, while Dr; Ross opined at trial that the child did have 
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traumatic axonal injury. Counsel, however, failed to cross-examine Dr. Ross on this 
disagreement with Dr. Reichard, or get Dr. Ross to admit that he had not personally examined the 
slides from the brain, either the routine or APP stains. See Report of Dr. Arden, pg. 4-5. 
Counsel admitted that he did not cross-examine br. Ross about tliis and that he was unaware that 
Dr. Reichard had not diagnosed Diffuse Axonal Injury. Depo., pg. 99, ln. 5-20. 
i. Counsel's cross-examination of Dr. Harper was deficient 
Counsel rendered deficient performance in regard to the testimony of Dr. Deborah 
Harper. Counsel failed to object or move to strike when Dr. Harper vouched for the abilities of 
state's witness Dr. Ross. Exhibit B, pg. 1031, ln. 12-14. ("Dr. Ross, I'm sorry to say, is no 
longer our - in our Medical Examiner's Office, because he is a super clinician.") Counsel did 
not have a reason for his failure to object. Depa., pg. 84, ln. 9-12. Counsel also failed to object 
to irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial testimony regarding the estimated force needed to inflict the 
injuries, comparing it to the force of being hit by a car, or being dragged behind a horse, or 
having a horse step on Kyler's abdomen, or being hit by a baseball bat, even though there was no 
foundation showing she could accurately make such estimates of force. Exhibit B, pg. 1034, ln. 
7-21. 
Counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to cross-examine Dr. Harper, 
when she testified that the child had an intrinsic brain injury (suggestive of axonal injury), an 
opinion contrary to the clinical CT scan and to the neuropathology examination. See Report of 
Dr Arden, pg. 4-5. Defense counsel stated that he did not cross-examine Dr. Harper about this 
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because he was not aware of the difference between Dr. Reichard's report and Dr. Harper's 
testimony about it. Depo., pg. 100, In. 8-15. 
k. Counsel's performance during the testimony of Det. Birdsell 
_was deficient 
Counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object to the admission of 
photographs taken a month after Kyler's death, which included many sympathy cards sent to the 
family. During Detective Birdsell's testimony, photographs taken inside the Nash trailer 
approximately a month after Kyler's death were admitted. Exhibit B, pg. 996, ln. 19 - pg. 997, 
ln. 23; Exhibit C (State's Exhibits 4, 5 and 6). The photos were inflammatory because they 
included a large display of sympathy cards sent to Lisa Nash and thus were inadmissible under 
_J_RJ~. 4_o3 "becaus_e th_e ~a11ger of unfair__p __ i:_~J_.udi ___ ~e out\¥eigh.~4 any probative vah.1e. _ pefense 
- -- --
counsel could not think of why he did not make an objection to this evidence. Depo., pg. 46, ln. 
2-12. 
l. Counsel's performance was deficient during the direct and 
cross-examination of Mr. Grove 
Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he introduced evidence in the 
direct examination of Mr. Grove regarding the bad relationship between Mr. Grove and his son 
Alex. Exhibit B, pg. 1074, ln. 1-24. There was no valid strategic purpose for introducing this 
evidence as, even if it were expected to be brought up by the state, it could have been kept out by 
filing a motion in limine as it is both irrelevant and inadmissible other acts evidence. Defense 
counsel could not say why he brought out this evidence. Depo., pg. 93, In. 9-17. 
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Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to the prosecutor 
questioning Mr. Grove about the fact he was behind on child support. Exhibit B, pg. 1115, ln. 
21-24. The state's cross-examination about this topic was improper as discussed in Section B 
above. Moreover, even if it were relevant, this evidence could have been kept out by filing a 
motion in limine as it is both irrelevant and inadmissible other acts evidence. 
Further, in his cross-examination of Mr. Grove, the prosecutor characterized Mr. Grove's 
sworn testimony as the "story you told, which is ''the story you need the jury to believe" and then 
opined that "some things ... just don't really make sense." ExhibitB, pg. 1113, In. 8-11. While 
defense counsel's objection was sustained, counsel did not ask that the comments be stricken, 
that the jury be instructed to disregard the comments or that the prosecutor be reprimanded for 
his blatant misconduct. Id. 
Defense counsel's performance was also deficient when he failed to object to the 
prosecutor asking Mr. Grove when he had been prescribed Ativan and whether the prescription 
''was a result of [his] emotional state Friday[.]" Exhibit B, pg. 1120, ln. 9-12. This questioning 
was clearly objectionable because it went beyond the Court's procedure at the time of the 
medical recess, which only informed the jury that "an unforeseen medical situation has arisen 
which affects our ability to proceed with trial today'' and did not mention Mr. Grove or the nature 
of the medical situation. Exhibit B, pg. 1067, ln. 3-5. 
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m. Counsel's performance was deficient during the preparation 
for his testimony and in the direct and cross-examination of Dr. 
Arden 
Defense counsel rendered deficient performance in the presentation of the expert 
testimony of Dr. Jonath~ Arden. Specifically, Dr: Arden :requested that defense counsel provide 
him with all existing microscopic slides for examination prior to trial. Defense counsel, 
however, did not comply with that request and did not provide any special stain slides, including 
iron stains, to Dr. Arden for review. Those slides existed and have been provided to Dr. Arden 
for review in connection with this post-conviction Petition. Had defense counsel provided the 
iron stain slides to Dr. Arden prior to trial, Dr. Arden could have testified to his observations of 
the slides which would have both confirmed and extended his testimony on the ages of the 
injuries sustained by  
Upon his review of the iron stains slides, in preparation for this post-conviction action, 
Dr. Arden was able to confirm some of the findings recorded by Dr. Ross. Dr. Arden was also 
able to make some additional observations that support and extend his (Dr.Arden's) opinion on 
the ages of the injuries. Some of the iron-staining is co-existent with the fresher-appearing 
hemorrhage; this in conjunction with the inflammatory response, indicates that the hemorrhage is 
in the early stages of response. This observation is consistent with and strengthens the opinion 
offered by Dr. Arden that the injuries sustained by  had occurred several days to five days 
prior to death. Dr. Ross testified that the fresher hemorrhage was coincidentally located with the 
positive iron staining, thus representing older and newer injuries in the same locations. Dr. 
Arden disagrees with this interpretation, which relies on coincidence and fails to synthesize the 
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totality of the findings into a unified diagnosis. Based upon Dr. Arden's post-trial examination 
of the iron stains, he has found positive iron staining trapped within connective tissue (i.e., 
separate from the visible hemorrhage), which represents the remnants of much older healed 
bleeding. 
Had Dr. Arden been allowed to review the iron stains prior to trial, he could have testified 
that the iron stain autopsy slides contain evidence not only of significant aging of the more recent 
injuries such that they were not particularly consistent with having been incurred just prior to 
clinical presentation, (i.e., when Stacey Grove was with  but also of much older bleeding, 
reflective of older injuries. And had Dr. Arden been allowed to review the iron stains prior to 
trial, he could have testified that  had been injured at some much earlier time or times, 
unrelated to when he was with Stacey Grove. 
Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to provide slides from the 
brain examination to Dr. Arden for the doctor's examination prior to trial. Dr. Arden did not 
have the opportunity to examine APP stained slides from the neuropathology examination prior 
to trial. He has not been able to review the slides since the trial as their location is unlmown. 
Performing his own independent examination of the APP stained slides prior to trial would have 
afforded him the opportunity to assess all of the evidence related to penumbra! axonal injury and 
potentially would have allowed him to have rebutted Dr. Ross's opinion that there was a 
laceration of the brain structure, but absent being provided those slides, he could not do so. 
Defense counsel's performance was deficient for failing to object to the prosecutor 
attempting to impeach Dr. Arden with alleged "gross mismanagement" when he was the Medical . _ _ _ .. 
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Examiner in the District of Columbia. Exhibit B, pg. 1382, In. 6 - pg. 1388, In. 12. These 
allegations of administrative errors and allegations of sexual harassment were irrelevant under 
IRE 401 and 402 because they did not impeach Dr. Arden's medical testimony. Further, the 
allegations' unfair prejudice outweighed any probative value and were inadmissible under IRE 
403. The allegations were also not admissible under IRE 404, nor did the state give any notice of 
its intent to use the evidence to the extent it claims the evidence was admissible under IRE 
404(b). Defense counsel's performance was also deficient for failing to attempt to rehabilitate 
Dr. Arden on re-direct examination by pointing out that the allegations of mismaganment had 
nothing to do with his abilities as a forensic pathologist or his conclusion in this case. Defense 
counsel admitted that he was aware of these allegations prior to trial, Depo., pg. 85, In. 12-13, so 
he could have moved in limine to exclude that evidence. Or, failing that, he could have alerted 
the jury to those allegations himself. Defense counsel stated., "I should have [ alerted the jury to 
the allegations]. I should have pulled that thorn. That was a mistake." Depo., pg. 85, In. 18-22. 
Finally, defense counsel could not think of a reason why he did not object to the 
prosecutor's allegation that Dr. Arden was on a "special mission." Depo., pg. 47, In. 6-16. 
n. It was deficient performance for defense counsel to fail to 
introduce photographs of  taken at St. Joseph's Hospital soon 
after he arrived in an ambulance 
Photographs taken of  when he arrived at St. Jospeh's Hospital are attached (under 
seal) to the Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, previously filed with this Court. These photographs 
show no redness or bruising and therefore are inconsistent with the state's theory that Mr. Grove 
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had just brutally beaten  which resulted, in part, in serious abdominal injuries. It was 
deficient performance for defense counsel to fail to introduce those photographs. 
o. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed 
to move for a mistrial after many jurors fell asleep during the 
testimony 
Counsel admitted that he was made aware by his paralegal that a juror was asleep during 
his cross-examination of Dr. Ross. In fact, however, counsel was aware during the trial that 
jurors were falling asleep during the testimony ofDrs. Ross and Arden. He was also put on 
notice regarding the sleeping jurors because the Court was required to take unscheduled recesses 
because of it. See e.g., Exhibit B, pg. 921, ln. 16 - pg. 922, In. 6; pg. 983, In. 9-13; pg. 1351, In. 
19-25. As set forth in Section C above, jurors' sleeping during the presentation of evidence is a 
form of juror misconduct which deprives the defendant of due process of law and it was deficient 
performance for defense counsel to fail to move for a mistrial. 
p. Defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed 
to question paramedic David Chenalt about Lisa Nash's reaction 
to  's injury 
Mr. Chenalt could have testified that Ms. Nash's behavior was ''the most bizarre reaction 
we've ever seen for especially a kid call." See Grand Jury Tr. p. 214, In. 5 -pg. 217, In. 15.5 The 
fact that defense counsel allowed the prosecutor to elicit evidence from Steve Stocking that Mr. 
Grove's affect was ''too calm," while failing to bring out evidence from a paramedic that Lisa 
Nash's behavior was ''the most bizarre reaction we've ever seen" demonstrates the absence of a 
strategy regarding this type of evidence. If counsel believed Mr. Stocking's opinion was 
5 The Grand Jury Transcript is a confidential document in the criminal case of which the 
Court has taken judicial notice. 
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admissible, there would be no conceivable reason to fail to call Mr. Chenalt to testify about Ms. 
Nash's affect. Defense counsel testified that he did not know why he failed to introduce this 
testimony. Depo., pg. 95, In. 1-8. 
q. Defense counsel's performance during closing argument was 
deficient 
Defense counsel's performance during closing argument was deficient in several respects. 
First, he failed to argue that the state had failed to carry its burden of proof because Dr. Reichard 
did not testify and the other doctors did not have an adequate basis for their opinions of when the 
injury happened. Defense counsel's performance during the state's closing and rebuttal 
arguments was deficient because he failed to object to multiple instances of misconduct by the 
pro~ecutor. These inITT@ces cU"e discu~sed in S~ction B abc)Ve. A,tthe cleposttion, defense 
counsel could not say why he did not object to the prosecutor's comments about Dr. Arden's 
"financial position," Depo., pg. 47, In. 6-16; pg. 57, In. 11-15, or the proesecutor's comments 
about having evidence that Mr. Grove had been violent with  in the past, Depo., pg. 60, In. 
10-12, or his comments that ''we don't want to let a murderer go free," Depo., pg. 60, In. 13-16, 
or his comments that Mr. Grove had "a different kind of emotional breakdown" which resulted in 
the injuries to  Depo., pg. 62, In. 7-13. 
Defense counsel's performance was also deficient because he failed to move for a mistrial 
or curative instructions after the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments. While defense 
counsel expressed doubts about the efficacy of curative instruction, Depo., pg. 63, In. 10-14, such 
a request would have at least preserved the prosecutorial misconduct issue for appeal. Depo., pg. 
65, In. 14-18. 
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r. Mr. Grove was prejudiced 
As noted above, in analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court 
should not look to each example of deficient performance and determine whether it was 
prejudicial. Instead, the Court should consider all the deficient performance and then determine --
whether the cumulative effect was prejudicial. Boman v. State, 129 Idaho at 527, 927 P.2d at 
917 and Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho at 32, 878 P.2d at 206. See also Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 
at 1001. The cumulative effect here demonstrates a reasonable probability of a different result 
had defense counsel's performance not been deficient. Crucial state's evide~ce would have been 
excluded, exculpatory defense evidence would have been presented, and egregious prosecutorial 
misconduct would have been prevented or resulted in a mistrial, or a mistrial would have been 
- . 
granted due to juror misconduct. 
ID. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Grove has established a Confrontation Clause violation, that he was deprived of due 
process of law by Prosecutorial and Juror Misconduct and that he was deprived of the Effective 
Assistance of Counsel. Consequently, this Court should deny the state's motion, grant Mr. 
Grove's motion for summary disposition and vacate the criminal judgment and conviction. 
f~ 
Respectfully submitted this~ day of March 2013. 
iltM-M LJ~( 
Deborah Whipple 
D ~ ~!QJ.1\.J;. ~~~--
Dennis Benjamin ~ 
Attorneys for Stacey Grove 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STACEY GROVE 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
Petitioner, 
Respondent 
CASE NO. CV- 12-01798 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
STATE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION and RESPONSE to 
PETITIONER'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
_Respondent, State of Idaho, by and through its counsel of record, Nez Perce County Deputy 
Pros~cuting Attorney, Nance Ceccarelli, submits the following in support of the State's Motion for 
Summary Disposition currently before th.is Court, and in response to the Petitioner's brief in 
support of the Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition currently before this Court. 
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FACTUAL and PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Petitioner was convicted of first-degree felony murder following a jury trial in July 2008; 
Petitioner was sentenced in January 2009 to life in prison with 22 years fixed. Petitioner appealed 
the CQnvictio11. ~}v1~cll 20! l,_the Id849 Court of Appeals affirmed t_1-e copv_ictio_n and sente~ce. 
On September 12, 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court denied Petitioner's Petition for Review. 
Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and accompanying Affidavits in Support of the 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on September 7, 2012. The State and the Petitioner have each· 
filed Motions for Summary Disposition. 
APPLICABLE STANDARDS 
The crux of the Petitioner's arguments rests in various assertions and allegations that 
attempt, but do not succeed in raising issues of material fact. Petitioner surmises as to the intent of 
witnesses, trial counsel, and jurors present at trial and supports those conclusions based on his 
reading and hind-sight analysis of the trial transcript. (see various citations to the trial transcript in 
Petitioner's Brief in Response.to State's Motion. .. ) 
"Summary dismissal is permissible when the petitioner's evidence has raised no genuine 
issue of material °fact that, ifresolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle the petitioner to the 
requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted." 
State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561 (2008); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,271 (Ct.App.2002). 
Petitions that are unverified and conclusory may be dismissed by motion for summary disposition. 
LC. § 29-4906. Conclusory or unverified allegations are "insufficient to entitle petitioner to an 
evidentiary hearing." King v. State~ 114 Idaho 442,446 (Ct.App.1988). 
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The Petitioner bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, the 
allegations upon which his request for post-conviction relief is based. LC. § 19-4907; Stuart v. 
State, 118 Idaho 865,869 (1990); Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269,271 (Ct.App.2002) (emphasis 
added). Petitioner has requested that the Court take judicial notice of transcripts,_ a:ffida~w, lg<;l_ged. 
documents, exhibits, and the entire record. Additionally, the Petitioner has provided the Court with 
numerous citations to state and federal case law as if the allegations made in the petition are true; 
however, few of the allegations are substantiated or corroborated with anything more than affidavits 
by family members who were present during the trial ( and could have brought the alleged failings 
of jurors and defense counsel to the attention of the Petitioner) or a backwards-looking interpretive 
analysis of what happened and conjuring a different result. 
ARGUMENTS 
Petitioner fails to meet the :requirements of LC; §19-4901(a) for Post-Conviction Relief 
because he fails to assert claims that are valid under The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, 
he has failed to support his claims with affidavits or evidence sufficient to provide an issue of 
material fact, and he raises issues that could have been raised on direct appeal but were not. 
Therefore, the petition fails to raise a claim for relief and should be summarily dismissed. 
Petitioner alleges five causes of actions for post-conviction relief. Each cause of action is 
addressed individually. 
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1. Whether Petitioner was denied the right to confront witnesses against him wht:n 
State's witnesses testified at trial about tests and results they personally did not 
perform nor had personal knowledge. 
_Petitioner asserts that his right to confront witnesses:against him was violated when tht:: 
State's witnesses testified at trial about neuropathology tests and examination results which they 
neither performed nor had personal knowledge; and further, that the neuropathologist, Dr. Reichard, 
who performed the tests and examination, was not a witness at trial. Trial counsel for the Petitioner 
admits that he was aware of the report of Dr. Reichard, the contents of the report, that State experts 
witnesses relied upon and opined based on the contents of the report, and trial counsel did not raise 
objections to the testimony of the various State expert witnesses, because of"where we were going 
and what we were trying to accomplish in the defense "(Depo. pg. 18, ln.4-pg. 32, ln. 25). 
Petitioner's trial counsel admits familiarity with Crawford v. Washington and its import 
related to the confrontation clause and specifically admits that he did not object-to the expert 
testimony and specifically did not make any objections based on confrontation clause during trial 
for the "same reasons we've talked about" (referring to his trial plan, strategies, objectives, and 
overall defense of the Petitioner Depo. pg. 37, ln 19)J 
Petitioner's Sixth Ainendment rights related to the confrontation clause were not violated 
because he had opportunity to plan, prepare, and present a defense that confronts the information 
relied upon by State witnesses and specifically did not. 
Petitioner's claim should be summarily dismissed. 
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2. Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct (a) outside the presence of the 
Court during trial, (b) during the state's case-in-chief, (c) during the cross-
examination of Petitioner and ( d) during closing and rebuttal argument. 
, Petitioner asserts that the prosecutor committed .mi~()onduct in multiph: ways: 
• first, he projected family photos of the victim prior to the Court going on record, thus 
exposing the jury to extra-judicial evidence; 
• second, he appealed to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury through the use 
of inflammatory tactics by eliciting testimony of the victim's sister; 
• third, he elicited inadmissible evidence during cross-examination of Petitioner and Dr. 
Arden; and, 
• finally, comments during his closing and rebuttal arguments constitute conduct 
sufficiently egregious as to result in fundamental error. 
Petitioner is precluded from raising issues in a post-conviction petition that could have been 
raised on direct appeal butthat Petitioner failed to raise previously. Furthermore, issues that could 
have been raised on direct appeal but were not are precluded and cannot be raised in post-
conviction proceedings. LC. § 19._490l(bJ. Petitioner's allegations ofprosecutorial misconduct 
should have been raised on direct appeal and are not valid claims for post-conviction relief under 
LC.§ 19-4901(a) and should be summarily dismissed. 
The deposition of Petitioner's trial counsel makes it very clear that: 
1) Certain instances of allegations of prosecutorial misconduct were 
unobserved by trial counsel (setting up power point exhibits Depo. pg.38-40, 
In. 23); 
2) State's exhibits at trial are now construed by Petitioner to be inflammatory 
and prejudicial when in fact it is impossible to discern from the photographs 
what kind of cards were on display and therefore impossible to determine what 
effect, if any, the photographs had on the jury at that time (Depo. pg. 45 In. 18-
pg. 46 ln. 12 and State's trial exhibits 4, 5, 6); 
3) Trial counsel did not see any grounds for a mistrial because "if I (sic) had ... 
I would have made that motion. And again, I didn't want to hammer it home." 
(reference to the concept of not highlighting or emphasizing negative things to a 
jury Depo. pg. 52 In. 6). 
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Reading all of this voluminous record, including the transcript of the trial and of trial 
counsel's deposition, there is no evidence of egregfous conduct by the prosecutor and 
consequently of any fundamental error, as alleged by the Petitioner. There is nothing in the 
_ record, too, to sµggest that appellate counsel was deficient for failing to raiseJlie i_ssll.~ of 
prosecutorial misconduct when it appears that there was no notice of prosecutori~ misconduct 
observed by or brought to the attention of the Court by trial counsel or Petitioner or of 
"observers" who now come forward with affidavits. Thus, this claim should be summarily 
dismissed. 
3. Whether Petitioner was denied due process when jurors engaged in misconduct by 
allegedly sleeping during the presentation of evidence. · 
Petitioner asserts that jurors engaged in misconduct when they were allegedly sleeping 
during the presentation of evidence as various points throughout the trial. Petitioner engages in a 
discµssion attempting to distinguish this case from Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139 (Ct.App.2006): 
Murphy did not identify which day of the five-day jury trial the juror allegedly slept, 
describe the length of time the juror allegedly slept, or explain what testimony or evidence 
the juror allegedly slept through. In the absence of such evidence, there was no showing of 
deficient performance or prejudice. Therefore, it was proper for the court to dismiss this 
claim. 
Id. at 150. 
However, although Petitioner presents affidavits that identify days in which jurors allegedly 
slept, and while there is some indication in some -0f the affidavits referencing testimony that jurors 
allegedly slept through, the allegation does not indicate which jurors were allegedly sleeping 
through the referenced testimony. Thus, does Petitioner expect us to assume that all jurors were 
. sleeping all of the time, or tlrroµgh all of th~ ~pop:ant testnne>ny,_:~r.through only the testimony 
that was in support of Petitioner's defense? 
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In fact, trial counsel was aware of only one specific time during Dr. Ross's testimony in 
which a juror was "falling asleep" (Depo. pg. 67 ln. 1 - pg. 70 1n. 1 ). Without any specific 
information as to the amount of "important" testimony allegedly missed by the jurors, with the 
s~gle documented exception noted above_dllring the cross examina,tion of Dr. ~~ss by trial counsel, 
it is unfathomable that for a trial lasting more than a week that these audience members, who now 
recall jurors sleeping, would not have shared this critically important information with trial counsel 
or the Petitioner. There is nothing in this vast record that supports any claim of due process 
violations because of juror misconduct. Further there is nothing in this vast record that supports 
any claim of appellate counsel or trial counsel being ineffective for deficient performance for 
failing to raise the issue of juror misconduct. 
Petitioner's allegations of juror misconduct should be summarily dismissed. 
4. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective for deficient performance for either 
failing to raise the issue of prosecutorial misconduct or juror misconduct. 
Nothing in Petitioner's petition or in the record supports an argument that appellate 
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Further, there is 
nothing in the record to support a claim that either of these allegations of misconduct occurred other 
than in hindsight. Finally, trial counsel specifically admits that his lack of making a record on these 
issues was likely strategic (Depo. pg. 52 ln. 6; Depo. pg. 67 ln. 1 - pg. 70 ln. 1; and, other multiple 
references within the Deposition to trial counsel's reasoning). 
Petitioner's claim of deficient performance by appellate counsel should be summarily 
dismissed. 
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5. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for numerous actions such as failing to 
present an adequate analysis, failing to move for a mistrial, failing to challenge for 
cause a juror, and for rendering deficient performance. 
Petitioner offers a laundry list of claims that trial counsel was ineffective. However, the 
deposition of Petitioner's trial counsel makes it clear that there was a competent, strategic defense 
planned around a theory that the Petitioner was innocent and that the Petitioner could not have 
murdered  (Depa pg 104 In 7 - pg. 105 1n 9). 
Therefore, Petitioner's claims that trial counsel was ineffective and deficient should be 
summarily dismissed. 
Petitioner fails to meet the standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington for purposes of 
determining whether counsel was ineffective. This Court cannot" ... second-guess strategic and 
tactical decisions and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the 
decision is shown.to have resulted from inadequate preparation. ignorance ofthe relevant law. ... " 
State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561 (2008); Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 584 (2000). In addition, 
"[t]here is a strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within the wide range of 
professional assistance." Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988). 
Petitioner has not shown that any of trial counsel's strategic decisions (e.g., summoning a 
new jury pool, or peremptory challenge of a juror) resulted from inadequate preparation or 
ignorance of the relevant law (Deposition of Scott Chapman in its entirety). 
Therefore, Petitioner's claims of ineffective trial counsel cannot be the basis for his relief 
and should be summarily dismissed. 
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION and 
RESPONSE to PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OFPETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 8 
269
-' '- ------ __ . ______ J l_-.::.:~ ·=--"-_-:__J -
































Petitioner fails to meet the requirements of LC. § 19-4901(a) for Post-Conviction Relief 
because he has failed to support his claims with affidavits or ,evidence, he f~ls to assert claims that 
are valid under The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, and he raises issues that could have 
been raised on direct appeal but were not. 
The State respectfully requests that this Court grant the State's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal because the Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any genuine issue of material fact and 
therefore, the petition fails to raise any claims for relief that may be granted under The Uniform 
Post-Conviction Procedure Act. 
DATED this 29th day of March, 2013 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing, BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION, was hand delivered via court basket to: 
(l)J(_~,or~~~~j 
(2) t hand delivered via court basket, or U 
(3) __ sent via facsimile, or 
(4) __ mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United States Mail. 
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
Dennis Benjamin 
Deborah Whipple 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Barlett LLP 
P.O.Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
DATED this 29th day of March, 2013. 
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Case No. CV-12-01798 
AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW PARNES 
Andrew Parnes, being duly swom and upon oath, hereby states: 
1. I am an attorney who has been licensed to practice in the State of Idaho 
since 1990. 
2- I graduated from Williams College (B.A. 1967); Stanford University (M.A., 
1971; Ph.D., 1973) and Boalt Hall School of Law~ University of Californi~ at Berkeley 
(JD., 1978). 
3. I am also admitted to the State Bar of California and U.S. District Court, 
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Northem District of California (1978); U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit (1981); and 
the U.S. Supreme Court (1982). 
4. I am AV rated by Martindale-Hubbell and have been named one of the 
nBest Lawyers in America." I am a past president of the Idaho Association of Crimin~ 
Defense Lawyers and a member of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. 
5. My practice focuses on criminal defense:, including appellate and post-
conviction practice~ in both the state ~d federal courts. I have represented clients :i,n 
numerous capital cases in Idaho~ California and Utah overth.e past twenty five years. 
6. · twas asked to provide my opinions regarding any deficient performance of 
trial cou.ri.sel 'r~garding the failure to object to the introduction ofinadmissible hearsay in 
; . 
· violation ofth~ defendant's constitutional right of confrontation and the failure to .object 
. . 
to instances of!P1"osecutorial misconduct during trial .. In preparation of this affidavit, I 
i 
have· reviewed !the foUowing materials: 
at The Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed :in this 
matter; 
b; The Answer filed by the State of Idaho; 
c.1 The Briefs filed by :Mr. Grove and the State of Idaho rega:rding the 
Motions for: Summary Disposition; 
d.: The opinion of the Court of Appeals in State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 
483,259 P.3d 629 (Ct App. 2011); 
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e. The deposition of Scott Chapman, dated January 24, 2013; 
f. Portions of the discovery related ta the reports provided by Drs. 
">-Chm,- Harper. Huntet;~Ross ·ma Reichard; 
g. The report of Dr. Arden, dated December 4. 2012; 
h.. Portions of the trial transcript inclucling the testimony of Dr. Chin, 
Dr. Hunter. Dr. Ross> Dr. Harper and Dr. Arden; 
1. The trial tronscript containing the opening and closing statement.s of 
counsel for the State and Mr. Grove. 
7. Based upon my experience and the review of the above materials, it is my 
professional opinion that trial counsel, Scott Chapman, did not provide effective 
assistance of counsel as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668-(1984) and 
its progeny in several respects as set forth in more detail herein below. 
8. The central issue in the case was the timing oftbe injuries to the child. Mr. 
Chapma:n acknowledged this fact in both his opening statement and closing argument at 
trial. See, also, Chapman Deposition, p. 18. In its opinion, the Court of Appeals referred 
to the iss.ue as ''the central disputed question in this case - when the injuries which 
u1timately caused K.M. 's. death occurred and whether it was likely that K.M. would have 
lost consciousness and/or shown severe symptoms :immediately after the injuries were 
inflicted/' State v. Grove, 151 Idaho a.t490. Thus, ex:clusion of any·evidence supporting 
the prosecution's theory tha1 the injuries occurred only in the morning when Mr. Grove 
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was alone with the child was critical to the defense of the case, and a reasonably 
competent attorney would have taken all steps necessary to seek ·exclusion of s:uch 
evidence. Since the-basis for the testifying expeits' opinions about the time -0f tbe . • , -s,-,..,.---~-·,-·:·--. 
injuries was based upon the report of Dr. Reichar~.wh~ was not listed as a prosecution 
witness and was not called by the prosecution, a reasonably competent attomey should 
have sought to exclude all refe:r:ence to Dr. Reic4ard' s report 
9·. In preparation for trial, Mr. Chapm·an contacted a forensic pathologist to· 
review the findings of the experts provided in the State's discovery; however, Mr. 
Chapman did not interview Dr. Reichard at any point before or during trial. See, 
Chapman Deposition,· p~ 28. A reasonably competent attorney preparing for trial in this 
matter would have inten,iewed Dr. Reichard for a number of reasons. including to obtain 
. . 
ail. understanding of why Reichard made the conclusions about the laceration of the 
corpus calfosum. · This is especially critical in light of 'the contrary conclusions reached by 
the defense expert, Dr. Arden. 1n my experience, experts, such as Dr. Reichard, are 
willing to discuss their :findings with defense attorneys. 
10. Mr. Chap;man stated that his main reason for not objecting to the Reichard 
report was that he believed thatDr. Arden would, in large degree, ·~poke enough holes in 
that to make - I guess in a sense hopefully make reliance on that report misplaced." 
Chapman Depositi.o~ p. 19. :Mi". Chapman also "guess[ ed]" that he had to talce into 
accqm:lt the p_ossibility that the State could have called Dr. Reichard to testify. Chapman 
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Deposition, p. 20. 
11. A reasonably competent attorney would have at least known at the 
beginning:oftri-althat Dr; Reich;a:td"Was riot listed as a witness by the State" o_dcfentifie~fas· ·,:----
-a witness during the jury voir dire process. In addition, the reasons given by Mr. 
Chapman provide no valid excuse for his failure to investigate the basis for Reichard's 
opinions· by contacting Reichard before trial. Mr. Chapman's stated concern, that Dr. 
Reichard might be called to testify ifhe objected, is unreasonable given Dr. Reichru:d's 
unavailability and the fact .that Dr. Reichard could have been called as a rebuttal witness 
to Dr. Arden, _irrespective of whether a confrontation clause objection had been made. 
12. A reasonably competent attorney preparing for a first degree murder trial in 
2008 should have been aware of the Idaho Rules of Evidence relating to the introduction 
of expert evidence and the limitation placed upon the reliance by expem on the reports of 
others as set forth in Rule 703. An objection to the testifying doctO!"s' reliance on the 
Reicha.td report as well H.8 an objection to the mtroducti.Qn of the autopsy report (trial 
exhibit 11), whlch included-the Reichard report, should have been made on the basis of 
the rules of evidence. Mr. Chapman provided no tactical reason for his failure to object 
to the report on the basis of this rule. See, Chapman Depositio~, p. 32. 
13. Furthermore, reasonably competent attorneys preparing for trial in 2008 
should have been aware of the decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) 
.. and us~c;iitas a basis to seek exclusion of the Reichard report and the testifying doctors' 
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reliance on that report. Mr. Chapman could not recall ifhe even considered Crawford as 
a means of e~cluding this harmful evidence at the_time of trial. Chapman Deposition, pp. 
-·-:. ,-·- C:--.-. • :-·:.· "' - ,:_=-_-_ - •. 
-14. The opinion of the Idaho Court of Appeals notes that "the Confrontation 
Clause ,rio1ation issue complained ofin this case implicates a_ constitutional right (a 
conclusion not disputed by the state), ... " Grove, 151 Idaho~ 491. However, because 
Mr. Chapman failed to object to the evidence at trial, the appellate court did not reach the 
merits of the constiti.rtional violation. A critical part of trial counsel's duty is to make 
proper objections so that his client will be able to seek an appeal on those objections, if 
the defendant i:s convicted at trial. Beca.use Mr. Chapman clid not object to the Reichard 
report,. he failed to represent his client as required by the Sixth Amendment. 
15. - Trial_counsel also has a responsibility to assure that instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct are brought to the attention of the trial judge so that the judge 
_ can admonish the prosecutor, exclude the evidence or improper comment, or if the 
objection is overruled, so that there is a basis for an appellate court to review the 
objections. 
16. In this case, there are numerous instances where 1vfr. Chapman failed to 
object to such misconduct. Mr. Chapman could not recall why he failed to make such 
objections but speculated that he might not have wanted to highli~t the improper 
e~~~ce or a.rgum~tto the jury. Chapman Deposition, pp. 43,; 47, 78. However, during 
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the prosecutor's closing argument, Mr. Chapman did make one objection in front of the 
jury which was sustained by the judge and the juzy was ins1ructed to disregard tlurt 
. __ cpmment. See, TrialTranscript, pp. 1430. It is therefore unlikely that the'speciilative 
rea_sons given by :Mr. Chapman for his failure to object to other instaJ,.ces of misconduct 
support a finding that he was acting as a reasonably competent attorney. 
17. A reasonably competent attorney would have objected if family photos not 
admissible in evidence were projected on a· screen when the jury was.present. Such 
family photos are highly inflammatocy and prejudicial as well as lacking in relevance. 
The State did not even seek to introduce these photos and their being placed in front of 
the jury in this. circumstance should have been the basis for an objection, including a 
motion for mistrial and at least curative instructions. Similarly, a reasonably competent 
attomeywould have objected to the admission oftrial exhibits 4, 5 and 6, which depicted 
the trailer home of Lisa Nash and were taken on August 1, 2006, weeks after K.M.'s 
death. :Mr. Chapman failed to object to these photos which niay have been of slight 
· relevance related to the testimony of the officer reg~g the dimensions of the trailer but 
contained highly prejudicial evidence of what appear to be numerous sympathy cards sent 
after K.M. 's death. A reasonably competent attorney would have sought to exclude these 
photographs as irrelevant under I.RE 401 and 402, or alternatively more prejudicial than 
probative under I.RE. 403, as there was no dispute about the dimensions of the trailer. 
7 -AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW PARNES 
-,' . - ·-- .. -.. ~ .. ,,, .. _ .... --~ -.--~-·, -~ 
278
- ----··---------- - -
°'P: 12 2013 10:03AM Nevin Benjamin,McKay8'.9art 208 345 8274 page ~ 
18. Having filed an objection to the admission ofKaylee's testimony and 
having obtained a specific limitation on that testimony from the tria1 judge, a reasonably 
. . 
... ·,_.~_:_>,. ---oompetentatto:rney·wow.d'have objected lo any extension of:hertcsfunoiiy-'tfeyoricfihc :->~.:,--,,.---- ... ·-.,.-
court ruling, :including the prejudicial testimony of her last goodbye to her brother. 
19. On the day that M.r. Grove was originally scheduled to testify, he suffered a 
medical condition and based upon that condition. the court briefly continued the trial. 
The court informed the jury of a general medical matter but did not reference Mr. Grove 
ot the nature of the condition. During cross-examination of11r. Grove, the prosecutor 
asked .lvfr. Grove about his prescription for Ativan and his "emotional condition" on 
Friday, without objection fro:m defense counsel. A reasonably competent trial comIBel 
would have objected to those questions, which were irrelevant to the case. Instead of 
. . 
objecting, Mr. Chttp:tnan brought that testimony up during his closing argument telling the 
jury this evidence had "nothing to do with anything," in essence acknowledging that he 
should have objected ta the questioning. During closing argument, the prosecutor 
. referred to this testimony, again with.out objection, trying to connect Mr. Grove~s medical 
condition during trial to his "emotional breakdown, an instantaneous fit of anger" whe11 
Mr. Grove allegedly hit K.M. 
20. During closing arguments, the prosecutor made other improper and 
objectionable comments to the jury, including attacks on the defense expert, references to 
the numb·~ of child abuse cases and murders throughout the country and in the councy;· --- · 
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reasons why the prosecutor did not call K.M ~s father to testify, as well as an argument 
that the jury should not let a murderer "go free."· Mr. Chapman objected to none of these 
comments~,-A reasonably competent attorney would hEIVe olJJected to these iiillamii:iitory·,. .. - .. -· -·· . 
comments in order to obt.ain a curative instruction from the court or possibly a mis-trial if 
the pros~cutor continued to make these types of comments to the jury: There is no 
tactical reason to fail to object to such instances of prosecutorial misconduct. 
SUBSRIBED AND SWORN TO 
before me this .\@day of April, 2013. 
Notary Public for the State of Idaho 
Residing at: ~ tC~ 
MyCommissionExpires: 'g-31-\ 8 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on April R 2013,. I caused a true and correct co_py of the fofogoing 
document to be: 
to: 
hand delivered · 
X faxed 
Nance Ceccarelli 
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecuting· Attorney 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF IN 
- SUPPORT OF PETITIONER'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
Respondent. 
Petitioner, Stacey Grove, submits the following reply brief in support of his motion for 
summary disposition. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief may be granted if this Court 
determines no genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions 
together with any affidavits on file. The Court must liberally construe the facts and reasonable 
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,521,236 P.3d 1277, 
1281 (2010). Here, the Court may consider the verified allegations in the Amended Petition, the 
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admissions by the state in its Answer, the files and records of the criminal case proceedings, the 
deposition of Scott Chapman and the many affidavits filed, including the affidavits of Andrew 
Parnes and Dr. Jonathan Arden. The state has not filed any affidavits in response. As explained 
below, no genuine issue-of material fact exists and summary disposition should-be, granted in 
favor of Mr. Grove. 
II.ARGUMENT 
A. Mr. Grove's Right to Confront Witnesses ,4.gainst Him was Violated 
Mr. Grove set out at pages 3-14 of his Brief in Response to State's Motion for Summary 
Disposition and In Support of Petitioner's Motion (Petitioner's Brief) why there is no genuine 
issue of fact and why summary disposition should be granted in his favor because his Sixth 
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him was violated. At pages 3-4 of his brief, 
Mr. Grove set out the relevant law. At pages 5-14, Mr. Grove set out why the application of the 
relevant law to the uncontroverted facts before this Court requires that post-conviction relief be 
granted to him on the confrontation claim. 
The state's Reply Brief in Support of State's Motion for Summary Disposition and 
Response to Petitioner's Brief in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition 
(State's Brief) does not address either Mr. Grove's statement of the law or his discussion of the 
application of the law to this case. State's Brief page 4. Rather, the state argues that trial counsel 
was familiar with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and did not object to the 
violation of Mr. Grove's constitutional rights in accord with a trial plan, strategies, objectives 
and overall defense. State's Brief at page 4. The state further asserts without citation to · 
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authority that because Mr. Grove had an opportunity to prepare a case to confront the evidence 
against him and did not do so, there was no confrontation clause violation. Id. 
The state's failure to dispute either Mr. Grove's statement of the relevant law or his 
~--~-·a:n.atysiS' of the application of the law to the-fact-s111-dicatesthe state's agreement wiili,Mr: Grove's --
analysis. See State v. Almaraz, _Idaho_, _P.3d_, 2013 WL 1285940 (2013), holding 
that the state's failure to argue harmless error precluded a finding ofhannless error even in the 
face of the "unassailable" evidence of guilt. 2013 WL 1285940 (Jones, J., dissenting). 
The state's argument, rather than denying a violation of the confrontation clause, appears 
to be that even though the facts would ordinarily establish a violation, there was no constitutional 
error because defense counsel was aware of Crawford and did not object and because Mr. Grove 
had an oppo:rtunity to present a defense. State's Brief at 4. 
However, the state offers no authority for its underlying premise - that a knowing, 
voluntary and intelligent waiver of confrontation rights may be made by counsel without his 
client's consent See State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 858, 655 P.2d 46, 65 (1982) (Bistline, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting), "[C]ounsel had a right - better said - a duty - to challenge 
evidence obtained in violation of statutory or constitutional rights, or both." Because the state 
offers no authority for the finding that counsel could waive Mr. Grove's constitutional rights 
without his consent, this Court should not consider the state's argument and should grant 
summary disposition in Mr. Grove's favor on the confrontation claim. 
Finally, the state's argument that Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses was not violated 
· because "he had opportunity to plan;prepare,-andpresent adefensethat confronts the 
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information relied upon by the State witnesses and specifically did not," State's Reply Brief, pg. 
4, is a non sequitur. The opportunity to defend against "the information relied upon by the State 
witnesses" is not related to the question of whether that information was improperly admitted in 
· ,_--''"'~", · --- ., violation of the confrontation clause; · Pla:inly,..,.Mr:"Grove ·could not--'con.front the source of-critical 
evidence relied upon by the state, i.e., the observations and report of Dr. Reichard and the 
observations of the unnamed transplant surgeon because those people were not called to testify. 
He could not cross-examine the missing witnesses. But insofar as the state is again arguing that 
Mr. Grove's counsel somehow waived Mr. Grove's rights by failing to make proper 
confrontation clause objections, it again cites no authority for the proposition that counsel may 
waive such a right without Mr. Grove's knowledge and consent. Contra, State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209,227,245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010) ("In Idaho, we permit a defendant to waive a right of 
constitutional magnitude, so long as the defendant does so knowingly, voluntarily, and 
intelligently."); State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 391, 630 P.2d 674, 678 (1981) ("While 
ordinarily a client is bound by his attorney's actions .... an attorney may not waive a 
'fundamental' right of a client without the client's informed consent."). 
Moreover, even if the state's unsupported argument is considered, summary disposition 
should be granted in Mr. Grove's favor based upon the following. 
The state argues that Mr. Chapman had a strategic reason to fail to object to the evidence 
which was inadmissible under I.RE. 703, the confrontation clause, or both. However, this Court 
need not defer to strategic decisions which result "from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the 
relevant law or other shortcomings capable-of objective review:~'- Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 
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558, 561, 149 P.3d 833, 836 (2006). What Mr. Chapman said at the deposition was he had two 
reasons he did not object to the introduction of the autopsy report (which included Dr. Reichard's 
report). The first was that "[t]here wasn't anything in that autopsy report that didn't work with .. 
on to explain his ''thrust of the case" as: "That the injuries that occurred to  were inflicted at 
a time when Stace was not around or with the child in any fashion that it could have happened." 
Id., ln. 20-23. But this statement proves that it was an objectively unreasonable decision to not 
object because Dr. Reichard's report contained the most important fact pointing to the injury 
occurring when Mr. Grove was alone with  i.e., the laceration in the corpus callosum. If 
Mr. Chapman had objected to the admission of the report (and the many testimonial descriptions 
of Dr. Reichard's findings by other state witnesses), the jury would have been unaware of the 
existence of the alleged laceration at all, a plainly better position for the defense to be in. In fact, 
. Mr. Chapman frankly admits that "Dr. Reichard's report undermined the thrust of [the] defense." 
Depo., pg. 19, ln. 10-13. Further, he admits "[t]hat finding is particularly damaging to the thrust 
of [his] defense of Stace Grove." Depo., pg. 21, ln. 1-4. And, he admitted that "[f]rom a 
strategic point of view, it would have been better for [his] theory of the case to keep out this 
evidence if [he] could." Depo., pg. 22, ln. 21-25. Thus, Mr. Chapman's decision to not make 
meritorious hearsay and confrontation clause objections due to his belief that Dr. Reichard's 
findings worked with the thrust of his case is objectively unreasonable. 
Mr. Chapman also speculated that he might have a second reason to not object. He said, 
"Also had to, J guess; take into consideration the possibility-that Dr. Reichard could have been·-
made a witness and come to testify and then have him and Arden sitting there at opposing 
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positions." Depo., pg. 20, In. 1-5 ( emphasis added). This, of course, is pure speculation on Mr. 
Chapman's part. Moreover, it is objectively unreasonable. Mr. Chapman admits that he never 
even spoke to Dr. Reichard prior to trial: 
- -- ------Q. -Okay. Prior to the trlal~ 'dioycru ever-speak ttr-Dr~ Reichard? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you make any efforts to speak to him? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you recall why you did not speak to Dr. Reichard in this case? 
A. Again, I had a theory, and it was based on where we - "we" as in where Stace 
was at at given times and places, 8.1'.ld it wasn't ne~essary. 
Q. But Dr. Reichard's conclusion was due to the tear in the brain that your theory 
of the case was impossible? 
A. Dr. Reichard's conclusion, yes. 
Depo., pg. 28, In. 3-25. Thus, Mr. Chapman did not speak to Dr. Reichard because he believed 
that Dr. Arden's testimony would counteract Dr. Reichard's testimony. Consequently, it cannot 
be that he failed to make hearsay and confrontation clause objections because he was afraid that 
Dr. Reichard might testify. 1 
1 As previously argued, Mr. Chapman's-decisionto allowhighly damaging inadmissible _ 
evidence to be introduced because he believed Dr. Arden's testimony would counter it was also 
an objectively unreasonable decision. Petitioner's Brief in Response to State's Motion for 
Summary Disposition and in Support of Petitioner's Motion ("Petitioner's Brief'), pg. 42-43. 
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Moreover, had defense counsel spoken to Dr. Reichard, he would have learned that Dr. 
Reichard had not been contacted by the prosecutor about testifying2 and could have made his 
objections at trial knowing that the doctor was in New Mexico and not available to testify. But 
even without speakirigtcfflr:Retchatd, it shouldhav-e'been·obvious to Mr. ChapmanthatDr. 
Reichard was not going to testify because he was not among the trial witnesses provided by the 
state to the Court. See Exhibit B (Trial Transcript), pg. 137, In. 9 - 138, In. 6 (where the court 
reads a list of forty witnesses not including Dr. Reichard to the jury panel during voir dire). 
Thus, Mr. Chapman's failure to object, to the extent it was based upon a concern that Dr. 
Reichard might be called to testify, was based upon inadequate preparation and ignorance of the 
law, ICR 16 (b )(7), on his part. 3 
Further, the absence of objection to the evidence was due to ignorance of the law. Mr. 
Chapman did not testify that he was familiar with Crawford v. Washington, supra, at the time of 
the trial. He was asked whether he was currently familiar with the case. Depo., pg. 37, ln. 5 - pg. 
38, ln. 9. And, he testified that he could not say whether he was aware of the case at the time of 
the criminal trial. Depo., pg. 37, In. 23-25. Moreover, Mr. Chapman erroneously described the 
holding in Crawford as, "[t]hat there was a confrontation right that trumps hearsay exceptions." 
2 This assertion is based upon a telephone conversation held between counsel for Mr. 
Grove and Dr. Reichard on March 25, 2013, where he stated that he was never contacted by 
either the prosecutor or defense counsel with regard to his autopsy report. 
3 In addition, a decision to not object in order to avoid Dr. Reichard testifying in person 
would be objectively unreasonable because Dr. Reichard's findings were, in ~ome respects, more 
favorable to Mr. Grove than the opinions of the other doctors. For example, Dr. Ross suggested 
that there was evidence of shear injury, -ice, --diffuse axonial injury, in the brain. Exhibit B, pg. 
942, In. 14-17. Dr. Reichard, however, noted in his report that "[t]he extensive nature of 
V[asular]A[xonial]I[njury] precludes interpretation for diffuse axonial injury." Reichard Report, 
pg. 2. 




·---- ----- ,: ·- I· 
I 1:• 
-- -----~- -
Depo., pg. 37, In. 9-12. This does not show the level oflegal knowledge needed to make an 
intelligent decision about whether an objection to the evidence would be meritorious. To the 
contrary, Mr. Chapman's belief regarding the holding of Crawford shows that he is not - even 
now - familiar witlrthe"imp-0rrofthat case:'-''--'-''·'c:·- .. .. . : ----""----- ·-:·· 
Counsel also admitted that the testimony about the particulars of Dr. Reichard's report by 
other doctors was inadmissible under I.R.E. 703. Depo., pg. 31, ln. 15 - pg. 32, ln. 19. When 
asked why he did not make a Rule 703 objection he said: "I cannot sit here and specifically tell 
you why I did not, other than, again, my general thought process about where we were going and 
what we were trying to accomplish in the defense." Depo., pg. 32, ln. 20-23. But, as shown 
above, his "general thought process" in this regard was based upon inadequate preparation 
(because he failed to detennmethatDr: Reicharcfwas riot going.to be called as a witness), 
ignorance of the relevant law ( due to his incomplete understanding of Crawford v. Washington) 
and other shortcomings capable of objective review (his opinion that the admission of Dr. 
Reichard' s report and the testimony about his findings by the other doctors would not harm the 
thrust of his defense when the true effect was precisely the opposite). Consequently, under 
Estrada, this Court owes counsel no deference. 
As to the hearsay evidence regarding the abdominal injuries, counsel could not say why 
he failed to object. 
Q. Okay. When Dr. Ross4 testified that he had been told by the transplant 
surgeon about hemorrhaging in Kyler's abdomen, you failed to object to that. Can 
you tell me why? 
4 In addition, Dr. Harper also testified without objection about what the transplant 
surgeon observed. Exhibit B, pg. 1032, ln. 20 - pg. 1030, In. 11. 




Q. Would you agree that that would be hearsay? 
A. Yes. 
Depo;, pg:-81~"-fi:L 017-23. Counsel acknowledged that the evidence was importantto the sta-tei.s- --- · 
theory of the case. 
Q. Okay. Would you agree that an important piece of evidence at trial was the 
evidence of the internal injuries of  that were found during the transplant 
procedure? 
A. I think they were important, but I think the brain was the focus. 
Q. And one of the reasons why the internal injuries evidence was important was 
because the doctor said that  would have been in excruciating pain, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And that hurt your theory of the case because biological mom and 
Stace did not report  being in excruciating pain, correct? 
A. I would agree that they did not report him being in excruciating pain. 
Depo., pg. 88, ln. 4-19. Again, it was objectively unreasonable for defense counsel to fail to 
make a meritorious objection to this evidence. 
Finally, if counsel failed to exercise Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses without Mr. 
Grove's permission, that would only be additional proof that Mr. Grove did not receive the 
constitutionally mandated effective assistance of counsel. 
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B. The Misconduct by the Prosecutor Deprived Mr. Grove of a Fair Trial 
The state now argues that the prosecutorial misconduct issue cannot be raised now 
because it could have been raised on direct appeal. 5 In doing so, it again fails to even 
. acknowledge· much less discuss Stafe-iCYefl',W-Wliicli held that: 
If the alleged error was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, it shall only 
be reviewed by an appellate court under Idaho's fundamental error doctrine. Such 
review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the defendant bears the burden of 
persuading the appellate court that the alleged error: (1) violates one or more of 
the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need 
for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) 
was not harmless. If the defendant persuades the appellate court that the 
complained of error satisfies this three-prong inquiry, then the appellate court 
shall vacate and remand. 
150 Idaho at 228,245 P.3d at 980. On direct appeal, it could not be shown that Mr. Chapman's 
--· .... -- - -
failure to object was not the result of an intentional waiver on the part of trial counsel and Mr. 
Grove. Thus, the claim could not have been raised upon appeal. See also Affidavits of Diane 
Walker and Eric Frederickson. Thus, the state's argument that the issue should have been raised 
on direct appeal should be rejected. 
However, it is now clear that there was not such a waiver by Mr. Grove. Further, Mr. 
Chapman could not have intended to waive his objection to some of the misconduct because he 
admitted that he may not have been aware of the misconduct that had occurred. In particular, Mr. 
Chapman stated he could not recall whether the prosecutor projected autopsy photos along with 
family photos of  in the mornings prior to testimony while the jury entered the jury room 
5 At the same time, the state argues that appellate counsel's performance was not 
deficient notwithstanding the failure to raise the issue on appeal. State's Brief, pg. 7. As 
previously argued, the state cannot have it both ways in this regard. Petitioner's Brief, pg. 34-35. 
The state fails to even attempt to reconcile this fundamental contradiction in its briefing. 




- ----- --- --
through the courtroom. Depo., pg. 40, ln. 1-24. Thus, he could not say whether he had a reason 
for failing to object. 
Further, at the deposition, defense counsel could not say why he did not object to the 
· -prosecutor's misconduct in·exceedirrg'the scope of-this Court's ruling regarding-the admissibility 
of Kylee Bandel's testimony. Depo., pg. 43, ln. 5-8. He could not think of a reason why he 
failed to object to the admission of State's Exhibits 4-6 (showing the family living room and 
approximately 25 sympathy cards) at the trial, Depo., pg. 46, In. 10-12, or to the prosecutor's 
comments that Dr. Arden was on a "special mission," Depo., pg. 47, ln. 14-16, orto the 
prosecutor's comments about Dr. Arden's "financial position" affecting his testimony, Depo., pg. 
47, In. 6-16; pg. 57, ln. 11-15, or the prosecutor's comments in closing argument about how it 
was coiimion for parerikfo killbabie-s, -Depo., pg. 59, In: 8-11; or his comment that Dr. Ross had 
the "unenviable task of taking Kyler's body apart piece by piece," Depo., pg. 59, In. 14-18, or his 
comment about having evidence that Mr. Grove had been violent with  in the past, Depo., 
pg. 60, In. 10-12, or to the prosecutor's comments that ''we don't want to let a murderer go free," 
Depo., pg. 60, ln. 13-16, or his comments that Mr. Grove had "a different kind of emotional 
breakdown" which resulted in the injuries to  Depo., pg. 62, In. 7-13. Mr. Chapman did 
not testify that he made an intentional decision to not object. 
The state also argues that trial counsel's decision to not ask for a mistrial based upon 
misconduct was a reasonable strategic decision because Mr. Chapman said he did not want to 
"hammer it home." State's Reply, pg. 5, quoting Depo., pg. 52, In. 6. This argument is without 
·· force because it ignores that a motion for mistrial is not made before the jury and thus defense 
counsel's decision could not have logically been made on that basis. 
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Next, the state argues that it was not clear that State's Exhibits 4-6 were improper 
because it is not possible to discern from the photographs what kind of cards were on display. 
State's Reply, pg. 5. The photographs speak for themselves in this regard. The exhibits clearly 
,- 0 --'--'c<sl'iow the presence ofmany sympathy cards::--Moreover; one would not expect:Cbristmas cards to,..;_ __ · 
still be on display on August 1, the day when the photographs were taken by Detective Birdsell, 
but one would expect sympathy cards as  passed away on July 10. Exhibit B, pg. 996, ln. 
23-2. 
Finally, it is··important to note that the state does not argue that the many instances of 
misconduct did not occur. Instead, the state weakly suggests that prosecutorial misconduct must 
be "egregious" or "fundamental error" before it can be raised in post-conviction. State's Reply 
Brief, pg. 6 (emphasis in original). In addition to being offensive to the ideals of fair play and 
justice for the prosecutor to argue his intentional misconduct should be tolerated because it just 
wasn 't all that bad, the state fails to cite to any authority in support of that proposition. Id. In an 
earlier pleading, it did argue that a conviction will be set aside for prosecutorial misconduct only 
when conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental error. State's Answer and 
Amended Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissal ("State's Motion"), pg. 5, citing State 
v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772,785,948 P.2d 127 (1997). However, the "fundamental error" rule in 
Porter refers to the scope of review when the appellate court is asked to reverse based upon 
unobjected-to error raised for the first time on appeal: "Because Porter did not object ... we can 
address this issue only if it constitutes fundamental error." Id. This is clear because there is no 
· indication inPvrter that there was a contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor's comment 
that a defense witness was "lying" or to alleged errors during closing arguments. Further the 
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Porter Court relied upon State v. LeMete, 103 Idaho 839, 655 P.2d 46 (1982), a case which also 
dealt with a claim of prosecutorial misconduct raised for the first time on appeal. Recently, the 
.Supreme Court cited Porter for exactly this proposition: "Accordingly, when an objection to 
· == ,._.""_---:,·-,-~-proseclit6nal nri'scoiidi.ict is not raised·at trial; ·fue·miscom:luct will seft'e as a basis for setting---
aside a conviction only when the "conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental error. 
State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 785, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997)." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 
694,716,215 P.3d 414,436 (2009); see also State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679,683,227 P.3d 
933, 937 (Ct. App. 2010) ("Accordingly, when an objection to prosecutorial misconduct is not 
raised at trial, the misconduct will serve as a basis for setting aside a conviction only when the 
'conduct is sufficiently egregious to result in fundamental error.' State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 
·1ss, 948 P.2d 127, 140 (1997VJ "The cases cifod by the state are thus not apposite to this case. 
C. Juror Misconduct Deprived Mr. Grove of a Fair Trial 
In this section of its Reply Brief, the state merely repeats its previous citation to Murphy 
v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 139 P.3d 741, 752 (Ct. App. 2006), but totally fails to address Mr. 
Grove's argument that Murphy is distinguishable from this case. See Petitioner's Brief, pg. 29-
30. In addition, it ignores Mr. Grove's argument that the state has the burden of proving the 
constitutional error, i.e., the jurors' misconduct, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). See also, State v. Almaraz, supra, reversing a 
murder conviction where the state failed to make any argument to carry its burden of proving 
Chapman harmless error. Thus, the state's repeated complaints that Mr. Grove has not 
· specificaily proved which jurors were sleeping during precisely what portions of the testimony 
flips the burden of proof upside down. It is the state which must prove that the jurors were not 
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sleeping during any evidence which may have made a difference in the deliberations. However, 
it has not supported its (implicit) claim of harmless error with any evidence and thus no genuine 
question of material fact exists. Consequently, summary disposition in favor of Mr. Grove 
D. The Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel Claim 
The state does not argue in its Reply Brief that any of the claims other than Prosecutorial 
Misconduct have been forfeited under I.C. § 19-4901(b) because they could have been raised on 
appeal. That argument was addressed above and need not be repeated here. 6 
E. Mr. Grove was Deprived if the Effective Assistance of Trial Counsel 
The state fails to respond to Mr. Grove's objection that the state's motion for summary 
disposition is not sufficiently specific under DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599-, 601, 200 P :3 d 
1148, 1150 (2009) and I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l), which requires grounds for a motion be stated with 
"reasonable particularity." Compare Petitioner's Brief, pg. 35-36 with State's Reply, pg. 8. Mr. 
Grove takes this as an implied concession of the point especially in light of the state's cursory 
and desultory one-page reply to his detailed argument in support of summary disposition in his 
favor. Compare Petitioner's Brief, pg 35-60 with State's Reply, pg. 8. 
Mr. Grove set forth seventeen general areas of deficient performance (subsections (3 )( a)-
( q) of section E) in his brief. Of these, the state mentions only argument (3)(a), i.e., trial 
counsel's failure to summon a new jury pool after prejudicial comments made by a venire 
. - -- --- ---·- -- 6 Earlier the state argued that the Juror Misconduct claim should have.been raised on 
appeal and asked the Court dismiss on that basis. State's Motion, pg. 8, 13. The reason why that 
argument is incorrect was addressed in the Petitioner's Brief, pg. 33-35. The state has apparently 
abandoned that argument as it makes no attempt to address Mr. Grove's arguments. 
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member and the failure to peremptorily challenge Juror #5. It claims that those decisions were 
not shown to have been the result of "inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law ... " 
State's Brief, pg. 8, quoting State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123 (2008). However, 
- that·deference·to trial counsel's actions is only applicable-to strategic decisions made-by counseL · 
It does not apply in this instance because counsel never claimed that the decision to not seek a 
new jury pool was strategic. He said that while it ''would have been [ of] some concern," he did 
not see it as "an earth shattering concern." Depa., pg. 73, pg. 18-20. Likewise, defense counsel 
could not say why he did not challenge Juror #5 for cause. Depo., pg. 77, In. 1-3. Thus the 
state's reliance upon Payne is misplaced as there is no evidence that either shortcoming was a 
matter of strategy. (Why counsel's performance was deficient during voir dire is explained at 
page 39-41 of the Petitioner's Brief.) 
Instead of addressing the other sixteen issues raised, the state merely observes that "the 
deposition of trial counsel makes it clear that there was a competent, strategic defense planned 
around a theory that Petitioner was innocent and that the Petitioner could not have murdered 
 State's Reply, pg. 8. However, while having a theory of defense is necessary to provide 
effective representation, it is not sufficient by itself to provide constitutionally adequate 
representation. Here, the state simply fails to address the multiple instances of deficient 
performance and fails to raise a material question of fact as to any of them. And as Mr. Grove 
has also established that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial (and the state has never 
argued otherwise), his motion for summary disposition should be granted. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
The Court should grant Mr. Grove's motion for summary disposition, vacate the 
conviction and order a new trial. 
4 ''"'-'-~,.,,.----~,--Respectfully-submitted this--· /()-day'o-fAprit2&Br:· -:·.: __ -.--... 
Attorneys for Stacey Grove 
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I CERTIFY that on April /D, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be: 
-~mailed 
hand delivered 
_ emailed to nancececcarelli@co.nezperce.id.us 
to: Nance Ceccarelli 
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P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS 
BENJAMIN 
Dennis Benjamin, being duly sworn and upon oath, hereby says: 
1. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State ofldaho. 
2. Deborah Whipple and I represent the Petitioner herein. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of email correspondence between Dr. Marco 
Ross, then of the Spokane County Medical Examiner, and Dr. Ross Reichard, then of the New 
Mexico Office of the Medical Investigator. 
4. This correspondence shows that Dr. Reichard was contacted on August 3, 2006, three 
weeks after  Martin's death, by Dr. Ross in regards to conducting neuropathology 
consultations "in cases that have a significant potential to require his services as an expert 
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witness in court" 
5. Dr. Ross writes Dr. Reichard that ''we usually obtain neuropathology consults in just 
about all of our infant and child homicides (or suspected homicides)[.]" 
- 6i-Dt. Ross writes Dr. Reichard that '~we are primarily interested in sending our brains 
from pediatric homicides and pediatric suspicious deaths[.]" 
7. Dr. Ross asks Dr. Reichard about his fee schedule and Dr. Reichard responds by 
noting his fees to conduct the examination and his additional fees for testimony. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a Spokane County Medical Examiner Chain-of-
Evidence Form. 
9. The form shows that tissue was sent from the Spokane Medical Examiner to the New 
Mexico. Office of Medical Investigations onAugust 14, 2006, and was received on August 15, 
2006. 
10. These documents demonstrate that Dr. Reichard was contracted to produce a report 
about  Martin which could be used in future criminal trial proceedings and that Dr. 
Reichard was aware that was the case. 
11. These documents show that Dr. Reichard's findings and opinions expressed in his 
autopsy report are "core testimonial statements" under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-
52 (2004), as the report contains "extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions" and also 
because the statements contained therein are "statements that were made under circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statements would be 
available for use at a later trial." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted). 
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This ends my affidavit. 
Dennis Benjamin) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on April .ln_, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 




to: Nance Ceccarelli 
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
~~ .. "F--
Dennis Benjamin 








Ross Reichard CV 
May06.doc (58 ••• 
R Ross Reichard [RReichard@salud.unm.edu] 
Thursday, August 03, 200611:53 AM 
Ross, Marco 
Re: Neuropathology Consults 




[J ( -· .r y 
I appreciate your inquiry and would be interested in providing neuropathology service for 
your office. I've been out of town the last couple of days, hence the delay in my 
response. For outside brain consultations I typically have the referring pathologist fix 
the brain for 2-weeks in 20% fonnalin and then. ship it. I'll cut it the week I receive 
it. If only H&Es are needed then I usually have a finalized report within 2 weeks of 
receiving the brain. If.· I have to ·order i.mmunostains or special stains then that adds 
another.week 9r so, depending on the complexity of the.case. We charge $1250 and that 
includes slides and stains. Of course, if I have to come testify that is additional. Our 
office charges $350/hr or $2800/day. I also return all slides,.photos, tissue, blocks etc 
to·you. 
I hope this answers some of your questions. Please do not hesitate to call me, office 
505-272-0722 or cell 505-379-9·509. I've also attached a .copy of my CV. 
Ross 
Ross Reichard, MD 
Medical Investigator 
Director of Neuropathology 
Assistant.Professor of Pathology 
MSCll 6030 
1.University of New Mexico 
. .Albuquerque, NM 87131-0001 
Phone: (505) 272-0722 
Fax: (505) 272-0727 
>>> ".Ross, Marco" <MRoss@spokanecounty.org> 7/27/2006 4:44 PM >>> 
Dr. Reichard: 
A couple of months ago you replied to the Name-L listserv that you would be interested i~ 
doing neuropathology consults. We usually obtain neuropathology consults in just about 
'--all o:f; our infant and child homicides (or suspected homicides) and selected adult cases. 
The neuropath,ologist that we currently use provides very thorough and timely 
consultations. However, because of the demands of his private practice, he has expressed 
reluctance to do cases that have a significant potential to require his services as an 
expert.witness in court. 
Obviously, those are usually the infant homicide cases. So we hope to find another 
neuropathologist who can help us out. 
I woul.d appreciate finding out about what you might be able to offer us, what your fee 
schedule is, and anticipated turnaround times. We are primarily interested in sending our 
brains from pediatric homicides and pediatric suspicious deaths, but would also send our 
other neuropathology consults, as well, if you desired. 
Marco Ross 
Marco A. Ross, M.D. 
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Boise, Idaho 83701 
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CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
AFFIDAVIT OF STACEY GROVE IN 
OPPOSITION TO STATE'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
Stacey Grove, being duly sworn and upon oath, hereby says: 
1. That I am the Petitioner herein. 
2. That I am told that the Respondent argued at the hearing on the State's Motion for 
Summary Disposition, held on April 30, 2013, that Scott Chapman and I devised a trial strategy 
together where I would waive my right to cross-examine Dr. Ross Reichard. I state the 
following in response to that argument. 
3. I did hot know and I was never informed by Mr. Chapman that I had a right to 
confront witnesses. 
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4. In particular, I was never told by my attorney that the right to confront witnesses 
meant more than just the right to cross-examine the witnesses actually called by the state at 
trial. 
5. While I knew that I had the right to ha~e my attorney cross-e~amin~"the witnesses 
actually called by the state at trial, I did not know that evidence coming from a person who did 
not testify could be excluded in some cases if Mr. Chapman did not have the opportunity to 
cross-examine that person. 
6. I never told Mr. Chapman that I was willing to waive the right to have such evidence 
excluded from trial. 
7. I never gave Mr. Chapman permission to waive for me the right to have such 
evidence excluded from trial. 
8. Mr. Chapman and I never devised a trial strategy together. Mr. Chapman did not 
involve me in matters of trial strategy, saying that he had the case "under control." 
9. We never spoke about a trial strategy that involved my waiver of my right to 
confront witnesses. 
10. I never waived or intended to waive my right to confrontation. 
This ends my affidavit. 
...... 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO 
day of May, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on May _, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 




to: Nance Ceccarelli 
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
DJ,~. 
Deb Grove 
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Nez Perce County, Idaho 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
. STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STACEY L. GROVE, 
vs. 













CASE NO. CV2012-0001798 
MOTION TO STRIKE 
COMES NOW, Respondent, State of Idaho, by and through its attorney of record, 
NANCE CECCARELLI, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Nez Perce County, Idaho, and hereby 
requests that the Affidavit of Stacey Grove in Opposition to State's Motion for Summary 
Disposition be stricken from the record in the above-entitled proceedings. This motion is based 
on the reasons that the presentation and filing of the affidavit is untimely and blatantly unfair. ____ _ 
Petitioner, and opposing counsel, were provided ample opportunity to share opinions and 
MOTION TO STRIKE 1 
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,• t 
offer evidence pursuant to the Court's briefing schedule and date set for oral argument. (See 
attached Exhibit A) Petitioner, through opposing counsel, had the "last word" in oral argument 
during the April 30, 2013, hearing on both the State's and Petitioner's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal. 
Petitioner now submits an affidavit in response to the State's oral arguments after the 
Judge has taken the case under advisement. Thus presented, the State is unable to research, 
contradict, or respond to allegations made as factual statements in the Petitioner's affidavit. 
Petitioner is attempting, it appears to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the quality 
of the representation of trial counsel and the existence of a concerted trial strategy presented to 
the jury. The premise that Petitioner participated in and contributed to the development and 
conduct of his defense and the trial strategy was raised and specifically argued in the State's 
"Answer and Amended Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissal" (filed in February 
2013) to which opposing counsel replied and responded. 
Petitioner should have presented his affidavit along with his initial petition pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 19-4903, or the amended petition, or following receipt and review of the deposition 
of Petitioner's trial counsel, or at any time up to the date of oral argument. 
The State respectfully requests that this Court strike the affidavit of Stacey Grove and 
rule according to the record as complete following the oral arguments of April 30, 2013. Or in 
the alternative, if this Court does not grant the State's Motion to Strike, then the State 
respectfully requests leave and sufficient time to properly respond to the allegations in this new 
affidavit. 
DATED this ____gt_ day ofM~y, 2013. 
ce Ceccarelli 
'-1:)eputy Prosecuting Attorney 
MOTION TO STRIKE 2 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that a full, true, complete and correct copy of the 
foregoing MOTION TO STRIKE was 
~· ,c_.) (l) __ h; 
(2) __ hand delivered via court basket, or 
(3) __ sent via facsimile, or 
(4) {/mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the United 
States Mail. 
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
Dennis Benjamin 
Deborah Whipple 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Barlett LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
dlt:-
DATED this () day of May, 2013. 
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CASE NO. CV12-01798 
ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS 
AND ARGUMENT 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent, 
TIIBREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1) Petitioner's Response to State's Motion for Summary D_~position and Petitioner's 
Brief in Support of Petitioner's Renewed Motion for Summary Disposition due on or 
before March 15, 2013; 
2) State's Reply Brief in Support ofits Motion for Summary Disposition and State's 
Response to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition due on or before March 
29, 2013; 
ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS 









3) Petitioner's Reply Brief in Support of Petitioner's Renewed Motion for Summary 
Disposition due on or before April 12, 2013; 
4) Oral argument shall take place before the above-entitled Court in the Courtroom 
of the Nez Perce County Courthouse on April 30, 2013, commencing at 1 :30 p.m. 
DATED this I 2 f'aay of February,_ 2013. 
0-e(J( ,:? 
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that _a true copy of fi:e foregoing O~ER SC~DULJNG BRI_EY~ AND 
ARGUMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, tbisl£:.'CT.a.Y of 




Boise ID 83701 
Nance C~carelli - VILU"-3 ~ 
P O Box 1267 - - - · r . 
Lewiston ID 83501 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, CLERK 
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CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
OIJJECTION TO STAT:ff?S [d9TTIGi.'} 
TO STRIKE 
Petitioner, Stacey Grove, objects to the State's Motion to Strike dated May 8> 2013. :rv1r. 
Grove objects to the motion because it is based upon a misstatement of the proceedings to- dr!Li.:. in 
this Court. 
The State has moved to strike the affidavit-of Mr. Grove filed fol1owh1g the 1\prH JO, 
2013, hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment on the grounds that the affidavit is 
witimely and unfair. Mr. Grove filed the motion in response to the State's theory, raised for th:-: 
first time during the April 30, 2013, hearing, that he and Scott Chapman devised ,L fi:ial st1 atcgy 
together according to which Mr. Grove would waive his constitutional right to cross-examine Dr. 
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1n 08 i2.013 3:05PM Nevin Benjamln,McKay~Bart 208 345 8274 
' ~ page ~~-
Ross Reichard. 
The State claims in its motion that "The premise that Petitioner participated in and 
contributed to the development and conduct of his defense and the trial strategy was rniscd anrl 
specifically argued in the State's 'Answer and Amended Motion for Sunm1ary Disposition and 
Dismissal'[.]" State's Motion to Strike page 2. The State does not offer a page citation within ils 
fourteen page Answer and Amended Motion to support its claim. However, review of thi; cntiri;; 
document demonstrates that the State's Answer and Amended Motion for Summary Disposition 
and Dismissal ·does not raise ''the.premise" that Mr. Chove acted in concert with Mr. Chapman to 
· voluntarily waive his constitutional right to confrontation ... This them:y was first raised hy the 
State in its oral argument on April 30, 2013. Mr. Grove could· not have responded to this new 
theory prior to the oral argument because h!;' had no idea that the State intended to mn.ke such an 
argument. In assessing the lack of notice to Mr. Grove, it shouJd be noted that none of the 
State's pleadings nor the deposition of Mr. Chapman ever in any way alluded to the State's 
. . 
current claim that Mr. Grove acted in concert with Mr. Chapman to v..raive his constitutional 
confrontation rights. See Chapman Deposition, pg .. 104, ln. 6-pg. 106, In. 11; pg. 109, ln. 2··6 
(entirety of questioning by State of Mr. Chapman). Nor has the State ever offered any citation to 
any statement from either Mr. Grove or Mr. Chapman which would support suc-h a theory. 
Mr. Grove requests that the State~s Motion to Strike be denied. 
ntj 
Respectfully submitted this _I_ day of May, 2013. 
/hkJ, ~ Deborah Whipple 
Attorneys for Stacey Grove 
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l?Y. 0.8 ,2013 3:05PM Nevin Benjamin,McKay&Bart 208 345 8274 
....--:--::-, 
page 'L.,_ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on May~, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the forcgoi11g 
document to be: 
mailed 
hand delivered 
_ faxed to (208) 799-3080 
le· emailed to mi.ncececcarelli@co.nezperce.~d.us 
to: Nance Ceccarelli 
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
) 
STACEY GROVE, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) CASE NO. CV 2012-1798 
) 
v. ) OPINION AND ORDER 
) ON MOTIONS FOR 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
) 
Respondent. ) 
This matter came before the Court on the State's-Motion for Summary 
Disposition and the Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition. 1 The Petitioner was 
represented by Dennis Benjamin, of the firm Nevin; Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett. The 
State was represented by Nance Ceccarelli, Nez Perce County Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney. Oral argument was heard on April 30, 2013. The Court, being fully advised 
in the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
1 Following the hearing on these motions, the Petitioner submitted the Affidavit of Stacey Grove in 
Opposition to the Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition. The State filed a Motion to Strike, r 
which is granted. The affidavit was not timely, and further, the testimony presented within can be 
addressed at the evidentiary'hearing held on this matter. 
OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS 1 




- ----- - -------------------- - --------------- - ---------------- - ------------------- - -
BACKGROUND 
Following a trial by jury, Stacey Grove was found guilty of first degree felony 
murder by aggravated battery of a child under twelve years old. The victim was twenty-
three month old  Martin. The jury returned the guilty verdict on July 30, 2.008. 
Judgment of conviction was entered on January 28, 2009. The Court of Appeals of Idaho 
considered the Petitioner's appeal of his judgment of conviction. On March 25, 2011, the 
Court issued an appellate opinion which affirmed Grove's conviction of first degree 
felony murder. 
' 
A detailed factual summary of this case is found in the Court of Appeals Opinion, 
State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 485-489, 259 P.3d 629, 631-635 (Ct. App. 2011). Facts of 
this case which are pertinent to issues below are set forth in detail in the following 
analysis. However, a brief timeline of events is as follows: The victim was in the custody 
of his father on July 9, 2006, and then returned to his mother's home early that evening. 
In the morning hours of July 10, 2006, paramedics arrived at the home of the victim's 
mother, and immediately transported the victim to the hospital in Lewiston, Idaho. The 
emergency room physician immediately recognized the child needed more specialized 
care than the hospital could provide, and thus arranged transport to a hospital in Spokane, 
Washington. The victim was declared brain dead on July 11, 2006; cardiac death r 
occurred on July 12, 2006, when an organ donation procedure was performed. An 
autopsy of the body was performed on July 12, 2006. 
The Petitioner initiated this proceeding for post-conviction relief by filing a 
Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on September 7, 2012. On October 5, 2012, 
the State filed a motion for summary disposition. The Petitioner filed a motion for 
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summary disposition on October 15, 2012. On January 2, 2013, an Amended Verified 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was filed by the Petitioner. On April 30, 2013, the r 
Court heard oral argument on the parties' cross-motions for summary disposition. 
· · POST-CONVICTION RELIEF STANDARD 
Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a person sentenced for a 
crime may seek relief upon making one of the following claims: 
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution 
of the United States or the constitution or laws ofthis state; 
(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence; 
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law; 
( 4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented 
and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the 
interest of justice; 
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, or conditional release was 
unlawfully revoked by the court in whichhe was convicted, or that he is 
otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; 
(6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902(b) through (f), Idaho r 
Code, that the petitioner is innocent of the offense; or 
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack 
upon any ground or alleged error heretofore available under any common 
law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy. 
LC.§ 19-490l(a). 
A petition for post-conviction relief "may be filed at any time within one (1) year 
from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from 
the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." I.C. § 19-
4902(a) 
Petitions for post-conviction relief are a special proceeding distinct from the 
criminal action that led to the petitioner's conviction. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 
711, 905 P .2d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 1995). "An application for post-conviction relief 
initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature." Fenstermaker v. State, 128 Idaho 285, 
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287,912 P.2d 653,655 (Ct. App. 1995). However, unlike an ordinary civil action that 
requires only a short and plain statement of the claim, an application for post-conviction 
relief "must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the 
applicant, and affidavits, records or other-.evidence supportip.g its ~llegations must 1?_~ -. _ . . . ,. ... _ _ ... 
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with 
the petition. LC. § 19-4903." Id. 
In a proceeding for post-conviction relief, the petitioner bears the burden of 
pleading and proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. "Thus, an applicant must allege, and 
then prove by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to establish his claim 
for relief." Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844,846, 875 P.2d 941 (Ct. App.1994). 
f 
Under I.C. § 19-4906, summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief 
may occur upon motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. However, 
- .. 
"[ s ]ummary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no 
genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the 
petitioner to the requested relief." Fenstermaker, 128 Idaho at 287, 912 P.2d at 655. "If 
the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must conduct an 
r 
evidentiary hearing and make specific findings of fact on each issue." Sanchez, at 711, 
905 P .2d at 644. "It is also the rule that a conclusory allegation, unsubstantiated by any 
fact, is insufficient to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing." Baruth v. Gardner, 
110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986). 
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ANALYSIS 
The petition before this Court has been appropriately filed pursuant to the 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act (hereafter ''UPCPA")2. "[T]he UPCPA was 
· instituted as the exclusive vehicle-to present claims,. regarding whether a co:nviction or, 
sentence was entered in violation of constitutional or statutory law." Eubank v. State, 
130 Idaho 861, 863, 949 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Ct. App. 1997); Still v. State, 95 Idaho 766, 
768,519 P.2d 435,437 (1974). The Petitioner asserts five claims within the Amended 
Petition. 
(' 
1. Whether Petitioner was denied the right to confront witnesses against him in 
violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article 1, Section 12 of the Idaho Constitution. 
The Petitioner asserts that his right to confront witnesses was violated during the r 
criminal trial. This alleged violation occurred when witnesses called by the State testified 
about neuropathology tests and examination results which were relied upon and 
incorporated into the autopsy report for purposes of determining the cause and manner of 
death of the victim. The Petitioner contends medical witnesses relied on results of 
neuropathology testing; however, those witnesses neither performed nor had personal 
knowledge of the neuropathology testing and examination. The right to confront 
witnesses was further violated when the neuropathologist who did perform the tests was 
not a witness at the trial. 
2 The Petitioner's claims do not fall under the constitutional remedy of habeas corpus. "A writ of habeas 
corpus, on the other hand, is the appropriate method for challenging unlawful conditions of confinement." 
Id.; Olds v. State, 122 Idaho 976, 979, 842 P.2d 312, 315 (Ct. App. 1992). The distinction between a 
petition for post-conviction relief and a writ of habeas corpus is important because the constitutional 
remedy of habeas corpus has no time limitation. Id. 
OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS 5 
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a. Testimony at trial 
An autopsy of the victim's body was performed on July 12, 2006, shortly after his 
death, for the purposes of determining the cause and manner of death. Forensic 
•., -pailiol-ogist-Dr-.- Marco Ross-performed the autQµS-y •. -~--D.r. Ross removed_the :viG:tim,:s 
r 
brain, and consistent with his office's procedures, he sent the brain to Dr. Ross Reichard, 
a neuropathologist at the University of New Mexico. Dr. Reichard performed the 
autopsy of the brain and sent a report of his findings and conclusions to Dr. Ross.4 Dr. 
Ross incorporated the Neuropathological Diagnoses, taken directly from Dr. Reichard's 
report, into the Autopsy Report. Other than the incorporated Neuropathological 
Diagnoses, Dr. Reichard's report was not offered or admitted at the trial. 
Dr. Ross later testified at Grove's criminal trial.5 During the tria1Dr. Ross's 
autopsy report was introduced, without objection, as State's Exhibit 11.6 Dr. Ross relied 
on Dr. Reichard's report for purposes of completing his autopsy report. Dr. Ross reached 
the following conclusions regarding cause and manner of death in the autopsy report: 
r 
The cause of death is cerebral edema and subdural hemorrhage due to 
blunt force impact to the head. The intra-abdominal contusions are the 
result of blunt force impacts to the abdomen. The manner of death is 
homicide. 
Autopsy Report, at 3(State's Exhibit II). 
3 Dr. Ross was the Deputy Medical Examiner at the Spokane County Medical Examiner's Office. The 
victim died at the hospital in Spokane, Washington, and the autopsy was performed by the Spokane County 
Medical Examiner's Office on behalf of Nez Perce County, Idaho. 
4 Dr. Reichard's Autopsy Report is included in this record as Plaintiffs Exhibit I, attached to the 
Deposition of Scott M. Chapman, taken on January 24, 2013. Dr. Ross relied on this report, and included 
the Neuropathological Diagnoses in the Autopsy Report, at page 2 (See State's Exhibit 11, included within 
Exhibit C, attached to the Verified Petition of Post-Conviction Relief). Dr. Reichard's full report was not 
introduced or admitted at trial. 
5 Dr. Ross's testimony can be found in the record of this case as Exhibit B, Volume II, attached to the 
Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Dr. Ross's testimony is located in the trial transcript at pages 
892-988. 
6 A copy of Dr. Ross's autopsy report can be found in the record of this case as State's Exhibit 11, included 
within Exhibit C, attached to the Verified Petition of Post-Conviction Relief. 
r 
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r 
The State also called Dr. Deborah Harper to testify. Dr. Harper is a pediatrician · 
from Spokane who has special training regarding physical and sexual abuse and neglect 
of children. 7 Dr. Harper had examined the victim at the hospital in Spokane, 
,. · · · - ·· ·-Washington, prior to his death. -In addition:.to-her-,own.observations, Dr. Harper.spoke ... 
with the victim's parents, relied on the autopsy reports of Dr. Ross and Dr. Reichard,8 
and also reviewed various medical records, including notes from the organ harvest team. 
Dr. Harper used this information to come to a conclusion about the victim's death and his 
physical manifestations of injury prior to death. 
Two other doctors also testified at the trial. Dr. Hunter9 was the emergency roorrf 
physician who attended to the victim at St. Joseph's Regional Medical Center, in 
Lewiston; Idaho, when the paramedics brought him to the emergency room. Dr. Hunter 
relied on the autopsy report submitted as State's Exhibit 11. He testified that based upon 
his review of the report, the injuries suffered by the victim should have produced 
immediate symptoms such as unconsciousness, given the degree of injury described in 
the autopsy. In addition to Dr. Hunter, another emergency room physician also testified. 
Dr. Chin is an emergency room physician at Tri-State Memorial Hospital, in Clarkston, 
Washington. Dr. Chin examined the victim at the emergency room on July 8, 2006, two 
days before  was taken to St. Joseph's Regional Medical Center, and ultimately to 
r 
7 Dr. Harper's testimony can be found in the record of this case as Exlubit B, Volume II, attached to the 
Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief: Dr. Harper's trial testimony is located in the transcript at 
rages 1021-1059. 
Dr. Harper also relied on the surgery notes from the organ harvest procedure that occurred after the victim 
was declared brain dead, but before his body was taken off life support. 
9 Dr. Hunter's testimony can be found in the record of this case as Exhibit B, Volume II, attached to the 
Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Dr. Hunter's testimony is located in the trial transcript at 
pages 857-891. 
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the hospital in Spokane.10 Dr. Chin also reviewed the autopsy report and testified  
did not have the types of injuries that were present within the autopsy report at the time 
he was examined at Tri-State Hospital on July 8, 2006. Dr. Chin explained why he 
--'-'"'"· · - --.-- -- -- --reached this conclusion, based uponJ(yler?s-.actions and responses duri,p_g bis exam. _ 
Further, Dr. Chin testified that based on what he had read in the autopsy this was the 
most brutal case he had ever seen. 
The Petitioner asserts that his right to confront witnesses was violated when the 
r 
autopsy report prepared by Dr. Reichard was admitted into evidence, and also referred to 
in testimony by four witnesses during the trial. As indicated above, Dr. Reichard's 
autopsy report was not separately admitted into evidence; only a portion of the report was 
incorporated into Dr. Ross's Autopsy Report that was admitted as State's Exhibit 11. 
b. Confrontation Clause analysis from Crawford v. Washington until 
present. 
The Confrontation Clause found within the Sixth Amendment confers upon the 
accused the right to be confronted with witnesses against him. 
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause provides that, "[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him." We have held that this bedrock 
procedural guarantee applies to both federal and state prosecutions. 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 
(1965). 
r 
10 The victim's father, Todd Martin, had taken  to the emergency room at Tri-State while  was in 
his custody days prior Kyler's death. Martin was concerned about a sore on Kyler's nose and some bruise~-
the child had, as well as the fact  had broken his leg-incidents that Martin felt may be the result of 
child abuse. Dr. Chin's trial testimony can be found in the transcript attached as Exhibit B, Volume II to 
the Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. Dr. Chin's testimony is located at pages 845-857. 
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Crawfordv. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42-43, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1359, 158 L.Ed.2d 
177(2004).11 The Idaho Supreme Court first applied Crawford in State v. Hooper, 145 
Idaho 139, 176 P .3d 911 (2007).12 
- Crawford altered this anal"¥,Sis with-regardto te.stuponials,tatements.Jn 
Crawford, the Court held that testimonial statements of witnesses absent 
from trial are admissible only where declarant is unavailable and where 
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. 541 U.S. 
at 59, 124 S.Ct. at 1369, 158 L.Ed.2d at 197. Although the Court declined 
to spell out a comprehensive definition of "testimonial," the Court did set 
forth some guidelines. First, the Court looked to Webster's dictionary 
definition of ''testimony" from 1828. Testimony is "[a] solemn declaration 
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact." 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51, 124 S.Ct. at 1364, 158 L.Ed.2d at 192 (quoting 
1 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)). 
The Court then listed three formulations of "core" testimonial statements: 
(1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that 
is, material such as affidavits, custodial examination&, prior 
testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar 
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be 
used prosecutorially;" 
(2) "extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized 
testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior 
testimony, or confessions;" and 
r 
11 "Prior to Crawford, the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause did not bar admission of an 
unavailable witness's statement against a criminal defendant if the statement bears 'adequate indicia of 
reliability.' Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d at 608. To meet that test, the declarant 
must be unavailable and evidence must either fall within a 'firmly rooted hearsay exception' or 'bear 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."' State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 142-143, 176 P.3d 911, 914' 
- 915 (2007). 
12 The United States Supreme Court applied the Confrontation Clause analysis from Crawford in the 
consolidated cases Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 
L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). 
In Davis, the Supreme Court held that "[ s ]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course 
of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of 
interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial 
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that 
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant 
to later criminal prosecution." Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. at 2273-74, 165 L.Ed.2d at_. 
Thus, a statement is testimonial under Crawford and Davis when the circumstances objectively 
indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution, unless made in the course of police 
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating the primary purpose of the interrogation 
is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. at 2274, 
165 L.Ed.2d at_. 
State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 143-144, 176 P.3d 911,915 - 916 (2007). 
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(3) "statements that were made under circumstances which would 
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement 
would be available for use at a later trial." r 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 124 S.Ct at 1364-1365, 158 L.Ed.2d at 
192-193 (internal citations omitted). This is not an exclusive list of 
--''testimonial" evidence'""-Rather.,.these fonnulations_ ~ share a ~~common 
nucleus" and then define the Clause's coverage at various levels of 
abstraction around it Id 
Hooper, 145 Idaho at 142-143, 176 P.3d at 914-915. Further, "a statement is testimonial 
under Crawford and Davis when the circumstances objectively indicate that the primary 
purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution, unless made in the course of police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable 
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency." Id. at 143-144, 176 P.3d at 915-916, 
r citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2274, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 
(2006). Thus, the Hooper Court endorsed a primary purpose test to determine whether 
an out-of-court statement is testimonial. 
Since State v. Hooper, other cases have come before the United States Supreme 
Court for further analysis on the issue of whether a defendant's right to confrontation was 
violated. The next case to be considered by the high court was Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009). InMelendez-
Diaz, the trial court admitted into evidence an affidavit from a state laboratory reporting 
the results of forensic analysis of a substance. The affidavit attested that material seized 
by police, and connected to the defendant, was cocaine. The Melendez-Diaz Court 
r 
determined that these affidavits from the state laboratory were "testimonial," and thus the 
affiants were "witnesses" subject to the defendant's right of confrontation under the Sixth 
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Amendment Id. at 307-308, 129 S.Ct at 2530. The Melendez-Diaz Court held that the 
defendant's right to confront witnesses13 was violated. "The Sixth Amendment does not 
permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits, and the 
admission of such"evidenceagainstMelendez.-,-Diaz was-error." Id. at 329, 129.S.Ct at 
2542. The Melendez-Diaz Court rejected several arguments offered by the State as bases 
r 
for claiming the affidavits were excluded from the scope of the Crawford rule, including: 
the analysts who conducted the tests were not accusatory witnesses, statements in the 
affidavits were obtained by neutral, scientific testing, and that the affidavits were akin to 
official and business records. These arguments were not persuasive because the forensic 
testing on the substance taken from the defendant at arrest was performed for the limited 
purpose of determining whether the substancewas cocaine, so that the results could be 
used in a later criminal prosecution against the defendant. The affidavits were prepared 
specifically for use in a criminal trial, and thus were "testimony against" the defendant, 
subject to confrontation. Id. at 324, 129 S.Ct. 2527. 
Two cases addressing the right to confrontation were addressed by the United 
States Supreme Court in 2011: Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S._, 131 S.Ct 1143, 179 
L.Ed.2d 93 (2011) and Bullcomingv. New Mexico, _U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 180 
L.Ed.2d 610 (2011). In Michigan v. Bryant, out-of-court statements were made by the 
victim of a shooting to the police officers who responded to the call. The victim 
t 
identified the man who shot him and described the circumstances of the shooting; he died 
· 13 In Melendez-Diaz, counsel for the defendant objected to the admission of the reports at trial, arguing that 
the analyst should be required to testify in person. "Petitioner objected to the admission of the certificates, 
asserting that our Confrontation Clause decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 
158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), required the analysts to testify in person. The objection was overruled, and the 
certificates were admitted pursuant to state law as 'prima facie evidence of the composition, quality, and 
the net weight of the narcotic ... analyzed."' Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. at 309, 129 S.Ct. at 
2531. 
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r 
within hours. Id. at_, 131 S.Ct. at 1150. The Bryant Court followed principals similar 
to Davis v. Washington, and determined that the ongoing emergency where an armed 
shooter was at large objectively indicated that the primary purpose of the police 
questioning· was-to -address the emergency ,-and-thus,.-thevictim' s statements to. the ,poli0,e=_,:.""- ... , -··.· :·····-
were not testimonial in nature. Id. at_, 131 S. Ct. at 1166-1167. 
In Bullcoming, the defendant was arrested on charges of driving while 
intoxicated, and a forensic laboratory report certifying that Bullcoming's blood-alcohol 
concentration was well above the threshold requirement was admitted. The prosecutor did 
not call the analyst who signed the report as a witness; instead another analyst who was r 
familiar with the lab's procedures was called as a witness. 14 This analyst had neither 
· participated in nor observed the test on Bullcoming's blood sample. Jd. at._, B 1 S.Ct. 
at 2709. 
The Bullcoming Court held: 
14 Similar to Melendez-Dias, counsel for the defendant objected to the State calling the substitute analyst. 
The case was tried to a jury in November 2005, after our decision in Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), but before Melendez-Diaz. 
On the day oftriai the State announced that it would not be calling SLD analyst Curtis Caylor as 
a witness because he had "very recently [been] put on unpaid leave" for a reason not revealed. 
2010-NMSC-007, ,r 8, 147 N.M. 487, 226 P.3d l, 6 (internal quotation marks omitted); App. 
58. A startled defense counsel objected. The prosecution, she complained, had never disclosed, 
until trial commenced, that the witness "out there ... [was] not the analyst [ ofBullcoming's 
sample]." Id, at 46. Counsel stated that, "had [she] known that the analyst [who tested 
Bullcoming's blood] was not available," her opening, indeed, her entire defense ''may very well 
have been dramatically different." Id, at 47. The State, however, proposed to introduce Caylor's 
finding as a "business record" during the testimony of Gerasimos Razatos, an SLD scientist who 
had neither observed nor reviewed Caylor's analysis. Id, at 44. 
Bullcoming's counsel opposed the State's proposal Id, at 44-45. Without Caylor's 
testimony, defense counsei maintained, introduction of the analyst's finding would violate 
Bullcoming's Sixth Amendment right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." lbid.FN2 
The trial court overruled the objection, id., at 46-47, and admitted the SLD report as a business 
record, id, at44-46, 57.FN3 The jury convicted Bullcoming ofaggravatedDWI, and the New 
Mexico Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, concluding that ''the blood alcohol report in the 
present case was non-testimonial and prepared routinely with guarantees of trustworthiness." 
2008-NMCA-097, 1 17, 144 N.M. 546, 189 P.3d 679, 685. 
Bullcomingv. New Mexico, 131 S.Ct. at2711-2712. 
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The question presented is whether the Confrontation Clause permits the 
prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a 
testimonial certification-made for the purpose of proving a particular 
fact-through the in-court testimony of a scientist who did not sign the 
certification or perform or observe the test reported in the certification. We 
hold that surrogate testimony of that order does not meet the constitutional r 
··~: - 0~quirement.· The accused!s,xight-is,;t0-be-confronted with-the analyst who. ···'"-'"·-c:c-,-~_,. __ i ... 
made the certification, unless that analyst is unavailable at trial, and the 
accused had an opportunity, pretrial, to cross-examine that particular 
scientist. 
Id. at_, 131 S.C.t at 2710. Thus, the blood-alcohol tests results were testimonial in 
nature because the report was "created solely for an 'evidentiary purpose' ... in aid of 
police investigation." Id. at_131 S.Ct. at 2717. 
Most recently, the United States Supreme Court decided Williams v. Illinois, 567 
U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 183 L.Ed.2d 89 (2012), where the issue was whether Crawford 
bars an expert from expressing an opinion based on facts gleaned from a laboratory report 
when the expert lacked firsthand knowledge regarding the preparation of the report. Id. 
at_, 132 S.Ct. at 2227. The hearsay evidence was a DNA profile prepared by an r 
outside laboratory using vaginal swabs collected from the victim of the crime. The 
fVilliams Court distinguished the forensic reports from Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming 
from the DNA testing in Williams. 
In Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the Court held that the particular 
forensic reports at issue qualified as testimonial statements, but the Court 
did not hold that all forensic reports fall into the same category. 
Introduction of the reports in those cases ran afoul of the Confrontation 
Clause because they were the equivalent of affidavits made for the 
purpose of proving the guilt of a particular criminal defendant at trial. 
There was nothing resembling an ongoing emergency, as the suspects in 
both cases had already been captured, and the tests in question were 
·· relatively simple and can generally be performed by a single analyst. In 
addition, the technicians who prepared the reports must have realized that 
their contents (which reported an elevated blood-alcohol level and the 
presence of an illegal drug) would be incriminating. 
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The Cellmark [DNA] report is very different. It plainly was not 
prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual. In 
identifying the primary purpose of an out-of-court statement, we apply an 
objective test Bryant, 562 U.S., at--, 131 S.Ct., at 1156. We look for 
the primary purpose that a reasonable person would have ascribed to the 
statement, taking into account all of the surrounding circumstances. Ibid. 
--·-- .--.:~ ;~~--_'-"-~-~-----,~-------·"-- -- --,- ------·--·---- -·- _.·_·.:.:::_ --· -
Id. at_, 132 S.Ct. at 2243. The Williams Court explained the purpose of the DNA 
report was not to accuse the defendant or create evidence for use at trial. 
Here, the primary purpose of the Cellmark report, viewed objectively, 
was not to accuse petitioner or to create evidence for use at trial. When the r 
ISP lab sent the sample to Cellmark, its primary purpose was to catch a 
dangerous rapist who was still at large, not to obtain evidence for use 
against petitioner, who was neither in custody nor under suspicion at that 
time. Similarly, no one at Cellmark could have possibly known that the 
profile that it produced would turn out to inculpate the 
petitioner-or for that matter, anyone else whose DNA profile was in a 
law enforcement database. Under these circumstances, there was no 
''prospect of-fabrication" and no incentive to produce anything other than_ 
a scientifically sound and reliable profile. Id., at--, 131 S.Ct., at 1157. 
The situation in which the Cellmark technicians found themselves was 
by no means unique. When lab technicians are asked to work on the 
production of a DNA profile, they often have no idea what the 
consequences of their work will be. In some cases, a DNA profile may 
provide powerful incriminating evidence against a person who is 
identified either before or after the profile is completed. But in others, the 
primary effect of the profile is to exonerate a suspect who has been 
charged or is under investigation. The technicians who prepare a DNA 
profile generally have no way of knowing whether it will tum out to be 
incriminating or exonerating--or both. r 
In short, the use at trial of a DNA report prepared by a modem, 
accredited laboratory ''bears little if any resemblance to the historical 
practices that the Confrontation Clause aimed to eliminate." Bryant, supra, 
at--, 131 S.Ct., at 1167 (THOMAS, J ., concurring). 
· · · -Id. at_, 132 S.Ctat 2243-2244. Ultimately, to determine whether there is a violation 
of the Confrontation Clause, the Williams case requires the application of an objective 
test, considering ''the primary purpose that a reasonable person would have ascribed to 
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the statement, taking into account all of the-surrounding circumstances." Id. at __ , 132 
S. Ct. at 224 3. If the forensic report was "made for the purpose of proving the guilt of a 
particular criminal defendant at trial," it is testimonial. Id. 
r 
In the case athand, the Petitioner urges this Court to find Dr. Reichard's report to 
be testimonial, in a manner similar to the forensic analysis considered in Melendez-Diaz 
and Bullcoming. In support of this argument, the Petitioner relies on a case from the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals, United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30 (D.C. Cir. 
2011). In Moore, the government called Dr. Jonathan Arden, chiefD.C. Medical 
Examiner15, and Jerry Walker, a DEA senior forensic chemist. Dr. Arden testified 
regarding the contents of approximately 30 autopsy reports authored by other medical 
examiners in his office, and Walker testified regarding24 drug analyses, only four of 
which were performed by Walker. 651 F.3d at 71. The autopsy and DEA reports16 were 
admitted into evidence over the defendants' objection.· Id. 
The Moore Court found that the autopsy reports were testimonial statements, 
analogous to the laboratory reports in Bullcoming. 
First, "solemn declaration[ s] or affirmation[ s] made for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact" are testimonial statements. Melendez-
Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532 ( citation and quotation marks omitted). Put 
another way, "[a] document created solely for an 'evidentiary purpose,' ... 
made in aid of a police investigation, ranks as testimonial." Bullcoming, 
131 S.Ct. at 2717 ( quoting Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2532). The 
Supreme Court concluded the certifications in the laboratory report 
analyzing Bullcoming's BAC were testimonial because "a law-
enforcement officer provided seized evidence to a state laboratory 
required by law to assist in police investigations," the certifying forensic 
analyst ''tested the evidence and prepared a certificate concerning the 
r 
15 As the Petitioner has noted in briefing, this case involves the same forensic pathologist that the Petitionef 
called as an expert witness at trial to refute the testimony of Dr. Ross and Dr. Harper regarding the time of 
injury that caused  s death. · 
16 One autopsy report was admitted into evidence pursuant to stipulation. By footnote the Moore Court 
noted the admission of this report raised no Confrontation Clause issue. Moore, 651 F.3d at 71. 
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-result of his analysis," the certificate was formalized in a signed document 
and headed a "report," and the document referenced court rules relating to 
the admissibility of certified blood-alcohol analyses. Id at 2717. 
Analogous circumstances make the autopsy reports here testimonial. 
The Office of the Medical Examiner is required by D.C.Code § 5-
1405(bKll~ to investigate"[ cijeathsfor_which the Metropplitan fl91ice 
Department ["MPD"], or other law enforcement agency, or the United 
States Attorney's Office requests, or a court orders investigation." The 
autopsy reports do not indicate whether such requests were made in the 
instant case but the record shows that MPD homicide detectives and 
officers from the Mobile Crimes Unit were present at several autopsies. 
Another autopsy report was supplemented with diagrams containing the 
notation: "Mobile crime diagram (not [Medical Examiner]-use for info 
only)." Still another report included a "Supervisor's Review Record" from 
the :MPD Criminal Investigations Division commenting: "Should have 
indictment re John Raynor for this murder." Law enforcement officers 
thus not only observed the autopsies, a fact that would have signaled to the 
medical examiner that the autopsy might bear on a crimiruil. investigation, 
they participated in the creation of reports. Furthermore, the autopsy 
reports were formalized in signed documents titled "reports." These 
factors, combined with the fact that each autopsy found the manner of 
death to be a homicide caused by gunshot wounds, are "circumstances 
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial." Melendez-Diaz, 129 
S.Ct. at 2532 ( citation and quotation marks omitted). 
Id. at 72-73. The Moore Court found the admission of the autopsy reports was a violation 
of the Confrontation Clause.17 The Court in Moore did not have available to it the 
analysis from Williams v. lllinois, which was decided the following year. 
r 
After the United States Supreme Court decision in Williams v. fllinois, the 
Supreme Court of illinois decided the issue of whether an autopsy report is testimonial in 
People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570(2012). In this case an autopsy was performed by a state 
medical examiner who had since retired prior to defendant's criminal trial. Id. at 575. At 
trial, a different medical examiner testified, stating she had reviewed the autopsy -- 0 - -
protocol, toxicology reports, investigator's reports, and photographs that documented the 
17 In Moore the Court did not vacate the conviction, however, because the Court determined the admission 
of the autopsy report, while an error, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 73. 
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retired medical examiner's external and internal examinations of the victim's body. Id. 
Ultimately, the medical examiner testified that she did not conduct the autopsy 
examination, but that she agreed with the retired medical examiner's finding of 
strangulation; Id. at576.-
The lliinois Supreme Court applied an objective primary purpose test, as 
described in Williams v. lllinois, in order to determine if the autopsy report was 
testimonial. 
The Williams dissent rejects this focus on the targeting of a particular 
individual, reminding us that Davis formulated the test as whether the out-
of-court statement was "made for the primary purpose of establishing 'past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution'-in other words, 
for the purpose of providing evidence." Id. at--, 132 S.Ct. at 2273 
(Kagan, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Ginsburg and Sotomayor, JJ.) 
(~uoting Davis, 547U.S. at 822,126 S.Ct. 2266). The dissent accuses the 
plurality of adopting, without explanation, a new formulation of the 
primary purpose test when forensic testing is involved, asking whether the 
report was prepared "for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted 
individual." Id. at-, 132 S.Ct. at 2273. 
Id. at 590. Ultimately, the Illinois Court determined the report was not testimonial 
because it was (1) not prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual 
or (2) for the primary purpose of providing evidence in a criminal case. Id. The lliinois 
Court determined the autopsy report was not testimonial based upon the following 
analysis: 
Under state law, as soon as a coroner "knows or is informed that the 
dead body of any person is found, or lying within his county,* * * [he] 
r 
shall * * * take charge of the same and shall make a preliminary r 
investigation into the circumstances of the death" if any one of five 
enumerated conditions exists. 55 ILCS 5/3-3013 (West 2010). One such 
condition is that the death was "sudden or violent death, whether · ·· · 
apparently suicidal, homicidal or accidental." 55 ILCS 5/3-3013(a) (West 
2010). Further, even when the police suspect foul play and the medical 
examiner's office is aware of this suspicion, an autopsy might reveal that 
the deceased died of natural causes and, thus, exonerate a suspect. For 
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example, an autopsy of an apparent victim of a crime could reveal that the 
cause of death was a ruptured congenital brain aneurysm and that the 
physical altercation was not a contributing cause. 
In the present case, although the police discovered the body and 
arranged for transport, there is no evidence that the autopsy was done at 
- - - '"' -the specific request of the police. The medical ~xarniner's. office perforrped _ _ 
the autopsy pursuant to state law, just as it would have if the police had 
arranged to transport the body of an accident victim. 
The statute also requires that when the coroner or medical examiner 
determines that the cause of death is homicide, he shall withdraw certain 
specimens from the body and shall deliver these specimens to the Illinois 
State Police, Division of Forensic Services, "in addition to any other 
findings, specimens, or information that [he] is required to provide during 
the conduct of a criminal investigation." 55 ILCS 5/3-3013 (West 2010). 
Thus, Dr. Choi, as the assistant medical examiner assigned to this case, 
was required by law to prepare a report and to submit that report, along 
with other items, to the police. Although he was aware that the victim's 
husbandwasincustody andthathehad admittedto '_'choking"her, his 
examination could have either incriminated or exonerated him, depending 
on what the body revealed about the cause of death. See Williams, 567 
U.S. at--., 132 S.Ct. at 2228. In short, Dr. Choi was not acting as an 
agent of law enforcement, but as one charged with protecting the public 
health by determining the cause of a sudden death that might have been " 
suicidal, homicidal or accidental." 55 ILCS 5/3-3013 (West 2010). 
Further, while it is true that an autopsy report might eventually be used 
in litigation of some sort, either civil or criminal, these reports are not 
usually prepared for the sole purpose of litigation. A finding of accidental 
death may eventually lead to claims of product liability, medical 
malpractice, or other tort. A finding of suicide may become evidence in a 
lawsuit over proceeds of a life insurance policy. Similarly, a finding of 
homicide may be used in a subsequent prosecution of the accused killer. 
But the primary purpose of preparing an autopsy report is not to accuse "a 
targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct" ( Williams, 567 U.S. 
at--, 132 S.Ct. at 2242) or to provide evidence in a criminal trial ( 
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266). An autopsy report is prepared in 
the normal course of operation of the medical examiner's office, to 
determine the cause and manner of death, which, if detennined to be 
homicide, could result in charges being brought. · 
And, unlike the forensic report at issue in Melendez-Diaz, the autopsy 
report was not certified or sworn in anticipation of its being used as 
evidence; it was merely signed by the doctor who performed the autopsy. 
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(Thus, the autopsy report would not be deemed testimonial by Justice 
Thomas, because it lacks the formality and solemnity of an affidavit, 
deposition, or prior sworn testimony.) 
In the present case, the autopsy report did not bear testimony against 
the defendant. Nothing in the report directly linked defendant to the crime. 
,,.,., · ,-c, ·Unlike a DNA-test whi-ch-might identify.a.defondantas the perpetrator.of-a 
particular crime, the autopsy finding of homicide did not directly accuse 
defendant. Only when the autopsy findings are viewed in light of 
defendant's own statement to the police is he linked to the crime. In short, 
the autopsy sought to determine how the victim died, not who was 
responsible, and, thus, Dr. Choi was not defendant's accuser. 
Finally, as a practical matter, because a prosecution for murder may be 
brought years or even decades after the autopsy was performed and the 
report prepared, these reports should be deemed testimonial only in the 
unusual case in which the police play a direct role (perhaps by arranging 
for the exhumation of a body to reopen a "cold case") and the purpose of 
the autopsy is clearly to provide evi4ence for use in a prosecution. The 
potential for a lengthy delay between the crime and its prosecution could 
- severely impede the cause of justice if routine autopsies were deemed 
testimonial merely because the cause of death is determined to be 
homicide. 
Id. at 591-593. 
i' 
r 
The Illinois Court also acknowledged that at this time there is a split of opinion 
amongst various courts regarding the application of the primary purpose test to reports of 
forensic testing.18 Ultimately, however, the Court determined nothing in the autopsy 
18 The Illinois Court provided the following cases regarding the split of opinion on this matter: 
We acknowledge that defendant has cited several cases from other jurisdictions in which the 
courts of our sister states have held that an autopsy report is testimonial hearsay, either in a case 
in which the report was admitted or in which a medical examiner other than the one who 
performed the autopsy was permitted to testify to the contents of the report. See, e.g., State v. 
Davidson, 242 S.W.3d 409,417 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (holding that when an autopsy report is 
prepared at the request of law enforcement in anticipation of a murder prosecution and the report 
is offered to prove the victim's cause of death, the report is testimonial); Martinez v. State, 311 
S.W.3d 104, 111 (Tex.Ct.App.2010) (holding that an autopsy report is testimonial when its 
primary purpose is to establish or prove past events, ·as· demonstrated by-police officer's 
attendance at autopsy, his taking of photographs during autopsy, and where statutory basis for 
performance of the autopsy was suspicion of death by unlawful means); United States v. Moore, 
651 F.3d 30, 73 (D.C.Cir.2011) (per curiam) (classifying autopsy reports as testimonial when 
requested by law enforcement, officers are present during autopsies, and officers participated in 
preparation of diagrams and other portions of the reports), cert. granted in part in Smith v. 
United States, -U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 2772, 183 L.Ed.2d 638 (2012). 
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report directly-Iinked the defendant to the crime and that the autopsy sought only to 
determine how a victim died, and not who was responsible for the death. Thus, the r 
medical examiner who prepared the report was not the defendant's accuser, as required 
-· ··~._-·_. __ ~=-- _·-.,.~~..:.~-.-· -_..,.. - ·- - ,, -•·,·,!';-
c. Application to the case at hand 
As noted by the Court of Appeals of Idaho in State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 259 
P .3d 629 (2011 ), the centrally disputed issue in the Petitioner's criminal trial focused on 
the time the injuries that caused Kyler's death occurred. 
Initially, we clarify that the crux of this issue affects the central 
disputed question in this case-when the injuries which ultimately caused 
K.M.'s death occurred and whether it was likely that K.M. would have lost 
consciousness and/or shown severe symptoms immediately after the 
injuries were inflicted. In other words, did the injuries occur on the 
morning that K.M. lost consciousness-and was alone with Grove--or 
several days prior, when it was undisputed that the injuries could not have 
However, these cases are countered by cases holding that an autopsy report may be admitted 
into evidence without the testimony of the pathologist who performed the autopsy without 
violating the defendant's rights under the confrontation clause. See, e.g., State v. Craig, 110 Ohio 
St.3d 306, 2006--0hio--4571, 853 N.E.2d 621, at ,i,i 80-88 (concluding that autopsy reports are 
admissible nontestimonial business records), review granted by State v. Craig, 126 Ohio St3d 
1573, 2010-0hio--4539, 934 N.E.2d 347 (table); United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 236-37 
(2d Cir.2006) (holding that autopsy reports are admissible as business records and are 
nontestimonial "even where the declarant is aware that [the report] may be available for later use 
at trial"); Banmah v. State, 87 So.3d 101, 103 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2012) (autopsy reports are 
nontestimonial because they are prepared pursuant to statutory duty and not solely for use in 
prosecution); Cato v. Prelesnik, 2012 WL 2952183, *3 (W.D.Mich. July 18, 2012) (rejecting 
Crawford claim in habeas petition on basis that Crawford did not clearly establish that autopsy 
results are testimonial in nature and that even under Melendez-Diaz, the answer to this question 
is uncertain). In addition, the cases cited by defendant predate the Supreme Court's decision in 
Williams. 
This split of opinion and the confusion regarding application of the primary purpose test to 
reports of forensic testing may eventually be resolved by the United States Supreme Court. In 
the meantime, while we are not prepared to say that the report of an autopsy conducted by the 
medical examiner's office can never be testimonial in nature, we conclude that under the 
objective test set out by the plurality in Williams, under the test adopted in Davis, and under 
Justice Thomas's "formality and solemnify'' rule, autopsy reports prepared by a medical 
examiner's office in the normal course of its duties are nontestimonial. Further, an autopsy report 
prepared in the normal course of business of a medical examiner's office is not rendered 
testimonial merely because the assistant medical examiner performing the autopsy is aware that 
police suspect homicide and that a specific individual might be responsible. 
People v. Leach 980 N.E.2d at 593-594. 
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been inflicted by Grove because he was not alone with K.M. In this· 
regard, important to the state's theory of the case that Grove caused the 
fatal injuries on the morning of July 10 was the conclusion of Dr. 
Reichard, based on his microscopic examination ofK.M.'s brain, that 
K.M. had suffered a laceration of the corpus callosum, which would have 
likely caused immediate loss of consciousness, thereby implicating Grove 
as the cause ofK.M.'s injuries,,d_urin~the36-45 minute-period of time. 
during which he was alone with K.M. Grove points out that both Dr. Ross 
and Dr. Harper recited Dr. Reichard's observations in this regard, as 
gleaned from the autopsy report, as neither was present during the autopsy 
nor conducted their own microscopic analysis, and relied on these 
observations in forming their respective opinions that K.M.'s injuries had 
been inflicted on July 10. 
By contrast, Grove's expert, Dr. Arden, testified that he did not agree 
with Dr. Reichard that a laceration was present and that the anomaly was 
the result of handling of the brain after death. He also offered his opinion, 
after examination of the microscopic slides, that K.M.'s injuries had been 
inflicted at least three days prior to death (thus absolving Grove of having 
caused them) and that they would not have necessarily resulted in 
immediate loss of consciousness. 
Id. at 490,259 P.3d 636. The testimony at issue here is limited to two issues: first, the 
Neuropathological Diagnoses from Dr. Reichard's report, which was incorporated into 
the Autopsy Report. Second, witnesses who were offered as medical experts testified 
regarding their reliance on Dr. Reichard's brain autopsy report. 
r 
The Petitioner claims the introduction of the Autopsy Report and the testimony 
from witnesses regarding Dr. Reichard's report were violations of the Petitioner's right tQ 
confront witnesses. It is undisputed that defense counsel did not object to the admission 
of the Autopsy Report, nor did defense counsel object when medical experts testified 
regarding Dr. Reichard's findings from the brain autopsy. As noted above, every case 
that found a violation of the Confrontation Clause originated from testimony or reports 
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thafwere admitted over objection at trial. 19 Because there was no objection.2° to-the r 
report or the testimony in this case, there cannot be a Confrontation Clause violation. 
Further, as noted by the Court of Appeals, the decision to not object to the autopsy report 
may have been a tactical decisiotr---en.-fue-,part-of counseLc..Counsel's,,choice ofwitnesses, __ --
manner of cross-examination, and lack of objections to testimony are considered tactical, 
or strategic, decisions. Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365,368 (1994). 
The issue of ineffective assistance of counsel will be addressed in a different section 
within this opinion. 
In the alternative, this Court notes the issue of whether an autopsy report is 
testimonial is a matter of first impression in Idaho. As such, this Court follows direction 
from State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 P.3d 911 (2007). Further, this Court finds the r 
Petitioner's reliance on US. v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30 (D.C. Cir. 2011), unpersuasive. 
Instead, the more recent analysis from Williams v. lllinois, 567 U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2221, 
183 L.Ed.2d 89 (2012) is applicable. The Williams case considered DNA analysis that 
was performed by an outside laboratory. In this case, Dr. Ross relied on the findings of 
Dr. Reichard when reaching his opinion that the cause of death was: 
The cause of death is cerebral edema and subdural hemorrhage due to 
blunt force impact to the head. The intra-abdominal contusions are the 
result of blunt force impacts to the abdomen. The manner of death is 
homicide. 
Autopsy Report, at 3 (State's Exhibit 11). It is also clear that Dr. Ross adopted a portion 
of Dr. Reichard's report when writing the Autopsy Report which was admitted at trial. 
19 This issue was before the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Grove. The Court considered the 
fundamental error doctrine and concluded that Grove could not challenge the admission of the testimony 
for the first time on appeal. Id. at 493, 259 P.3d at 639. 
20 The admission of State's Exhibit 11 can be found in the trial transcript at pages 901-902. Defense 
counsel asked one question in aid of objection, but elected not to object after hearing Dr. Ross's answer to 
his question. 
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There is nothing in this record which establishes that Dr. Reichard's separate report was 
admitted into the record at trial. Thus, this Court must consider whether the admission of 
Dr. Ross's autopsy report was testimonial, and whether this admission was a violation of 
---- "the Confrontation Clause~--0.flased.::Upontheobjectiv~-p:cimmy p.UFposes test as setforth in 
Williams, the report was not testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. r 
Nothing in this record establishes the autopsy report was "made for the purpose of 
proving the guilt of a particular defendant at trial." Williams, 567 U.S. at_, 132 S.Ct. 
at 2243. Instead, the report is akin to the DNA testing and reporting that was at issue in 
Williams. Here, while it is not disputed that an autopsy report may be used during the 
criminal prosecution of homicide simply based upon the determination of manner of 
death, nothing in the testimony establishes that Dr. Ross, or Dr. Reichard, were creating 
autopsy reports for the purposes targeting a specific defendant. 
The Williams Court explained that a DNA profile may provide powerful 
incriminating evidence, but in the alternative, the report may also exonerate a suspect 
who has been charged or under investigation. Id. at_, 132 S.Ct. at 2243-2244. An r 
autopsy report is much the same. In the case at hand, there is no indication that Dr. Ross 
knew of a potential suspect of the crime. Further, nothing in the Autopsy Reports or Dr. 
Ross' s testimony refers to a specific defendant, nor was the Autopsy Report created 
solely for an evidentiary purpose in aid of police investigation, as the drug analysis 
reports in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming. 
There were two witnesses who referred to Dr. Reichard's report during testimony 
at trial: Dr. Ross and Dr. Harper. This testimony was not objected to at trial. However, 
based on this Court's analysis, any objection to the testimony would have been overruled. 
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Petitioner also asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the doctors 
referred to Dr. Reichard's report. Because there was no violation of the confrontation 
clause, counsel's performance could not be deficient for failing to object, thus, it is not 
-- - · ·-- --·-- -- --- necessary for this Gourtto,address-the-ineffective:-assis:tance-of cou,nsel claims.as .they_ --
relate to Dr. Reichard's report. The State's motion for summary disposition is granted on 
this issue. The Petitioner's motion for summary disposition is denied. 
2. Whether Petitioner was denied a fair trial and due process of law by multiple 
instances of prosecutorial misconduct. 
The Petitioner sets forth several instances during the trial that he contends the 
r 
prosecutor engaged in misconduct that was a gross violation of the prosecutor's duty to 
ensure fairness in every stage of the trial. Amended Petition, at 12-18. These events 
include the following assertions: First, that the prosecuting attorney projected family 
photos of the victim on a screen when jurors were entering the courtroom; sec011g,_ :$e. 
prosecuting attorney committed misconduct by calling and questioning the victim's 
sister, a young child; third, the prosecuting attorney committed misconduct while cross-
examining the defense's expert witness; and lastly, allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct during the closing statements at trial. 
It is undisputed that the claims above were not objected to at trial. Further, the 
issues were not raised in the appeal before the Idaho Court of Appeals. The Petitioner 
asserts that the issues could not have been raised on appeal, and thus, the Court should 
engage in a fundamental error analysis, or in the alternative, analysis under the 
cumulative error doctrine. 
First, this Court notes that even though the assertions were not objected to during 
trial, the matter could have been presented on appeal, similar to the issues regarding the 
OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS 24 





- - -- -. -____ :~J ,:". 
Petitioner's right to confront witnesses, as addressed above; The proper forum for 
considering fundamental error or cumulative error was before the Court of Appeals. 
Because this issue was not raised on appeal, it may not be considered in post-conviction 
The scope of post-conviction relief is limited. An application for post-
conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal. LC.§ 19-490l(b). "[A] 
claim or issue which was or could have been raised on appeal may not be 
considered in post-conviction proceedings." Whitehawk v. State, 116 
Idaho 831, 832-33, 780 P.2d 153, 154-55 (Ct.App.1989) (citing LC.§ 19-
4901(b)). 
Rodgers' claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on statements 
concerning Cox's ability to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege could 
have been raised during the earlier litigation that also challenged the 
prosecutor's conduct. 119 Idaho at 1074, 812 P.2d at 1235. Since this 
issue could have been raised on appeal, it is not properly before this Court 
in an appeal ofa post-conviction proceeding. --
Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 725, 932 P.2d 348,353 (1997). Therefore, the State's 
motion for summary disposition is granted as to this issue, and conversely, the 
Petitioner's motion for summary disposition is denied. 
3. Whether Petitioner was denied due process and the right to a jury trial due 
to juror misconduct 
The Petitioner alleges he was denied his state and federal constitutional rights to 
due process when jurors repeatedly slept during the presentation of evidence at the 
criminal trial. The Petitioner has submitted affidavits from several individuals who 
attended the trial in the audience. These individuals aver that several. jurors were 
sleeping, most notably during the testimony of Dr. Ross, Dr. Harper and Dr. Arden. 
There is_ evidence in the record that jurors were having some difficulty staying awake 
r 
r 
during the afternoon when Dr. Ross testified. A recess occurred in the afternoon, after 
the following statement by the prosecuting attorney: "Your Honor, if I might, it's gettini 
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pretty warm in here, and I've recently noticed that the jurors might be in need of a break. 
They're having a hard time staying awake. This might be a good time." Petitioner's 
Exhibit B, Trial Transcript, at 983. After this statement, a break was taken, after which 
- -defense-effilll:sef.stated he had finished cross .. e-xamination of Dr, Ross. Petitioner/s., ,-7.,:;--_ '"··---, 0·,, ·:·c:- _ - -- - .•. _ 
Exhibit B, Trial Transcript, at 984. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has expressed disfavor of allegations of juror 
inattentiveness being raised days, weeks, or months after a verdict has been rendered in r 
State v. Bolen, 143 Idaho 437, 146 P.3d 703 (Ct. App. 2006). In that case the defendant 
filed a motion for a new trial based upon juror misconduct. The Bolen Court emphasized 
that if jury misconduct is known to the defendant and no request for curative action is 
made, a post-verdict motion for a new trialwill not lie. 
With respect to the instant issue, if jury misconduct occurs during trial and 
is unknown to the defendant and defense counsel until after .a guilty 
verdict, relief may lie pursuant to a motion for a new trial. In contrast, if 
the jury misconduct is known to the defendant or to defense counsel and 
no timely request is made of the trial court to ameliorate the same or take 
other curative action, a post-verdict motion for a new trial on that basis 
will not lie. In essence, the rule is a corollary of the contemporaneous 
objection rule as to evidence. See Idaho Rule of Evidence 103(a)(l). As 
the United States Supreme Court has noted, "[a]llegations of juror 
misconduct, incompetency, or inattentiveness, raised for the first time 
days, weeks or months after the verdict, seriously disrupt the finality of the 
process." Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 
2747, 97 L.Ed.2d 90, 106 (1987). 
With regard to the instant circumstance of inattentive or sleeping 
jurors, the great weight of authority from other jurisdictions is in accord 
with the reasoning of Baker and Fox in that if the defendant or his counsel 
know that a juror is sleeping or otherwise inattentive and the matter is not 
brought to the attention of the trial court, post-verdict relief will not be 
· granted pursuab.t to ~ftnotion for a new trial or mistrial. See United-States 
v. Rivera, 295 F.3d 461, 470-71 (5th Cir.2002); United States v. Krohn, 
560 F.2d 293,297 (7th Cir.1977); Whitingv. State, 516 N.E.2d 1067, 
1067-68 (Ind.1987); Randleman v. State, 552 P.2d 90, 93-94 
(Okla.Crim.App.1976); see generally cases collected in George L. Blum, 
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Annotation, Inattention of Juror from Sleepiness or Other Cause as 
Ground for Reversal or New Trial, § 5 Necessity of Preserving Claim of 
Error for Review, 59 ALR 5th 1, 58 (1998). 
r 
Id at 440, 146 P.3d at 707. The Bolen Court determined that the trial court did not err in 
of the alleged jury misconduct during the trial. Id. at 441, 146 P.3d at 708. 
In the case at hand, there is evidence in the record that defense counsel was aware 
that jurors may be sleeping. First, the record reflects that the Court allowed for a recess 
based upon the request by the prosecutor that he was concerned jurors were having 
difficulty staying awake. Petitioner's Exhibit B, Trial Transcript, at 983.21 Second, in 
his deposition, defense counsel states he was informed by his paralegal during the cross-
··· examination of Dr. Ross-that a juror was sleeping .. Deposition of Scott Chapman, at 66- ·~ 
I 
68. Defense counsel indicated he believed that a recess was taken at this time. Id . 
As stated above, the scope of post-conviction relief is limited. Similar to the 
matter regarding prosecutorial misconduct, this issue could have been raised in the direct 
appeal of the criminal trial. The Petitioner has submitted the affidavit of appellate 
counsel, which states that this issue could not have been raised on direct appeal because 
trial counsel did not draw the misconduct to the Court's attention. Affidavit of Diane 
Walker, at 2. Nevertheless, there is some information in the record that jurors may have 
been having difficulty staying awake. Thus, because the matter should have been 
addressed on appeal, this Court will not address this issue at this juncture. See 
Whitehawkv. State, 116 Idaho 831, 832-33, 780 P.2d 153, 154-55 (Ct.App.1989) (citing r 
LC. § 19-490l(b)). 
21 On page 921, the Court interrupts the prosecuting attorney in order to consult with counsel whether it 
would be appropriate to recess early for lunch. The record indicates the trial recessed at 11 :30 a.m. during 
Dr. Ross's direct examination. 
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The Petitioner has raised a question of-material fact on the issue of whether 
counsel was ineffective for failing to bring to the Court's attention that jurors may be 
sleeping. Therefore, an evidentiary hearing will be held on the limited issue of 
4. Whether Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
The Petitioner asserts that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
two issues on direct appeal, whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise 
issues on appeal regarding prosecutorial misconduct or juror misconduct. Ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims, for trial counsel or appellate counsel, are judged under the 
standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L. 
Ed. 674(1984). 
An accused has a constitutional right to assistance of counsel. Gideon 
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 805 
(1963). The right to counsel necessarily includes the right to effective 
assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n. 14, 90 
S.Ct. 1441, 1449 n. 14, 25 L.Ed.2d 763, 773, ri.. 14 (1970); Matthews v. 
State, 122 Idaho 801,806,839 P.2d 1215, 1220 (1992). The right to 
effective assistance of counsel extends to the defendant's first appeal as a 
matter of right. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387,396, 105 S.Ct. 830,836, 83 
L.Ed.2d 821, 829 (1985). 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-
conviction petitioner must show that the attorney's performance was 
deficient and, in most cases, must also show that prejudice resulted from 
the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 67 4, 693 (1984); Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 
520,960 P.2d 738, 741 (1998); Hassettv. State, 127 Idaho 313,316,900 
P.2d 221,224 (Ct.App.1995); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 
654,656 (Ct.App.1990). Deficient performance is established if the 
applicant shows that the attorney's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688,104 S.Ct. at 2064, 
80 L.Ed.2d at 693; Berg, 131 Idaho at 520, 960 P.2d at 741; Aragon v. 
State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Russell, 118 Idaho 
at 67, 794 P.2d at 656. To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance 
OPINION AND ORDER ON MOTIONS 28 





~--~~----- .. - .:k~v.~•>Y-..%..-·~·:===-:----~ . .._-.,.----~---~- ,. .... ,. ... ,....._..,. - ----··--~~--- - ----------------- - -- --
..• -.. ~--- . =. 
the outcome of the criminal casewould have been different. Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 697; Berg, 131 Idaho at 
520, 960 P.2d at 741; Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Russell, 
118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656. 
Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 658-659, 168 P.3d 40, 42-43 (Ct. App. 2007). The 
. .. ;:;·-----,. _._ . -
Petitioner is claiming appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise issues on 
appeal which were not objected to at trial. Appellate counsel avers that the issues could 
not be raised on appeal because the trial record was not sufficient, and the issues could 
not be raised under the fundamental error doctrine under State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 
694, 215 P.3d 414 (2009). Affidavit of Diane Walker; Affidavit of Eric Fredericksen. A 
similar matter was addressed inMintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 168 P.3d 40 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
First, Idaho case law establishes no bright line delineating categories of 
errors that will be deemed fundamental, and thus subject to appellate 
review without objection below. Therefore,zrule deeming appellate 
counsel ineffective for failing to raise an issue of fundamental error would 
force appellate attorneys to raise on appeal nearly all possible errors, 
whether preserved by objection in the trial court or not, to avoid the risk of 
being declared ineffective. This would be a misuse of the resources of 
appellate defense counsel, the Idaho Attorney General's Office, and the 
Idaho appellate courts. Such a rule would also place on our trial and 
appellate courts in post-conviction proceedings the difficult task of 
determining, on a case-by-case basis, whether a particular error was 
actually "fundamental" and whether the record on direct appeal was 
sufficient to review the claim at that time. 
Second, it is often not to a criminal defendant's advantage to raise an 
r 
f 
issue of fundamental error on direct appeal because the record in the r 
criminal proceeding may not be adequately developed for a full 
presentation of the defendant's claim. For example, Idaho's appellate 
courts have held that the State's violation of a plea agreement is 
fundamental error that may be reviewed in the absence of objection in the 
trial- court, State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 74, 106 P.3d 397,400 (2005); 
State v. Rutherford, 107 Idaho 910, 915-16, 693 P.2d 1112, 1117-18 
(Ct.App.1985), but this Court has also declined to address such claims 
where the record on appeal is not complete enough to allow appellate 
examination of all the factors that must be considered on such a claim. 
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State v. Kellis, 129 Idaho 730, 733-34, 932 P.2d 358, 361-62 
( Ct.App.1997). In the latter circumstance, we have left the issue for 
presentation in a post-conviction proceeding, where an adequate record 
could be developed. We have also observed that if the appellate court were 
to consider, as fundamental error, the merits of a claim that cannot be 
adequately supported by the bare record in the criminal proceedings, it 
-would require that we rule-against the appealing defendant, and that ruling 
would be res judicata, precluding the defendant from later pursuing the 
issue in a post-conviction action where adequate evidence to support the 
claim might be presented. See generally State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 
376,859 P.2d 972,974 (Ct.App.1993). See also I.C. § 19-4901(b) 
(precluding assertion in a post-conviction action of any issue that was or 
could have been raised on direct appeal). 
Third, a trial attorney's failure to object to inadmissible evidence or 
other potential errors may be done for legitimate strategic or tactical 
purposes. See, e.g., Prattv. State, 134 Idaho 581,584 n. 1, 6 P.3d 831,834 
n. 1 (2000). The record on direct appeal would rarely disclose this 
practical strategy, and it would be incorrect to grant relief to a defendant in 
such a circumstance. 
Finally, the allowance of this type of claim for ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel is ordinarily not necessary to protect a defendant's rights 
because the defendant can bring the same claim of impropriety in the trial 
proceedings as a claim of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel for 
failing to object to the alleged error in the trial court. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, a rule allowing a post-conviction claim 
of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise an issue of 
fundamental error would be impractical, inefficient, and often 
disadvantageous to defendants whose interest would be better served by 
presenting such a claim in a post-conviction action asserting ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel. 
r 
Id. at 662, 168 P.3d at 40. For the same reasons as asserted inMintun, these claims 
would be best addressed in this post-conviction proceeding as ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel claims. Therefore, the Petitioner's motion for summary disposition is denied 
on this claim. The State's motion for summary disposition is granted. 
r 
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5. Whether Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial. 
As stated above, ineffective assistance of counsel claims are judged under the 
standards set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L. 
----·-.- - · - Ed. 674 (1984}· , --- -
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-
conviction petitioner must show that the attorney's performance was 
deficient and, in most cases, must also show that prejudice resulted from 
the deficiency. Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674,693 (1984); Bergv. State, 131 Idaho 517, 
520,960 P.2d 738, 741 (1998); Hassettv. State, 127 Idaho 313,316,900 
P.2d 221,224 (Ct.App.1995); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 
654,656 (Ct.App.1990). Deficient performance is established if the 
applicant shows that the attorney's representation fell below an objective 
standard ofreasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 
80 L.Ed.2d at 693; Berg, 131 Idaho at 520,960 P.2d at 741; Aragon v. 
State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Russell, 118 Idaho 
-at6'7, -794-P .2d-at 656. To establish prejudice, .the applicant must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance 
the outcome of the criminal case would have been different. Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068., 80 L.Ed.2d at 697; Berg, 131 Idaho at 
520,960 P.2d at 741;Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Russell, 
118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656. 
Mintun v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 658-659, 168 P.3d 40, 42-43 (Ct. App. 2007). 
The Petitioner sets forth several claims that trial counsel was ineffective. The 
Petitioner has raised issues of material fact regarding whether trial counsel was 
r 
ineffective, thus, an evidentiary hearing will be held on this matter, limited to the issues r 
set forth below. 
a. Issues which are summarily dismissed 
The State's motion for summary dismissal is granted with respect to the issues set 
forth below. For each of these issues, the Petitioner has failed to set forth material facts 
which establish that trial counsel's performance was deficient, or that the deficiency 
prejudiced the defendant at trial. 
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i. Whether counsel's performance was deficient for failing tor 
object when expert witnesses referred to Dr. Reichard's 
report 
This issue was addressed at length in the foregoing analysis. Because this Court 
0 '.l'.ms determined that the expert's reliance and testimony regarding Dr. Reichard'cS-r.eport, ___ _ _ __ 
was not in violation of the Confrontation Clause, trial counsel could not have been 
deficient in his performance for failing to object to this testimony. Therefore, the State's 
motion for summary dismissal is granted as to these claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
ii. Whether counsel's performance was deficient during voir 
dire 
The Petitioner claims counsel was deficient during voir dire for failing to move 
r 
for a mistrial when a potential juror stated he worked in the funeral business and knew 
Officers Greene and Petrie welL See Exhibit B, Trial Transcript, at 155-l56. In_ addition, 
the Petitioner claims counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge for cause or 
peremptorily challenge Juror #5 who revealed he worked at St. Joseph's Hospital and 
knew State's witnesses who also worked there. See Exhibit B, Trial Transcript, at 144. 
The Petitioner relies on Mach v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 630 (9th Cir. 1997) in support 
of his argument. In Mach, during voir dire a potential jury member stated she was a 
social worker who had been involved in cases where children had accused an adult of 
sexual assault. The jury stated that in her experience children who testified in these cases 
had never been known to lie about sexual abuse. 137 F.3d at 633. In this case, the 
reviewing Court assumed that at least one juror may have been tainted as a result of the 
statements. 
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The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial "guarantees to the criminally 
accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors." Irvin v. 
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). 
"Even if 'only one juror is unduly biased or prejudiced,' the defendant is 
denied his constitutional right to an impartial jury." United States v. 
Eubanks, 591 F.2d 513, 517 (9th Cir.1979); see also United States v. 
-,C'":-:<,,; :--- ···-· • - -Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 71 (9th Cir.1977)"0ue11r-0cess requires thatthe -
defendant be tried by a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely 
on the evidence before it. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,217, 102 S.Ct. 
940, 945-46, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). r 
At a minimum, when Mach moved for a mistrial, the court should have 
conducted further voir dire to determine whether the panel had in fact been 
infected by Bodkin's expert-like statements. Given the nature of Bodkin's 
statements, the certainty with which they were delivered, the years of 
experience that led to them, and the number of times that they were 
repeated, we presume that at least one juror was tainted and entered into 
jury deliberations with the conviction that children simply never lie about 
being sexually abused. This bias violated Mach's right to an impartial jury. 
Id. The ease at hand is distinguishable from Mach. First, although the potentialjuror 
was a professional, his professional capacity as a funeral director did not rise to the same 
level as a social worker who works with children in a child sexual abuse case. Further, 
the Petitioner has not established a material issue of fact that if counsel was deficient, 
prejudice resulted from the deficiency, as required by Strickland. 
A claim for post-conviction relief will be subject to summary dismissal if 
the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima facie case as to 
each essential element of the claims upon which the petitioner bears the 
burden of proof. DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,603,200 P.3d 1148, 
1152 (2009). Thus, summary dismissal is permissible when the petitioner's 
evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in 
the petitioner's favor, would entitle the petitioner to the requested relief. 
Hoffman v. State, 153 Idaho 898,902,277 P.3d 1050, 1054 (Ct. App. 2012). Thus, this 
issue will not be considered at the evidentiary hearing. The State's motion for summary 
dismissal is granted on this issue. 
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iii Whether counsel's performance was deficient because he · 
failed to make a hearsay objection to the Nash testimony. 
· The Petitioner asserts that counsel was deficient for failing to offer a hearsay 
objection when the victim's mother testified she was told  had blood in his brain 
that could not be removed. The victim's mother was testifying regarding the events that 
occurred at Sacred Heart Hospital after her son had been.transferred there. Exhibit B, 
Trial Transcript, at 754-756. Ms. Nash was not testifying as to the truth of the matter 
asserted, but r~ther explaining her understanding of the events of the day. Thus, the 
Petitioner has failed to establish that a hearsay objection would have been sustained. 
r 
Further, the Petitioner has not established a material issue of fact that if counsel was r 
deficient, prejudice resulted from the deficiency, as required by Strickland. Thus, this 
issue will not be considered at the evidentiary hearing. The State's motion for summary 
disposition is granted as to this issue. 
iv. Whether counsel's performance was deficient for failing to 
make a foundation or relevancy objection to the Stocking 
testimony 
The Petitioner asserts counsel was deficient for failing to object to the testimony 
from paramedic Steve Stocking regarding the Petitioner's demeanor when the paramedics 
arrived in response to the 911 call. See Exhibit B, Trial Transcript, at 838-839. The 
paramedic stated that he felt the Petitioner was too calm, because parents are usually 
excitable when their child is very sick. The Petitioner relies on Bloching v. Albertson's r 
Inc., 129 Idaho 844, 846, 934 P.2d 17,19 (1997), wherein the Court found the plaintiff · 
could not testify to the medical opinion that seizures he had were a result of the 
pharmacist providing a different type of insulin than he was prescribed. The Court held a 
lay witness was not competent to testify to such an opinion. Bloching is distinguishable 
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:frorri the case at hand where the testimony was about the witness's perception of the 
Petitioner's demeanor. 
In State v. Missamore, 119 Idaho 27, 32,803 P.2d 528, 533 (1990), the Court held 
r 
that a dialogue between the prosecutoranda victim was prejudicial where the victim-·-
repeatedly stated the defendant was harassing. 
Generally, a trial court may allow a lay witness to state an opinion about a 
matter of fact within his or her knowledge, as long as two conditions are 
met. First, the witness's opinion must be based on his or her perception; 
and second, the opinion must be helpful to a clear understanding of the 
witness's testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. I.RE. 701; 
accord State v. Rosencrantz, 110 Idaho 124, 714 P.2d 93 (Ct.App.1986). 
The admissibility of such testimony turns upon its underlying factual 
basis, not the fact that it is in the format of an opinion. See Report of the 
Idaho State Bar Evidence Committee, comments to I.RE. 701 at 4 (1983 
and 1985 Supp.). · 
Id. In the case at hand, the paramedic's statement was based on his perception of the 
scene of the call;-and also was helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's te$timony.,._ -e---.. 
The Petitioner has not raised an issue of material fact that counsel was deficient for 
failing to object to this statement. Further, the Petitioner has not .established a material 
issue of fact that if counsel was deficient, prejudice resulted from the deficiency, as 
r 
required by Strickland. Thus, this issue will not be considered at the evidentiary hearing. 
The State's motion for summary disposition is granted as to this issue. 
v. Whether counsel's performance was deficient during the 
testimony of Detective Birdsell 
The Petitioner asserts counsel rendered deficient performance in failing to object 
to the admission of photographs ofNash's home, taken a month after Kyler's death, 
which included a view of sympathy cards sent to the family. See Exhibit B, Trial 
Transcript, at 996-1007; Exhibit C, State's Exhibits 4,5, and 6. Detective Birdsell 
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provided a diagram ofNash's home, and described the location where the paramedics 
found the victim. Detective Birdsell also discussed the height of the kitchen counter and 
whether the floor indicated a fall had happened. 
The pictures in ques-tion-po1tray,the furniture--n1,theroom,.and a collection of 
cards is visible upon the entertainment center located in the living room. However, the 
Petitioner fails to establish how sympathy cards sent to Nash were inflammatory or 
unduly prejudicial to the Petitioner. A review of the testimony establishes that sympathy 
cards were never mentioned. The Petitioner has not raised an issue of material fact that r 
counsel was deficient for failing to object to the pictures. Further, the Petitioner has not 
established a material issue of fact that if counsel was deficient, prejudice resulted from 
the deficiency, as required by Strickland. Thus, this issue will not-be considered at the __ 
evidentiary hearing. The State's motion for summary disposition is granted as to this 
. -~-:-.-'-·. 
issue. 
vi. Whether counsel was deficient for failing to introduce 
photographs of  taken at St. Joseph's hospital soon 
after he arrived by ambulance 
Photographs of the victim were taken after the paramedics took him to St. 
Joseph's Regional Medical Center. The Petitioner alleges counsel was deficient for 
failing to have these photographs introduced. Petitioner's argument centers on the idea r 
that the photos show no redness or bruising, and thus, are inconsistent with the State's 
theory that the Petitioner had just brutally beaten the victim. State's Exhibit 12 provided 
a full view of Kyler's body before the autopsy. This photo is also void of any evidence 
ofredness or bruising. See Petitioner's Exhibit C, Trial Exhibit 12. Further, Dr. Ross 
testified regarding the presence or absence of bruising on the child during the autopsy. 
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With respect to Exhibit 12, Dr. Ross explained that most of the discoloration found on the 
child's body was due to Betadine or iodine based solution to sterilize the body surface 
r 
prior to surgery. Exhibit B, Trial Transcript, at 904. A review of the record establishes 
that at no time was-tliere-=--signiflcantredness-or--bruising·visible-on tlie-victim 's-body.--
Thus, the Petitioner has failed to establish a material question that the Petitioner was 
prejudiced by counsel's failure to present the photos taken at St. Joseph's. Further, the 
Petitioner fails to establish he was prejudiced by tliis decision of counsel. 
vii. Whether counsel was deficient for failing to question 
paramedic David Chenault regarding Lisa's reaction to 
Kyler's injury 
The Petitioner claims counsel was deficient for failing to call paramedic David 
Chenault as a witness in this case. During the grand jury proceedings, Chenault testified 
tliat the victim's mothers reaction to Kyler's injuries during the 911 call were the "most 
r 
bizarre reaction we've ever seen especially for a kid call." The Petitioner asserts Chenault 
should have been called to testify in order to rebut Paramedic Stocking's testimony. 
In his deposition, trial counsel avers that his theory of the case was that ''the injuries that 
occurred to  were inflicted at a time when Stace was not around or with the child in 
any fashion that it could have happened." The testimony that Petitioner claims Chenault 
would have testified about does not further tlie theory of the case as stated by trial 
counsel. 
The Petitioner has established that this decision by counsel was a strategic 
decision. "[T]actical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on 
appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant 
r 
law or other shortcomings capable of objective_ evaluation." Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 
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231,233, 880 P.2d 261,263, citing Davis v. State, 116Idaho 401; 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 
1248 (Ct.App.1989). Because this was a tactical decision, summary dismissal is 
appropriate on this issue. 
· b. IssneS'-tobe,addressed-,at-theevidentiary-hearing ·.--
The Petitioner has raised issues of material fact on the following claims, and thus, 
an evidentiary hearing will be held for the presentation of facts on these limited issues: r 
i. Whether counsel's performance was deficient during direct 
and cross-examination of the Petitioner 
The Petitioner asserts counsel's performance was deficient during the direct and 
cross-examination of the Petitioner during the criminal trial. Specifically, the Petitioner 
claims counsel was deficient because he introduced evidence regarding the Petitioner's 
relationship with his son, Alex, and then failed to object when the prosecuting attorney 
asked whether the Petitioner was behind on child support payments. Finally, the 
Petitioner asserts defense counsel was deficient for failing to object when the prosecutor 
questioned the Petitioner regarding an Ativan prescription. The Petitio:o.er will be 
allowed to address these claims in an evidentiary hearing. 
r 
ii. Whether counsel was deficient during the direct and cross-
examination of Dr. Arden 
The Petitioner has presented a question of material fact regarding whether counsel 
rendered deficient performance in the presentation of the expert testimony of Dr. Arden. 
The Petitioner asserts that Dr. Arden was not supplied with all existing microscopic slides 
for examination prior to trial. Further, the Petitioner asserts counsel was deficient for 
failing to object when the Prosecutor elicited testimony for purposes of impeaching Dr. 
Arden. The Petitioner will be allowed to address these claims at the evidentiary hearing. 
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iii. Whether counsel was· deficient for failing to move for a 
mistrial because jurors may have been sleeping during the 
presentation of testimony 
As addressed above, Petitioner bas raised a material issue of fact regarding 
r 
whether:defense·eounselwas--dencientfor failing-to- bring-to the Court's attention.that j-""'"''"'-,"' ,~ _, , 
jurors may be sleeping. Therefore, this issue may be addressed at the evidentiary 
hearing. 
iv. Whether defense counsel's performance during closing 
argument was deficient 
Lastly, the Petitioner asserts that counsel's performance was deficient during 
closing statements because he failed to object to multiple instances of misconduct by the 
prosecuting attorney. Further, defense counsel failed to move for a mistrial or curative f' 
instruction following the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments. The Petitioner has 
"- -'.· raised a question of material fact on this issue, and therefore, will be allowed to address 
this claim at the evidentiary hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, there are issues of material fact with regard to 
whether the Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel during the trial in this 
case. Thus, an evidentiary hearing will be held on these issues, limited to those four 
claims as set forth above. The State's motion for summary disposition is denied with 
respect to these limited issues. However, the State's motion is granted as to the 
remaining issues, consistent with the foregoing analysis. The Petitioner's motion for r 
summary disposition is denied. 
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ORDER 
The Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition is hereby DENIED. 
The State's Motion for Summary Disposition is hereby DENIED in part, and 
- GRANTBD-m part, based-upontheforegoing-opinio1r.- -- -
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this JJ 'a.ay of July, 2013. 
U({JL ____ -o 
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge 
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CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
Petitioner, Stacey Grove, asks this Court, pursuant to I.C.R. l l(a)(2)(B), to reconsider its 
order granting in part the Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition. A memorandum of 
law in support of this motion is filed contemporaneously herewith. 
Dated this~ day of August, 2013. 
~.1 ~!~~ &:>"'-'-
Deborah Whipple Dennis Benjamin \ 
Attorneys for Stacey Grove 
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CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Stacey Grove submits the following in support of his motion for reconsideration of the 
Court's order granting in part the Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition. 
Reconsideration should be granted because the Court's Confrontation Clause analysis is in error. 
Moreover, there is a similar case now pending before the United States Supreme Court, and this 
Court should not dismiss Mr. Grove's claim prior to decision in that case. Further, the 
Prosecutorial and Jury Misconduct claims could not have been raised on appeal and should not 
have been dismissed on that basis here. In the alternative, if the issues could have been raised on 
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appeal, it was ineffective assistance for appellate counsel to fail to do so and so the claims should 
be heard in an evidentiary hearing as elements of the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel 
claim. Finally, many of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims have been dismissed 
without mention or discussion by the Court. 
II. WHY RECONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GRANTED 
A. The Court Should not Have Dismissed the Confrontation Clause Claim 
The Court should reconsider its conclusion that the admission into evidence of the portion 
of the autopsy report which contained Dr. Reichard's findings and the testimony about those 
findings did not violate Mr. Grove's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. The Court 
has two bases for its ruling: 1) that the evidence was not objected to by defense counsel, and 2) 
the evidence was not ''testimonial." See, Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary 
Disposition ("Opinion") pg. 22. First, the Court dismissed this claim on a theory not advanced 
by the moving party. Second, a constitutional violation may be raised for the first time in a post-
conviction petition, even when there was an opportunity to object at trial. Third, the Court's 
confrontation clause analysis is incorrect, especially as to the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim. Fourth, the evidence was inadmissible under the Idaho Rules of Evidence. And, lastly, a 
claim similar to Mr. Grove's is currently pending before the United States Supreme Court in a 
petition for a writ of certiorari, and this Court may wish to defer any ruling dismissing Mr. 
Grove's claim until after the petition is decided. 
1. The Court dismissed without prior notice on a basis not raised by the state 
First, Mr. Grove objects to the Court dismissing this claim on a ground which was not 
argued by the state in its motion. The state first argued that the evidence was admissible under 
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I.R.E. 702 and 703 and thus there was no confrontation clause violation. See Respondent's 
Answer and Amended Answer for Summary Disposition and Dismissal ("State's Brief'), pg. 3-4. 
It later argued that trial counsel's failure to object was part of a legitimate trial strategy. 
Respondent's Reply Brief in Support of State's Motion for Summary Disposition and Response 
to Petitioner's Brief in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition ("State's Reply 
Brief'), pg. 4. It never argued that Dr. Reichard's report was not ''testimonial" evidence for 
purposes of the Sixth Amendment. 
The Court summarily dismissing on grounds not raised by the state violated Mr. Grove's 
constitutional right to due process and his statutory right to twenty days notice of the grounds for 
a sua sponte dismissal. In Gibbs v. State, 103 Idaho 758, 653 P.2d 813 (1982), instead of 
accepting the State's sole argumentthat the petition was untimely, the court relied on different 
grounds and dismissed Gibbs's petition "upon its own initiative." Id. (emphasis in original). On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals found that the district court improperly dismissed because it did not 
give the 20-days notice required by I.C. § 19-4906(b).1 The Supreme Court later endorsed the 
holding in Gibbs, writing that "[w]here the state has filed a motion for summary disposition, but 
the court dismisses the application on grounds different from those asserted in the state's motion, 
it does so on its own initiative and the court must provide twenty days notice." Saykhamchone v. 
State, 127 Idaho 319,322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995). 
Reconsideration should be granted on this basis alone. In addition, both of the Court's 
bases for dismissing the Confrontation Clause claim are in error. 
1 When a court is satisfied ... that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief .. 
. it may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing. 
The applicant shall be given an opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal." 




c·.--'.'I . I 
2. This claim may be raised in post-conviction 
This Court finds that "because there was no objection to the report or the testimony in this 
case, there cannot be a Confrontation Clause violation." Opinion, pg. 22. However, this 
conclusion is foreclosed by the text of the post-conviction statute, which does not require a 
contemporaneous objection before an issue may be raised. Idaho Code§ 19-4901(a) states that 
"[a]ny person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime, and who claims ... that the 
conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution of the United States ... may 
institute, without paying a filing fee, a proceeding under this act to secure relief." No 
contemporaneous objection is required under the statute. 
In addition to the absence of textual support for the ruling, there is no support for the 
Court's position in the structure of the post-conviction act. To the contrary, to require a 
contemporaneous objection to a constitutional violation before the issue could be raised in post-
conviction would be diametrically opposed to the provision, found in the very next section of the 
statute, that "[a]ny issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited 
and may not be considered in post-conviction." LC. § 19-4901(b ). Statutes dealing with the 
same subject matter must be read in para materia in order to determine what the legislature 
intended. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 103 Idaho 808,654 P.2d 901 (1982) 
("Statutes which are in pari materia are to be construed together to the end that legislative intent 
will be effected"); Magnuson v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 97 Idaho 917, 556 P.2d 1197 
(1976) ("[A]ll sections of the applicable statutes should be considered and construed together to 
determine the intent of the legislature"). 
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Reading subsection (a) of§ 19-4901 to require an objection in order to raise an issue in 
post-conviction while reading subsection (b) to bar the raising of that same issue because, with 
an objection, the issue could have been raised on appeal is inconsistent with the legislative 
purpose of the post-conviction which is to "comprehend[] and take[] the place of all other 
common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the 
conviction or sentence." LC. § 19-490l(b). It would, in effect, suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus in a large number of cases, in violation of Article I, § 5. ("The privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety 
requires it[.]") This would be contrary to the purpose of the post-conviction act, which has been 
construed by the Supreme Court "as an expansion of the writ." Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235, 
459 P.2d1017 (1969). 
Finally, there is no support in the case law for such a restriction on the scope of the post-
conviction act. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals has held that unobjected-to error should 
not be raised on direct appeal, but should be raised in post-conviction. For example, in Mintun v. 
State, 144 Idaho 656, 661-62, 168 P.3d 40, 45-46 (Ct. App. 2007), the petitioner argued that his 
appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising a Confrontation Clause issue on direct appeal as 
a claim of fundamental error. The Court of Appeals held that Mintun's appellate counsel could 
not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a claim of fundamental error on an issue that was 
not preserved by objection in the trial court. One of the reasons given for the holding was that 
"it is often not to a criminal defendant's advantage to raise an issue of fundamental error on 
direct appeal because the record in the criminal proceeding may not be adequately developed for 
a full presentation of the defendant's claim." In addition, the Court of Appeals noted that claims 
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could be raised more effectively in post-conviction because a more complete record could be 
developed, especially about why no objection had been made. Id. (As will be seen below, there 
is additional evidence presented in post-conviction, which was not presented at the criminal trial, 
which demonstrates that Dr. Reichard's report and the testimony describing its contents was 
testimonial. The deposition of defense counsel also shows there was no strategic reason for 
failing object to the evidence.) Thus, it is clear that unobjected-to violations of a constitutional 
right may be raised in post-conviction proceedings. 
Examples of such cases are common. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised 
for the first time in post-conviction proceedings are too common to require citation to authority, 
but other unobjected-to constitutional errors have been raised too. These include: 
• Violation of plea agreement: Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517,519,960 P.2d 738, 
740 (1998) ("Berg asserted that the prosecutor breached the parties' plea 
agreement by recommending that he be sentenced to prison rather than 
recommending a retained jurisdiction."); Short v. State, 135 Idaho 40, 41, 13 P.3d 
1253, 1254 (Ct. App. 2000). 
• Violation of the right to testify: Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700,706,274 
P.3d 1, 7 (Ct. App. 2012), review denied (Apr. 25, 2012) ("[T]he issue of the 
failure of a defendant to testify may be viewed in post-conviction proceedings 
either as a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or as a claim of a deprivation 
of a constitutional right."); Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 924 P .2d 622 (Ct. App. 
1996); DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 603-04, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152-53 (2009) 
("The district court erred in analyzing DeRushe's claim as alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel rather than as alleging denial of his constitutional right to 
testify on his own behalf[.]"); Barcella v. State, 148 Idaho 469, 224 P.3d 536 (Ct. 
App. 2009). 
• Due process right to participate in defense: Murillo v. State, 144 Idaho 449, 
452, 163 P.3d 238,241 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Murillo argues that he was rendered 
unable to participate in his defense because he had an insufficient opportunity to 
confer with his trial counsel with the aid of an interpreter and was not provided 
with copies or oral translations of documents related to his case.") 
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• Adequacy of plea colloquy: Noel v. State, 113 Idaho 92, 94, 741 P.2d 728, 730 
(Ct. App. 1987) ("Noel's petition alleged, among other things, that he was not 
adequately advised by his legal counsel, or by the court, of the 'requisite specific 
intent to commit murder, nor of the possible consequences of a guilty plea.'"). 
• Suggestiveness of line-up and other issues: Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 
545,531 P.2d 1187, 1190 (1975) ("He maintains the district court should have 
investigated through the medium of an evidentiary hearing his application wherein 
he raised questions as to: (1) the unfair suggestiveness of the lineup; (2) the lack 
of counsel at the lineup; (3) pleas induced by false statements of counsel; and ( 4) 
appellant's mental capacity during the criminal proceedings.") 
Thus, it is clear there is no case law bar to Mr. Grove rasing the confrontation issue in 
post-conviction. To forbid him to do so, after trying to raise it on appeal and being rebuffed by 
the Court of Appeals, would put Mr. Grove in a constitutional Catch-22 where he has no forum 
to raise his claim. This situation would deprive Mr. Grove of his state consitutional right to 
access to the courts under Article 1, § 18. The Court should reconsider its holding and permit the 
claim to proceed on its merits. 
Insofar as the Court was literally holding that the Confrontation Clause cannot be violated 
in the absence of an objection by the defense, the Court is incorrect. See, Michigan v. Bryant, 
_U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 1143, 1150-51 (2011), citing People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 WL 
1882551 (Aug. 24, 2004) (per curiam), which specifically notes that Bryant was raising the 
Confrontation Clause claim for the first time on appeal. At no point did the U.S. Supreme Court 
state in Bryant that the failure to object at trial foreclosed a Confrontation Clause violation. See 
also, People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570, 580-81 (2012), cited by this Court at pages 16-20 of its 
Opinion. Leach specifically notes that the question of whether admission of the autopsy report 
violated the Confrontation Clause was being reviewed for plain error because no objection was 
made below. The Court reached the Confrontation Clause issue because, "the issue implicates a 
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fundamental constitutional right and is in need ofresolution by this court." 980 N.E.2d at 581, 
citation omitted. And, in Mr. Grove's case itself, the Court of Appeals did not decline to review 
the Confrontation Clause issue on direct appeal because the lack of an objection at trial precluded 
the existence of a constitutional violation but rather because the record available to the appellate 
court could not establish that counsel's failure to object was not a tactical decision. State v. 
Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 492-93, 259 P.3d 629, 638-39 (Ct. App. 2011). 
Further, it is of note that the right of an accused to confront the witnesses against him or 
her is a fundamental right made obligatory on the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,403, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1068 (1965). There is a presumption against 
the waiver of constitutional rights. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1247 
(1966} Nonetheless, the right of confrontation may be waived. Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 4, 86 
S.Ct. at 1246-47, 16 L.Ed.2d at 317; Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 452, 32 S.Ct. 250, 252-
53, 56 L.Ed. 500, 504 (1912). In order for a waiver to be effective, "it must be clearly 
established that there was an 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 
privilege."' Brookhart, 384 U.S. at 4, 86 S.Ct. at 1247, 16 L.Ed. at 317, quoting Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed.2d 1461, 1466 (1938). In this case, 
defense counsel did not make an intentional relinquishment of Mr. Grove's constitutional right to 
confrontation as evidenced by his email to the State Appellate Public Defender that he had not 
discussed Mr. Grove's confrontation rights. Exhibit to Chapman deposition. 
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3. The contents of Dr. Reichard's report were inadmissible under the Confrontation 
Clause 
a. Justice Alita 's plurality opinion in Williams has no precedential value 
The Court finds the analysis in Williams v. Rlinois, 567 U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 2221 (2012), 
to be applicable. Opinion, pg. 22. That conclusion is incorrect because, while there were five 
Justices finding no confrontation clause violation, there was no majority rationale. Justice 
Thomas concurred in the result on a completely different rationale than the affirming plurality. 
Justice Alito, writing for the affirming plurality, set forth two rationales for the plurality result: 1) 
the DNA match evidence was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and 2) the DNA 
report did not have the "primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual of engaging in 
criminal conduct." Williams, 132 S.Ct. 2235-42 (plurality). 
According to the Harvard Law Review, "In failing to issue a majority opinion, the 
Supreme Court [in Williams] deeply muddled Confrontation Clause doctrine." Further, "The 
Court's failure to issue a majority opinion is Williams 's principal fault, leaving doctrinal 
confusion in the wake of its 4-1-4 vote." Leading Cases, Sixth Amendment - Confrontation 
Clause-Forensic Evidence: Williams v. Illinois, 126 Harvard Law Review 266,272 (2012). The 
Ohio State University law professor Douglas Berman, less formally, but perhaps more to the 
point, wrote his reading of Williams led him ''to this simple conclusion: 'What a bloody mess."' 
Berman, D., "Williams v. Illinois, the latest SCOTUS Confrontation Clause ruling, finally 
handed down by deeply divided Court," Sentencing Law and Policy, 
www.sentencing.typepad.com (June 18, 2013) (last visited 8/1/2013). 
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In the absence of clear doctrinal guidance from the United States Court, this Court should 
look to the pre-Williams cases for guidance, as Williams is limited to precise facts before it due to 
a lack of a majority rationale. It is important to note that neither Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 
U.S._, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011), nor Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009), 
were overruled by Williams and are still controlling law; likewise Crawford v. Washington, 541 
U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 125 S.Ct. 2266 (2006), 
were not overruled and remain controlling. Thus, the law continues to be that statements are 
testimonial if they were made for the primary purpose of establishing "past events potentially 
relevant to later criminal prosecution"-in other words, for the purpose of providing evidence. 
Davis, 547 U.S., at 822. Applying these controlling cases requires a finding that the 
Confrontation Clause was violated; -See; Petitioner's Brief in Response to State's Motion for 
Summary Disposition and in Support of Petitioner's Motion pg. 3-14, and Petitioner's Reply 
Brief in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition, pg. 2-8. 
Nevertheless, even if the Court attempts to apply Williams to this case, the conclusion is 
the same: the evidence was not admissible. As this Court does not rely upon the first rationale of 
the Williams plurality2, this memorandum will focus upon Justice Alito's second rationale. 
b. The primary purpose of Dr. Reichard's report 
(i) "primary purpose" according to Justice Alito 
Even if there was a majority in support of Justice Alito's "primary purpose" test as 
applied in Williams, application of the test supports the exclusion of Dr. Reichard's evidence. 
2 A majority of the Court rejects Justice Alito's first rationale and it therefore has no 
precedential value. Justice Thomas, id., at 2258, and the four dissenters, id., at 2268. 
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According to Justice Alito' s plurality opinion, evidence which falls within his "primary 
purpose" is testimonial evidence under the Sixth Amendment. As explained by the District of 
Columbia Court of Appeals: 
If the four-Justice plurality would deem a statement testimonial under the targeted 
accusation test, the four dissenting Justices surely would deem it testimonial under 
the broader evidentiary purpose test. Similarly, if Justice Thomas would deem a 
statement testimonial employing his formality criterion along with the evidentiary 
purpose test, the four dissenting Justices necessarily would deem it testimonial 
using the evidentiary purpose test alone. It therefore is logically coherent and 
faithful to the Justices' expressed views to understand Williams as 
establishing-at a minimum-a sufficient, if not a necessary, criterion: a 
statement is testimonial at least when it passes the basic evidentiary purpose test 
plus either the plurality's targeted accusation requirement or Justice Thomas's 
formality criterion. Otherwise put, if Williams does have precedential value as the 
government contends, an out-of-court statement is testimonial under that 
precedent if its primary purpose is evidentiary and it is either a targeted accusation 
or sufficiently formal in character. 
Young v. United States, 63 A.3d 1033, 1043-44 (D.C. 2013). 
The plurality explained that "if a statement is not made for 'the primary purpose of 
creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony,' its admissibility 'is the concern of state 
and federal rules of evidence, not the Confrontation Clause."' Williams v. lllinois, 132 S. Ct., at 
2242-44, quoting Hammon v. Indiana, 547 U.S. 813, 829-832 (2006). Here, Dr. Reichard was 
engaged by Dr. Ross for the very purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial 
testimony. Further, the state knew that Dr. Ross would rely upon the findings of Dr. Reichard as 
a basis for his own conclusion. This is shown by the email correspondence between Dr. Ross 
and Dr. Reichard which conclusively demonstrates that the primary purpose of Dr. Reichard's 
consultation was to develop evidence for use in a criminal case where expert testimony might be 
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required. See Exhibit A to the Second Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin, filed on April 12, 2013 
("Second Benjamin Affidavit"). 
When a Court looks for an out-of-court statement's "primary purpose," it looks "for the 
primary purpose that a reasonable person would have ascribed to the statement, talcing into 
account all of the surrounding circumstances." Williams, 132 S. Ct., at 2242-44. The primary 
purpose of the Cellmark report in Williams, viewed objectively, was not to accuse the defendant 
or to create evidence for use at trial. In this case it was the opposite. The primary purpose of Dr. 
Reichard's consultation was to obtain a report from an expert who was available to provide 
expert testimony in homicide cases. Dr. Ross said in his email to Dr. Reichard: 
We usually obtain neuropathology consults in just about all of our infant and child 
homicides ( or suspected homicides) and selected adult cases. The 
neuropathologist that we currently use ... has expressed reluctance to do cases 
that have a significant potential to require his services as an expert witness in 
court. 
Obviously, those are usually the infant homicide cases. So we hope to find 
another neuropathologist who can help us out. 
I would appreciate finding out what you might be able to offer us, what your fee 
schedule is, and anticipated turnaround times. We are primarily interested in 
sending our brains from pediatric homicides and pediatric suspicious deaths[.] 
Exhibit A to Second Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin. 
Unlike Williams, where "[t]he technicians who prepare a DNA profile generally have no 
way of knowing whether it will turn out to be incriminating or exonerating-or both," Dr. 
Reichard knew that the brain he received in this case would be evidence in a homicide case. 
Also, unlike Williams, where the affirming plurality found it "significant that in many labs, 
numerous technicians work on each DNA profile," thus making a requirement that all of them 
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testify unworkable, in this case only Dr. Reichard worked on the brain. Williams v. fllinois, 132 
S. Ct., at 2242-44. And, Dr. Reichard told Dr. Ross that he was willing and able to testify if 
needed. Exhibit A to Second Benjamin Affidavit. 
The documents show that Dr. Reichard's report was "prepared for the primary purpose of 
accusing a targeted individual." This fact distinguishes Mr. Grove's case from Williams v. 
fllinois, where a rapist was unidentified, still at large and the report was prepared in order to 
identify and apprehend an unknown person out of millions of possible individuals. Here, Dr. 
Reichard's report was intended to confirm Dr. Ross's belief that a homicide had been committed 
by one of a very small number of possible homicide suspects, e.g., Kyler's care givers. Further, 
unlike the case in Williams, "where no one at Cellmark could have possibly known that the 
profile that it produced would turn out to inculpate petitioner-or for that matter, anyone else 
whose DNA profile was in a law enforcement database," Dr. Reichard would have known there 
was an extremely limited universe of possible suspects in this case and would have realized that 
the results of his examination would be incriminating. 
The email correspondence shows that Dr. Reichard was contacted on August 3, 2006, 
three weeks after  Martin's death, by Dr. Ross in regards to conducting neuropathology 
consultations "in cases that have a significant potential to require his services as an expert 
witness in court." Attached as Exhibit B to the Second Benjamin Affidavit is a Spokane County 
Medical Examiner Chain-of-Evidence Form. That form shows that tissue was sent from the 
Spokane Medical Examiner to the New Mexico Office of Medical Investigations on August 14, 
2006, and was received on August 15, 2006. 
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In short, the opinion of the affirming plurality in Williams v. fllinois, does not support the 
Court's conclusion. Since the "primary purpose" of Dr. Reichard's report was to develop expert 
testimony for use in a criminal trial against one of a very small number of possible homicide 
suspects, Mr. Grove being one, it would be considered to be "testimonial" under the plurality 
opinion. The email correspondence and the chain-of-custody documents demonstrate that Dr. 
Reichard was contracted to produce a report about  Martin which could be used in future 
criminal trial proceedings and that Dr. Reichard was aware that was the case. The "primary 
purpose," of Dr. Reichard's consultation and report was to develop evidence in a homicide case 
where there were a limited number of suspects. Thus Dr. Reichard's evidence was ''testimonial," 
that term is understood by Justice Alito and the plurality, and Mr. Grove's right to confront 
witnesses was violated. 
(ii) "primary purpose" according to Justices Thomas and Kagan 
The documents also show that Dr. Reichard's findings and opinions expressed in his 
autopsy report fall within those "core testimonial statements" under Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004), because they are "extrajudicial statements ... contained in 
formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions" 
and also because they are "statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an 
objective witness reasonably to believe that the statements would be available for use at a later 
trial." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted). 
As noted by Justice Kagan, 
We have previously asked whether a statement was made for the primary purpose 
of establishing "past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution"-in 
other words, for the purpose of providing evidence. Davis, 547 U.S., at 822, 126 
14 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
372
. . . . ---- j - I_ - I. 
------- -------
S.Ct. 2266; see also Bullcoming [v. New Mexico], 564 U.S.[--], at--, 131 
S.Ct. [2705], at 2716-2717 [180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011) ]; [Michigan v.] Bryant, 562 
U.S.,[-] at-,-, 131 S.Ct. [1143], at 1157, 1165 [179 L.Ed.2d 93 
(2011) ]; Melendez-Diaz [v. Massachusetts], 557 U.S. [305], at 310-311, 129 
S.Ct. 2527[, at 2532, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009) ]; Crawford, 541 U.S., at 51-52, 
124 S.Ct. 1354. 
Williams, 132 S.Ct., 2273-74 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas agrees with the primary 
purpose analysis, although he would also require the statement to be solemn or formal, akin to an 
affidavit. Justice Thomas notes, however, that: 
The original formulation of that test asked whether the primary purpose of an 
extrajudicial statement was to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to 
later criminal prosecution. I agree that, for a statement to be testimonial within the 
meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the declarant must primarily intend to 
establish some fact with the understanding that his statement may be used in a 
criminal prosecution. 
Id. at--, 132 S.Ct. at 2261 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). Thus, Justice Thomas agrees that the Supreme Court's prior precedent 
establishes the primary purpose test as described by Justice Kagan. And as the Williams plurality 
opinion did not and could not overrule that prior precedent, it still controls. 
As there was a Sixth Amendment violation under Justice Alito's "primary purpose" test 
as well as under Justice Kagan's dissent, there is a majority of eight in Williams who would find 
Mr. Grove's Sixth Amendment right was violated. 
c. Justice Thomas 's definition of "testimoniaI" 
Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment in Williams, expressed a singular view of 
what evidence is testimonial. He wrote: 
In light of its text, I continue to think that the Confrontation Clause regulates only 
the use of statements bearing "indicia of solemnity." This test comports with 
history because solemnity marked the practices that the Confrontation Clause was 
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designed to eliminate, namely, the ex parte examination of witnesses under the 
English bail and committal statutes passed during the reign of Queen Mary. 
Accordingly, I have concluded that the Confrontation Clause reaches '"formalized 
testimonial materials,"' such as depositions, affidavits, and prior testimony, or 
statements resulting from " 'formalized dialogue,' " such as custodial 
interrogation. 
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct., 2259-60 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal 
citations omitted). 
While Justice Thomas found the DNA report in Williams to not be testimonial, he would 
have found both Dr. Ross's and Dr. Reichard's autopsy reports to be covered by the Sixth 
Amendment. The reports were written by the doctor who did the examination, unlike the DNA 
report which was signed by two reviewers who did not purport to have conducted the testing. 
Therefore, the doctors' signatures attest to the accuracy of the findings, unlike the DNA report 
where the reviewers did not and could not certify the accuracy of the testing results. Further, the 
report here was made pursuant to Idaho law, which requires a written report of the result of any 
investigation into a suspected homicide. LC.§ 19-4301. Thus, Justice Thomas would find the 
evidence obtained from Dr. Reichard's report to be testimonial because it has sufficient indicia of 
solemnity. 
In addition, the four dissenters would have found Dr. Reichard's report and the testimony 
about its contents to be testimonial. Thus, a close reading of Justice Thomas' s concurring 
opinion shows there is a majority in favor of Mr. Grove's position here. Justice Thomas and the 
dissenters all agree the evidence here was testimonial. 
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d. The concurring opinion of Justice Breyer 
In addition to the above, there is another five-person majority favoring Mr. Grove in 
Williams. The second majority consists of Justice Breyer and the four dissenters, who would all 
find that Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses was violated, albeit on a different basis than 
Justice Thomas and the dissenters. 
Justice Breyer concurred in the affirming plurality's opinion. He wrote, "I would set this 
case for reargument. In the absence of doing so, I adhere to the dissenting views set forth in 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009), and 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S.--, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011). I also join 
the plurality's opinion." Williams v. lllinois, 132 S. Ct., at 2245 (Breyer, J., concurring). This is 
important because under the dissenting opinions in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming v. New 
Mexico, Dr. Reichard's statements would be considered to be testimonial. Adding Justice 
Breyer' s vote to the four dissenting Justices in Williams and there is another five-vote majority 
for the exclusion of the evidence. 
Justice Breyer joined Justice Kennedy's dissent in Melendez-Diaz, which states that the 
Confrontation Clause should be concerned with testimony from traditional witnesses. Justice 
Kennedy explains that: 
It is remarkable that the Court so confidently disregards a century of 
jurisprudence. We learn now that we have misinterpreted the Confrontation 
Clause-hardly an arcane or seldom-used provision of the Constitution-for the 
first 218 years of its existence. The immediate systemic concern is that the Court 
makes no attempt to acknowledge the real differences between laboratory analysts 
who perform scientific tests and other, more conventional witnesses-"witnesses" 
being the word the Framers used in the Confrontation Clause. 
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Crawford and Davis dealt with ordinary witnesses-women who had seen, and in 
two cases been the victim of, the crime in question. Those cases stand for the 
proposition that formal statements made by a conventional witness-one who has 
personal knowledge of some aspect of the defendant's guilt-may not be admitted 
without the witness appearing at trial to meet the accused face to face. But 
Crawford and Davis do not say-indeed, could not have said, because the facts 
were not before the Court-that anyone who makes a testimonial statement is a 
witness for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, even when that person has, in 
fact, witnessed nothing to give them personal knowledge of the defendant's guilt. 
Because Crawford and Davis concerned typical witnesses, the Court should have 
done the sensible thing and limited its holding to witnesses as so defined. Indeed, 
as Justice THOMAS warned in his opinion in Davis, the Court's approach has 
become "disconnected from history and unnecessary to prevent abuse." 547 U.S., 
at 838, 126 S.Ct. 2266. The Court's reliance on the word "testimonial" is oflittle 
help, of course, for that word does not appear in the text of the Clause. 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 330-31 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This concern 
was repeated by Justice Kennedy (again with Justice Breyer concurring) in Bullcoming, "This 
Court's missteps have produced an interpretation of the word 'witness' at odds with its meaning 
elsewhere in the Constitution, including elsewhere in the Sixth Amendment." Bullcoming v. 
New Mexico, 131 S. Ct., at 2728, (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
Dr. Reichard was not a laboratory analyst, rather, he was an ordinary witness under the 
Bullcoming and Melendez-Diaz dissents, and his statements would be covered by the 
Confrontation Clause. Thus, the views of Justice Breyer added to the views in Justice Kagan's 
dissent in Williams produces a majority for the proposition that a physician who is retained for 
the purpose of investigating a suspected crime and who, by him or herself, conducts an 
examination which leads to inculpatory evidence, is a witness whose evidence may not be 
presented in absence of an opportunity for cross-examination. 
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e. The Post-Williams autopsy report cases 
The Court, in its Opinion, relies upon People v. Leach, 2012 IL 111534, 980 N.E.2d 570 
(Ill. 2012). The Leach Court concludes ''that whichever definition of primary purpose [Justice 
Alito's or Justice Kagan's] is applied, the autopsy report in the present case was not testimonial 
because it was (1) not prepared for the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual or (2) 
for the primary purpose of providing evidence in a criminal case." Id., at 590. However, Leach 
is easily distinguishable because here the evidence clearly establishes that Dr. Reichard's portion 
of the autopsy report fits into both categories. Dr. Reichard's services were only obtained when 
it was anticipated that expert testimony in a criminal trial would be required, thus meeting both 
the "targeted individual" and "primary purpose" requirements. 
In addition, the Leach Court fails to take into account that the autopsy report there would 
be considered to be testimonial by the Williams majority of Justice Breyer and the dissenters. Dr. 
Reichard would be considered to be an ordinary witness by Justice Breyer and his out-of-court 
statements would be subject to the Confrontation Clause. See section d above. 
A contrary conclusion to Leach was made by the New Mexico Supreme Court in State v. 
Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, (N.M. 2013). In Navarette, "the disputed issue was who shot 
Reynaldo-the driver, who was closest to Reynaldo, or Navarette, who was several feet away 
from Reynaldo. Relevant to this disputed issue, Dr. Zumwalt, the Chief Medical Examiner, 
testified at trial. He repeated the assertion of Dr. Dudley, the doctor who performed the autopsy, 
but who did not testify, ''that this was a distant range shooting, because Dr. Dudley did not see 
any evidence of a close range shooting." 294 P.3d at 437. The New Mexico Court found that Dr. 
Dudley's findings were testimonial under the Sixth Amendment. 
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In so finding, the Court found that it was clear that the autopsy was performed as part of a 
homicide investigation and "in fact, two police officers attended the autopsy." Thus, it "is 
axiomatic that Dr. Dudley made the statements in the autopsy report primarily intending to 
establish some facts or opinions with the understanding that they may be used in a criminal 
prosecution." 294 P.3d at 440. In this case, Dr. Ross's report indicates that four police officers 
and Prosecuting Attorney Spickler were at the autopsy. State's Trial Exhibit 11, pg. 12. Thus, 
when the case was referred to Dr. Reichard for further examination it was for the purpose of 
establishing facts to be used at a later criminal trial. 
Next, the New Mexico Court found "that even if a statement (in this case, a forensic 
report), does not target a specific individual, the statement may still be testimonial." 
It explained that: 
In Williams, four justices concluded that a forensic report was not testimonial 
because the report did not target a specific individual. Id. at--, 132 S.Ct. at 
2243 (plurality opinion). Justice Thomas rejected this approach in his concurring 
opinion, stating "The new primary purpose test [from the Williams plurality 
opinion] asks whether an out-of-court statement has the primary purpose of 
accusing a targeted individual of engaging in criminal conduct. That test lacks any 
grounding in constitutional text, in history, or in logic." Id. at--, 132 S.Ct. at 
2262 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). Writing for four justices who dissented in Williams, Justice 
Kagan also rejected this approach, stating: 
[T]he plurality states that the Cellmark report was not prepared for 
the primary purpose of accusing a targeted individual. Where that 
test comes from is anyone's guess. Justice THOMAS rightly shows 
that it derives neither from the text nor from the history of the 
Confrontation Clause. And it has no basis in our precedents. 
Id. at--, 132 S.Ct. at 2273 (Kagan, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Ginsburg, 
and Sotomayor, JJ.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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294 P.3d, at 438-439. Thus, while Dr. Reichard's report was targeted at a limited group of 
possible suspects, it did not have to be in order to meet the primary purpose test of a majority of 
the Supreme Court. 
Further, the New Mexico Court concluded that "[b ]ecause an autopsy conducted in the 
context of a death caused by this type of injury will automatically trigger a duty by medical 
examiners to report their findings to the district attorney, see [New Mexico Statutes] § 24-11-8, 
we conclude that autopsy reports regarding individuals who suffered a violent death are 
testimonial." Id. Likewise here, LC.§ 19-430l(B) requires the coroner to summon "a person 
authorized to practice medicine and surgery in the state of Idaho to inspect the body and give a 
professional opinion as to the cause of death." When a coroner is informed that a person has 
died as a result of a homicide or under suspicious circumstances, the coroner must "refer the 
investigation to the ... chief of police[.]" LC. § 19-4301. Under Navarette, autopsy reports in 
Idaho are also testimonial. 
Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court found that its autopsy reports were 
testimonial even post-Williams because its state statute required the Medical Examiner to 
formulate opinions or testimony injudicial proceedings. State v. Kennedy, 735 S.E.2d 905,922 
(W.V. 2012). And as previously indicated, it does not matter that the autopsy report does not 
target a specific person. The observations, findings, and opinions within the report are 
statements that were made when Dr. Reichard understood that the statements might be used in a 
criminal prosecution where there were only a few possible suspects. 
The State of New Mexico has filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in Navarette. The 
case has been assigned Docket No. 12-1256. According to the United States Supreme Court 
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website, the briefing has been completed and the case has been distributed to the Justices for 
consideration on the Supreme Court's September 30, 2013, conference. 
www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docket. That being the case, the Supreme Court could announce 
whether it will accept review of the case as soon as when the Court comes back into public 
session on October 7, 2013, the first Monday of October. This Court may want to defer ruling on 
this motion until after the United States Supreme Court has decided whether to accept review of 
Navarette. 
j Conclusion 
The evidence here is testimonial under both Justice Ali to' s "primary purpose" test and 
Justice Kagan's "primary purpose" test. Thus, there are eight votes that the evidence falls within 
the Confrontation Clause. Even if the evidence did not fall within Justice Alito' s test, it falls 
within Justice Thomas's "sufficient solemnity" test and is testimonial evidence when his vote is 
added to the four dissenting votes. Further, Justice Breyer's views, as expressed in his 
concurrence, added to the four dissenting votes, results in another five member majority in favor 
of Mr. Grove's position. Finally, while the Illinois Supreme Court found an autopsy report to not 
be testimonial post-Williams, that case is easily distinguished. At the same time, the Supreme 
Courts of West Virginia and New Mexico have both found autopsy reports to be testimonial. 
Reconsideration should be granted. 
B. The Court Should Not Have Dismissed the Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim 
The Court summarily dismissed this claim "[b ]ecause this issue was not raised on 
appeal," noting "that even though the assertions were not objected to during the trial, the matter 
could have been presented on appeal, similar to the issues regarding the Petitioner's right to 
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confront witnesses, as discussed above." Opinion, pg. 24-25. As will be explained, this is not a 
proper basis to dismiss the case. 
First, as the Court notes in footnote 19 of the Opinion, appellate counsel attempted to 
present the confrontation issue on appeal. However, the Court of Appeals found that it could not 
be raised for the first time appeal. The Court of Appeals wrote, that: 
[W]e conclude that we cannot ascertain from the record whether Grove's failure 
to object to Dr. Ross's and Dr. Harper's testimony as to Dr. Reichard's findings 
and conclusions was not a tactical decision-the record simply does not eliminate 
the possibility that the failure to object was strategic .... As we noted above, our 
Supreme Court has made it clear that application of the fundamental error doctrine 
is to be limited, and we abide by that pronouncement and conclude here that 
Grove cannot challenge admission of the testimony for the first time on appeal. 
State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 492-93, 259 P.3d 629, 638-39 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied 
(2011). The Court of Appeals's treatment of the Confrontation Clause issue proves Mr. Grove's 
point: The prosecutorial misconduct claims could not have been raised for the first time on 
appeal. See also, Affidavit of Diane Walker; Affidavit of Eric Frederickson. 
Second, Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720,725,932 P.2d. 348,353 (1997), the case relied 
upon by the Court, is not applicable to this case. In order to understand the holding in Rodgers v. 
State, that "Rodgers' claim ofprosecutorial misconduct based on statements concerning Cox's 
ability to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege could have been raised during the earlier 
litigation that also challenged the prosecutor's conduct," it is necessary to first look at the 
arguments raised in the criminal case. 
In the direct appeal, Mr. Rodgers asserted that the district court erred in not requiring co-
defendant Cox to testify, even though Rodgers had entered into a stipulation with the stattfthat 
the witness was unavailable to testify due to right against self-incrimination. He also argued that 
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"that defense counsel's failure to object to 'cloak[ing] Cox with a blanket right not to testify' is 
not fatal because it was fundamental error to allow the prosecutor to invoke the Fifth 
Amendment privilege on Cox's behalf." State v. Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1066, 1076, 812 P.2d 1227, 
1237 (Ct. App. 1990) affd, 119 Idaho 1047, 812 P.2d 1208 (1991). The Court of Appeals 
disagreed with Mr. Rodgers, writing: 
We believe it is sufficient to say that under the circumstances shown above, the 
trial court committed no error in accepting the stipulation of counsel that Cox was 
an unavailable witness. Rodgers did not indicate that he needed the court's 
permission to call Cox if, indeed, he wanted to. Moreover, it is clear that 
defendant's counsel were not in any way deterred from calling Cox by the 
prosecutor's statements. No request was made to the trial court to grant immunity 
to Cox. Moreover, the record does not show that Rodgers requested the prosecutor 
to grant Cox use immunity. 
119 Idaho at 1076-77, 812 P.2d at 1237-38. 
On post-conviction, Mr. Rodgers claimed that ''the prosecution misrepresented the right 
of Daron Cox to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and improperly 
represented that Cox would refuse to testify at trial." The Supreme Court would not consider this 
issue noting "Rodgers' claim ofprosecutorial misconduct based on statements concerning Cox's 
ability to assert the Fifth Amendment privilege could have been raised during the earlier 
litigation that also challenged the prosecutor's conduct." Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho at 725, 932 
P.2d at 353. That was obviously the case, because the allegation that the prosecutor had 
misstated Cox's ability to assert the Fifth Amendment was part of the argument that the trial 
court erred in not requiring him to testify. Thus, Mr. Rodgers could not raise in post-conviction 
an aspect of the issue he actually raised on direct appeal because a post-conviction petition is not 
a substitute for an appeal. LC.§ 19-4901(b). 
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In this case, the instances of prosecutorial misconduct alleged in the post-conviction are 
not aspects of any claim raised on direct appeal. Consequently, Rodgers is not apposite. 
Moreover, the claim could not have been raised on direct appeal for the same reason the 
Confrontation Clause issue was not permitted to been raised: There was no objection below and 
the record before the appellate court was incomplete as to whether the failure to object was 
strategic. 
Moreover, since Rodgers the standard for what issues may be raised for the first time on 
appeal has changed. At the time of Mr. Rodgers's direct appeal, fundamental error was loosely 
defined as an error "which so profoundly distorts the trial that it produces manifest injustice and 
deprives the accused of his constitutional right to due process." State v. Mauro, 121 Idaho 178, 
180,824 P.2d 109, 111 (1991), quoting State v. Morris, 116 Idaho 834,836,780 P.2d 156, 158 
(Ct. App. 1989). At the time of Mr. Grove's direct appeal, the Mauro standard had been 
modified by State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,224,245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). As the Court of 
Appeals explained in State v. Grove, supra.: 
Recently in Perry, our Supreme Court summarized the analysis which applies in 
cases of unobjected-to error: 
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the 
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated; (2) the 
error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including 
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical 
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error 
affected the defendant's substantial rights, meaning (in most 
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial 
proceedings. 
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State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 490-91, 259 P.3d 629, 636-37 (Ct. App. 2011), review denied 
(Sept. 12, 2011). On direct appeal there was no "information as to whether the failure to object 
was a tactical decision." Therefore, the error could not have been raised under the Perry 
fundamental error doctrine. This is conclusively demonstrated by the Supreme Court's treatment 
of the prosecutorial misconduct claim raised in that case. It refused to consider the claim on 
direct appeal and stated that the claim should be raised in post-conviction: 
It appears to be a reasonable possibility, under the facts ofthis case, that defense 
counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's improper conduct in both eliciting 
vouching testimony and later referencing that testimony during closing was a 
strategic decision. Therefore, this claim cannot properly be dealt with in a 
fundamental error review and is more properly pursued on post-conviction relief 
where additional fact-finding may be conducted to determine the motivation for 
defense counsel's failure to object. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at229,245 P.3dat 981; See also, Jeffrey W. Bower, Clarity and 
Balance: Appellate Review of Harmless Error, Fundamental Error, and Prosecutorial Misconduct 
After State v. Perry, 48 Idaho L. Rev. 85, 104-05 (2011);3 and State v. Skunkcap, 34746, 2013 
WL 2714563 (Idaho Ct. App. June 14, 2013) (Court refuses to consider a claim raised for the 
first time on appeal because "Skunkcap has failed to argue or demonstrate that the decision not to 
object at trial was not a tactical decision."). 
Here appellate counsel could not have even attempted to raise the incident of 
prosecutorial misconduct where Prosecuting Attorney Spickler exposed the members of the jury 
3 There, the author writes, "The second component [ clear and obvious error] acts as a 
limit on the first by requiring the appellate court to probe the record for any indication that the 
clear or obvious error went intentionally unobjected to as part of a tactical decision by the 
defendant with the hopes of using the error as grounds for reversal on appeal. It was this second 
component of prong two that lead the court in State v. Perry to disregard Perry's claims of 
prosecutorial misconduct during the prosecutors questioning of witnesses." 




to extra judicial evidence. Defense counsel testified that he did not see Mr. Spickler projecting 
autopsy and family photographs of  on a courtroom screen while the jury reported for duty. 
(According to the State, it is "very clear that: 1) Certain instances of allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct were unobserved by trial counsel (setting up power point exhibits Depo. pg. 38 -40, 
ln. 23)[.]" State's Reply, pg. 5.) And according to the Supreme Court, "When facts outside the 
record are to be used as the basis of a challenge . . . such issues cannot properly be raised on 
appeal, but must be raised by application under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act[.]" 
Kraft v. State, 99 Idaho 214,215,579 P.2d 1197, 1198 (1978). Thus, this unobserved, 
unobjected-to, incident of misconduct could not have been raised on appeal because it does not 
appear in the record of court proceedings. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the absence of an 
objectionattrial did not prevent appellate counsel from raising the on-the-record instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct on appeal, Kraft prevented them from raising the off-the-record 
misconduct. 
Finally, as pleaded in the Petition, if the issue could have been raised on appeal, it should 
have been raised on appeal and thus was deficient performance on the part of appellate counsel. 
This will be discussed in detail in Section D below. Even if the appellate counsel issue were not 
viable, Mr. Grove should be able to raise specific instances of unobjected-to prosecutorial 
misconduct as examples of deficient performance in his ineffective assitance of trial counsel 
claims. This will be explained in detail in Section E below. 
C. The Court Should Not Have Dismissed the Juror Misconduct Claim 
Similar to the prosecutorial misconduct issue, the Court finds that because "there is some 
information in the record that jurors may have been having difficulty staying awake" the juror 
27 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
385
misconduct issue "should have been addressed on appeal [ and therefore] this Court will not 
address this issue at this juncture." Opinion, pg. 27. However, the issue could not have been 
raised on appeal under Perry. Mr. Grove could not demonstrate on the scanty trial court record 
that any of the jurors had gone to sleep during the testimony. All the record of the trial 
proceedings shows is that: 1) the Court took an early lunch break during the state's direct 
examination of Dr. Ross (Exhibit B, pg. 921, In. 16 - pg. 922, In. 6); 2) the Court took a recess at 
the prosecutor's suggestion and observation that the jurors were "having a hard time staying 
awake" during the cross-examination of Dr. Ross (Exhibit B, pg. 983, In. 9-13) (emphasis 
added); and 3) that the Court interrupted the cross-examination of Dr. Arden and, after consulting 
with counsel, decided to break for lunch. (Exhibit B, pg. 1351, In. 19-25). None of these 
instances show that the jurors were actually asleep during the important testimony of Drs. Ross 
and Arden. 
Therefore, on this record, appellate counsel could not have raised a fundamental error 
claim because they could not have demonstrated the first and second of Perry's requirements: 
They could not show that one of Mr. Grove's unwaived constitutional rights were violated 
because they could not show that any of the jurors were actually asleep. Appellate counsel also 
could not show that the error was clear or obvious, without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure 
to object was a tactical decision. Reconsideration should be granted. 
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D. If the Previous Rulings Stand, the Court Should Not Have Dismissed the Ineffective 
Assistance of Appellate Counsel Claim 
If the Court does not reconsider its decisions dismissing the prosecutorial misconduct and 
jury misconduct claims, it should then reconsider its decision dismissing the ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claim. If, as the Court writes, the juror misconduct issue and 
prosecutorial misconduct issues could have been raised on appeal, it was deficient performance 
for appellate counsel to fail to raise the issues. They would have been stronger appellate issues 
on the merits than the challenge raised by appellate counsel to the Court's sentencing discretion. 
They also would have been stronger issues than the Confrontation Clause issue raised, since the 
Court of Appeals refused to even consider that issue. Mintun, supra. 
Mr. Grove was prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to raise the juror misconduct and 
prosecutorial misconduct issues. It is no substitute for Mr. Grove to be able to raise the claims as 
aspects of his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim because the standard of prejudice under 
Strickland is higher for ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims than it is for ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claims. In his trial counsel claims, Mr. Grove must show a 
reasonable probability of a different result at trial. Specifically, he must show that if trial 
counsel's performance with respect to the prosecutorial misconduct had been adequate, there is a 
reasonable chance that the jury would have found him not guilty. Or, Mr. Grove must show a 
reasonable probability that the Court would have granted a mistrial had defense counsel made a 
timely challenge to the juror misconduct. Strickland, supra. In order to prevail on the ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel claims, all Mr. Grove needs to show is the reasonable probability 
that he would have gained a new trial upon appeal. Mintun, supra. 




The Court should reconsider this issue, if it does not reconsider the prosecutorial and 
juror misconduct issues. 
E. The Court Should Not Have Dismissed Several of the Ineffective Assistance of Trial 
Counsel Claims 
The Court granted an evidentiary hearing on some, but not all of the allegations of 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. As with the Confrontation Clause issue, the Court 
summarily dismissed all of these claims on grounds not raised by the state. The state never took 
the time to individually analyze each of the claims and only made a general argument that all of 
the particular examples of deficient performance were examples of strategic decisions on the part 
of defense counsel. See, State's Brief, pg. 11-12; State's Reply, pg. 8. However, that was not the 
basis of the Court's summary dismissal. Thus, Mr. Grove's constitutional right to due process 
and his statutory right to twenty-days notice of the proposed grounds for a sua sponte dismissal 
were violated. Saykhamchone v. State, supra. In addition, the Court dismissed several issues 
without discussion. Accordingly, reconsideration should be granted. 
In Paragraph 70 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel 
rendered deficient performance in failing to assert Petitioner's state and federal constitutional 
rights to confrontation (Idaho Const. Art. I,§ 13, United States Const. Amendments 6 and 14) 
and by failing to make proper evidentiary objections. The Court dismissed this claim due to its 
previous fmding that "the expert's reliance and testimony regarding Dr. Reichard's report was 
not in violation of the Confrontation Clause[.]" Opinion, pg. 32. That conclusion should be 
reconsidered for the reasons already set forth in the Confrontation Clause section above: 1) that it 
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is a basis for dismissal not argued by the state, nor did the Court give notice prior to dismissal on 
this basis, and 2) that there was, in fact, a Confrontation Clause violation. 
In addition, the Court's Confrontation Clause analysis, which relies upon the 2012 case of 
Williams v. fllinois, does not fit the analytical framework of the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim which must look back in time to see what a reasonably competent attorney would have 
done at the time of trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,689 (1984) (holding that 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims requires that conduct be evaluated from the counsel's 
perspective at the time of trial); see also, Carrera v. Ayers, 670 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 2011) on 
reh'g en bane, 699 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2039 (2013) (defense 
counsel's performance must be judged based on the law and prevailing legal standards as they 
existed at the time of trial). 
That being the case, it is important to consider counsel's actions in the legal environment 
as it existed at the time of trial in July of 2008. At that time, the controlling U.S. Supreme 
Court's decisions were Crawford v. Washington, supra., and Davis v. Washington, supra. 
Crawford defined "testimonial" as "[a] solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose 
of establishing or proving some fact." 541 U.S. at 51, quoting 1 N. Webster, An American 
Dictionary of the English Language (1828). In addition, the Court listed three "core" testimonial 
statements: (1) "ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material such as 
affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to 
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used 
prosecutorially;" (2) "extrajudicial statements ... contained in formalized testimonial materials, 
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions;" and (3) "statements that were 
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made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the 
statement would be available for use at a later trial." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal 
citations omitted). This, however, is not an exclusive list of "testimonial" evidence. Id. In 
Davis, the Supreme Court established a "primary purpose" test, defining statements made during 
an interrogation as testimonial when "the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or 
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution." 547 U.S., at 822. As 
explained above, Dr. Reichard's statements were testimonial under Crawford and Davis. 
The leading Idaho Supreme Court case in 2008 was State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 176 
P.3d 911 (2007), which synthesized Crawford and Davis and held that a statement is testimonial 
''when the circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution, unless made in 
the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating the primary purpose 
of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency." 145 Idaho at 
144, 176 P.3d at 916. The Hooper Court found that a forensic interview of a child witness was 
testimonial. "[S]ince the purpose of a forensic interview is to collect information to be used in a 
criminal prosecution, and there is a clear connection between the police and the ST AR Center, 
the interview was the functional equivalent of a police interrogation. Thus, it is testimonial 
under Crawford and Davis, and inadmissible unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant 
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness." 145 Idaho at 142-143, 176 P .3d at 
914-15. 
Here, irrespective of the effect, if any, that William v. lllinois now has upon confrontation 
clause doctrine, at the time of the trial in Mr. Grove's-case, the evidence about Dr. Reichard's 
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findings was testimonial under the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Crawford, Davis and 
Hooper. A Confrontation Clause objection to that evidence at trial would have been sustained. 
Thus it was deficient performance to fail to make that objection because the exclusion of the 
evidence would have furthered defense counsel's theory of the case. The deficient performance 
prejudiced Mr. Grove because Dr. Reichart's findings severely undercut the defense theory of the 
case by purporting to show that the fatal injuries were inflicted after Lisa Nash left the house for 
work. Thus, the Court should permit an evidentiary hearing on this aspect of the ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel claim. 
Finally, Mr. Grove argued that the evidence, even if it did not violate the Sixth 
Amendment, was inadmissible under the rules of evidence. This Court did not grant an 
evidentiary hearing on this claim. At the same time, it did not discuss or expressly dismiss the 
claim. Thus, reconsideration should be granted. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 703 provides: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the 
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in 
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts 
or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the 
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their 
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially 
outweighs their prejudicial effect. 
Id, (emphasis added). The conclusions found in the autopsy report (State's Exhibit 11) at page 
2, Section I(E), entitled "NEUROPATHOLOGY CONSULTATION (UNIVERSITY OF NEW 
MEXICO; ALBUQUERQUE, NM," all came from Dr. Reichard's report. In addition, the 
injuries noted in Section Il(C) ("CLINICAL HISTORY OF RETROPERITONEAL 
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HEMORRHAGE AND BILATERAL PSOAS MUSCLE HEMORRHAGES") were not seen by 
Dr. Ross but were noted by transplant surgeon. Exhibit B, pg. 938, ln. 20 - pg. 389, ln. 3 ("I did 
not see this, but the surgeon who did the transplant surgery in his notes described .... "). Thus, 
these portions of the autopsy report were not admissible under I.RE. 703. 
In addition to the testimony quoted immediately above, Dr. Ross also testified at length 
about Dr. Reichard's findings. Exhibit B, pg. 940, ln. 21 - pg. 942, ln. 23; pg. 945, ln. 2-12; pg. 
948, ln. 23 - pg. 950, ln. 17; pg. 984, ln. 22 - pg. 985, ln. 6; pg. 987, ln. 4-8. This testimony 
about the transplant surgeon's and Dr. Reichard's findings were also inadmissible. Thus, defense 
counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the evidence on that basis. Defense counsel could 
not specifically say why he failed to make an I.RE. 703 objection. Chapman Depo., pg. 32, ln. 
20-25. However, defense counsel admitted that making such an objection would not have run 
counter to his theory of the case. Id., pg. 36, In. 10-14. In fact, it would have forwarded the 
defense strategy because an objection would have kept out evidence which showed that  
would have had an immediate and acute reaction to the fatal head injuries. 
While I.R.E. 703 permits the disclosure of inadmissible evidence if the court specifically 
determines that the probative value of the inadmissible evidence in assisting the jury to evaluate 
the expert's opinion substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect, a majority of the Williams v. 
Illinois Court rejects the validity of that portion of the rule. First, Justice Thomas wrote, "Of 
course, some courts may determine that hearsay of this sort is not substantially more probative 
than prejudicial and therefore should not be disclosed under Rule 703. But that balancing test is 
no substitute for a constitutional provision that has already struck the balance in favor of the 
34 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
392
l·'--···"''_:_. -
accused." 132 S.Ct., at 2259 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kagan, in the 
dissent, also rejected the approach: 
[U]nder the plurality's approach, the prosecutor could choose the analyst-witness 
of his dreams (as the judge here said, ''the best DNA witness I have ever heard"), 
offer her as an expert (she knows nothing about the test, but boasts impressive 
degrees), and have her provide testimony identical to the best the actual tester 
might have given ("the DNA extracted from the vaginal swabs matched Sandy 
Williams's")-all so long as a state evidence rule says that the purpose of the 
testimony is to enable the factfinder to assess the expert opinion's basis. (And this 
tactic would not be confined to cases involving scientific evidence. As Justice 
THOMAS points out, the prosecutor could similarly substitute experts for all 
kinds of people making out-of-court statements.) The plurality thus would 
countenance the Constitution's circumvention. If the Confrontation Clause 
prevents the State from getting its evidence in through the front door, then the 
State could sneak it in through the back. What a neat trick-but really, what a way 
to run a criminal justice system. No wonder five Justices reject it. 
132 S.Ct., at 2272 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
Moreover, the trial record in the criminal case shows that the Court was never asked to 
perform the Rule 703 balancing test. But even if the evidence had been deemed admissible after 
the balancing test, the Confrontation Clause analysis would continue to bar the evidence even if 
it was admissible under Rule 703. 
Reconsideration should be granted because the Court's analysis of the Williams case is 
incorrect and, more to the point, it is not relevant to this claim because it had not been decided at 
the time of the criminal trial. In addition, the Court does not expressly dismiss or even address 
the I.RE. 703 claim in its Opinion. At the same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary 
hearing on it. Therefore, the Court should address this issue upon reconsideration and grant an 
evidentiary hearing on it. 
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In Paragraph 71 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel 
rendered deficient performance in failing to object to hearsay testimony from Lisa Nash 
regarding the autopsy report contents. At trial, Lisa Nash testified that she was told that  
had blood in his brain that could not be removed. Defense counsel did not object on hearsay 
grounds. The Court dismissed this claim finding that the evidence was not hearsay because she 
"was not testifying as to the truth of the matter asserted, but rather explaining her understanding 
of the events of the day." Opinion, pg. 34. However, no limiting instruction was requested or 
given and there is no reason to believe the jury self-limited its use of the evidence to its non-
hearsay purpose. Thus, the failure to object to the testimony and obtain a limiting instruction 
was deficient performance. Counsel's failure to do so prejudiced Mr. Grove because, as noted 
above, had counsel asserted Petitioner's constitutional confrontation rights or made the proper 
evidentiary objection to the Dr. Reichard evidence, the state would have had no proof of cause of 
death other than Ms. Nash's hearsay testimony. Without that testimony, Mr. Grove would not 
have been convicted. 
In Paragraph 72 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel 
rendered deficient performance in failing to object to the testimony of Steve Stocking, a 
paramedic, that Petitioner was too calm in his opinion when the paramedics arrived in response 
to the 911 call. Exhibit B, pg. 838, ln. 22. Mr. Stocking was not a psychologist or psychiatrist 
and had no qualifications as an expert on the appropriate reactions in a crisis. His opinion 
regarding Petitioner was not relevant (IRE 401 and 402) and did not fall within the scope of 
admissible opinion testimony by a lay witness (IRE 701) because it involved specialized 
knowledge of the appropriate reaction of people in crisis. 
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The Court dismissed this claim finding that the testimony was "based upon his perception 
of the scene of the call, and also was helpful to a clear understanding of the witness's testimony." 
Opinion, pg. 35. However, that was not the case. 
First, Mr. Stocking's testimony that Mr. Grove was ''too calm" was not based upon his 
perception. His perception was that Mr. Grove appeared calm. The testimony that Mr. Grove 
was "too calm" was merely his opinion. The foundation for his lay opinion was never 
established by the state. Thus, his opinion was not "rationally based upon the perception of the 
witness" as required by subsection (a) of the rule. This is shown by Mr. Stocking's admission 
that he had never met Mr. Grove before and did not have any idea how Mr. Grove usually reacts 
to similar situations. Exhibit B, pg. 838, In. 22 - pg. 839, In. 2. Mr. Stocking's opinion was only 
backed up by the testimony that "[p]arents are u-sually excitable when their child is very sick." 
Id., pg. 839, In. 5-6. This testimony does not show what Mr. Stocking's past experience was 
with regard to parents in similar situations. It also shows that he was judging Mr. Grove's 
demeanor by erroneously comparing him to the usual reactions of parents, even though Mr. 
Grove was not Kyler's father. 
As the Supreme Court wrote in State v. Missamore, 119 Idaho 27, 32, 803 P.2d 528, 544 
(1990), "The admissibility of such testimony turns upon its underlying factual basis[.]" Here, the 
evidence does not meet that test as there was no showing of Mr. Stocking's factual basis for his 
opinion, i.e., the number of times he had observed parents in similar situations, and, moreover, 
the evidence showed that Mr. Stocking's opinion was based upon the false assumption that Mr. 
Grove was Kyler's parent. 
37 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
395
"' -- . -______ j -- ·--- " " - !-_. ··-~-- . - - . ----- . - __ · - --. ·:J 
Second, his opinion that Mr. Grove's demeanor was too calm does not aid the jury's 
understanding of his testimony, which was merely a narration of arriving at the home, staying 
there for two minutes --"tops"- before leaving in the ambulance with  Id, pg. 837, ln. 25 -
pg. 838, ln. 1. Thus, it was inadmissible under subsection (b) of Rule 701 as well. See Hudelson 
v. Delta Int'/ Mach. Corp., 142 Idaho 244,249, 127 P.3d 147, 152 (2005) (Lay witness opinion 
that a van pulled out into traffic "safely," was not admissible under I.R.E. 701.) The Supreme 
Court in Huddleson, affirmed the district court determination that "Ms. Victor could testify at 
trial regarding what she observed," but held that "her opinion of whether Mr. Phibbs's conduct 
was safe or unsafe would not be helpful to a clear understanding of her testimony or to the 
determination of an issue of fact." Id. Similarly here, the testimony that Mr. Grove was calm 
was admissible under Rule 701, the testimony that he was too calm was not. 
Moreover, even if the testimony was admissible under I.R.E. 701, that fact does not 
overcome the relevancy problem with the testimony. Mr. Grove's demeanor, when compared to 
the typical parent does not make any fact of consequence to the action more or less likely. Even 
if it was proper lay opinion, the testimony was still inadmissible under I.R.E. 401 and 402. 
The Court should reconsider its ruling on this claim and permit it to go to an evidentiary 
hearing. 
In Paragraph 73 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's 
performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Chin's testimony that there was "no 
way we would have missed any of the[] injuries" described in the autopsy report. Exhibit B, pg. 
851, In. 5-6. 
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The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the 
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this 
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it. 
In Paragraph 74 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's 
performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Chin's testimony that what he "read 
in this autopsy report is the most brutal case" he had ever seen. Exhibit B, pg. 851, In. 6-7. This 
testimony should have been objected to because it was not relevant under IRE 401 and 402. In 
addition, it was unfairly prejudicial under IRE 403. 
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the 
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this 
claim upon reconsiderationand grant an evidentiary hearing on it. 
In Paragraph 75 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's 
performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Hunter's testimony that 
subarachonoid hemorrhage has to have immediate symptoms. Exhibit B, pg. 874, In. 24 - pg. 
875, In. 22. There was insufficient foundation for that testimony as Dr. Hunter admitted that he 
is not a pathologist or neurologist. Exhibit B, pg. 874, In. 24-25. 
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the 
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this 
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it. 
In Paragraph 76 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's 
performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Hunter's testimony that  was 
either "ejected from an automobile" or "was beaten very severely." Exhibit B, pg. 871, In. 12-14. 
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There was insufficient foundation for Dr. Hunter to give this opinion. 
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the 
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this 
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it. 
In Paragraph 77 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's 
performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Hunter's testimony that a short fall 
"is rarely, rarely likely to produce any kind of significant head injury or bleeding" and then failed 
to impeach that testimony. Exhibit B, pg. 888, ln. 16-20. That evidence was inadmissible 
because there was no foundation for his opinion. Further, Dr. Hunter's opinion could have been 
impeached with medical research published in peer-reviewed medical journals. 
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the 
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this 
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it. 
In Paragraph 78 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's 
performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Hunter's opinion, stated without any 
qualification as an expert, that  had sure signs of shaken baby syndrome. Exhibit B, pg. 
869, ln. 4-16. 
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the 
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this 
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it. 
In Paragraph 79 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's 
performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Ross's testimony that, although he 
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the transplant surgeon. Exhibit B, pg. 938, ln. 20-23. That testimony was inadmissible hearsay 
under I.R.E. 703. 
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the 
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this 
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it. 
In Paragraph 80 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's 
performance was deficient because he failed to object to the foundation for Dr. Ross's testimony 
regarding the head and alleged brain injuries because Dr. Ross also testified that he had never 
viewed any of the slides or recuts himself. Exhibit B, pg. 959, ln. 10-15. 
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the 
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this 
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it. 
In Paragraph 81 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's 
performance was deficient because he failed to object to Dr. Ross's testimony that Dr. Reichard's 
observation of a tear in the corpus callosum showed there was "a very significant force" applied, 
something comparable to a "very high fall" of "a couple of stories or so," or a "motor vehicle 
accident, or inflicted blunt force trauma." Exhibit B, pg. 945, ln. 5-12. That testimony was not 
admissible under IRE 703. Further, there was no foundation for Dr. Ross's opinion about the 
amount of force necessary to cause such an injury. 
41 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
399
-- -,c- -_-,,,.~---;,,,,,_-- I L - ___ j - .. -------· .. -··--····-·· ···--
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the 
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this 
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it. 
In Paragraph 82 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel 
rendered deficient performance in regard to the testimony of Dr. Deborah Harper. Counsel failed 
to object or move to strike when Dr. Harper vouched for the abilities of state's witness Dr. Ross. 
Exhibit B, pg. 1031, ln. 12-14. ("Dr. Ross, I'm sorry to say, is no longer our - in our Medical 
Examiner's Office, because he is a super clinician.") Counsel also failed to object to irrelevant 
and unfairly prejudicial testimony regarding the estimated force needed to inflict the injuries, 
comparing it to the force of being hit by a car, or being dragged behind a horse, or having a horse 
step on  s abdomen, or being hit by a baseball bat, even though there was no foundation 
showing she could accurately make such estimates of force. Exhibit B, pg. 1034, ln. 7-21. 
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the 
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this 
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it. 
In Paragraph 83 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel 
rendered deficient performance in failing to object to the admission of photographs taken a 
month after Kyler's death, which included many sympathy cards sent to the family. The Court 
dismissed this claim finding that Mr. Grove had not shown the cards were unduly prejudicial to 
him, especially as the sympathy cards were never mentioned during the testimony. Opinion, pg. 
36. However, it is well established that appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury 
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through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86-87, 
156 P.3d 583, 587-88 (Ct. App. 2007). This is true whether the appeal is subtle or overt. 
As the Court observes in this case, Detective Birdsell provided a diagram of Lisa Nash's 
home. He testified that he took detailed measurements of the home, entered the measurements 
into a computer program called "Crime Zone, which then makes scaled diagrams based on the 
information ... you put into the system." Exhibit B, pg. 1000, In. 14-23. These diagrams were 
entered into evidence as State's Exhibits 7 and 8. He also testified that the kitchen counter was 
36 inches off the ground. Id., pg. 1006, In. 7-8. Thus, the photographs of the entertainment 
center with the sympathy cards had no probative value because it did not depict the area of the 
house in question, i. e, the counter and the floor where  fell. Rather, the purpose of its 
admission was to have the jury discover the 25 sympathy cards for themselves while examining 
the exhibits during deliberations thus evoking sympathy for Lisa Nash and unfair prejudice 
against Mr. Grove. 
This Court should grant an evidentiary hearing on this claim. 
In Paragraph 84 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel 
rendered deficient performance in not moving to exclude any reference by any witness to the 
brain autopsy because no valid chain of custody for the brain was presented. In particular, the 
state failed to present any evidence that the brain examined at the pathology laboratory in New 
Mexico was Kyler's brain. 
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the 
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this 
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it. 
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In Paragraph 85 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's 
performance was deficient because he failed to move to strike the prosecutor's comments after 
his objection to prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination was sustained. Exhibit B, 
pg. 1113, ln. 12-13. In particular, during his cross-examination of Mr. Grove, the prosecutor 
characterized Mr. Grove's sworn testimony as the "story you told, which is "the story you need 
the jury to believe" and then opined that "some things ... just don't really make sense." Exhibit 
B, pg. 1113, ln. 8-11. While defense counsel's objection was sustained, it was deficient 
performance to fail to ask the Court to strike the comments and instruct the jury to disregard 
them. 
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the 
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. It would be manifestly unfair 
to dismiss Mr. Grove's prosecutorial misconduct claim and then also deny him the opportunity to 
raise this issue as a part of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The Court should address 
this claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it. 
In Paragraph 93 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's 
performance was deficient because he failed to question paramedic David Chenalt about Lisa 
Nash's reaction to Kyler's injury. The Court dismissed this issue finding that "this decision by 
counsel was a strategic decision." Opinion, pg. 37. However, what Mr. Chapman said in his 
deposition was that he did not know why he failed to introduce this testimony. Depo., pg. 95, In. 
1-8. 
At most, the decision happened to not be inconsistent with the general defense strategy 
that the injuries were inflicted at a time when Mr. Grove was not present, but was not made as 
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part of that strategy. At the same time, the evidence that Ms. Nash's reactions also appeared 
unusual would have added to the defense by neutralizing the state's evidence that Mr. Grove was 
too calm by showing that people have a wide range of reactions to similar circumstances. 
This Court should grant an evidentiary hearing on this claim. 
In Paragraph 99 of the Amended Petition, Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's 
performance was deficient because he failed to point out the differences between Dr. Reichard's 
report and the state witnesses' conclusions drawn from that report. In particular, the PAI 
identified by Dr. Reichard (assuming for discussion that it was present) is a localized 
phenomenon and, by his own publication, does not imply that more diffuse or widespread axonal 
injury is present. Thus, Dr. Reichard did not diagnose diffuse traumatic axonal injury in the 
brain of  Martin while Dr. Ross opined at trial that the child did have traumatic axonal 
injury. However, defense counsel failed to cross-examine Dr. Ross on this disagreement with 
Dr. Reichard or get Dr. Ross to admit that he had not personally examined the slides from the 
brain, either the routine or APP stains. 
Counsel also failed to cross-examine Dr. Harper, the pediatrician, when she testified that 
the child had an intrinsic brain injury (suggestive of axonal injury), an opinion contrary to the 
clinical CT scan and to the neuropathology examination. 
The Court does not expressly dismiss or even address this claim in its Opinion. At the 
same time, it did not grant Mr. Grove an evidentiary hearing on it. The Court should address this 
claim upon reconsideration and grant an evidentiary hearing on it. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons above, this Court should grant reconsideration. The Court's 
Confrontation Clause analysis is in error and not applicable to the Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel claim because it is based on cases not decided at the time of trial. The Prosecutorial and 
Jury Misconduct claims could not have been raised on appeal and should not have been 
dismissed on that basis. Finally, many of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims have 
been dismissed without mention or discussion by the Court and reconsideration should be 
granted on that basis. 
Respectfully submitted this 1 ,1 day of August, 2013. 
{J.Mu-u4 L1l ·~, f 
D~rnh Whipple 7 
Attorneys for Stacey Grove 
~~~-
Dennis Benjamin 
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I CERTIFY that on August h2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 




to: Nance Ceccarelli 
Deputy Nez Perce County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
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CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
FETn~IONER''S REPLY 
MEMORANDlJM lN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR RECONSH}ERA 'HON 
A. The Coit.rt Should Not Haye Dismissed the Confrontation Clause Claim 
The state complains that the document showing the emails betvveen Drs. Ross and 
Reichard "was never admitted, was never offered as testimony or evidence[.]" Motion Objecting 
to Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration ("Respondent's Objection"), pg 2. Bul il is no 
surprise that the emails were neve1· admitted, or offered as testimony or evidence because there 
has not been an evidentiary hearing on the Confrontation Clause claim or any other claim. At 
this point presenting evidence through affidavits is sufficient to avoid summary disposition. 
I.R.C.P. 56(b ). The document in question is attached to the Second Affidavit of Dennts -- -





:_._J I .·,:.,·· .. 




Benjamin as Exhibit A and was before the court at the time of the hearing on the cross-motions. 
Thus, it may be considered for purposes of granting or denying summary disposition. The state 
has not moved to strike the document, nor has it alleged that the document is not a1.1thentic t>r th::it 
it is not a true and correct copy of the actual email exchange. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procdure 56(e) states that "supporting and opposing affidavits sbnH 
be made on personal know~edge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in cvic.lcncc, 
and shall show affumatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters s:tat~d 1:"J:::rdo." 
However, the Supreme Court has said that "we have not required the triai court to rnl.e Oil the 
admissibility of the affidavit when there is no objection to it. If ther~ is no timely objection, the 
trial court can grant sµn:nnary judgment based upon an affidavit that does not comply ·with Rule 
56(e)." Esser Elec, v. Lost River Ballistics Technologies, Inc., 1451daho 912, 917-18, 188 P.3d 
854, 859-60 (2008), citing State, Dept. of Agric. v. Curry Bean Co. Inc._, J 39 Idaho 789, 86 P Jd 
503 (2004) (conclusory affidavit)~ Tolmie Farms, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., Inc., 124 Idaho 607, 
862 P.2d 299 (1993) (statements containing hearsay ru1d lacking adequate foundation); East 
Lizard Butte Water Corp. v, Howell, 122 Idaho 679,837 P.2d 805 (1992) (statements lacked 
adequate foundation). In Esser, the Court held that "[b ]ecause Esser Electric did not object to the 
affidavit of Lost River's president, the district court d:id not err in relying upon it when granting 
Lost River'~ moJion fm_ summary judgment." Id. See also James v. A1ercea, 152 Idaho 914, 918, 
277 P.3d 361, 365(2012) (citing Esse,. and holding court did not abuse its discretion in 
considering allegedly insufficient affidavit); Antim v. Fred Meyers Stores, Inc.> 150 Idaho 774, 
782, 251 P .3d 602, 610 (2011) (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Esser and noting lack of objection). Here 








Mr. Grove does not eve11 seek to use the documents in support of his motion for summary . . . 
disposition, although it would be proper under the authority cjted above. He only seeks to use 
them to avoid summary disposition and obtain the opportunity to fully prove the facts n.t an 
evidentiary hearing. 
The state also complains that the emails "served only in a capacity for rcforcucc for the 
purpose of informing an expert opinion." Respondent's Objection, pg. 2. Mr. Grnve is not able. 
to fully respond to this statement because its meaning and import are obscure. First, the phn:isc 
. . 
that the ·emails "served only ~ a capacity for refer~nce'' is unintelligible in this con.text, at k:nst to 
Mr. Grove .. Second. if the purpose of the emails was to 1'inform[] an expert witness," as c1ni.mcd 
by the state, that purpose supports Mr. Grove's position that Dr. Reicl1ard's rcpo1i is i.es1in:10niul 
evidence under Young v. United States, 63 A.3d 1033, 1043-44 (D.C. 2013). As previously 
· noted, Young analyzed the four-Justice plurality in Illinois v. Williams, -U.S.-, 132 S.Ct. 
2221 (2012) and saw: 
Williams as establishing-at a minimum-a sufficient, if not a necessary, 
criterion: a statement is testimonial at least when it passes the basic evidentiary 
purpose test plus either the plurality's targeted accusation requirement or Justice 
Thomas's formality criterion. Otherwise put, if Williams does have precedential 
value as the government contends, an out-of-court statement is testimonial under 
that precedent if its priinary purpose is evidentiary and it is either a targeted 
accusation _or sufficiently fonnal in character. 
63 A.3d at 1043-44. 
What the emails show isthat Dr. Ross engaged Dr. Reichard with the purpose that he 
should develop evidence for use in future criminal prosecutions where he might be required to 
testify in court and that Dr. Reichard was aware of this. The chafo of custody form (Exhibit B lo 
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the Second Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin) shows that the brain was sent to the Office of the 
Medical Examiner in New Mexico on August 14, 2002, eleven days after the email exchange. /\t 
that point, the state had detemined that  s death was a homicide and targeting the very [ew 
people who had been with  shortly before he died- specifically Lisa Nash and Si.ace Grr.-r.:t;-. 
Thus, both the primary purpose test and the targeted accusation test of Justice Alilo arc 
demonstrated by the email exchange. When the four plurality votes are adtlcd to the ·four 
' f\J-:··t .·•. 1:1, ,;. '; '. .... 
dissenting votes, there is an eight member majority in Williams for the proposjtion tlwt Dr. 
Reichard's report was testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes. Here, Dr. Reichard's 
report was developed for the purpose of assisting the prosecution in a case of s11spected homicide 
where only a few persons could have committed the offense. 
Further the state totally fails to address the other argumc-nts as to why there was a 
Confrontation Clause vfolation here as set forth at pages 2-22 of tl1e Memorandum in ,Support of 
Motion for Reconsideration ("Petitioner's Memorandum"). In particular, the state fail to addrr.:ss 
the argur1ent that th~ Gourt dismissed this claim on grounds not argued by the state in its 
pleadings. In.Na;.;a_v._ Riv_aspel-Toro, 151 Idaho 853. 264 P.3d 960 (2011), the S1.1prcmc Court 
reversed the anmtqfsuriima:r'yjw;lgipent on a basis not raised by the moving party. It wrote: 
When filing a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must notify the 
opposing party of the particular grounds for the motion. The motion must "state 
with particularity the grounds therefor including the number of the applicable civil 
rule, if any, under which it is filed and shall set forth the relief or order sought." 
Idaho R.qv. P. 7(b )(l ) .... If a ground for summary judgment is not stated with 
particularity in the moving papers, the opposing party need not address that 
ground. 
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151 Idaho at 862, 264 P .3 d at 969. Summary disposition should be reconsidered here because 
the Confrontation Clause issue and the ineffective assistance of counsel issue were botb 
dismissed on grounds not argued by the state. 
In addition, the state fails to address Mr. Grove's arguments about why People v. LeaPh: 
2012 IL_ 111534, 980 N.E.2d 570 (Ill. 2012) is distinguishable from this case and why State i'. 
Navarette, 294 P.3d 435, (N.M. 2013) is better reasoned, more applicable to the facts here and 
should be followed. 
All the state does in this regard is to repeat its previous argument that "Petitioner'~ iri,11 
counsel had a particular trial strategy in mind in presenting a defense," whlch involved the 
intentioJlal waiver of Mr. Grove's right to confront witnesses. Neither the Deposition of Mr. 
. . . 
Chapman nor the Affidavit of Stacey Grove in Opposition to Respondent's Moliou for Srnnmary 
Disposition (pending the State's Motion to Strike) support this theory. More to the point, the 
argument is irrelevant with regards to Mr. Grove's Motion for Reconsideration because tllis 
Court did not rely on that argument in dismissing the Confrontation Clause claim or th~ aspect.s 
of the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel claim which related to Mr. Chapman's foilui:-e to object 
to the admission of Dr. Reichard's testimonial evidence. Thus, furt]1er discussion ofthis poii:tt is 
not curren~ly called for and has, in any case, been refuted in detail elsewhere. See e.g., . . ' ' 
Petitioner's Reply Brief in .Support of Petitioner's Motion for SununarJ Disposition, pg. ,,1..9_ 
In sum, the state presents no reason for the Court to not grant reconsideration 011 thi::: 
issue. 
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B. The Court Sho11ld Not Have Dismissed tlae Prosecutorial and Jury ~fisconduct C{ffhm· 
Regarding the Prosecutorial and Juror Misconduct claims, the state ·writes that "jt i~i 
· djfficult to distinguish legitimate, tactical trial strategy and true error by counsel." Respondent's 
Objection, pg. 2. This statement is tantamount to a concession by the state that an evidcntinry 
hearing is needed on these claims. And, indeed, the Court has granted hearings on some n.spc..:1.'.1 
of those issues, but only within the context of the Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cluirn~;. Thr,:: 
state does not address Mr. Grove's arguments that those claims are independent of tl::P- In1cfJ<.,c:t\·r: 
Assistance of Counsel claims. Thus, no reply is needed. 
The state does parrot the Court's citation to Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720,725, 932 
P.2d. 348, 353 (1997), bµt it does not address the reasons Mr. Grove has presentc.d as to why tbnt 
case is not applicable here. Petitioner's Memo, pgs. 22 -26. In particular it does not a.ddres:; rvfr. 
Grove's argument that the instances ofpro.secutorial misconduct alleged i11 the post-conviction 
petition were not aspects of any claim raised on direct appeal and, consequently, Rodgers is not 
apposite. Moreover, the state ignores the fact that the Prosecutorial Misconduct cfaim cou1c! nut 
have been raised on direct appeal for the same reason the Confrontation Clause issue was not 
permitted to been rai~ed: There was no objection below and.the record before the appellate c..:ourt 
was incomplete as to whether tQe failure to object was strategic. 
The state also fails to acknowledge that th<? standard for what issues may be raised for the 
first time on appeal has changed since Rodgers was decided. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 
245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010). Nor does it address the fact that trial cow1sel could not have objected 
to the misconduct by Prosecuting Attorney Spickler which exposed the members of the .i'm-y to 
6 • .PETITIONER'S REPLY lvIBMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF M0110N FOR 
RECONSIDE:RATION 
411
;ep 03 , 2013 3:08PM Nevin Benjamin,McKa y&Bart 208 345 827 4 
, .. -_-:· 
- - , I -__ , _-____ -< --'"-· -- - ---- 'j :. __ ·, -- --- :__ - ' 
page 8 ~-
extra judicial evidence because he was unaware of it. Likewise, this particular clah11 could not 
have been raised on appeal because it does not appear in the record of court proceedings. 
C. The Court Sltould Not Have Dismissed the Ineffective Assista1ice of Coun.wd Claims 
Finally, the_ state argues that the Court did not need to spedfically address why it 
dismissed many of the individual ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Respondent's 
Objection, pg. 3. However, that is not the case. Mr. Grove has a due process and statutory right 
to be informed of the basis for the court's dismissal of his petition before it occur:i. The no rice 
must come either from the state's motion for summary disposition or by the courl giving sua 
sponte notice and grantingtwenty days to respond to that notice. Gibbs v. Stale, 103 ldalrn 75fc., 
653 P.2d &13 (1982) (district court improperly dismissed petition because it did not give the 
20-days notice required by t.c. § 19-4906(b)). In this case, the jneffective assistance of counsel 
claims were all dismissed on grounds not raised by the state in violation of Nava v. Rivo.s-Del 
Toro, supra, as was discussed above. 
Further, there is no way to know why the Court dismissed the claims it did not discuss. 
Thus; Mr. Grove's right to prior notice and a fair opportunity to respond have been violated. 
Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319,322, 900 P.2d 795, 798 (1995) ("Where. the st.ate has 
filed a motion for swnmary disposition, but the court dismisses the application on grounds 
different from those asserted in the state's motion, it does so on its own initiative and the court 
must provide_ twenty days notice.''). While Mr. Grove has responded in this Motion to the 
reasons for dismissal set forth by the Court, he cannot respond to the claims which were 
dismissed without discussion. Consequently, reconsideration should be grante-d, 
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Finally, the sta:te does not address the-merits of Mr. Grove's arguments why 
'• . . ' . . .• . ·: . ' ; ~ '' ' ,;, .. ~. . . . 
reconsideration should be granted as to the issues which were discussed by the Coru"t so no rep1y 
is needed. See Petitioner's Memo pgs. 30-45. 
D. Conclusion 
For all the reasons above and in the Petitioner's Memorandum, this Court should grant 
reconsideration and order an evidentiary hearing on all the claims. 
Respectfully submitted this ~ay of Sep.tember, 2013. 
LJ,zv~ 
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorneys for Stacey Grove 
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CASE NO. CV 2012-1798 
OPINION AND ORDER 
ON PETITIONER'S MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION 
This matter came before the Court on the Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. 
Th~ Petitioner \.\'aS represented by Dennis Benjamin, oft.lie firm Nevin, Benjamin, 
McKay & Bartlett. 1 The State was represented by Nance Ceccarelli, Nez Perce County 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney. Oral argument was heard on October 28, 2013. The 
Court, being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
BACKGROUND 
The Petitioner asks this Court to reconsider the Opinion and Order on Motions for 
Summary Judgment, issued on July 11, 2013 (hereinafter July Opinion). A _summary of 
1 Mr. Benjamin participated via teleconference. 
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the underlying criminal case and the history of this case are set forth in the July Opinion. 
1'he .Petitioner is seeking reconsideration of this Court's ruling on five issues contained 
within the July Opinion. 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF STANDARD 
Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a person sentenced for a 
crime may seek relief upon making one of the following claims: 
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution 
of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state; 
(2} That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence; 
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law; 
( 4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented 
and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the 
interest of justice; 
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, or conditional release was 
unlawfully revoked by the court in which he was convicted, or that he is 
otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; 
( 6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902(b) through ( f), Idaho 
Code, that the petitioner is innocent of the offense; or 
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack 
upon any ground or alleged error heretofore available under any common 
law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy. 
I.C. § 19-490l(a). 
A petition for post-conviction relief "may be filed at any time within one (1) year 
from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from 
the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." I.C. § 19-
4902(a) 
Petitions for post-conviction relief are a special proceeding distinct from the 
criminal action that led to the petitioner's conviction. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 
711, 905 P.2d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 1995). "An application for post-conviction relief 
initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature." Fenstermaker v. State, 128 Idaho 285, 
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287, 912"P.2d 653,655 (Ct. App. 1995). However, unlike an ordinary civil action that 
requires only a short and plain statement of the claim, an application for post-conviction 
relief "must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the 
--~ 0 ·• .,_... ·•··-· • · •• · ··-applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its .allegations .must be 
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with 
the petition. I.C. § 19-4903." Id. 
In a proceeding for post-conviction relief, the petitioner bears the burden of 
pleading and proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. "Thus, an applicant must allege, and 
then prove by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to establish his claim 
for relief." Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844, 846, 875 P.2d 941 (Ct. App.1994). 
UnderLC. § 19~4906, summary disposition of a petition for post-,conviction relief 
may occur upon motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. However, 
"[s]ummary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no 
genuine issue of material fact which, ifresolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the 
petitioner to the requested relief." Fenstermaker, 128 Idaho at 287, 912 P.2d at 655. "If 
the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must conduct an 
evidentiary hearing and make specific findings of fact on each issue." Sanchez, at 711, 
905 P .2d at 644. "It is also the rule that a conclusory allegation, unsubstantiated by any 
fact, is insufficient to entitle a petitioner to an evidentiary hearing." Baruth v. Gardner, 
110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986). 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION STANDARD 
On a motion for reconsideration pursuant to I.RC.P. 1 l(a)(2)(B), the court must 
take into account any new facts that may affect the correctness of the prior interlocutory 
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·order. Nationsbanc Mortgage Corp. v. Cazier, 127 Idaho 879,884,908 P.2d 57-2, 577 
(Ct. App. 1995), citing Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'/ Bank of North Idaho, 118 
Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990). The burden is on the moving party to bring 
· - ·-· ·- · · ·· -··· ··· · · the new facts tothe court's -attentien;-the court is-not required-to search the record. to 
determine whether there are any new facts that would affect its earlier decision. Coeur 
d'Alene Mining Co., 118 Idaho at 823, 800 P.2d at 1037. Finally, the decision to grant or 
deny a motion for reconsideration rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. 
Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001). 
ANALYSIS 
The Petitioner is seeking reconsideration of this Court's ruling on five issues: 
dismissal of Confrontation Clause claims;. dismissal of the prosecutorial misconduct 
claim; dismissal of the juror misconduct claim; dismissal of ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims with respect to prosecufurial and juror misconduct; and dismissal of other 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The Court will first consider the dismissal of the 
Confrontation Clause claims, and then discuss the remaining claims together. 
1. Dismissal of Confrontation Clause claims 
a. I.C. §19-4906(b) notice requirement 
The Petitioner asserts that reconsideration should be granted because the Court 
did not give the Petitioner twenty-days notice that the claims would be dismissed, 
pursuant to LC. § 19-4906(b).2 The Petitioner asserts the Court dismissed the application 
21.c. § 19-4906 states in pertinent part: 
(b) When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and the 
record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose would be served 
by any further proceedings, it may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application 
and its reasons for so doing. The applicant shall be given an opportunity to reply within 20 days 
to the proposed dismissal. In light of the reply, or on default thereof, the court may order the 
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on grounds different than those asserted in the State's motion, thus the Court dismissed 
the claims on its own initiative. The Petitioner relies on Saykhamchone v. State, 127 
Idaho 319, 900 P.2d 795 (1995). 
Where the statehas:-filed~a·-motion-for summacy-dispesition,. but the .court 
dismisses the application on grounds different from those asserted in the 
state's motion, it does so on its own initiative and the court must provide 
twenty days notice. Gibbs v. State, 103 Idaho 758,653 P.2d 813 
(Ct.App.1982). 
Id. at 322, 900 P.2d at 798. In the case at hand, the Court granted the State's motion for 
summary disposition in part, and denied it in part, reserving certain issues to be addressed 
at an evidentiary hearing. The Court reviewed the record as a whole in reaching its 
determination. The Court's ruling is made pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c); however, in the 
alternative, the Petitioner was given an opportunity to reply to the dismissal as a result of 
the motion for reconsideration currently before this Court. The Court has considered th:~ 
information set forth in the detailed Memorandum in Support of Motion for 
Reconsideration as a reply to the dismissal in this case. Thus, the Petitioner's reliance on 
I.C. § 19-4906 is not a basis for allowing an evidentiary hearing on the issues related to 
the Confrontation Clause claims which have been summarily dismissed. 
b. Consideration of State v. Navarette 
The Petitioner asserts the Court erred in the determination that the Confrontation 
Clause was not violated by the testimony of witnesses in reference to Dr. Reichard's 
application dismissed or grant leave to file an amended application or, direct that the 
proceedings otherwise continue. Disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if there 
exists a material issue of fact. 
( c) The court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the application 
when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and 
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. 
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report following a separate autopsy of the victim's brain. The Petitioner provides 
additional analysis on this issue, and asks the Court to consider the determination of the 
New Mexico Supreme Court in State v. Navarette, 294 P.3d 435 (N.M. 2013). The Court 
has reviewed Navarette;~ and·finds the-case is distinguish.able from the matter before this 
Court. In the case at hand, Dr. Ross performed the autopsy of the body of the victim, and 
made observations about the body, and also limited observations of the victim's brain. 
Dr. Ross then had the brain sent to Dr. Reichard for further in depth autopsy. Dr. Ross 
i1:i~orpora1~d a portion of Dr. Reichard's report into the autopsy which was admitted into 
evidence in this case. Further, Dr. Ross made some reference to Dr. Reichard's report 
when he was testifying in open court. 
In Navarette, the forensic pathologist who completed the autopsy of the victim, 
Reynaldo, was not available to testify in court. Instead, the Chief Medical Examiner, Dr. 
Zumwalt, testified based upon his review of her autopsy report. Navarette, 294 P.3d at 
437. The defendant objected to both Dr. Zumwalt's testimony, and also the admission of 
Dr. Dudley's autopsy report. The objections were overruled, the testimony was heard, 
and the report was admitted. Id. The Navarette Court made the following determination: 
[T]he importance of a bright-line constitutional rule that requires the 
out-of-court declarant to be subjected to cross-examination is readily 
apparent. Dr. Zumwalt testified that evidence of soot, stippling, or 
gunpowder cannot always be easily seen by the naked eye and often ends 
up on the clothing, rather than the skin, and therefore autopsy photographs 
of the body would not necessarily capture such evidence. Consequently, 
in material respects, the autopsy findings do not involve objective markers 
that any third party can examine in order to express an independent 
opinion as to the existence or non-existence of soot or stippling. Such 
observations are not based on any scientific technique that produces raw 
data, but depend entirely on the subjective interpretation of the observer, 
who in this case was Dr. Dudley. How Dr. Dudley reached the conclusion 
that there was no evidence of soot or stippling on Reynaldo's body or 
clothing should have been the subject of cross-examination. Inquiry into 
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her training, the equipment used to arrive at her subjective conclusion, .. 
whether the evidence of soot or stippling might have been masked by 
blood, or any other variables that would influence her decision should 
have been tested in the crucible of cross-examination. "[T]he analysts who 
write reports that the prosecution introduces must be made available for 
confrontation even if they possess 'the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie 
···· · and=thc~-veracity-ofMotherT-eresa/3tBuZlcoming,-.. U.S. at---, 131 ··:- --_: ._-- --- -----· .... - ----···--
S.Ct. at 2715 (quoting Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 
319 n. 6,129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d314 (2009)). 
This is not to say that all material contained within an autopsy file is 
testimonial and therefore inadmissible. Without attempting to catalogue all 
material in a file that could be admissible, we note that an expert witness 
may express an independent opinion regarding his or her interpretation of 
raw data without offending the Confrontation Clause. See Aragon, 201 O-
NMSC-008, ,r,r 26-30, 147 N.M. 474,225 P.3d 1280 (confrontation case 
framing the question presented as whether the testifying analyst was 
testifying to his own opinion or merely parroting the opinion of the analyst 
who performed the forensic analysis and noting that the testifying analyst 
had not analyzed the raw data to reach his conclusion). For example, in 
this case, after being shown the autopsy photographs, Dr. Zumwalt 
expressed his own opinion-about the entry and exit wounds, explaining the 
basis for bis opinion. He did not simply parrot the opinion or subjective 
statement of the pathologist who performed the autopsy and took the 
photographs. Thus, he was available for cross-examination. 
Because Dr. Zumwfllt related testimo:riia1 hearsay from Dr. Dudley to 
the jury, and it was not established that Dr. Dudley was unavailable and 
Navarette had a prior opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Dudley, 
Navarette's confrontation rights were violated. We therefore reverse his 
convictions and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion. 
Id. at 442-443. 
In the case before this Court, Dr. Ross was the lead forensic examiner. He 
performed the autopsy of the victim, and made personal observations of every part of the 
victim's body, including the brain. However, he then sent the brain to another 
pathologist for more in-depth examination. Dr. Ross testified as to his observations and 
opinions regarding the cause of death. Dr. Ross was available, and subjected to, thorough 
cross-examination. The testimony of Dr. Ross was further scrutinized through the 
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defendant's presentation of an expert witness. · Thus, the case is distinguishable from 
Navarette, where the attending forensic pathologist was not available to testify in court. 
This Court notes there is a split of authority on this issue, and referred to some 
cases:considered by the Supreme~Courtof IUino-is,in-the analysis from People v. Leach,_~---...,-h--;,- - -- - --- -· 
We acknowledge that defendant has cited several cases from other 
jurisdictions in which the courts of our sister states have held that an autopsy 
report is testimonial hearsay, either in a case in which the report was admitted or 
in which a medical examiner other than the one who performed the autopsy was 
pennitted to testify to the contents of the report. See, e.g., State v. Davidson, 242 
S.W.3d 409,417 (Mo.Ct.App.2007) (holding that when an autopsy report is 
prepared at the request of law enforcement in anticipation of a murder 
prosecution and the report is offered to prove the victim's cause of death, the 
report is testimonial); Martinez v. State, 311 S.W.3d 104, 111 
(Tex.Ct.App.2010) (holding that an autopsy report is testimonial when its 
primary purpose is to establish or prove past events, as demonstrated by police 
officer's attendance at autopsy, his taking of photographs during autopsy, and 
where statutory basis for performance of the autopsy was suspicion of death by 
unlawful means); United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30, 73 (D.C.Cir.2011) (per 
curiam) ( classifying autopsy reports as testimonial when requested by law 
enforcement, officers are present during autopsies,.and officers.participated in 
preparation of diagrams and other portions of the reports), cert. granted in part 
in Smith v. United States, -U.S.--, 132 S.Ct. 2772, 183 L.Ed.2d 638 
(2012). 
However, these cases are countered by cases holding that an autopsy report 
may be admitted into evidence witp.out the testimony of the pathologist who 
performed the autopsy without violating the defendant's rights under the 
confrontation clause. See, e.g., State v. Craig, 110 Ohio St.3d 306, 2006-0hio-
4571, 853 N.E.2d 621, at ,r,r 80-88 (concluding that autopsy reports are 
admissible nontestimonial business records), review granted by State v. Craig, 
126 Ohio St.3d 1573, 2010-0hio-4539, 934 N.E.2d 347 (table); United States v. 
Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 236-37 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that autopsy reports are 
admissible as business records and are nontestimonial "even where the declarant 
is aware that [the report] may be available for later use at trial"); Banmah v. 
State, 87 So.3d 101, 103 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2012) (autopsy reports are 
nontestimonial because they are prepared pursuant to statutory duty and not 
solely for use in prosecution); Cato v. Prelesnik, 2012 WL 2952183, *3 
(W.D.Mich. July 18, 2012) (rejecting Crawford claim in habeas petition on 
basis that Crawford did not clearly establish that autopsy results are testimonial 
in nature and that even under Melendez-Diaz, the answer to this question is 
uncertain). In addition, the cases cited by defendant predate the Supreme Court's 
decision in Williams. 
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This split of opinion and the confusion regarding application of the primary 
purpose test to reports of forensic testing may eventually be resolved by the 
United States Supreme Court. In the meantime, while we are not prepared to say 
that the report of an autopsy conducted by the medical examiner's office can 
never be testimonial in nature, we conclude that under the objective test set out 
by the plurality in Williams, under the test adopted in Davis, and under Justice 
· ">-'fhomas·t~r''formality ancl·seiemnity''-rule, autopsy reports prepared by a~medical 
examiner's office in the normal course of its duties are nontestimonial. Further, 
an autopsy report prepared in the normal course of business of a medical 
examiner's office is not rendered testimonial merely because the assistant 
medical examiner performing the autopsy is aware that police suspect homicide 
and that a specific individual might be responsible. 
People v. Leach, 980 N.E.2d 570, 593-594 (2012). Based upon the record before this 
Court, the Petitioner's motion to reconsider this issue is denied. 
2. Remaining claims 
The Petitioner seeks reconsideration of the Court's ruling on four other claims: 
dismissal of the prosecutorial misconduct claim; dismissal of the juror misconduct claim; 
dismissal of ineffective assistance of counsel claims with respect to prosecutorial and 
juror misconduct; and dismissal of other ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The 
Court has reviewed the Petitioner's motion and finds no basis for reconsideration of the 
Court's previous ruling. Further, no new facts have been presented with respect to these 
claims, therefore, the Petitioner's motion for reconsideration is denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is 
denied. 
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ORDER 
The Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
··..,.·_·:=_-:::.-~_-:""_.,.. ... - .,,_.-,.. ·- ~-"-]~.---.. ---- -----~---- -----.-. --·--·. 
DATED this ~D~y of November 2013. 
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of 
-the foregoing OPU·~10N AND ORDER-ON 
PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
was mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at 
Lewiston, Idaho, this Z I 5,..., day of 
November, 2013, to: 
Dennis Benjamin 
P 0Box2772 
Boise ID 83701 
~an~e Ce~~c8-:,elli - M..t~44tr 
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Lewiston ID 83501 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk 
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CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
ORDER GRANTING MOTJ.O.N J"{."1"-1 
PER.l\ilISSI(?N FOR 
INTERLOCUTORY A'PP1<:}(L 
The Court, having reviewed the Petitioner's_ Motion for ~em1issio11 to Take 
Interlocutory Appeal of i1s Ju]y 11,.2013, order summarily dismissing Mr. Gm ve' s firs, 1'.:1,: .. :· 
of action (alleging a denial oftbe right to confront the witnesses against him in violoti:,.11 cd· ;;,:_ 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article T, § 13 of th~ 
Idaho Constitution)and Mr. Grove's fifth cause of action (alleging a denial of cffec,1ivo 
assfitan~e;._;f'aJ?;: . ~~~bi~tion of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United S r.n.tt:::i 
· -i • - • '.".;·_\('.(.;hflrit~}1J~·);1-J-::;-,;.\ .. . : -
Constitutibnand1~tte'r; § 13.ofthe Idaho Constitution insofar as counsel foiled lo as:;1·rt )\·fr. 
· ·.'.? ·.,'(,.,:;,.,"!. ;• i/:,_11\(:,. '•?:ti::,:-~-.;~~·_:·' .. 
Grove's state and federal rights to confrontation) finds good cause to grant foe motion. Tic 
issues involve a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial grounds for 
difference of opinion and in which an immediate appeal would advance the ntdedy rc~;n]uli en. 
of the litigation. 
ACCORDINGLY, THE COURT HEREBY: 
1 • ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PERMISSION FOR INTERLOCUTORY 1\Vl' EAl, 
. _ ,'. · , ·. ·~ ·,\;~ ·r:4~Jt~~Ft~i:,: . ·: -· ·. · · 
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L . GRANTS THE MOTION FOR PERMISSION ON APPEAL; 
., ,;i.~ :b~cj~~'.~,PETITIONER TO FILE A MOTION ·wITH THE JD AHO 
, · , ·. · .~:.. >.-Y, /.~(:i ; ... 3:--~ .... ~ .. ,-~- _ . '· 
SUPREME :~~;p'.RF1rEQ't:)~STING ACCEPTANCE OF THE APPEAL TJNDER 
• ~ - ..J~ • --·-~ ,r;·-:,-~·---··-- -···· -.-----·----
iA.R. °i2(c)(i) 'w!TI-IJN FOURTEEN DAYS AFfER THE FILD'fG OF TI:UR 
ORDER. 
SO ORDERED-thls /1~day ofDecember, 2013. 
.• ~-: ,: 
·, 
. . ' . -; .-· ~ ;'- . 
Carl B. Kerrick 
District Judge 
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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
· · FILED 
IN THE MA TIER OF THE MOTION 
REQUESTING COURT TO ACCEPT 
APPEAL BY PERMISSION. -




-~---------~------·----------------------------~----- ) l • . ,_,_,., _ ,,u 
STACEY LEWIS GROVE, 
Petitioner, 
V. 











· ORDE~ ENYING MOTION 
REQ'CJESTING COURT TO ACCEPT 
APPEAL BY PERMISSION 
Supreme Court Docket No. 41714-2013 
Nez Perce County No. 2012-1798 
Ref. No. 14-22 
/_ 
A MOTION REQUESTING COURT TO ACCEPT APPEAL BY PERMISSION ·with 
attachments and a MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION REQUESTING COURT TO 
ACCEPT APPEAL BY PERMISSION with attachments were filed by counsel for ;petitioner on 
December 31, 2013, requesting this Court for an Order granting permission to appeal the district 
court's.Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary Disposition, file-stamped July 11, 2013, in Nez 
Perce County case number CV 2012-1798. Thereafter, an OBJECTION TO "MOTION 
REQUESTING COURT TO ACCEPT APPEAL BY PERMISSION" was filed by counsel for 
Respondent on 'January 7, 2014. The Court being fully advised; therefore, after due consideration, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Petitioner's MOTION REQUESTING COURT TO 
ACCEPT APPEAL BY PERMISSION be, and hereby is, DENIED. 
DATED this _2../e.;anuary, 2014. · 
cc: Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge Carl B. Kerrick 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. Kenyon, c\erk 
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· IN THE-DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEC 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
v. SW.t 
ORDER REASSIGNING ALL CIVIL C.liliES ) 
PREVIOUSLY ASSIGNED TO DISTRICT } 
JUDGE CARL B. KERRICK TO DISTRICT ) 




All civil cases arising in the Second Judicial District currently assigned to 
- . 
Judge Carl B. Kerrick are REASSIGNED, effective February 28, 2014, to Judge Jay 
P. Gaskill. 
This Administrative Order shall be served on all parties by the Clerk of the 
Court for each county in those cases currently assigned to Judge Kerrick. Receipt of 
this Administrative Order shall constitute notice that a new judge has been 
assigned pursuant to Rule 40(d)(l)(Et I.R.C.P. 




Administrative District Judge 
Administrative Order 2014-2 - 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
7 r,--.. A.IJYI' ( 
I hereby certify that on this _._ day of~, 2014, a true copy of the 
foregoing was delivered to the following: 
.· _-,-:..:::_ .--: -:·--·-s--·---- ;,·· -:·- ,., .... ------· -
__ U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
__ Valley Messenger Service 
__ . Hand Delivery 
~acsimile 
Administrative Order 2014-2 - 2 
__ U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
) 
STACEY L. GROVE, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO. CV12-l 798 
) 
vs. ) ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
) STATUS CONFERENCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
ITIS HEREBY ORDERED that Tuesday, the 29th day of April, 2014, at the hour of 
2:15 P.M. Pacific Time in the District Court Chambers of the Nez Perce County Courthouse, 
Lewiston, Idaho, is the time and place set for a Telephonic Status Conference in the above-entitled 
matter with THE COURT initiating the call. 
DATEDthis ~ 
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
STATUS CONFERENCE 1 
431
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the 
foregoing ORDER FOR 
TELEPHONIC STATUS ~~ 
CONFERENCE ;was waifed, postage 
ptepaici,:, by the . uncier~igµ~d. __ at 




Boise ID 83701 
Fax: (208) 345-8274 
Nance Ceccarelli 
PO Box 1267 
Lewiston ID 83501 
Fax: (208) 799-3080 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk 
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
STATUS CONFERENCE 
I i· 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDIC 














) _____________ ) 
CASE NO. CV-2012-1798 
ORDER OF VOLUNTARY 
DISQUALIFICATION FOR 
CAUSE 
Pursuant to the Petitioner's Motion for Disqualification under ir.c.p. 40(d)( 4), 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Honorable Jay Gaskill be disqualified a the judge-in 
this case. 
i:--
DATED this a day of April, 2014. 
1 • ORDER OF VOLUNTARY DISQUALIFICATION FOR CAUSE 
OR\GlI~AL 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STACEY GROVE, 
vs. 










) _________ ) 
CaseNo. CV12-01798 ·· 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE 
In accordance with the Order entered by the Supreme Court on January 31, 2014, it 
is ORDERED that Senior Judge Carl B. Kerrick, is assigned to preside over all further 
proceedings in the above-entitled matter until further order of the Court. 
DATED this~y of April, 2014. 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE -1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a full, true, complete 
and correct copy of the foregoing 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE was faxed to: 
Dennis Benjamin 
POBox2772 




Lewiston ID 83501 
(208) 799-3080 
Hon. Carl B. Kerrick_:_hand delivered 
on fuis.;{)~ay of April, 2014. 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE - 2 
-- ._ ,-:.. -----------· ---
- --. : ' · ____ . -~-~· ,_._.· ·. __ ·_ : 
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
) 
STACEYL. GROVE, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO. CV12-1798 
) 
vs. ) ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
) STATUS CONFERENCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
ITIS HEREBY ORDERED that Thursday, the 15th dayofMay, 2014, at the hour of 
10:45 A.M. Pacific Time in the District Court Chambers of the Nez Perce County Courthouse, 
Lewiston, Idaho, is the time and place set for a Telephonic Status Conference in the above-entitled 
matter with THE COURT initiating the call. 
/sr DATED this ~~--day of May, 2014. 
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
STATUS CONFERENCE 
Q~ 0 
CARL B. KERRICK- District Judge 
1 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the 
foregoing ORDER FOR 
TELEPHONIC STATUS 
CONFERENCE was mailed, postage 
prepaid,. .by the un~rsigned at 




Boise ID 83701 
Fax: (208) 345~8274 
Nance Ceccarelli 
P OBox 1267 
Lewiston ID 83501 
Fax: (208) 799-3080 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk 
B: 0U 1----'""-Y'-.c,_:::'--'e,__-----+--.............: 
ORDER FOR TELEPHONIC 
STATUS CONFERENCE 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICTAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STACEY GROVE, 
vs. 











) _________ ) 
Case No. CV-2012-1798 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE 
___ ,,--cc--:--------__ ·------ _-'.] 
In accordance with the order entered by the Supreme Court on January 31, 2014, it is 
ORDERED that Senior Judge Carl B. Kerrick is assigned preside over all further 
proceedings in the above-entitled matter until further order of the Court 
DATED this 14th day of May 2014. 
J hn R. Stegner 
Administrative District Judge 
ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE -1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a full, true, complete 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
ASSIGNING JUDGE was transmitted by facsimile to: 
Dennis Benjamin 
P0Box2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
Nance Ceccarelli 
P0Box1267 
Lewiston,. ID 83501 
(208) 799-3080 
Hon. Carl B. Kerrick - hand delivered 
on this _rl_ day of May 2014 . 
. ORDER ASSIGNING JUDGE - 2 
__ ··.,1 
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---- ___ J 
DANIEL L. SPICKLER 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Nez Perce County, Idaho 
Post Office Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
-- -:Y:elephone (208) 799-3073 
ISBN: 2923 
FILED 
on 201~ RUG 26 PJfJ ~ 27 
· IGINiJ.rn o. WEEKS 
CLERK:p~ 
- _DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STACEY L. GROVE, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 











) _________ ) 
CASE NO. CV2012-0001798 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT 
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR 
COMES NOW, DANIEL L. SPICKLER, Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby 
petitions this Court for the appointment of a Special Prosecutor in the case of 
the Stacey L. Grove vs. State of Idaho, Case No. CV2012-0001798 and upon 
being duly sworn, hereby deposes and says: 
1) That your affiant is the duly elected Prosecuting Attorney of Nez 
Perce County, and was sworn into office on January 14, 2013; 
2) That your affiant has the duty to prosecute all felony criminal 
and/or civil actions, pursuant to Idaho Code §31-2604 as Prosecuting 
Attorney; 
3) That your affiant petitions this Court to appoint Jessica Lorrello, or 
his/her delegee, a member of the Idaho Bar Association and an experienced 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR Page 1 
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,- ______ -_-_______ --____ -______ -_-,,1 
,-_ 
attorney in criminal prosecution, as the Special Prosecutor in that he/she is a 
suitable person to perform the duties required of your affiant in prosecuting; 
4) That your affiant petitions this Court to appoint Jessica Lorello, or 
his/her delegee, as Special Prosecutor pursuant to LC. §31-2603 throughcrut ·-
the duration of all further proceedings in this case. 
q.,e_ 
DATED this aJi day of August, 2014. 
Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
On this~ ~of August, 2014, before me·, a Notary Public for Idaho, 
appeared Daniel L. Spickler, known to me to be the person whose name is 
subscribed to the within instrument, and acknowledged to me that he 
executed the same. 
No ary Public,for the_p_!_ate of Idaho 
Residing at: -e&,W:JTO"\-- , 
Idaho / r 
My Commission ·Expires·:-- --o-;-G~--dO -\o 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR Page 2 
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AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
I declare under penalty of perjury that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing, PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, was 
sent via: 
· .,,----· --{1}-- hand delivered; e~-,-.---· - - ...... -- .. --
(2) hand delivered via court basket, or 
(3) sent via facsimile, or 
(4) -S mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the 
United States Mail. · 
ADDRESSED TO THE FOLLOWING: 
Dennis Benjamin 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Barlett LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
Jessica Lorello 
Attorney General's Office 
Special Projects Unit 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
DATED this (1'U. ~ay of August, 2014. 
M NIE S. KELLER 
Legal Assistant 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR Page 3 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 







STATE OF IDAHO, . ) 
) 
Respondent, ) _________ ) 
CASE NO. CV2012-0001798 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT 
OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that Jessica Lorello, 
or her delegee, be appointed as Special Prosecutor in the case of Stacey L. 
Grove vs. State of Idaho, Case No. CV2012-0001798, in that she is a suitable 
person to perform the duties required in prosecuting said case and that there 
is a conflict of interest in the Nez Perce County Prosecuting Attorney's 
continued prosecution of said case pursuant to I.C. §31-2604. 
DATED thiltt~:y of August, 2014. 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR Page 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing, Order for 
Appointment of Specia I Prosecutor, 
-c1) __ hand delivered, or 
(2) ___ hand delivered via court basket, or 
(3) sent via facsimile, or 
(4) lLrnailed, postage prepaid, by depositing the same in the 
United States mail, addressed to the following: 
Prosecutor's Office -
P. 0. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Dennis Benjamin 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Barlett LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
Jessica Lore I lo 
Attorney General's Office 
Special Projects Unit 
PO Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
DATED this zqP...day of August, 2014. 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR Page 2 
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PATTY 0. WE~S 
. . 1 CL o 1 I T. C U 
IN'IHBDISTRICTCOURTFOR'fHESECONDJlJ_DIC#• . m 
STATE OF :IDAHO, IN AND FORT~ COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE . ·... . . . .. ~ . 
·' .• 
STACEYGROVE; . .-·- )·- '' .. . · . ,:;-· . 
vs. 
. : . . . 
.. . · 
. ' : 
.. Petitione,r, .. 
.. \ :-·:· ·.·· .... ···:. . 
·: .. · : . 








) STATE ·oF iDAiio:. :. :· 
· ,ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 




Pursuant to _the motion filed by Petitioner Stacey Grove and the State of Idaho for 
permission to conduct Discovery, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner is granted . . . 
permission to obtain arid_.examine the brain tissue of  Martin along with the histology 
blocks, and histology slides from Dr. Ross Reichard's :neuropathological examination, all of 
which are currently in possession of the Spokane County (Washington) Medical Examiner. 
Ordered this JO"faay of December, 2014. 
Carl B. Kerrick 
District Judge 
't:tnni'S t.tA1 jAfY\;l<'\ 
Jt~;~lontto 
~6) 3t(5- 8Z7l{ 
(UB) 8St/- 8oB3 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT DISCOVERY 
. I ! . 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOff)J.ll'Wf:{:~NfJ'tU~IQ.$.L DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND Ft:ttrrtt1m t~TY OF NEZ PERCE 
ClERK~F T DIST. COURT i 
- STACEY GROVE, . _ _ __ } __ - . . . . 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 9EPUTY 







ORDER TO TRANSPORT 
PETITIONER TO HEARING 
It appearing the above-named Petitioner is in the custody of the Idaho Department of 
Corrections and it is necessary that he be brought before the Court for further proceedings. IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that the Sheriff of Nez Perce County, State ofldaho, bring the Petitioner 
to the Court at Lewiston, Idaho, County of Nez Perce, State ofldaho, on or before the 23rd day of 
March, 2015, so that he may attend the evidentiary hearing scheduled in this case on March 24-
26, 2015. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the Department of Corrections release the said 
Defendant to the Sheriff of Nez Perce County, State ofldaho, for the purpose of the 
aforementioned appearance and retake him into custody upon return to the Department of 
Corrections. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that immediately following the conclusion of the 
evidentiary hearing, the Sheriff return the saidDefendant to the custody of the Idaho Department 
of Corrections. 
Dated this /1-ri-day of March, 2015. 
<Le~ b 
Honorable Carl B. Kerrick 






STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
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1.Dl; P1~R 2 3 fll'l 10 lllq 
CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
ORDER GRANTING REQUEST 
FOR PETITIONER TO WEAR 
CIVILIAN CLOTHING AT 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
THE COURT, having considered Petitioner's request that he be allowed to wear civilian 
clothing at the evidentiary hearing, HEREBY ORDERS THAT STACEY GROVE BE 
ALLOWED TO WEAR CIVILIAN CLOTHING TO THE EVIDENTIARYHEARING TO BE 
HELD BEFORE THIS COURT ON MARCH 24, 25 AND 26, 2015. 
Dated this :2Z'~y of March, 2015. ~ 
~Li.:_-.~~-'l!J~===:::::==::~C)--
Carl B. Kerrick 
District Judge 
~fo: Dt-nn:.s ~;~~:"" ~1) !,I/S-827'/ 
Jt~; lA. lt,,-ttl() (z.~1 8~ -Bo83 
tr1M·t uh: fJt'l J~ I 
1 • ORDER GRANTING REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 
I 
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09 .. \2015 11:07AM Nevin Benjamin,McKay&Bart 208 345 8274 
't; "o, 
page 2 
Dennis Benjamin, !SBA# 4199 
Deborah Whipple, ISBA #4355 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McK.A Y & BARTLETI LLP 
P .0. Box 2772 
303 W. Bannock 
Boise, Idaho · 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
rlLED_ 
1D1S .RP~ 9 RP\ W ~8 
/. 
· ~p,111.~i'!Y) .--.__ 
Attorneys.for Petitioner P\.l\'1' 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 















CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
SECOND MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION --
Petitioner, Stacey Grove, asks this Court, pursuant to l.C .R. 11 (a)(2)(B), to reconsider its 
order granting in part the Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition as to the confrontation 
clause issue and the confrontation clause aspects of the ine~ective assistance of counsel claim. 
This motion is based~ in part, upon State v. Stanfield,-Idaho-, -P.3d-, 2015 WL 1452930 
(Aprill, 2015). A memorandum oflaw in support of this motion is filed contemporaneously_ 
herewith. 
Dated this 4"f'... day of April, 2015. 
~hJ2~ 
Debo~ Whipple 
Attorneys for Stacey Grove 
1 • SECOND·MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on April'1:,_; 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing-




to: Jessica Lorello 
Kenneth Jorgensen 
Deputy Attorneys Gen~ral 
Criminal Law Division 
P .0. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
2 • SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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Dennis Benj!llIDll f \ ·L£ \) 
ISB #4199 
Deborah Whipple l\\1\ 10 19' 
ISB #4355 'ln\~ ~?\\ 9 . 
NEVIN, ~ENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP iii o. 'i4E~\q,ltl3Nl y1f"\ V\./"' 
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Attorneys for Petitioner 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTIUCT OF 















CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
SECOND MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Stacey Grove submits the following in support of his second motion for reconsideration 
of the Court's order granting in part the Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition. 
Reconsideration should be granted because the Court's Confrontation Clause analysis is in error 
in;light of State v. Stanfield, -Idaho-, -P.3d-, 2015 WL 1452930 (April 1, 2015). A true 
and correct copy of Stanfield is attached hereto as Exhibit A for the court's convenience. 
1 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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II. WHY RECONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GRANTED 
A. Tlie Court Should not Have Dismissed the Confrontation Clause Claim. 
I . Introduction 
- --·-
The Court should reconsider ifs conclusion that the admission into evidence of the 
testimony of other doctors about the ~dings contained in Dr. Ross Reichard' s- neuropathology 
report did not violate Mr. Grove's Sixth Am~dm.ent right to confront witnesses. The Court had 
two· bases for its ruling: 1) that the evidence was l}Ot objected to by defense counsel, and 2) the 
evidence was not "testimonial."· See, Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary Disposition 
("'Opinion") pg. 22. As will be- explained, the Court should grant an evidentiazy hearing on the 
Confrontation Clause issue which is pleaded ~ a stand-alone claim and as an aspect of the. 
Ineffective Assistance of Couns~l claim. 
· First, a constitutional violatio~ may be raised for the first time in a post-conviction 
petition, even when there was an opportunity to object at trial. The argument why Mr. Grove can 
raise this issue even though there was no objection at trial was set forth in the Memorandum in 
Support of the [First] Motion fur Reconsideration at pages 4-5, which is incorporated herein by 
this reference. In short, there is no statutory bar to raising such claims and cases where an 
unobjected-to trial error has been raised in post-conviction are common and include: Berg v. 
State, 131 Idaho 517,519,960 P.2d 738, 740 (1998); Shortv. State, 135 Idaho 40, 41, 13 P.3d 
1253, 1254 (Ct. App. 2000) (both raising breach of plea agreement claims); Rossignol v. State, 
152 Idaho 700, 706, 274 P.3d 1, 7 (Ct. App.), review denied (2012); Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 
3 60, 924 P 2d 622 (Ct. App. 1996); DeRushe v. State; 146 Idaho 599, 603-04, 200 P .3d 1148, 
1152-53 (2009); and Barcello v. State, 148 Id~~ ~69, 224 P .~d 5~ 6 _{_(?t. ~pp. ~QQ2)J™t raismg 
2 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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deprivation of the right to testify claims); Murillo v. State, 144 Idaho 449,452, 163 P.3d 238, 
241 (Ct. App. 2007) (raising a denial of the.right to participate in his defense claim); Noel v. 
State, 113 Idaho 92, 94, 741 P.2d 728, 730 (Ct. App. 1987) (raising an adequacy of plea colloquy 
cJaim); and Cooper v. State, 96 Idaho 542, 545, 531 P .2d 1187, ll90· (1975) (raising an unfair 
suggestiveness of lineup. claim, among other stand-alone claims). 
Second; reconsideration should be granted because the Court's ruling conflicts with State 
"· Stanfield; supra. This will be discussed in detail in the section immediately below. 
2. The contents of Dr. Reichard' s report were inadmissible under the Confrontation 
Clause per State v. Stan.field. 
The contents of Dr. Reichard's report, which were testified to by other doctors in this 
case, were testimonial and thus inadmissible under the Sixth Amendment's confrontatic,n clause. 
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court clarified what "testimonial" means in the context of forensic 
evidence. The court first reviewed the three leading United States Supreme Court cases, 
Melendez-Diazv. Massachusetts, 551 U.S. 305 (2009); Bullcoming v. New Mexico, -U.S. 
--, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011) and Williams v. Rlinois, - U.S. --, 132 8.Ct. 2221 (2012), 
noting that those "decisions are difficult to distill into controlling principles of law." Statifl,eld, at 
*4. In fact, while this Court attempted to follow the confusing and splintered Williams opinion, 
our Supreme Court took a very different interpretative approach. It found that ~[b ]ecause no 
position received support-from a majority of the justices, Williams does not provide us a 
governing legal principle and this Court views the decision as limited to the unique set of facts 
pre-sented in that case." Stanfield, at *8. 
3 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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Nevertheless, "[i]t is clear that a statement-forensic or otherwise--is testimonial if it is 
made pr:imarily with an_evidentiary pmpose, regardless of its formality or any other particular 
criteria." Stanfield, at *4. The Court went on to note: 
The only consistent requirement that can be distilled from these decisions is that 
in order. for a sta~ement-· forensic or otherwise--to be deemed testimonial, it 
must have been made with a primary objective of creating an evidentiary record to 
establish.·or prov~ a fact at trial. This Court has previously addressed the 
definition of testimoniaf statements only in the context of statements made by lay 
.. witnesses/where' we.likewise applied the primary purpose test to determine 
whether·.a·state,ment is·testimonial. State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 144-146, 176 
P .3d 91 l,' 916-184 (2007) (videotape of child victim's interview with police was 
te~timoniar' because it was admitted as a substitute for her live testimony)[.] .... 
[W]e conclude .. tbat our ~quiry should focus on whether the ... statements were 
made with a primary ·objective of creating an evidentiary record to establish or 
prove a fact at trial. 
Id (some internal citations omitted). 
The Stanfield ~ourt~·s ·cit~on to State v. Hooper is important in thls case because Hooper 
~as the most rec~t Idaho Supreme Court Confrontation Clause case at the time of :M:r. Grove's 
. . . . . . 
criminal trial. Trial counsel should have been familiar with.Hooper. Dr. Reichard's report was 
testimonial· evidence under Hooper because he prepared the report at the request of Pr. Ross with 
the priinary objective of creating an evidentiary record to establish or prove a fact at trial. The 
email correspondence between Dr. Ross and Dr. Reichard conclusively demonstrates that the 
primary purpose ofDr .. Reichard's consultation was to develop evidence for use in a criminal 
case where expert testimony might be required. Dr. Reichard was contacted on August 3, 2006, 
three weeks after  Martin's death, by Dr. Ross in regards to conducting neuropathology 
consultations "in case_s that have a significant potential to require his services as an expert 
'witness in court'' and Dr. Reichard agreed to perfonn that role. See Exhibit A to the Second 
4 • MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION 
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Affidavit ~fDennis Benjamin, filed on April 12, 2013. Attached as Exhibit B to that affidavit is 
a Spokane County Medical Examiner Chain-of-Evidence Form showing that tissue was sent from 
. . 
the Spokane Medical Examiner to the New Mexico Office o~Medical Investigations on August 
14, 2006, and was received on August 15, 2006. Dr. Reichard's report was testimonial 
evidence. 
-3. Conclusion 
The testimony regarding Dr. Reichard's examination and rept,rt violated the ::· 
· Confrontation Clause under State v. Hooper and State. v. Stanfield. Reconsideration ·of this claim 
. should be granted. 
B. The Court S;hould Not Have Dismissed the IneffectiveAssfsia_nce of Trial Co1msf!/ · 
ClaimBasedUpon tlie Failure to make a Confrontatwn Clause Objection at Trial. 
Even if Mr. Grove could not raise the Confrontation Clause issue as a stand-alone claim, ·. ~ 
. 4e should be able to raise defense counsel's failure to obje~t to that' evidence as alleged in 
· _. : Par~graph 70 of the Amended Petition. This Court dismissed the claim due to its previous 
finding that '"the expert's reliance and testhnony regarding Dr. Reichard's report was not in 
violation of the Confrontation Clause[.r Opinion, pg. 32 .. That conclusion should be 
reconsidered in light.of Stanfield for the reasons already set forth. in the Confrontation Clause 
section above. 
It was deficient performance to fail to make a Confrontation Clause objection because the 
exclusion of the evidence would have :furthered defense counsel's theory of the case. Dr. 
Reichart' s finding of a tear in the corpus callosum tended to show that  suffered a violent 
injury. The deficient perfonnance prejudiced Mr. Grove because Dr. Reichart's findings severely 
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undercut the defense theory of the case. It pur:p01ted to show that the fatal injuries were inflicted 
after Ms. Nash left  alone with .Mr. Grove because 1:Q.e immediate and debilitating nature of 
such an injury would have been plainly apparent to her. There is more than a reasonable 
probability of an acquittal in this case had Dr. Reichard's findings been excluded. 
Reconsideration should be granted and the Court should pennit an evidentiary hearing on 
this aspect of the meffective assistance '?{ trial counsel .claim. 
III. CONCLUSION ·. 
For all the reasons above, this Court should grant reconsideration of the Confrontation 
Clause issues. 
Respectfully subnrltted this~ day of April, 2015. 
Attorneys for Stacey Grove 
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available. 
NOTICE: THIS· OPINION HAS NOT BEEN 
RELEASED FORPUBUCATIONIN THE 
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. ~-UL RELEASED. 
ITIS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR WITHDRAWAL, 
Supreme Court ofldaho, 
Boise, August 2014 Tenn. 
STATE of Idaho, Plainti:ff-Re~pondent, 
v. 
Katherine Lea STANFIELD, Defendant-Appellant. 
No. 40301. April 1, 2015. 
Syn.op.sis 
Background: Defendant was convfoted in the District Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Ronald J. Wilper, 
J.~ of first-degree murder. Defendant appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Horton. J., held that: 
[I] the trial court's admission of testimony from 
neuropathologist did not violate defendant's Confrontation 
Clause rights; 
[2] neuropathologist's testimony that her laboratory's routine 
procedures were followed and that the slides she viewed 
contained the victim's brain tissue was hearsay; and 
[3] the exception to the hearsay rule that allo'Wed an expert 
to state an opinion based on inadmissible evidence and to 
indicate the general nature of the sources on which the expert 
has relied, but not to disclose, directly or indirectly, the 
contents of the sources on direct examination unless they 
were otherwise admissible applied to warrant admission of 
nemopathologist's opinion testimony. 
Affumed. 
West Headnotes (27) 
[lJ Criminal Law 
[2]. 
page 11 
"'-"' Questions of Fact and Findings 
When. a violation of· a constitutioll81 right is 
asserted, the Supreme Court will defer to the trial 
court's factual findings unless those findings are 
clearly erroneous. 
Cases that cite this headnot.e 
Criminal Law · 
,r.,.. Constitutional Issues in General 
The Supreme Court exercises free review over 
the trial court's determination as to whether 
constitutional requirements have been satisfied 
in light of fue facts found. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[J] Criminal Law 
(4] 
[S] 
t,;;> Reception of Evidence 
Whether admission of evidence violates a 
. defendant's right to confront-adverse wi1nesses · · 
under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation 
Clause is a question of law over which the 
Supreme Court ex.eroises_ free review_ U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 6. 
Cases th.at cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
.,._ Instructions 
The issue of whether a particular jury instruction 
is necessmy and whether the jury has been 
properly instructed is a matter oflaw over which 
the Supreme Court exercises free review. 
Cases that cite this headnote· 
Criminal Law 
~ Hearsay in General 
Criminal Law 
. +.!o Hearsay 
The trial court has broad discretion in deciding 
whether to admit hearsay evidence under one of 
the exceptions, and the Sup.eme Court will not 
overturn an exercise of that discretion absent 11 
clear showing of abuse. 
Vi'estlawNexf © 2015 Thoms_on Reuters. No claim to orlglnal U.S. Government Works. 1 
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Cases that cite tlus headnote 
Criminal Law 
e. Discretion of Lower Court 
Whether Jhe .!Aflt.rict . court bas abused, its. 
discretion is determined by examining; (I) 
whether 1he court correctly perceived the is.sue 
as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted 
within the outer boundaries of its discretion 
and consistently within the _applicable lega] 
standards; and (3) whether the court reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. . 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
~ Right of Accused to Confront Witnesses 
The right to confrontation is fundamental and 
applies equally to state prosecutions. ·U.S.C.A. 
C~Amend.6. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
'8!i.'t ·Right of Accused to Confront Witnesses 
1he Confrontation Clause only applies to 
witnesses against the accused, in other 
words, 1hose who bear testimony. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Am.end. 6. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
Criminal Law 
.,. Out-Of.Court Statements and Hearsay in 
General 
The Confrontation Clause only applies to 
statements that are testimonial. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 6. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[10] Criminal Law 
+.at Out-Of-Court Statements and Hearsay in 
General 
_j -- ~_: ___ :. ,-.,, .. _ . '' ... ·_. _____ ..:..:._..:..J --
page 12 
The Confrontation Clause does not bar 
statements not offered to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted. U.S.C.A. ConsLAmend. 6. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
fll] Criminal Law 
.._. Availability ofDeclarant 
If the statement is testimonia1, then its admission 
is permitted under the Confrontation Clause only 
if the declarant is unavailable and the defendant 
has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the 
declarant. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[12] Criminal Law 
..., Hearsay in General 
Criminal Law 
Qs.t Acts or Conduct 
Any -declaration,.- aifmnation, omission, or 
nonvernal conduct made for the purpose of 
establishing some fact;, qualifies as a statement 
Cases that cite this headnote 
(13) Criminal Law 
..,. Out-Of-Coun Statements and Hearsay in 
General 
Whether a statement is testimonial, for 
Confrontation Clause purposes. is determined by 
looking at the statemenl's primary pUJpose and 
its similarities to traditional testimony. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 6 . 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[14J Criminal Law 
~ Out-Of-Court Statements and Hearsay in 
General 
"Testimony" is defined as a solemn declaration 
or affinnation made for the p1,1rpgse _of 
establishing or proving some fact. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[15] CJiminal Law 
\~ © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to origin al U.S. Government Works. 2 
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~ Out-Of..Court Statements and Hearsay in 
General 
A statement is testimonial~ for Confrontation 
CJause purposes~ when· the · circumstances 
objectively indicate that the primary purpose-
is ~o establish .or prove past events pC>tenti_ally _ 
relevant to later criminal prosecution; when no 
such primmy purpose exists. the statement is 
nontestimonial and its admissibility is governed 
by state and federal rules of evidence. not the 
Confrontation Clause, U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 
6. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[lo.) Criminal Law 
~ Out-Of-Court Statements and Hearsay in 
General 
Criminal Law 
~ Use ofDocwnentary Evidence 
Cri:ndnal Law 
·.,. -Testim~ny at Preliminary Examination, 
Former Trial, or Other Proceeding 
While a statement does not have to be written 
or made under oath to be testimonial, for 
Confrontation Clause plllJ)oses, the formality 
of the statement .itself and the foIIllality of 
the circmnstances in which the statement is 
made are relevant to determine whether it was 
intended to establish some fact at trial. U.S.C.A 
Const.Amend. 6. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[17] Criminal Law 
o,,. Out-Of-Court Statements and Hearsay in 
General 
In essence, a statement is testimonial, for 
Confrontation Clause pmposes, when it is 
intended to be a weaker substitute for live 
testimony at trial U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
(18] Criminal Law 
e Use ofDocumentary Evidence 
page 13 
The introduction of reports· by non-testifying 
analysts violates the defendant's right of 
confrontation when tliey are for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some :met at trial, or are 
affirmations made for the purpose of estnbl ishing 
or proving some fact in a criminal proceeding. 
U.S.C.A. ConstAmend. 6. 
Cases tbat cite this headnote 
[19] Criminal Law 
..,. Out-Of-Court Statements and Hearsay in 
General 
In order for a statement, forensic or otherwise, lo 
be deemed testimonial, for Confrontation Clause 
purposes, it must have been made with a pdmruy 
objective of creating an evidentiary record· to 
establish or prove a fact at trial. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 6. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[20] Criminal Law 
~ Right of Accused to Confront Witnesses 
A defendant's right to confrontation is violated 
when an expert acts mer.ely as a ·well-
credentia!ed conduit, and does not provide 
·any independent expert opinion. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 6. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[21] Criminal Law 
'lh- Right of Accused to Confront Witnesses 
When an expert independently evaluates 
objective raw data obtained from an analyst. 
and exercises his or her own judgment in 
reaching a conclusion, the expert is not a conduit 
for the analyst's conclusion, for Confrontation 
Clause purposes, rather, the testifying expert's 
opinion is ~ original product that can be readily 
tested through cross-examination. U.S.C.A 
Const.Amend. 6. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[,22] Criminal Law 
~ Right of Accused to Confront Witnesses 
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The triaJ court's' admission of testimony from 
neuropathologist, who op:ined that child died 
from non-accidental head trauma after reviewing 
:ilidi;s prepared by technician, who did not 
testify at murder tria1, did not viol ate defendant's 
Coa:front.ation Clause rights; technician did not 
· make the slides with the primary obji;ictive 
of creating an cvidmtiazy record to establish 
· or prove a fact at trial, neuropathologist had 
personal knowledge that the slides were stained 
correctly based on her comparison of the slides 
with the control slide, and technician's act of 
labeling the slides did not require him· or her 
to make any conclusions or fac~l fmdings as 
to any issue to be decided at trial. U.S.C.A. 
Const.Amend. 6. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[23] Criminal Law. 
• R.lght of Accused to Confront Witnesses 
The rightto confrontation does :not mandate that 
the prosecution call every person involved :in the 
chain of custody. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 6. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[24] Criminal Law 
,&,,, Particular Determinat:iom, Hearsay 
InadmiSS1'ble 
Neuropathologist's testimony that her 
laboratory's routine procedures were foll~wed 
and that the slides she viewed contained 
the victim's brain tissue was hearsay, during 
prosecution for murder; the testimony provided 
facts that were specific· to the case. Rules of 
Evid., Ru1es 801(c), 802. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[25] Criminal Law 
+., Sources of Data 
An expert witness is allowed to base an opinion 
on: (1) facts within her personal knowledge; 
(2) facts presented to her at trial;. or (3) facts 
presented to her outside of court, but not 
perceived by her personally; if those facts are the 
type of facts reasonably relied upon by experts in 
page 14 
her field in drawing such condusions. Rules of 
Evid., Ruic 602, '703. 
CaBeB that cite this headnote 
[26] Criminal Law. 
.,.. Sources ofData 
The exception to the hearsay rule that allowed an 
expert to state art opinion based on inadmissible 
evidence and to indicate the general nature of 
the sources on which the expert has relied, 
but not to disclose, directly or indirectly, the 
contents of the sources on direct examination 
unless they ,vere otherwise admissible applied to 
warrant admission. ofneuropathologist's opinion 
testimony that: child died from non-accidental 
head trauma. which opinion was funned after 
reviewing child's brain tissue slides, which 
were labeled by technician, in prosecution 
for murder; neuropathologist testified that the 
slides she examined contained the brain tissue 
of v1ctitii and that those .slides were stained 
properly, the teclmician did not make any 
factual findmgs that neuropatbologist relied 
up1>.n, and new:opatbologist examined the tissue, 
documented herfactual fmdings, and formed her 
own opinion. Rules ofEvid., Rule 703. 
Cases that cite this headnote 
[27) Constitutional Law 
..,.. :Particular Issues and Applications 
Homicide 
~ First Degree, Capital, or Aggravated 
Murder · 
The trial court's jury instruction on the elements 
of first degree murder did nol violate defendant's 
due process rights, even though defendant 
argued that the jury should have been required 
to find that defendant specifically intended to 
cause great bodily harm to the victim; the court 
instructed the jmy as to.the elemel'lts of the 
offense and stated that defendant would be 
guilty of first degree murder if she committed·-· ·· · 
a battery upon the child which resulted in great 
bodilyhann,fromvvbicbthechilddied. U.S.C.A. 
·Const.Amend. 14. 
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Cases that cite this headnote 
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth.Judicial District 
of the ·State of Idaho; Ada County; Hon. Ronald J. Wilper, 
District Judge. 
The judgment of conviction is affirmed. 
Attorneys ftlld Law Finns 
· Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for 
appellantBrian R. Dickson argued. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, fur 
respondent.Russell J. Spencer argued. 
Opinion 
HORTON, Justice. 
,..1 Katherine Lea Stanfield appeals :from her judgment 
of conviction, entered· following a ·jury trial, for the· :first; 
degree murder of two year-old W.F. by aggra"ated battery 
on a child under twelve years.· Stanfield raises tvvo primary 
challenges on appeal. First, she alleges that the di~ct 
court erred in admitting certain expert testimony, clafming 
that its admission violated her Sixth koendment right to· 
confrontation and that the evidenee was inadmissible hearsay. 
Secon~ she contends that the district court deprived her of 
her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and right to 
a jury trial by failing to properly instruct the jwy. We affirm. 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On December . 11, 2009, at 3:35 p.m., Ada County 
Sheriff's dispatch received an emergency call from Stanfield 
requesting medical assistance for W .F ., the son of her 
daughter's boyfriend. At the time, Stanfield operated a 
daycare primarily for her two grandsons and W.F., and 
she had been watching W.F. most weekdays during the 
previous four months; Stanfiel~ !nlcJ dispat:che(! th.It W.F ... 
was unrespomlve after:fu.lling and hitting his head. A medical 
unit arrived at the scene at 3:40 p.m. and transported W.F. to 
· · · -St. Luke's Regioriai Medical Center. 
W.F. was treated by several doctors and underwent a number 
of tests, including two CT scans, which indicated severe 
head trauma. W :.F. did not regain consciousness and died 
page 15 
on December 13, 2009. An autopsy '>VOS pcrformod on W.F. 
which revealed axonal injury to his brain. According to 
Dr. Charles Gllirison, 1he pathologist who performed W .F.'s 
autopsy, this iajury could have been caused by either hypoxia 
or trauma. Dr. Gmrison requested that a neuropathologi:Jt 
become involved in· order to ascertain the cause of the j 
axonal injury. Dr. Garrison preserv-ed W.F.'s brain for this·' - : · ' - i 
examination. Based on Dr. Garrison's evaluation of all of the ! 
~1her evidence, but prior to receiving the neuropathologist's 
report, he concluded that W.F.'s death was· caused by non-
accidental trauma. 
Police questioned Stanfield and her two grandsons, C.D. ( age 
8) and J.I?. (age 5), about the incident immediately aftor W.F. 
was transported to the hospital and several times in the months 
following W J!.'s death. On September 21, 2010, Stanfield 
was charged with first-degree murder by aggravated battery 
on a child under twelve. Stanfield maintained that W.F. was 
not pushed or shaken, but had fallen down while she was 
in the kitchen and he was alone in the living room. The 
intenriews ofC.D. and J.D. corroborated Stanfield's version 
ofevent.s,butmultiple medieal experts-eonciµdedtbatW .F:'s 
injuries were inconsistent with this scenario. After charging 
Stanfield, in order to help resolve the conflicting theories, 
the S~. hired Dr. Lucy Rorke-Adams, a neuropathologist, 
to examine W.F.'s brain tisSUl'I to determine the cause. of his 
death. 
·The trial began on May 2, 2012, with the jui:y returning its 
verdict on June 4, 2012. The primaxy issue at trial was what 
-or whe>-eaused the injuries that resulted in W.F.'s death. 
The State contended that W .F. died from non-accidental bead 
trauma resulting from Stanfield abusing him. Stanfield dcrued 
that W.F. was abused and asserted that he hit his head after 
falling and his injuries were caused by a combination of 1he 
fall and other medical conditions, including hypox.ia caused 
by 'the emergency responders. 
*2 At tJ.ia1, seven medical experts testified for the 
prosecution and three testified for the defense. 1n addition 
to these experts, Dr. Rorke-Adams testified for the State 
regarding her examination of W.F . 's brain tissue and· the 
coriclusfons she drew from that ·examination. Dr. ilru=k,;_ 
Adams ·testified that, while she personally conducted the 
examination and wrote the_ report, she did not participate in 
preparing the slides that she examined; rather, her technician 
prepared the slides. 1 After verifying the technician's work 
by reference to a control slide, Dr. Rorke-Adams evaluated 
'WasttawNexr © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 5 
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the slides and wrote a report detailing her finding., and 
conclusions. 
Stanfield objected. arguing that because Dr. Rorke-Adams 
lacked personal knowledge of the technician's actions, Dr. 
Rorke-Adams' testimony violated her right to confrontation 
. . and was impermissible hearsay; The district courtovenuled 
Stanfield's objection:, and permitted Dr. Rorke-Adams to 
testify that the slides she examined contained W.F.'s brain 
tissue and that,. based on her examination of the slide~, she 
believed that W.F. died from non-acciden1al head trauma 
resulting from abuse. 
Without objection, the district court instructed the jurors that 
to find Stanfield guilty of first-degree murder, 1hey must 
find that she commi_tted aggravated battery on W .F., which 
resulted in his death, but that they were not required 10 find 
that she intended to kill. After deliberating for thirteen hours. 
the jury found- Stanfield guilty of first-degree murder. Toe 
district court sentenced Stanfield to life in prison, with ten 
years fixed.· 
·stmrfield appeals the district court's decision to pernrit Dr. 
Rorke-Adams to testify as to the results ofher examination 
and the ca~e of W.F.'s axonal injuries. Stanfield also 
challenges the district court's jury instruction, alleging that it 
constitutes fundamental error in violation of her Fourteenth 
Amendment right to due process and her right tQ a jury trial. 
Il. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
page 16 
(5] [6] The trial court has broad discretion in deciding 
whether to admit hearsay evidence tmder one of the 
exception~ and this Co-urt will not. overturn an exercise of 
that discretion ab.sent a. clear showing of abuse. State Dep't 
of Health & Welfare, a rel Osborn 11. Altman, 122 Idaho 
1004, 1007, 842 P.2d 683, 686 (1992). Wh~ther th~ di~i~~- .. ,~- ___ . __ 
court has abused its disctetioll is det~im-hi~d by·ex~ing: '" 
"(1) whether the court correctly perceived the issue as 
one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the 
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently within the 
applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the court reached 
its decision by an exercise of reason."Slate v. Shackelford, 
150 Idaho 355, 363, 247 P.3d 5&2, 590 (2010). Even if 
evidence was admitted in enor, this court will not grant relief. 
ifwe find the error to be harmless. ld.;·.ne alsol.C.R. 52. 
I1I. ANALYSIS 
*3 We first consider whether the district court erred by 
· permitting the introduction of Dr. Ro.rice-Adams' testimony . 
.. This requires a determination whether the -intrciducfion of_ 
her testimony abrjdged Stanfield's Sixth Amendment right 
of confrontation. We then separately consider whether Dr_ 
. ,~ork@-Adams' testimony included inadmissible hearsay. 
· .. Finally, ·we address Stanfield's challenge to the jury 
instruction. 
A. The ·district court did not err by admitting Dr. 
Rorke-Adams' testimony. 
{IJ [2 I [3] (4) When a violation of a constitutional riehtl. Tl,e ~on of the tl!Ytimo1ty did not violate 
• a..i-.,1 will d fi t th tri'al Uit' ,.__ al fi d. ~-stanfield.r Sixth.A.mendme11t right of confrontalio1r. 
lS ass.,,........., we e er o e co s li:11,;tu m mgs · . , · . 
nl tb fi d .. 1 ly er u As prev10usly noted, the district court overruled Stanfield's u ess ose m mgs are c ear erroneous. ~rate v . .nooper. • . . 
145 Idaho 139 142 176 P.3d 911 914 (2007) Thi Court objection and permitted Dr. Rorke-Adams to testify that 
· "fr ' - • th ..... al• urt' d t · . 51. the slides she examined contained W.F.'s brain tissue and exercises ee review over e u~ co s e emuna 10n as 
to whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in as to the findings and conclusions she reached based 
light of the facts found. "Id. Whether admission of evidence upon her examination of those slides. Dr. Rorke-Adams 
did not personally prepare the slides that she examined; 
violates a defendant's right to confront adverse witnesses 
under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause is a . rather, a technician in her Jab purportedly prepared the 
slides in accordance with instru_ctions ftom Dr. Rork(}-
question of law aver which this Court exercises :free review. 
id. Likewise; "It]he issue of whether a particillar jiirj,. 
instruction is necessary and whether the jury bas been · 
pmperly instructed is a matter of law over which this Court 
exercises free review."State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445,472, 
272 P.3d 417,444 (2012). 
Adams.-Stanfield contends 1hat·thnechrucian-;-oy laoeliiif--
the slides, asserted that they contained W.F.'s. tissue, and 
that, by retuming1he slides to Dr. Rorke-Aclanisvrithout any 
notations, asserted that the proper chemicals bad been applied 
to the tissue samples in accordance with her instructions. 
Stanfield argues that these assertions are testimonial and 
that Dr . .Rorke-Adams introduced them for their truth.. Thus, 
Stanfield contends that the Confrontation Clause required 
~ © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to orlglnal U.S. Government Works. 6 
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that the State produce the testimony of the laboratory 
technician in addition to that of Dr. Rorke-Adams. Absent 
this testimony, Stanfield argues, Dr. Rorke-Adams' opinions 
and conclusions were not relevant or reliable and should not 
have been presented to the jury. 
_:_ ~,._ ...... -,.· ·- "'". r· 
-- -~~ C~ent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence 
[7] The Confrontation Clause provides · 1hat "[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall- eajoy the right ... 
1:o be confronted with witnesses against him."U.S. Const 
amend. VI; see «lsoldaho Const. Art. I § 13. The right to 
confrontation is fundamental and applies equally to state 
prosecutions.Poinler v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 85 S.Ct. 
1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965). Our state constitution docs not 
contain a confrontation clause ·similar to that found in the· 
United States Constitution; therefore. this issue is analyzro 
solely under the United States Constitution. Stat.e v. Sharp, 
IOI Idaho 498,502, 616 P.2d 1034, I038 (1980). 
------------·-- _J - · _____ -: 
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instructions had not been followed constitute statements for 
Confrontation Clause purposes. However, these statements 
must be testimonial for the Confrontation Clause to apply. 
[13) [14] rl5] The Supreme Court bas not provided a 
comprehensive definition of"testimonial," but ~me ~i~fng_ _ 
principles may be gleaned from that Court's recent decisions. 
Whether a statement is testimonial is- determined by looking 
at the statement's primacy purpose and its similarities to 
traditional testimony. Davt.s, 547 U.S.. at 822, Testimony is 
defined as "[a] solemn declaration· or affmnation made for 
the pwpose of establishing or proving some feet "Crawford, 
541 U.S. at 51 (alteration in original~ citation omitted). 
Therefore, a statement is testimonial.when "the circumstances 
objectively .indicate that --· the primary pwpose ... js to 
establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution."Davts, 547 U.S. at 822. When no such 
primazy purpose exists, the statement is nontestimonial and 
its admissibility is governed by state and fed~ral rules of 
evidence not the Confrontation Clause. 2 .Michigan v. Bryant, 
[8) (9] [10] [11] The Confrontation Clause only562 u.s.' 344 _ 131 S_Ct. l 143r 1155, 179 L.Ed.2d 93 
"appli~~ to 'w~~:sses'/:gain~-~~-~ccu~eli-:::!11 o:tfter ~s~ (20ll). ' ' - -- - ·- ···· 
those who 'bear testimony. Crawford v. Washington, 
541 U.S. 36, 51, 124 S.Ct 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). 
The United States Supreme Court has determined that this 
language restric1:s the Confrontation Cl§:use to· testim-ofiml 
. hearsay. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823-24, 126 
S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006); Cra}'lrford. 541 U.S~ 
at 51. The Confrontation Clause only applies to statements· 
. that EW"testimonial" Davis, 547 U.S. at 823; Crawford, 541 
U.S. at 51. The Clause does not bar statements not offered 
to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Crawford, 541 U.S. 
at 59 n. 9 {citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414, 
105 S.Ct. 2078, 85 L.Ed.2d 425 (1985)). If 1he statement 
is testimonial, then its admission is permitted only if the 
declurant is unavailable and the defendant has had a prior 
opportunity to cross-examine the declanmt. Crawford, 541 
U.S .. at59;Hooper, 145Idahoat 143, 176P.3dat915. 
*4 [12] Any declaration, affinnation, omission, or 
nonverbal conduct made for the purpose of establishing 
some fact,, qualifies as a statement. The Supreme Court has 
recognizet!Jhat a.ff'.u:mp.tions.made_by. way.of.omissions-may---
--c~n~e statements. Bullcoming l'. New Mexico, - U.S. 
- -- 131 S.Ct 2705, 2714, 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011)-
(""H;furtll~i ~esented, by leaving the '[r]emarks' section 
of the report blank, that DQ 'circumstance or condition ··-
affect[ed] the integrity of the sample or ... the validity 
of the analysis.' "). In this case, the technician's labeling 
and the omission of any indication that Dr. Rorke-Adams' 
[16l [17] Furth.er, while a statement does not have to be 
written or made under oath to be testimonial, the formality 
of the statement itself and the formality of the circumstances 
in which the statement is made are relevant to determine 
whether it was intended to establish-some fact at trial. Da,,t,s, 
547 U.S. at 826, 827-28; see, e.g., Shackelford, 150 Idaho 
at 373, 247 P.3d at 600 (the totality of the cirownstances 
analysis considers "the fbrmality of questioning and lhe 
extent to which 1he interview was similar to live testimony"). 
In essence. a statement is testimonial when it is intended 
to be "a weaker substitute for live t.estimony at trial."Daris, 
547 U.S. at 828 (internal quotation, citation omitted). While 
this def'mition has been easily applied to traditional testimony 
presented by lay witnesses. its application ta forensic 
evidence and expert testimony has proved to be problematic. 
Three Supreme Court cases have addressed the subject 
presented in this case-whether the statements contamed in, 
or relied on in cr~g,_foren~~r_ep_orts_are~':testimonial"----- ---
but these decisions arc difficult to distill into controlling 
principles oflaw. Melendez-Di~l'_: MCI!sachusetts, 557 U.S. 
3-05, 129 S.Cf2527, 174 L.Ed2d 314 (2009); Bullcommg, 
- U.S.--, 131 S.Ct. Z7DS, 180 L.Ed.2d 610; Williams 
v. Dlinois, - U.S.--, 132 S.Ct 2221, 183 L.Ed-2d 89 
{2012). It is clear that a statement-forensic or otherw.ise 
-is testimonial if it is made primarily with an evidentiary 
"'11\i.i!!sttawtiM © 2015 Thomson ReU1ers. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 7 
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pmpose, regardless of its formality or any other particular 
criteria.· Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1155; see al,10 Melender;-
Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324. Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Stevens, 
and Souter, (and eventually Justices Sotomayor and Kagan) 
have consis_tently voted together, opining that this is 1he 
only requirement for ·a statement ·to be testimonial, See 
e.g. · Melendez-Diazt 55? U;S. at 310; :Justices Kennedy, 
Breyer, Alita, and Chief Justice Roberts. also consistently 
voting together, have considered whether tlie statement has 
an accusatory aspect. Justice Thomas has focused on the 
formality of the statement. See, e.g., id at-343-44 (Kennedy, 
J.,, dissenting); Id. at 329-30 (Thomas, J., conC1lII'ing). Given 
tlie present evolution of the Supreme Court's Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence, it is appropriate to more carefully 
elC81lline these decisions. 
•s The United States Supreme Cowt :fmrt: took up the 
issue of whether analysts' statements contained in forensic 
reports are testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes in 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massar:h11.Set1s, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S.Ct.. 
2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314, There, the trial court admitted three 
~c~t:ates _c>!_ ~alysis~ .!AA~ CQ,<JIU!le _~prei~nt._in. bags of __ 
powder seized from the defendant. ld. at 308. The· certificates 
were sworn to before a notary by the analysts who conducted 
the testing. Id. The plurality held that the certificates were 
testimonial' because they were ~soleinn: declrrition{s] or 
affumation[s-J made. for the pwpose of establishing or proving 
some fact" and were "quite plainly affidavits." Id. at 31 O 
(quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51). The Court noted that 
1he governing statute provided that "the sole purpose of 
the affidavits was to provide prima facie evidence of the 
composition, quality, and the net weight of the analyzed 
substance, "id. at 311 (emphasis in original, :internal quotation 
and citation omitted), and that the certificates provided. "the 
precise testimony the analysts would be expected to provide 
if at trial. "lei 3 
Despite this holding, the plurality explained that: 
[WJe do not hold, and it is not the 
case, that W1yone whose testimony 
may be relevant in establishing the 
-· - -·-· .'.:l -
page 18 
Id at 311 n. l ( emphasis in original). Justice Thomas 
concurred, resulting in a 5-4 holding that the Confrontation 
Clause was violated by admissisn of the certificates. 
Justice Thomas reasoned that, becaUlle the certifiCl3.tes 
-m:rc "formalized testimonial materials" and .. quite plainly 
· affidavits;" they we,re governed by the Confrontatit:m Clause, --- · · -·- ·· · 
Id at 329-30 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Kemedy, 
joined by Justices Roberts, Breyer, and Ali1o, dissented, 
arguing 1hat the Sixth Amendment's uire of the phrase 
"witnesses against" requires that the witness perceive "an 
event that gives him personal know]e.dge of some aspect of the 
defendant's guilt. "Id. at 343-44 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The 
dissent reasoned that ••[t]he analyst's distance from the crime 
and the defendant. in both space and time, suggests the analyst 
is not a witness against the defendant in the conventional 
sense."Id. at 345. 
Two years later, the Court again addressed the issue in 
BuJlcQmfng 11. New Mexico. -U.S.--, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 
ISO L,Ed.2d 610. In Bui/coming, the State introduced the 
re~ults_llf El blC!o.d alcohol test Ji~ _the_ principal .evidence. in . 
the defendant's prosecution for driving while intoxicated. 
Id. at 2709-10. The "certificate of analyst" was signed by 
the testing analyst and reported that the defendant's blood 
alcohol-concentration was .21. ld, at 2710.Additionally~ the 
analyst affirm~ that he had "received Bullcoming's blood 
sample intact with the seal unbroken, that he checked to make 
sure that the forensic report number and the sample number 
'corresponded,' and that ho penonned on Bullcoming's 
sample a particular test, adhering to a precise protocol. "Id at 
2714. The trial court allowed the certificate to be admitted 
as a business record during the testimony of another analyst 
who was employed by the same laboratory. Id. at 2712. 
Although the testifying analyst was familiar with the Jab's 
routine procedures, he had neither observed nor reviewed the 
certifying analyst's findings. Id. · 
*6 On appe~ the majority concluded that the report was 
indistinguishable from the report admitted in Melendez-
Diaz, despite not being sworn to under oath, and was thus 
testimonial. Id. at ?,717. They explained that "[a] document 
___ __ _ _ _______ . --- - . chain of custody,-authenticity-of the - -- -created soleJy-for-an~-identiary-purpose;;'-:::.nadi:dtnud ___ _ 
sample, or accuracy of the testing 
device, must appear in person as part-·· 
of the prosecution's case ... but, what 
· testimony is introduced must (if the 
defendant objects) be introduced Jive. 
of a police investigation, ranks as testimonial."Id. (citing 
M_e'/ftlJdez-:-Diaz, 129 S.Ct .at 2532): In addition tci affirming 
Melendez-Diaz, the Bullcomi,ig majority further explained 
that the Confrontation Clause required that tile staiemenf.s 
not only bad to be admitted through live testimony, but that 
the testimony had to be that of the specific analyst who· 
conducted the scientific test at issue. Id. at 2715. Toe Court 
W~ © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. a 
464
;,pr 09. 2015 11:12AM Nevin Benjamin,McKay&Bart 208 345 8274 
state v. Stanfield, - P.3d -(2015) 
2015 WL 1452930 
rejected the notion that "surrogate testimony" could satisfy 
the requirements of the Confrontation Clause because only 
the analystresponsible forthe testing could -convey what [he] 
knew or observed about the events his certification concerned, 
i,e., the particular test and testing process he cmployed."ld 
The Court held that the Confrontation Clause does not permit 
0 .a:··person··to•testify. to the·observations made by another, 
regurdless of whether they were reoorded, simply because the 
person testifying is fiuniliarwith the technology the observing 
witness usedJd. at27J4-15. 
Of particular significance to our decision today. Justice 
Sotomayor's concurrence discussed the limited scope of the 
holding, emphasizing tha~ the decision did not extend· to 
situations, such as the one presently before this Court. in 
which the "expert witness was asked for his independent 
opinion about underlying testimonial reports that were not 
the~lves admitted into evidence."Jd at 2722 (Sotomayor. 
J., concurring): 
(181 The oyerriding principle that we glean from Melendez-
Diaz and Bullcoming is . ~twi! i.i_itrod,tW:tion of reports 
by noU:tcstifying analysts violates the defendant's right 
of· confrontation when they arc "for the purpose of 
establishing or proving some fact at trial,"Melendez-Diaz, 
557 U.S .. at· 324, Dr' are : ''aff'm:ilation[sF'i:nade for the 
purpose of establishing or proving some fa.ct in a criminal 
proceeding."Bulfcoming,-U.S. at--, Bl S.Ct. at2716 
{alteration in eriginal; internal quotation omitted). In the 
present case, the challenged evidence served as foundation 
for the introduction of Dr. R-0rke-Adams' testimony rather 
than direct evidence of a fact pointing toward S1anfield's guilt. 
Thus, we do not view these decisions as dictating the result 
of this appeal. 
Most recently, in Wt/ltams v. Illinois, the Court examined 
application of the Confrontation Oause· to forensic reports 
which are relied on by a testifying expert, but which are 
not admitted into evidence. - U.S. at -- - --, 132 
S.Ct at 2227-28. Williams addressed •• 'the constitutionality 
of allowing an expert witness to discuss others' testimonfal 
statements if the testimonial statements were not themselves 
......... ---~-admitted..as.ev:idence~Jd.-at--22-33-(quoting-Bzcllcoming, -
U.S. at--, 131 S.Ct. at2722 {Sotomayor, J., concurring in 
--part)). 
*7 [n William~. two DNA profiles were produced. One 
profile was obtained from a vaginal swab :from a rape victim 
and 1he other from a sample oftbe defendant's blood. Id. at 
page 19 
2227. The testifying expert was not involved in obtaining 
or testing the DNA obtained from the victim; rather, her 
opinion was based on notatioos ~vilhin documents admitted 
as business records. Id. The expen did not tcatify to how tile 
testing laboratory (CelJmark) handled or tested the sample or 
to the accwacy of the profile created fr~m th,e SaIIIJlll:,. ~~~: ____ .... 
Yeporfifself was not aclm.itted·i~to evfci~ncito;-shown to the 
jury Jd. at 2227, 2230. However, the expert testified that the 
DNA profile recovered from the defendant's blood matched 
"the male DNA profile fowrd iii semen from th,e vaginal 
swabr .... "Id. at 2236 (emphasis in original). The defense 
asserted that the Confrontation Clause prohibited the expert 
from testifying regarding testing performed by Cellmark. Id. 
at 2231. 4 
The case was again detennined by Justice Thomas' fifth 
vote, however, this time Justice Thomas. concurred with 
the previously dissenting Justices-Chief Justice Roberts. 
and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito-finding no 
Confrontation Clause violation. Id. at 2255 (Thomas, J., 
concurring). The plurality held that even if the· Cellmark 
. repon had been· admitted ·into ·evidence: there wowd have· 
been no violation of the Confrontation Clause for several 
reasons: (1) "The Cellmark report is vezy different :from 
the sort of extrajudicial state.men-is, such as affid&.:vits, . 
depositions, prior testimony, · and confessfons, that the 
Confrontation Clause was originally understood to reach"; 
(2) "[tJhe report was produced before any suspect was 
identified"; (3) the report was not sought "for the purpose 
. of obtaining evidence to be used against [the defendant]. 
who was not even under suspicion at1he time"~ and, (4) the 
DNA pmfi.le produced "was not inherently inculpatory." Id. 
at 2228. 
The plurality determined that;, unlike the forensic reports in 
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, the DNA profile generated 
in Williams was not created in order to be used as evidence 
against a particular defendant. Id. at 2243. At the time the 
report was produced, the defendant was neither in custody nor 
under suspicion, and the teclmicians who prepared the profile 
didn't know whether the results would be incriminating. Id at 
2243-44. Therefore, th~plurality reasoned thai.th.e._primacy ________________ _ 
purpose of the technician's report was not to create evidence 
against the defenda.m, but was "to perform bis or her task in 
··accordance with accepted F~~ect~shd. at 2244. 
Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, agreed that the profile 
was not testimonial but solely because it Jacked the requisite 
formality and solemnity. Id. at2255 (Thomas, J .• concurring). 
V\1'esilawNeiee© 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 9 
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He rejected the plurality's new requirement that a statement 
rnwt target a particular individual to be testimonial because 
"[t]here is no textual justification ... for limiting the 
confrontation right to statements made after the accused's 
page 20 
{2nd Cir.2013)~ Jen/ans v. United States, 75 A.3d 174, 176 
(D.C.2013) ("Williams ... creates no new rule of law that we 
can apply in this case."). 
identity bc:came known."Jd. at2262 (Thomas, J., concurring). The facts presented by this appeal differ from bothMe/endez-
Likewise, Justice Kagan. writing for the four dissenting Diar, which involved a certified report that V.'aS admitted 
. · , .. , .··justices;- rejected· the-plurality's accusatory requiremerit,""i.s ' C. w1'thoi.lt live testimony, 'ruiif Bulfco~iiig-;""wfuch"Tmoiv~. ~ . 
well as Justice Thomas' formality requirement, adhering to signed report that was admitted through surrogate testimony 
1he view that forensic reports are testimonial based entirely of another analyst who had no connection to the report and 
on the primary pUipOse test Id. at 2273-74 (Kagan, J., offered no independent expertise. Melendez-Diaz, 551 U.S. 
dissenting). Justice Breyer concurred with the plurality but 305, 129 S.Ct 2527, 174 L.Ed2d 314; Bullcomtng, -
wrote separately to address what he believed was the true U.S. --. 131 S.Ct 2705, 180 L.Ed.2d 610. Indeed, the 
question raised: "How does the Confrontation Clause apply facts appear to fall within one of the .scenarios identified by 
to tl:te panoply of crime laboratory reports and 1n1derlying Justice Sotomayor as being outside the "'limited reach" of the 
technical statements written by (or otherwise made. by) majority opinion inBullcaming. - U.S. at--,--. Bl 
laboratory technicians?"'Jd. at 2244 (Breyer. J., concurring). S.Ct. at 2719,2722 {Sotomayor, J., concurring in part). 
It is this precise question that this Court faces. 
*8 In his concurrence, Justice Breyer discussed the practical 
problems resulting from ll requirement that eve.ry analyst 
involved in forensic testing must testify at trial. He concluded 
that an analyst's statements "lie outside th~ p~in}et~r of the 
... - . __ ··-- . ·:··.··. ·- __ -.. ·. ._,_ - , .. 
Clause" for both historical and practical reasons. Id. at 2251. 
Justice Breyer reasoned that, based on the historic purpose of 
the Clause, these types of statements would not be subject to 
confrontation becaus1nhey do not :impf1cate the-core concerns 
at :issue--the use of ex parte examinations as evidence. Id. 
at 2249-51, He expressed concern that costs resulting from a 
rule requiring the live testimony of every analyst involved in 
the testing process would cause prosecutors to forego DNA 
testimony and return to a reliance on eyewilness testimony. 
In Justice Breyets view, m "interpretation of the Clause that 
risks greater prosecution reliance upon Jess reliable evidence 
cannot be sound."Jd. at 2251. For these reasons, Justice 
Breyer concluded that reports of this nature fall outside 
app]ication of the Confrontation Clause. Id. 
Circuit courts and state courts have disagreed as to the proper 
application of current Supreme Court Confrontation Clauso 
jurisprudence. See, e.g., James. 712 F.3d at 96 (interpreting 
pre-Williams precedent as establishing that a statement is 
testimonial ifits primary purpose isto create a-record for later 
use at trial); United States v . .Durol'f-Ca/dera, 737 F3d 988, 
994-96 (5th Cir.2013) (declining to adopt requirement that 
statement be accusatory). United States v. Turner,.}09 F.3d 
H87, 1192-93 (7th Cir.2013) (considering whetn~(Jury may 
have considered statement as offered for its truth and whether 
:it was accusatory); Derr v. State, 434 Md. 88, 73 A.3d 254, 
270-71 (Md.2013) (requiring a statement to be sufficiently 
formalized to be testimonial). 
*9 [19] The only consistent requirement that can be 
distilled from these decisions is that in order for a statement-
forensic or otherwise-to be deemed testimonial, it must have 
been made with a primruy objective of creating an evidentiary 
record to establish or prove a fact at trial. Michigan 11. 
Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 131 S.Ct 1143, 1155, 179 L.Ed.2d 
When considering an opinion like Wtlliams, in which no 93 (2011); see auo Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324. This 
single rationale commands the support of a majority, "the CDlJlt bas previously addressed the definition of testimonial. 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken statements only in the context of statements made by lay 
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the witnesses. where we likewise applied the primary puipose 
narrowest grounds."'Markr v. United States. 430 U.S. 188, test to determine whether a statement is testimonial. State v. 
________ J9.3~.9.1_S.C1.. .. 9-90,-5l--L.Bd2il~-6Q-(l91-1}·{-quoting-Gregg--1foopet;·-i4:5-rdiilio1J"9~-144=14fi:-T76P .3d 911, 916-l 84 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n. 15, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 (2007)(videotape of child victim's mteJYiewwith police was 
L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)). Because no position received support testimonial because it was admitted as a substitute for her live 
from a majority of the j.ustices, Williams does not provide testimony); State v. Shackelford, 150 Idal10 355, 372-73, 247 
us a governing legal principle and this Court views the P.3d 582, 599-<iOO (2010) (statements of ex-wife were not 
decision as limited to the unique set of facts presented in testimonial because they were offered to evaluate-defendant's 
that case. 5 See e.g., United States v. James, 712 F.3d 79, 95 demeanor and not ofrered for thek truth). 
~festt~ © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10 
--~--· .. 
466
~pr 09 2015 11 :13AM Nevin Benjamin,McKay&Bart 208 345 827 4 
State v. Stanfield, - P.3d -(2015) 
2015 WL 1452930 
Although this Court has not previously addressed the recent 
developments in Conftontation Clause jurisprudence in the 
context of forensic evidence, our Court of Appeals has 
attempted to navigate these scarcely-charted wateis in State v. 
Kramer. 1.'.i3 Idaho 29, 278 P.3d 431 (Ct.App.2012). During 
page 21 
.. --
trial. Speers v. State, 999 N.E.2d 850, 854-55 {Ind.2013). 
In these cases, the underlying statements did not have an 
evidentiru:y pm-pose, and were thus not testimonial, because 
only the expert's independent cooolusion served as evidence. 
Lui, 315 P.3d at 510; Speers, 999 N.E.2d at 855. 
'Kramer's triill fo.t drivlilg under the influence: ofaltolioI/ .. .i.ii) [20] . ti1j . A defendant's right to confto11tation is 
the prosecution inlroduced calibration certificates for the violated when "an expert acts merely as a well-credentialed 
Intoxilyzer 5000 instrument used to determine the alcohol · conduit," and does not provide any independent expert 
concentration in Kramer's breath. Id. at 30, 32, 278 P.3d opinion United Slates v. Ranws-Gonzalez, 664 F.3d 1, S-
at 432, 434. Kramer nrgued that the Confrontation Clause 6 (1st Cir.2011) {testimony violated Confrontation Clause 
required the State to produce not just the certificates but because expert simply recounted results of another expert's 
the live testimony of the people involved in certifying the testing). These courts finding statemen~ to be testimonial 
machine.Id at 32,278 P.3d at 434. In a th.ought:ful and well- have done so when the expert has relayed another analyst'~ 
researched opinion, the Court of Appeals conc]uded that the conclusion that was not reached· independently by the 
certificates were not testimonial as they were not admitted as testifying expert. See, e.g., State 11. Navarette, 294 P .3d 435 
direct evidence of an element of the crime. Id. at 35-36, 278 (RM.2013). In Navarette, the testifying expert relied on the 
P.3d at 437-38 {"The certificates here 'support one fact (the findings of another analyst-who concluded that there was 
accuracy of the machine) that, in tum, supports another fact gunpowder residue on the victim-to determine how close 
that can establish guilt (the blood alcohol level).' ") (quoting the shooter was to the victim. Id. at 436-37. The court held 
CommonwealJlr v. Zeininger, 459 Mass. 775, 947 N.E.2d that the analyst's findings were testimonial becausethere were 
1060, 1069. (Mass.2011)). As-did fue,Court ofAppeals;· · no"objective·matlcerstliarariy third party can·e:xiimfue m 
we conclude that our inquiry should focus on whether the order to express an independent opinion"Jti at 438-439. 
technician's· statements were made with a primary objective However, when an expert independently evaluates objective 
of creating an evidentiruy re90f."d to establish or prove a fact raw data obtained from an analyst, an~ exen~ises hiw ~r 
at triaL · · · · - ··_:. · her own judgment in reaching a conclusion, the expert is 
A number of courts, presented with facts similar to those 
in Kramer, have likewise held that the testimony of an 
expert witness who 21Irives at an independent conclusion 
is pennissible llilder the Confrontation Clause even where 
other non-testifying analysts have provided underlying 
data or conducted portions of the testing. 6 In Washington 
v. Lui, the Washington Supreme Court held that the 
Confrontation Clause was not violated even though the 
testifying expert "did not personally observe the lab tests 
that underlaid her analysis"' because the output of the testing, 
an eleclrdpherogram, would have no meaning for the jury . 
without the testifying expert's evaluation of its significance. 
179 Wash.2d 457. 315 P.3d 493, 507-09 (Wash.2014). 
not a conduit for the analysts conclusion. United States v. 
Summers, 666 F.3d 192, 201-202 (4th Cir.2011). Rather, 
the testifying expert's opinion is a.11 "original product" that 
can be readily "tested through cross-examination." Id at 
202 (internal quotations and citation omitted). We join the 
majority of jurisdictions considering this subject and focus 
our attention on the question whether the primary pID])Ose of 
the lab technician's act of labeling the slides and the implicit 
assertion that the proper stain was applied was intended to 
establish some fact at trial and whether Dr.. Rorke-Adams 
served as a mere conduit. 
)>. Application of the Confrontation Clause analysis· to 
Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony 
Rather, the preliminary steps in an analysis are essentially 
art f th h · f ustod __ ,i •• :.l -~ .i. _ ... [22) Dr. Rorke-Adams testified that the slides..she.examined__ ___ _ ---~P- o ·e c am o __ c ___ Y,.J1111.Le_\uuence . ..w...u1es ....... L:eps-- . . . . . 
l ··- to th- "ght d t th elm. .b .1 ·ty f th contained the bram tissue of W.F ., and that this tissue had mere y goes e we1 an no e a 1ss1 1 1 o e . 
result. Id. Similarly, the Indim.ia Supreme Court_h~ld that the been ~~~~~th the ~yloid anti.gen. Stanfield co~tends that 
tee. hni · who .....:.:..~..,. d th bl d fro . f gl Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony relied on two assemons made c1an uau.:i.1.erre e oo m pieces o ass . . . . 
to wab ..,. lat t ~ __ ,i 1 . . by the technician: (J) that the slides were labeled with the s s .1.or er esung w.J.U ana yms was Just one person 
correct case number, and thus contained W.F.'s brain tissue; 
in the chain of custody, and es such, the defendant's right 
and (2) .that the technician applied the proper stain to the 
to confrontation was not violated becaui;e the expert who 
conducted the analysis and prepared the report testified at samples in accordance with the Jaboratory protocol, thereby 
permitting an accurate interpretation of the samples. 
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Dr. Rork~Adams testified that she received W.F.'s brain 
from Dr. Gaqison after he had conducted the autopsy, that 
the brain tiss11ewa.s labeled when she received it,, and that the 
tissue slices were sent to the technician with the same label. 
The slides that Dr. Rork~Adams received back :from the 
.. ___ .technician were also labeled. At trial, the following exchange 
occurred: 
[The prosecutor]. When the tissues arrived in your office, 
are tb.ey marked with who the tissues belong to? 
Dr. Rorke-Adams. Yes, of course. They're labeled. 
•u [The prosecutor]. And when you go 1o do your 
examination of these tissues, are they still .labeled? 
Dr. Rorke-Adams. Yes. 
(The prosecutor]. And the technician that put the stain on 
the tissues. does she write any reports? 
Dr. Ror~Adams. No. She-we write the report. She has 
. clocumentation"tO .the fact-thatshe received the-tissue, the· 
s1ain that we requ~ted her to do, and she notes when she 
cud it, and then when she handed it back to us. Those 
are the only pieces of documentation. This is the standard 
proceourc rnithe lab~ri.tory for every case. 
And so the label of the material is attached to the material. 
It remains with the material. Then the slides are prepared 
b)• the technician 1111d the slides are labeled with the same 
number that was attached to that specimen so we know that 
Specimen 500 came :from John Smith. And so we evaluate 
-we evaluate it,. write a report, and that report goes into 
the permanent .record. 
Dr. Rorke-Adams testified that she did not observe the 
technician prepare the slides, however. she explained that she 
was able to detennine if tile correct stain had been applied: 
page 22 
We tm out a request sheet. We ask specifically for that· 
antibody to be applied to the tissue. It's given to the 
technician along with the specimen. Toe lechnician Chen 
knows which antibody to use. Those technical procedures 
are done in that special laboratory. 
- -·--- -·- --~~--" .. -······ 
And then that prepared slide is given to the pathologist 
along '\(ith the sheet, lhe request sheet that we made out 
asking for that antibody, plus a control slide, which means 
that anotber piece of tissue that was known to contain this 
particular antigen that we're interested in has been used ~ 
to c~rrobo·rate the validity of the stain from the unknown 
slide. 
So. we look at the oontrol slide tirs.t to make certain that 1he 
technique was working so that we can rely then upon what 
we're looking at in the unknown slide. 
So these are all standard procedures in the laboratory, and. 
this is the· way it is done every day for all of tbe cases that 
come through. 
Dr. Rorke-Adams testified this procedure was followed in 
this case .. 
Thus, Dr,. Rorke-Adams had personal·kliciwledge-fuat the-
slides were stained correctly based on her comparison of 
the slides with the control slide. Based upon this testimony, 
Dr. Rorke-Adams did not rely upon an implied assertion 
by the technician that the slide had been properly prepared. 
Therefore, the only remaining implied assertion is that the 
labeling of the slides represented that slides contained W .F.'s 
tissue. 
[23] As in Lui and Speers, the labeling occurred 
during preliminary steps for Dr. Rorke-Adams' forensic 
examination. The technician did not make any conclusions 
or. factual findings as to any issue to be decided at trial 
when she labeled the slides and the technician's assertion 
[The prosecutor]. Are you able to tell when your technician had no probative value as· to Stanfield's guilt or innocence. 
places the stain on these tissues whether the stain has been Rather, the act of labeling was manifestly for a laboratory 
properly applied or not? -rather than trial-purpose: to identify the samples while 
· ---····--·-·---_______________ .ihe}LawaitedDr.,..llork-f>-A:clam.s'-examination:-Ji"ifflh='°"="'el'.~, wfii='=""t=-e -----
Dr:-Roflcci=Aoarns-:-Yes~--Because there's always a control assertions need not be contained in furmaliz.ed affidavits or 
slide that goes with it: Control slid_e means that-in this . a~!D!~!ld at trial to be testimonfal. the fact that the technician 
particular case, I asked for a spi,cific antibody to be applied did not prepare a report suggests that her purpose in labeling 
to this tissue. the slides was not to establish any fact at trial TI1e only 
testimony the technician could have supplied would be to 
attest lhat she did not alter the integrity or identity of the 
tissue samples. This is akin to the type of assertion made 
~-Next e 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 12 
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by any person whose name appears in a chain of custody. 
As the Supreme Court held m Mdendez-Diaz, the right to. 
confrontation does not mandate that the prosecution call every 
person involved in.the chain of custody. Me!.mdez-Dtaz v . 
.MrustWhusetu, 551 U.S. 305,311 n. 1, 129 S.Ct 2527, 174 
L.Ed.2d 314 (2009). 
'~ - . ~. 
•12 Further, like the calibration certificates in Kramer, the 
technician's assertions were not admitted as direct proof of an 
element of the crime; rather. they were admitted as foundation 
for the introduction of the results of Dr. Ro:rke-Adams' 
testimony regarding her examination of the samples and the 
conclusions she drew therefrom, Le., that W.F. died from 
non-accidenW trauma. These findings and conclusions were 
derived from Dr. Rorke-Adams' personal examination and 
obsenrations of the slides. Unlike the analyst inNavarette, the 
technician in this case made no independent conclusions and 
tbe labeling did not prove any fact relevant to Stanfield's guilt 
or innocence. 
For the.se reasons, we hold that there was no Confrontation 
Clause violation because .the technician's assertions -~re 
nof m.ade for an - e~dentiary purpo~e ~d · thus ~ere not 
testimonial. 
:;£Dr. Ror~}~, teai,,wnyw~ not inadmissible 
hearsay. 
(24] Much like her Confrontation Clause objection. 
Stanfield argues that Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony regarding 
the contents of the slides and her testimony regardlng the 
staining and accuracy of the slides constitute inadmissible 
hearsay. Stanfield contends that Dr. Rorke-Adams did 
not have an «independent basis of knowledge so as to 
testify that the assertions of the laboratory technician were 
accurate."The State responds that Dr. Rorke-Adams did not 
relay impermissible hearsay evidence but rather testified 
to the routine practices of her laboratmy and to matters 
that were within her personal .knowledge. as pennitted by 
I.RE. 406. 7 Initially, we note that while Dr. Rorke-Adams 
testified regarding her laboratory's routine procedures, she 
also testified that those procedures were followed in this 
---case-aml-that-the-shd-es-conrainecI-W:F:soram tissue. 8 This 
testimoey provided facts that were specific to this case and 
as such, exceeded that allowed underldaho Rule of Evidence 
406. 
Hearsay is defined as an out-of-court statement that is offered 
••to prove the truth of the matter asserted."1.R.E. 801(c). 
page 23 
Therefore, Dr. Rorke-Adams' testimony that procedures were 
followed and that the slides contained W.F.'s brain tissue was 
hearsay. 9 
[25} (26] Generally, hearsay evidence is not admissible 
at 1rial unless it mils under one of the recc;>gnized hearsay. 
·ex~eption;.· I.RE. 802; St~te l'. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418. 
423,224 P.3d. 485,490 {2009). How.ever, an expert witness 
is allowed to base an opinion on: "(1) facts within [her] 
personal lmowledge; (2) facts presented to [her] at trial; or 
{3) facts presented to [her] outside of court, but not perceived . 
by [herJ personally, if those fac:t:3 are the type: of facts 
reasonably relied upon by experts in [her] field in drawing 
· such conclusions."F.R.E. 703, Comment 1 10 ; F.R.E. 602; 
I.R.E. 701; I.R.E. 602; see also Walkins, 148 Idaho at 426, 
224 P.3d at 493. Idaho Rule of Evidence 703 provides that: 
The facts or data in the. particular case 
upon which an expert bases an opinion 
or inference may be those perceived 
by or made known to the expert at. 
or before the ·hearing. Ifofa· type······· 
reascmably relied upon by e>..-perts jn 
the particular field in forming opinions 
or inferences upon the subje~t, .. the 
facts or data need not. be acbnissib]e 
in evidence in order for the opinion 
or inference to be admitted. Facts or 
data that are otherwise inadmissible 
shall not be disclosed to the jwy 
by the proponent of the opinion or 
inference unless the court detennines 
that their probative value in assisting 
1he jwy to evaluate the expert's 
opinion substantially outweighs their 
prejudicial effect. 
*13 I.RE. 703. 1bis rule permits an. expert witness "to 
state an opinion based on inadmissible imdence and to 
indicate the general nature of the sources on which the expert 
bas relied. but not to disclose, directly or indirectly, the 
contents of the sources on direct examination unless they 
are-o1herwiscai:lmissible, or the court malces the required 
balancing detemtination."Watkin.r, 14-8 Idaho a! 426--27, 224 
.. P.3d at 493-94. "The i11tent of the rule is just that the opinion · 
does not have to be excluded because part of the basis was 
evidence that would not be admissible itself"Jd. at 426, 224 
P.3d at 493 (quoting Evidence Rules Advisory Committee 
Minutes of Meeting of November 2, 200 l at 3.). 
~~ © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 13 
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In 2002, the rule was amended to clarify that I.RE. 703 should 
not be used as "a back door for getting this evidence in the 
record ... Id. The amendment "serves to prevent an expert 
witness. from serving as a conduit for the introduction of 
otherwise inadmissible evidence."Id. at 427. 224 P.3d 485, 
224 P;3ch.t494. The amendment was riot .intended to change 
the ~eiming ofl.RE. 703; rather, it was intended to clarify 
its limitations. Thus, expert testimony that does nothing more 
than relay otherwise inadmissible hearsay to 1he jury is barred 
by I.RE. 703. Id. However, no error occurs if the hearsay 
evidence the expert relies upon is referenced but not actually 
introduced as evidence at trial. See, e.g., Doty v. Buhara, 123 
ldaho 329, 336, 848 P.2d 387~ 394 {1992). 
In Doty, this Court upheld the admission of an expert's 
opinion testimony as the cause of tire damage even though 
his opinion was based,· in part, on photographs and notes 
pre pared by another expert who had also examined the tire. Id. 
The expert was allowed· to testify "concerning observations 
made by" the other expert. Id. at 335-36, 84& P.2d 387, 848 
P.2d at 393;...94_ Likewise, in Lawton v, City of P.ocatello, a 
-case coix:enililg a ~~~~y~j~ a~cident, this Cowt upheld the 
admission of the testimQ11y of.an expert who opined that the 
accident site was dangerous and did not meet existing design 
-standards:' 12.6 Idaho 454, 464, 886 P.2d 330, 340 (1994). 
The expert's testimony referred to reports of otheF accidents 
that had occurred in the same area, al~ough the reports were 
not admitted into evidence. Id. This Court found no .error in 
the introduction of this testimony. Id. Although these cases 
were decided prior to the 2002 amendment. they reflect the 
meaning of the current rule. See Watkins, 148 Idaho at 426, 
224 P.3d at 493. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 703 was most recently interpreted in 
State v. Watkins.Id. In that case, this Court held that I.RE. 
703 did not allow an expert witness to reveal tI:ie contents of 
another expert's notes, even though the testifying expert relied 
on those notes and the notes were not themselves admitted 
into evidence. Id. at 427, 224 P.3d 485, 224 P.3d at 494. In 
that case~ the State's expert, Dr. Finis. testified that 
."'14 according 1o t~..pe.rformed at 
her private laboratory, Identigenetix, 
Watkins' DNA was in the semen on th~ .. -
giri's underwear and inside the condom 
and the girl's DNA was on the outside 
of the condom. Dr. Finis, however, 
was not at Identigenetix to receive the 
evidence in person and did not pelform 
page 24 
the DNA testing herself. Instead, Dr. 
Finis relied on communications with 
her colleague, Kermit Channell. as 
well as his notes, in forming her 
conclusions- about the tested evidence. 
-Id at 420,224 P.3d at-487. Spedfically; Dt. Finis tesfi:ncc!Iliili:.-,'-".-- -"-c·'-
sbe did not do the testing and was not prescat fur Channcll's 
testing but, according the Channell's notes: 
Channell used an oral swab taken 
:from the six-year-old girl to establish 
a reference DNA sample for her; that 
Channell used both penile and oral 
swabs taken from Watkins to establish 
a reference DNA sample for him~ and 
that Channell extracted DNA from 
both the inside and outside of the 
used condom and tested it to see 
whether it matched either Watkins' 
or the six-year-old girl's DNA. Dr. 
Finis testified that the DNA C::hann~~l __ 
tested- on tb.e--inside of the condom 
matched Watkins' DNA and that tbe 
DNA Channell tested on the outside 
of the c911dom was a mbdure -of both 
Watkin':, [sic]DNA and the six-year-
old girl's DNA. 
Id. at 423-24~ 224 P.3d at 490-91. This Court explained that 
the testimony was not admissible !Illder I.RE. 703 because 
it was evident that Channell's statements were not admitted 
fur the limited pmpose of evaluating Dr. Finis' testimony. 
Id. at 427, 224 P.3d 485, 224 P 3d at 494. Rather, they 
were relayed "for the pwpose of demonstrating the chain of 
CU5tody, Channell's testing methodology, and to identif}' the 
locations on the condom and panties on which Watkins' and 
the victim's DNA were found."ld. We further observed that 
no evidence, aside that contained in Channell's notes, was 
introduce to establish these facts. Id. 
In 1his case, Dr. Rorke-Adams testified that the slides she 
examined contained the brain tissue of W.F. and thaUbosei _____ _ 
slides were stained properly. As was the case with the expert 
in Doty, who relied on pictures and n~tes created by anoth(?r 
expert~- Dr. Rorke-Adams' conclusions were based in small 
part on the labeling created by the 1echnician. However, Dr. 
Rorke-Adams relied far less on the technician's actions than 
did the CA'J)ertwhose testimony we upheld in Doty.Dr. Rorke-
Adams did not testify "concerning observations made by" 
~-Nexr © 2015 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 14 
470
~pr 09, ,,2015 11 :14AM Nevin Benjamin,McKay&Bart 208 345 827 4 
State v. Stanfield, - P.3d -(2015) 
2015 WL 1452930 
another expert but rather explained why she could conclude 
that the slides belonged to W.F. and why she could observe 
the amyloid antigens in W.F.'s tissue. 
page ~5 
/-·· 
crime. Thus, Stanfield contends that the jury was required to 
find that she specifically intended to cause great bodily harm 
to W.F ., as opposed to finding that she committed battery, and 
in doing so, unintentionally caused great bodily hann. She 
Unlik Wi lL!..... th ...__1._: , , , 1 th thereforearguesthatthedistriat counviolatedherrighttodue e a.tn.1":;, e 1a.iuuc1ans asscruons were no e . . . . 
only evidence ~M es~Jµme~!J!e chain of cuslo4.Yc:0rJhe. ".- ~:,~~s ~c11}!_ llllitr\u;tcd the''? that tlu:;y d1CJ -~~t hn".c t~ -
-- : - ~L :d- l ----· --- -1- ycd- rn· th' D R k nod that she mtended to commit murder or 'to inflict great tesbng melJ..lO o ogy emp o . lS case, r. or ·e- . . 
Ad · d th · rt'all d th ...: by bodily harm m order to find her guilty of first degree murder. ams receive e tissue. pa 1 y prepare e ussue 
slicing _it, sent the tissue to the laboratory and received the 
tissue back from that laboratory. 
Further, unlike the situation in Wat.kins, where the testifying 
expert relayed factual findings and conclusions reached by 
another, the technician here did _not make any factual findings. 
Dr. Rorke-Adams did not relay any conclusions that were . 
drawn by the technician. Rather, it was Dr. Rorke-Adams 
who conducted 'the examination of the tissue, documented 
her factual findings, and formed her own opinion. Thu.5, 
we find that Dr. Rorke-Adams did not act as a conduit 
for inadmissible hearsay, but rather indicated the "general 
nature of the sources" she relied on in forming her opinion 
as pennitted by I.R.E. 703:Watkins; 148 Idaho-aPt2~21; 
224 P.3d at 493-94. Even though the district cow1 did not 
explicitly. apply the balancing test required by I.RE. 703, we 
.~iwlude that the district court did not err by permitting Dr. -
' Ro~~Adams' testimony. · 
B. The dutrict court properly instructed the jury as to 
the elements of fir.st degree murder. 
*15 [27] Stanfield contends that first degree murder by 
aggravated battexy on a child Wlder twelve is a-specific intent 
Footnotes 
Stanfield advanced this argument priorto this Court's decision 
in State v. Carver, 155 Idaho 489,314 P.3d 171 (2013). In 
Carver, this Court addressed ati identical claim and held that 
"tbe district court correctly instructed the jmy that Defendant 
would be guilty of first degree murder if he committed a 
battery upon the child which resulted in great bodily harm, 
from which the child died."Jr.l. at 494, 314 P.3d at 176. In this 
case, the district court gave the same instruction as we upheld 
in Carver. 1 1 The district court did not err in instructing the 
jury as to·tbe eltlillents of the offense. Thus, Stanfield has not 
shown that the district court violated her due process rights. 
· IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foreg~ing reasons., :we-.-afflnn the judgment of the 
district court. 
CbiefJustice BURDICK, Justice EISMANN and Justice Pro 
Tero WALTERS concur. 
1 As-part of her examination, Dr. Rorke-Adams testified that she cut "slices" ofW.F.'s bra.in. She gave those slices to a tecbnician, 
who transferred the tissue to slides, labeled the slides, applied the stuin that Dr. Rorko-AdlllDS specified, and returned the slides to 
Dr. Rorke-Adams for her examination. 
2 
3 
The rules of evidence may assist in determining the purpose of a statement For example, "'[b ]UBiness and public records are generally 
admissjble absent confrontation not because they qualify under an exception to the hearuy rules, but because-having been created 
for the _administration· of an entity's affairs and not foe the purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial-they are not 
testimonial."Melendez-Diaz v. MaMachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 324, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed2d 314 (2009}. 
The plurality also looked to the rules of evidence to determine if the statements served an evidenti . purpose. Melendez.-.Dwz,. _____ _ 
----------<rS-7-U:S::-1!:t321~-:-A1ffiou e ca1cs of enalysi s were records created in the ordinary course of the Jaboratory's business, 
4 
their purpose was not for !he administration of the laboratory's affairs but rather to establish or proye some fact at trial. lei at 324. 
Therefore, al though falling within the well~established business records elC~epl.ion, because their primary purpose was evxdi:atiary. 
the analysts were subject to confrontation. Id. 
The expert did not have personal knowledge of the testing conducted on the defendant's blood, however, the analyst who developed 
lhe profi1e from the blood sample extracted from lhe defendant testified at trial, as did the analyst who conf'mned that semen was 
found 011 'lhe vaginal swabs taken from the victim. Williams. -U.S. at--, 132 S.Ct. at 2229. 
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"'!be :five Justices who contr0l the outcome of today's case ilgree on very little ... they have left signilic1111t confusion in their wake. 
What comes out of four Justices' desire to limit Melendez-Dia: and .Bu/lcomingin whatever wny possible, combined with on-.= Justice's 
one-justice view of those.holdings. is-to be frank-who knows what Those decisions apparently no longer mean all that they 
say. Yet no one can tell in what way or to what extent they are altered because no proposed limitation commands the support of 11 
majority."Willi'am.r, - U.S. at--, 1.32 S.Ct. at 2277 (Kagan, J., dissenting).· · 
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Yolie, 621 Pa. 527, 79 A.3d·S20, 541 (Pa,2013) (The right lo confrontation :iatisfied when testifying 
expertwas':involvei:1-in a sufficient degree,m fue:analysis and-is-not simp1y_pa.rro1ing another analyst but mtlier· revteweffravNestmg 
data, evaluated the results, verified the test, and wrote the report); Stale v. Joseph. 230 Ariz. 296,283 P.3d 27, 29-30 (Ariz.2012) 
(the le$tifying e,q,ert relying on autopsy reponprepared by non-testifying doctor did not act as an.impermissible conduit because he 
testified'to his own conclusions regarding the victim's injuries); State v. Medfctne Eagle, 835 N.W.2d 886, 898-902 (S .D2013) (right 
tn confrontation was not violated despite the fact that analysts that performed some steps of the testing did not testify at trial because· 
the testifying expert "perfonned various steps of the [testing]; independently reviewed, analyzed, and compared the data obtained 
from the te.sting; and reached her own conclusions regarding the results of the testing"); State 1'. Ortiz-Zape, 367 N.C. I, 743 S.E.2d 
J S6, 163 (N.C.2013) ("when an expert gives an opinion, the opinion is the substantive evidence and the expert is the witness whom 
the defendant has the right to confront''); Mor shall v. People, 309 P ,3d 943, 947 (Colo.2013) ("'We join these courts in concluding 
that when a lab S1Jpervisor ... independentjy re.view!I scientific data, dr~ws the conclusion 1hat the data_indicales. the positive presence 
ofmelhamphetamine, and signs a report t,o that e:trectthat is admitted at trial, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied if she testifies 
and is available for cross-examination."); Smith l'. F1orirla, 2.S So.3d 838, 854-55 (Fla.2009) (no Confrontation Clause violation in 
admission of DNA tests because supervisor evaluated raw te:it results, compllfCd samples, made conclusions, and testified at 1rial); 
Grim v. Missi,rsippf. 102 So.3d 1073, 1081 (M:iss.2012) {holding that "a supervisor, reviewer, or other analyst involved may testify 
in place of the primary analyst where that person was actively involved in the production of the report and had intima.te knowledge of 
analyses even though [he or] she did not perform the t.ests first hand.") (alternation in originaI; internal quotatfon and citation omitted). 
We acknowledge that the decisions ofour sister states have not beenjn !J!!UO[Ill ai!l11:m1eJ:!t.See, e.g., State l'. Jf.<IV~tte, 294P .3d 
435. 43g.:...39 (N.M2013j (autopsy r~~g& ~e t~mo~al because when there are no "objective markers that any third party 
can examine in order to express an independent opinion"); Martin l'. State., 60 A.3d 1100; 1107 (Del.2013) (the testing analyst's 
rcp.n,sentations and test results were testimonial because the statements were conclusions that the testifying CJ<pert relayed and 
did notmake independently). ---- · -
"Evidcnc11 of a habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the 
presence of eyewitnesses, is reh:vantto prove that the conduct of the penon or organization on a particular occasion was in confonnity 
wilh the habit or routine practice."I.R.E. 406. 
As explained previously, we find that Dr. Rorke-Adams had independent knowledge rega.tding the administration of the proper stain 
to the slides based upon her comparison of the slides to a control slide. 
The claim that the slides contained W.F.'s tissue is of particular importance; if this assertion were not true, then Dr. Rorke-Adams' 
testimony would have been irrelevant 
The ldaho Rules of Evidence were modeled on the Federal- Rules of Evidence "in order to ob$ain uniformity in the trial practice in 
both the state and federal courts."C1iacon v. Sperry Corp., 11.l ldaho 270,275, 723 P.2d 814, 8[9 (1986). Thus, we seek to interpret 
identical rules ''in conform= with the interpretation placed upon the same rules by the federal courts.ft id. 
The :in.struc1ion at issue in Carver said that, 'in order for the defendant to be guilty of First Degree Murder in the perpetration of 
an aggravated battery upon a cnild under twelve ( 12) years of age .•. the state does not have to prove that the defendant intended 
to kill [the child]. but the state must prove that during the perpetration of llll aggravated battery on a cb:ild under twelve ( 12) years 
of age, the defendant killed [the child]."155 Idaho at 492, 314 P.3d at 174. At Stanfield's trial. the district court instructed the jury: 
"In order for the defendant to be guilty of first degree lllllrder ... the state does not bave to prove that the defendant intended to kill 
[W .F .]. but tb.e state must prove that during the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate an aggravated battery on a child under 12 years 
of age, the defendant.killed [W.F.)." · 
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Grove Has Failed To Show Any Basis For Reconsideration Of This Court's 
Summary Dismissal Of His Claims Related To An Alleged Violation Of His 
Confrontation Rights 
Introduction 
Grove requests reconsideration of this Court's· dismissal of his claims 
regarding an alleged violation of his confrontation rights. Specifically, he asserts 
1 
473
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this Court erred by holdfng: (1) That the defense in the criminal trial waived a 
confrontation objection, and therefore petitioner may not assert that objection in 
post-conviction; (2) That there was no "testimonial" evidence presented at trial 
subject -to a confrontation- objection;--and (3}--Counsel was not ineffectiy,e_-fof,,_ 
electing to not object on confrontation grounds. (Memorandum in Support of 
Second Motion for Reconsideration). He has presented no new argument or 
information in support _of his claims regarding issues (1) and (3), above. He asks 
for reconsideration of issue (2), above, in light of the recent decis-ion in State v. 
Stanfield, _ Idaho _, _ P .3d _, 2015 WL 1452930 (2015). Review of all 
three issues shows no grounds for reconsideration. 
B. · The Confrontation Objection Was Walved ln The Criminal Proceedings 
Contrary to Grove's contentions, there are specific statutes that bar his 
ability to raise his confrontation clause claim· in post-conviction. Post-conviction 
"is not a substitute for nor does it affect any remedy incident to the proceedings 
in the trial court, or of an appeal from the sentence of conviction.'' J.C. § 19-
4901 (b). Likewise, any ground "knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived in 
the proceeding that resulted in the conviction . . . may not be the basis for a 
subsequent application.'' LC. § 19-4908. Grove had an available remedy for any 
alleged violation· of his confrontation rights in the original criminal case but 
counsel tactically waived that objection. The 11right to confrontation may, of 
---------- -
course, be waived, jr1cluding by failure to object to the offending ev;dence." 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 314 n.3 (2009) (emphasis 
added). Because Grove, through counsel, waived any confrontation objection in 
2 
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the criminal case, he may not directly assert that objection in post-conviction. 1 
· He is barred from trying to use these proceedings for the prohibited purpo_se of 
asserting an objection he could have made, but instead waived, in the criminal 
:...:-:·.;.··.-'." =_:;- -· .. ·--:.~.'.- .. ¥-~i--: -- ------ ·---·- ··- ---"·---·-·· --. --- ._,_ .... _ .._. .,_.,-- .-.:--_' -, .... , 
Under sections 19-4901(b) and 19-4908 Grove's waiver of his claim or 
right in the criminal proceedings bars his post-conviction claim. Were this not so, 
every posr conviction petitioner who entered a guilty plea could challenge the 
lack of a jury trial; could claim that every choice by counsel to not call a witness 
violated his right to present evidence; and, closer to this case, could claim every 
waiver of cross examination or failure to object to arguably testimonial evidence 
violated his confrontation rights. Grove's claim that the waiver of confrontation in 
the criminal proceedings does not bar his claim in post-conviction is meritless. 
This Court properly dismissed the claim of a Confrontation Clause violation on 
the basis that this objection should have been raised in the criminal case and the 
choice to not make the objection constituted a waiver. 
c. Grove Has Failed To Show That The Portion Of The Doctors' Testimom 
Based On The Neuropathology Report Offends The Confrontation Clause 
This Court also ruled, in the alternative, that there was no Confrontation 
Clause violation because the neuropathology report was not ·"testimonial.!' 
(Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary Disposition, pp. 22-24.) This Court 
1 These statutes do not prevent Grove from asserting ineffective assistance of 
counsel for his choice to not object-only a direct assertion of the waived 
objection. That counsel's waiver was not the result of ineffective assistance of 
counsel is addressed below. 
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noted that there is a split in authority regarding whether an autopsy report is 
"testimonial," the touchstone for application of the Confrontation Clause. (Id.) 
This Court found more persuasive and applicable to the facts of this case 
-- -..opinions holding -that- an aut.opsy-.process conducted independenLof a .. police _;: -- ·c----.·-- .. __ _ 
investigation does not serve the primary function of creating evidence for a 
criminal prosecution. (Id.; see also pp. 8-20.) Grove contends that this holding 
is contrary to the recent decision in State v. Stanfield, 2015 WL 1452930 (Idaho, 
2015). Grove's claim that Stanfield shows any error in this Court's alternative 
ruling is w4thout merit. 
First, the opinion in Stanfield is of marginal utility in this case. In that case 
- the witness in question was an expert hired spe9ifically by the prosecution to 
prepare trial evidence. 2015 WL at "'1. The confrontation chaUenge was to 
evidence of actions by others in the expert's lab who processed evidence 
intended for trial.' kl_ at *2. Thus, Stanfield does not address the testimonial 
nature of evidence prepared outside the scope of a police investigation or 
prosecution. Many jurisdictions have held that autopsy reports were not 
testimonial, and therefore not subject to confrontation, precisely -because they 
were prepared for purposes other than police investigation or prosecution. See, 
§A, State v. Snelling, 236 P.3d 409, 413-14 (Ariz. 2010) (expert offering opinion 
based facts and data set forth in autopsy report did not violate confrontation 
rights); People v. Dungo, 286 P .3d 442, 449-50 (Cal. 2012) (testimony of expert 
regarding description of injuries in autopsy report as one basis for medical 
. conclusions d~d not grant right to confrontation of doctor who prepared report); 
4 
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People v. Hensley, 22 N.E.3d ·1175, 1193·.94 (Ill. App., 1st dist., 2014) (autopsy 
report prepared in normal course of business of medical examiner's office not 
testimonial); People v. Portes, 125 A.D.3d 794, 2015 WL 542337, *1 (App., 2nd 
<. <·--· , - --- --Dept.r20"t5} (admission-of autopsy.report did .noLviolate. confrontation rights).:-,_---<·'······ i~-- ---- -.-
Because Stanfield does not address the basis for this Court's determination that 
the neuropathology report was not testimonial, it does not provide grounds for 
reconsideration of the ruling that reliance on the report by other experts did not 
violate the Confrontation Clause. 
Second, even though the Stanfield opinion does not address the question 
of whether autopsy reports prepared outside the course of any criminal 
investigation are_ testimonial, it does cite with approvalState v. Joseph, 283 P .3d 
27 (Ariz. 2012), for the proposition that ''the testimony of an expert witness who 
arrives · at an independent conclusion· is· permissible · under the Confrontation 
Clause even where other non-testifying analysts have ptovided underlying data 
or conducted portions of the testing." Stanfield, 2015 WL at *9 & n.6. 
Jn Joseph the trial court allowed the prosecution's medical expert to testify 
based on an autopsy report prepared by another doctor. 283 P.3d at 29. He did 
not testify about the other doctor's "conclusions" but did testify about the 
"opinions he formed after reviewing the facts and photographs contained in the 
report." Id. The Court stated that "a testifying medical examiner may offer an 
opinion based on an autopsy performed by a non-testifying expert without 
violating the Confrontation Clause." 19.:. 
5 
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As did the expert ·in Joseph, the doctors in this case offered opinions 
based, in part, on an autopsy report. Grove had the opportunity to cross-
examine these doctors. He also had the opportunity to present evidence 
.-"'.'~~--·--' · ·······attempting-to uoclermine--the-expert~opinions by-cha:f:leng~ng the facts they:~reHed,--,,.,-----·- .. 
on in reaching those opinions. Because the experts arrived at their own 
independent conclusions about the cause of death and the timing of the inflictlon 
of the injuries, such was "permissible under the Confrontation Clause even 
where other n·on-testifying analysts have provided underlying data or conducted 
some portions of the testing.'' Stanfield, 2015 WL at *9. Grove has failed to 
show a basis for reconsideration of this Court's dismissal of the counts related to 
his confrontation claim. 
D. Counsel's Choice To Not Assert The Confrontation Issue Was Not 
· Ineffective Assistance Of Ctfurisel -
This Court held that because an objection on confrontation grounds wouid 
not have succeeded, counsel's performance by not objecting was not deficient 
and Grove suffered no prejudice. (Opinion, p. 32.) As set forth above, the 
Stanfield decision does not alter that analysis. 
Even if the Stanfield opinion had resolved the question of whether autopsy 
reports done in the regular course of business (as opposed to being part of the 
police investigation) were subject to a confrontation objection, that case was not 
available to counsel at any relevant time. As the Idaho Supreme Court stated in 
Stanfield, binding precedent on this general topic did not exist 2015 WL at *6. 
In the absence of settled law, counsel's performance can hardly be labelled as 
6 
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deficient. Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 630, 226 P.3d 1269, 1277 (2010) 
(''this Court will generally not find deficient performance where counsel fails to 
argue a novel 'legal theory in an undeveloped area of Jaw"); Piro v. State, 146 
---,_,~•-.-,, ---·- - · · · -,ddahoz8~r,9-1-; -190 .J>,Sd---905;--9-'.IQ (Ct.-App-.,"2"10&l~-{,'failure to advance:--a"'noveJ .. _ 
theory'' is not ineffective assistance of counsel). 
Finally, even if a confrontation objection may have had merit, such is not 
alone enough to show deficient performance or prejudice_ It is well established 
that "lack of objection to testimony fall{s] within the area of tactical, or strategic, 
decisions." Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (Ct. App. 
1994). The right to confrontation may be waived by counsel. See Melendez-
Diaz, 557 U.S .. at 314 n.3. "A co_urtgonsidering a claim of ine:ffective assistance 
must apply a 'strong presumption' that counsel's representation was within the 
'wide range' of :reas-0nable professional assistance." Harrington v. Richter, 562 
U.S. 86. 104 (2011) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 
(1984)). "When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court 
does not second-guess strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions 
cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to 
have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or 
other shortcomings capable of objective review." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 
561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008). 
n State v. Dunlarr,-io51dahoS-4o,384--;-3U--P-=3a--t-;-zt.-O--C2llt3).1he p.ost-
convlction petitioner alleged counsel was ineffective for failing to object to reports 
by doctors admitted at a capital sentencing because admission of those reports 
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allegedly violated the petitioner's Fifth Amendment and confrontation rights. The 
Idaho Supreme Court did not address the merits of such an objection at all; 
rather, it held that "[i]n the absence of evidence suggesting that the introduction 
'-''-"~'"·0~:---fof t-he--allegedly excludable-evidence],was.::t-he---product of inadequate,preparation 
or ignorance of the relevant law, we hold that the district court did not err by 
summarily dismissing this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." !fL. 
Just as in Dunlap, there is in this case an absence of evidence that 
counsel was ignorant of the relevant law or unprepared. Grove has presented 
no evidence rebutting the strong ~resumption that counsel's conduct fell within 
the range of reasonable representation. The same result as in Dunlap, summary 
dismissal, is thus appropriate. 
CONCLUSION 
Grove is barred from asserting a violation of his confrontation rights in this 
post~conviction case because counsel waived that right by not objecting in the 
criminal proceedings. The Stanfield opinion provides no basis for finding a 
confrontation violation or ineffective assistance of counsel because it did not 
address the preparation of autopsy reports in the regular course of business, but 
instead addressed only testing done at the specific request of the prosecution 
for trial. Finally, Grove has presented no evidence of any objective shortcoming 
of counsel, such as ignorance of the law or inadequate preparation, to rebut the 
8 
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presumption of effective assistance. Because it lacks merit, the motion for 
reconsideration should be denied. 
DATED this 16th day of Ap 
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COMES NOW, Petitioner Stacey Grove, through counsel Dennis Benjamin and Deborah 
Whipple, and offers this Closing Argument following the evidentiary hearing held March 24-25, 
2015. 
Per this Court's Order of July 11, 2013, four claims were addressed at the evidentiary 
hearing: A) whether trial counsel was ineffective in the direct and cross-examination of Mr. 
Grove; B) whether trial counsel was ineffective during the direct and cross-examination of Dr. 
· Arden;· C)whetl:i:et trial counsel was ineffective in addressing the matter of sleeping jurors;-and ·· -- ----- ·· · .. 
D) whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to multiple instances of prosecutorial 
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misconduct during closing arguments. To prevail on these claims, Mr. Grove is required to 
prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. ICR 57(c); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 
65, 67, 794 P.2d 654,656 (Ct. App. 1990). Mr. Grove carried this burden through the exhibits 
and testimony of multiple witnesses to jurors sleeping during trial, trial counsel Scott Chapman, 
Dr. Jonathan Arden, and Andrew Parnes, Ph.D., J.D. 
II. WHY RELIEF SHOULD BE GRANTED 
A. Ineffective Assistance in the Direct and Cross-Examination of Mr. Grove 
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Sixth Amendment has 
been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the 
states. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932}~ Idaho law alsoguarantees a criminal 
defendant's right to counsel. Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 13; I. C.c § 19-852. In general, a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the state or federal constitution, is analyzed 
under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466_U.S. 668 (1984), standard. In order to prevail 
under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that counsel's performance was deficient in that it 
fell below standards of reasonable professional performance; and 2) that this deficient 
performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. The prejudice 
prong of the test is shown if there is a reasonable probability that a different result would have 
been obtained in the case if the attorney had acted properly. Id. 
1. Evidence regarding Mr. Grove's relationship with his son and child suwort 
--·1 .... ~-~ ........ - ·--. 
Mr. Grove alleged in his Amended Verified Petition that defense counsel's performance 
was deficient because he introduced evidence in the direct examination of Mr. Grove regarding 




. ~ .. -' 
the bad relationship between Mr. Grove and his son Alex. The trial transcripts establish that 
defense did elicit such evidence. Exhibit B, p. 1074, ln. 1-24. Specifically, Mr. Grove testified 
that he had a troubled relationship with his biological son. 
It was a complicated situation with Alex. He's ten years old. He's a great boy. It 
-- --- ------- ----~- · -- -- · started off rougli wf tli llie very fiist.Me-anahis motlier, she bas1ca1Iy was gone-.----
Id;· 
When she was pregnant with  (sic), she started seeing some other guy. And 
come to find out, she moved in with him. And, you know, it was a real rocky 
relationship the whole way through. 
And at the latter -- the latter time when I was seeing him, there was a pull with 
him. I could tell that they were telling him things, and he would ask me questions 
that I didn't think -- and it was a hard situation. And at the time, it was my 
decision that I didn't want to stress him out with it, so I felt it would be best if I 
removed myself from the situation until he was old enough to be able to -- I could 
talk with him aqout what was going on. And he wouldn't -- he wouldn't have 
these feelings, because I could tell he was being tom, and I didn't want to see him 
go through that. And I thought the best would be for what I did, and that was the 
choice that I made. 
At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel testified that he could not recall why he 
elicited the evidence from Mr. Grove on direct examination. Defense counsel also admitted that 
the evidence was unfavorable to Mr. Grove. Evidentiary Hearing Transcript ("EH Tr.") p. 187, 
ln. 14-24. That is plainly true as it_portrays him as an uninvolved dad in a case where he is being 
accused of harming a child. The Tenth Circuit has held that where an attorney accidentally 
brings out damaging testimony due to a failure to prepare, his conduct cannot be called a strategic 
choice. Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283, 1296 (10th Cir. 2002). The prosecutor took advantage 
of the opening in his cross-examination by asking Mr. Grove if he currently maintained a 
relationship with Alex. Mr. Grove had to admit that he did not. Exhibit B, p. 1115, ln. 6-10. 
Mr. Grove also alleged that defense counsel's performance was deficient because he 
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failed to object to the prosecutor questioning him about the fact he was not currently paying child 
support. The trial transcript proves the prosecutor asked that question and that trial counsel failed 
to object. Exhibit B, p. 1 i 15, ln. 21-24.1 Plainly, this question was not relevant to any issue at 
the trial and an objection to it would have been sustained. I.R.E. 402; 403. 
Regarding the child support question, defense counsel testified that ''the decision, I guess, 
that I made at the time, best as I can recollect is, don't make it - don't make it any bigger than it 
is by objection." Evidentiary Hearing ("EH'') Tr. p. 189, ln. 3-5. This is not evidence of a 
strategic decision on defense counsel's part since he qualifies his answer with ''I guess" and "best 
as I can recollect." At the same time, defense counsel admitted that he could have moved pretrial 
to exclude such evidence as he was aware that Mr. Grove was behind on child support payment 
prior to trial. EH Tr. p. 189, ln. 9-15. 
'In fact, defense counsel filed a Supplemental Motion in Limine-on July 14, 2008, shortly 
before trial, to prohibit "any mention of the relationship that Stacey Grove has with his son, Alex 
Light, and/or child support obligations." Exhibit A, Vol. lB, p. 174. (The criminal trial record 
does not show that defense counsel ever sought or obtained a ruling on this motion.) Thus, 
defense counsel actually elicited from Mr. Grove evidence whi~h he sought to exclude pretrial. 
In addition, defense counsel knew the state was aware there was a problem with the child support 
payment as the Supplemental Motion in Limine put the state on notice. 
Andrew Parnes testified that there was no valid strategic purpose for defense counsel to 
elicit from Mr. Grove the evidence of his relationship with his son. The evidence undermined 
1 Q. Do you pay child support? A. At the time? 
Q. No. As of now. A. No, sir. 
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the defense case which ''was based on Mr. Grove's credibility'' and "the scientific evidence." In 
his view, defense counsel's actions fell below reasonable professional norms for a criminal 
defense lawyer especially "because there was a motion in limine ... that was filed to keep that 
information out." EH T. p. 250, In. 6-18. Mr. Parnes noted that the record did not show that 
-- ·-----·---------------------------------·-----
defense counsel had sought a ruling on his Supplemental Motion in Limine. EH Tr. p. 250, In. 
22. The failure to obtain a ruling was itself below reasonable professional standards. EH Tr. p. 
251, In. 5-13. 
Mr. Parnes was a highly credible witness. He was awarded a doctorate from Stanford and 
a law degree from UC-Berkeley, both world class universities. He been an attorney for 37 years 
practicing criminal defense and has practicing in Idaho since 1990. EH Tr. p. 245, In. 20 -p. 
246, In. 25 ... He served as the President ofthe Palo Alto Bar Association and of the Idaho 
·\-Association'of Criminal Defense Lawyers. EH Tr. p. 247, In. 3-19. Mr. Parnes had onlytestified--
as an expert on one prior occasion "[a]nd that was actually for the prosecution in a case where 
[he] believed that trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance [ of] counsel." EH Tr. p. 
278, In. 22-25. 
Mr. Parnes also testified that the prosecutor's question regarding child support was 
objectionable because it was not relevant, it was the subject of the motion in limine and that "it 
would certainly be more prejudicial than probative if there was any relevance to it at all." 
Further, there was no valid reason to let that evidence in. EH T. p. 251, In. 22 - p. 252, In. 5. 
85. Defense counsel's failure to object to inadmissible evidence has been found to be deficient 
performance under Strickland. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 689 S.E.2d 629,633 (S.C. 2010) ("The 
presumption of adequate representation based on a valid trial strategy disappears when trial 
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\ 
. ·! 
counsel acknowledged there was no trial strategy in mind when he failed to object to the 
improper hearsay and bolstering testimony.") (emphasis in original). 
In addition, the prosecutor committed misconduct when he raised the child support issue. 
"An accused in a criminal prosecution is entitled to a trial upon competent, relevant evidence; 
evidence which at least tends to establish his guilt or innocence; and evidence which has no such 
tendency, but which, if effective at all, could only serve to excite the minds and inflame the 
passions of the jury should not be admitted." State v. Wilson, 93 Idaho 194, 196-98, 457 P.2d 
433, 435-37 (1969), quoting State v. Fleming, 154 N.W.2d 65, 66 (Neb. 1967). This is so 
because "[a] fundamental principle of criminal law is that where the offense charged 'is of itself 
sufficient to inflame the minds of the average person, it is required that there be rigorous 
insistence upon observance of the rules of the admission of evidence'." Id., quoting People v. 
-Jones;-42 CaL2d 219,266 P.2d 38 (1954). '1However, reception at trial of irrelevant-and -- · .-: ___ _ 
immaterial evidence, which serves no probative function, but serves only to inflame the minds 
and passions of the jury to the prejudice of the defendant is reversible error." Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Wilson held that evidence of "[t]he degree on pain suffered 
by a young virgin upon being raped, as opposed to the feelings of a bride when first experiencing 
intercourse with her husband," was patently inadmissible and reminded the prosecutor that he 
was only "entitled to hit as hard as he can above, but not below, the belt." Id, quoting State v. 
Rollo, 351 P.2d 422, 426-427 (Or. 1960). It went on to list several other "examples of irrelevant, 
immaterial and inflammatory material, the admission of which into evidence was held to be 
reversible error," including: 
Evidence that defendant, accused of Mann Act Violation, failed to file income tax 
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returns; evidence that defendant, accused of murder, was a deserter from the army; 
evidence that defendant, accused of arson, had been treated for venereal disease; 
evidence that defendant, accused of murder, while in the army offered a friend 
$500.00 to shoot him in the foot in order to avoid :frontline duty; evidence, in 
prosecution for 'Malicious shooting at and wounding another with intent to kill,' 
of victim's prognosis for recovery and future ability to perform manual labor; 
evidence, in rape prosecution, that victim was pregnant as a result of the rape; 
------------ --- evidence, in murder prosecution, that victim was married and a parent; evioence- ------------ ---------
that married defendant, accused of murdering wife's friend, had been seen with 
other women[.] 
93 Idaho at 198,457 P.2d at 437. 
The evidence about Mr. Grove's child support arrears fits squarely into the Idaho 
Supreme Court's list of examples of "irrelevant, immaterial and inflammatory material,"and it 
was misconduct for the prosecutor to elicit such testimony because it had no such tendency to 
prove the charge and "could only serve to excite the minds and inflame the passions of the 
jury[.]" Id. Consequently, it was deficient performance for defense counsel to let the 
prosecutor's misconduct go unchallenged. 
2. Prosecutor's comments about "the story you need the jury to believe" 
Mr. Grove alleged that defense counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to 
move to strike the prosecutor's comments after his objection to prosecutorial misconduct during 
cross-examination was sustained. Verified Amended Petition, p. 32. The trial record shows that 
the prosecutor characterized Mr. Grove's sworn testimony as the "story you told, which is "the 
story you need the jury to believe" and then opined that "some things ... just don't really make 
sense." Exhibit B, p. 1113, ln. 8-13. While defense counsel's objection was sustained, he did 
· not ask that the comments be stricken or that the jury be instructed to disregard the comments. 
Id. 
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At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel said that he did not recall why he did not ask 
the court to strike that comment. He also could not think of a reason why he did not ask the court 
to reprimand the prosecutor for that statement. EH Tr. p. 192, ln. 5.:. 15. Mr. Parnes, however, 
testified that defense counsel should have asked the Court to strike the comment, "as was done in 
other parts of trial." He continued: "I would also add that, in this particular situation, that kind of 
a statement is so, I think, beyond the bounds that I would have probably have asked for a 
mistrial." EH Tr. p. 252, ln. 18 - p. 253, ln. 5. 
There is no doubt that the prosecutor committed misconduct in his characterization of Mr. 
Grove's sworn testimony. Counsel should not interject his personal opinion and beliefs about the 
credibility of a witness or the guilt or innocence of the accused. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 
86, 156 P.3d583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007); citing State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,280, 77 P,3d956, 
969 (2003); State ·v. Garcia, 100 Idaho 108, 110-11, 594 P .2d 146, 148-49 (1979); State v. 
Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160, 169,983 P.2d 233,242 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Brown, 131 Idaho 61, 
69, 951 P.2d 1288, 1296 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14, 909 P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. 
App. 1995); State v. Ames, 109 Idaho 373,376, 707 P.2d 484,487 (Ct. App. 1985). The 
prosecutor's characterization of Mr. Grove's testimony as a "story you need the jury to believe" 
and that "some things ... just don't really make sense" are mere assertions of his personal 
opinions and belief in Mr. Grove's guilt and to the lack of credibility of Mr. Grove's testimony, 
and thus was misconduct. The failure to object to improper statements by the prosecutor have 
been found to be deficient performance under Strickland. People v. Bodden, 82 A.D.3d 781, 
784, 918 N.Y.S.2d 141, 143 (2011) (Counsel failed to object to prosecutor's comments which 
implied that the defendant's character increased the likelihood that he was guilty.). That was also 






the case here. The failure to object was deficient performance. 
3. Prosecutor's question about Mr. Grove's emotional state 
Mr. Grove also alleged in his Amended Verified Petition that defense counsel's 
performance was deficient when he failed to object to the prosecutor asking Mr. Grove when he 
had been prescribed Ativan and whether the prescription ''was a result of [his] emotional state 
Friday[.]" Amended Verified Petition, pg. 32. The criminal trial record proves the questions 
were asked and that defense counsel failed to object. 
Q. [By Mr. Spickler] Let's go -- let's go to the morning of July 10th. Actually, let 
me ask you, are you currently on any medications? 
A. Ativan. 
Q. And when was that prescribed for you? 
A. Friday. 
. . .,------·--
Q. And that was a result of your emotional state Friday? 
A. Just -- yeah. I mean, it's -- it's just lack of sleep. It's just the whole thing. I 
mean, you know, this is pretty ... 
Exhibit B, p. 1120, ln. 9-12. Defense counsel explained that the phrase "emotional state Friday'' 
was a reference to the previous Friday when he wanted Mr. Grove to testify. Mr. Grove told 
counsel that morning that "he was unable to do so because oflack of sleep, and he just wasn't 
ready to do it." EH T. p. 197, ln. 25 - p. 198, ln. 1. 
At the evidentiary hearing, defense counsel testified that "at the time, or even looking at it 
now, I'm not sure, under the circumstances of the way all this came down, whether it was 
objectionable." EH T. p. 193, ln. 5-10. Mr. Parnes disagreed stating that the evidence was 
irrelevant. Further it was highly prejudicial when understood in its proper context. When the 




trial was continued on that Friday, ''the jury was told that there had been a medical issue, but they 
were not told what the details of that were." EH T. p. 253, ln. 14-21. See also, Exhibit B, p. 
1067, ln. 3-5. (Wherein the Court informs the jury that "an unforeseen medical situation has 
. arisen which affects our ability to proceed with trial today'' and does not mention Mr. Grove or 
.. ·-·· . --· 
the nature of the medical situation.) Defense counsel's failure to object to improper cross-
examination has been held to be deficient performance under Strickland. See, e.g., United States 
v. Wolf, 787 F.2d 1094, 1099 (Jh Cir. 1986) (Deficient performance found where prosecutor used 
cross-examination to bring in extraneous and at times unfounded charges in order to blacken the 
defendant's character.) 
In addition, the prosecutor used the "emotional state" testimony to great effect during his 
rebuttal argument. First, defense counsel brings up in his closing argument the questioning about 
"Stace having a breakdown last Friday" and argues that the evidence is simply an ad hominem >---
attack: "[I]f you can't get at the testimony, get at the man. What does that have to do with 
anything?" Exhibit B, p. 1445, ln. 2-4. The prosecutor then springs his trap during rebuttal: 
So, [defense counsel] talked about, well, why bring up the emotional breakdown 
of the defendant? Trying to attack the defendant. No, there's a reason for it. The 
reason for it is the State believes that he had an emotional breakdown, an 
instantaneous fit of anger, that morning that resulted in these injuries to the kids --
to the kid, to  
Exhibit B, p. 1458, ln. 13-19. Defense counsel did not object to this line of argument nor did he 
have the chance to respond because the prosecutor held it back until rebuttal. But had defense 
counsel properly objected, the evidence never would have come in at all. 
The introduction of all this evidence was prejudicial under Strickland because Mr. 
Grove's credibility was of paramount importance to the defense case. His testimony about what 
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happened after Lisa Nash left for work and he was alone with  was one half of the defense 
case, the other half being Dr. Arden's medical testimony. Thus, the evidence showing Mr. Grove 
had a bad relationship with his biological son and that he was not even paying child support 
painted him as a bad person and bad care giver, i.e., the kind of person who would beat an infant. 
The prosecutor's comments that Mr. Grove needed the jury to believe his story but that parts of it 
just don't really make sense, implied to the jury that Mr. Grove would lie to them because he had 
to, irrespective of the logical soundness of his testimony. And the prosecutor's argument that 
Mr. Grove had an emotional breakdown with  similar to the one he had in court, 
established what the state's evidence could not - an explanation for why Mr. Grove would 
brutally beat an infant. None of this would have been brought to the attention of the jury had 
defense counsel's performance not been deficient. Without it, there is a reasonable probability 
that state would not have obtained-a-conviction';----
B. Ineffective Assistance in the Direct and Cross-Examination of Dr. Arden 
Mr. Grove alleged in his Amended Verified Petition that trial counsel was ineffective in 
failing to object to the prosecutor impeaching Dr. Arden with alleged "gross mismanagement" 
when he was the Medical Examiner in the District of Columbia; in failing to attempt to 
rehabilitate Dr. Arden on redirect; and in failing to provide iron stain slides to Dr. Arden prior to 
his trial testimony. Amended Verified Petition, pp. 32-33; 35-37. 
The state's theory of this case was that Mr. Grove "brutally beat"  Martin to death, 
Ex. B, p. 691, In. 14-22, between 7:54 a.m. and approximately 8:30 a.m., on July 10, 2006. Ex. 
B, p. 745, ln. 7-p. 747, ln. 7. 
The defense theory was that the injuries happened prior to the 35 minutes when Mr. 
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Grove was alone with  Ex. B, p. 696, ln. 18-p. 708, ln. 24. As stated in defense counsel's 
opening at trial, the defense case for acquittal rested on two things: Mr. Grove's credibility when 
he testified under oath that he did not beat  and Dr. Arden's testimony that the injuries 
resulting in Kyler's death happened prior to 7:45 a.m. on July 10, 2006. Ex. B, p. 708, ln. 9-24. 
To make that case, the defense was relying on the jury to "take your intelligence and common 
sense and listen to Dr. Arden, listen to the testimony of the causation and the timing of these 
things." Ex. B, p. 708, ln. 13-15. As trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing, ''the 
nudge" of the case was the timing of the injuries and Dr. Arden was the sole medical witness to 
support the theory. EH Tr. p. 212, ln. 10-22. 
When Dr. Arden testified at trial, he placed the time of the injuries at three or more days 
before. a point between brain death and the cross-clamp. done for organ harvest. Ex. B, p. 1267, 
· ln.-11-15;p.1302,ln. l-p.1303,ln. 8. Hefurthertestifiedthatinjuries·tothepancreaswereat 
least a week old. Ex. B, p. 1302, ln. 1- 1303, ln. 8. Given that brain death occurred on July 11, 
2006, Ex. B, p. 934, ln. 11-13, and the cross-clamping occurred on July 12, 2006, Ex. B, p. 935, 
ln. 8-10, the injuries were, according to Dr. Arden's testimony, inflicted prior to the morning of 
July 10. By contrast, Dr. Ross testified for the state, based in part upon his review of Dr. 
Reichard's report, that the injuries occurred one to two days prior to the cross-clamping; in other 
words sometime between July 10 and July 11. Ex. B, p. 933, ln. 14-17; p. 934, ln. 24-p. 935, ln. 
16.2 
- "·· --· · --.- --,,::, · · - 2 · Jn·addition, Dr. Arden testified that there was no tear in the corpus callosum. Rather, 
the appearance of a tear was an artifact created during the preparation of the microscopic slides. 
Ex. B, p. 1291, ln. 11-15. Dr. Ross testified that there was a tear, but that it could have been 
caused either by trauma or by brain swelling instead of blunt force. Ex. B, p. 940, ln. 23-p. 942, 
ln. 23. 




Dr. Hunter, a state's medical witness, testified that he believed that  would have 
been somewhere between headachy and unconscious immediately following the injury that led to 
death. Ex B, p. 875, In. 8-22. Dr. Harper, another medical witness for the state, testified that 
upon receiving the injuries,  would have been obviously critically ill, unconscious or semi-
.···---- - -- - ., - -- - -·· ---·--- -. - -··. -·-· -· -·------··· ·- ·-····-··----·-·- -·· -- ·-··· --- -·---- ..... ···-· --·-
conscious. Ex. B, p. 1033, In. 16-21. She also testified that she did not need to consider 
microscopic evidence to conclude the time of injury - that sort of evidence was "all well and 
good" but "it doesn't make any difference." Ex. B, p. 1041, In. 18-24. She believed that  
was injured the morning of July 10. Ex. B, p. 1059, In. 8-17. Dr. Arden testified to the contrary, 
specifically that  could have been alert and active after being injured. Ex. B, p. 1306, In. 
15-p. 1310, In. 25. His testimony was supported both by testimony about the nature of head 
injuries and by the factthat injuries to the pancreas were over a week old showing that  was 
clearly active after being seriously injured. · .:,-~,,- · 
Dr. Arden came before the jury with very strong credentials. He testified to, among other 
qualifications, an impressive education, board certifications in both anatomic pathology and 
forensic pathology, licenses to practice medicine in five states and the District of Columbia, 
membership and a director's position in the National Association of Medical Examiners, and 
multiple academic appointments at several medical schools, including N.Y.U. and George 
Washington University Medical School. He had given lectures and published multiple articles 
in medical journals. He had been a medical examiner for 20 years, including positions as the first 
deputy chief medical examiner for New York City and for Washington, D.C. And, at the time of 
-- - ·- ...'." .... - - - -~- "·: -::..·. -· 
Mr. Grove's trial, he had both a private consulting practice and served as a forensic pathologist 
for the state of West Virginia Ex. B, p. 1235, In. 19-p. 1245, In. 14. 
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In contrast, the jury was given no real information about the state's expert pathologist, Dr. 
Reichard. In fact, Dr. Reichard himself never came and testified so that the jury could hear a 
non-hearsay account of his determination about the timing of the injuries to  Ex. B. Dr. 
Marco Ross, who did testify at trial, presented a much shorter and le~s extensive educational, 
academic, and professional resume to the jury. He testified to coming to pathology later in his 
career and provided no evidence of board certifications or publications or academic 
appointments. Further, he had worked as a medical examiner for just over eight years. And, the 
fact that he did not examine the brain himself indicated his own judgment of his lack of expertise 
as to pediatric brain injury diagnosis.· Ex B, p. 892, ln. 22-p. 893, ln. 13. 
While Dr. Hunter and Dr. Harper offered their opinions regarding the age ofKyler's 
injuries, neither had any expertise in the dating of injuries, Each testified based upon their 
anecdotal experience as physicians treating injuries;-:riot as pathologist/physicians diagnosing 
time of injury. Yet, as Dr. Hunter himself testified, "'In my experience' are the three most 
dangerous words in medicine, because each - any one of us has a limited experience compared 
with, say, large studies ... " Ex. B, p. 888, ln. 9-14. 
In a strict balancing of known expertise, Dr. Arden was by far the best qualified expert at 
trial to date the injuries and had the jury accepted his expert opinion, Mr. Grove would have been 
acquitted. 
However, the state seriously undermined Dr. Arden's testimony with a three-pronged 
attack. First, the prosecutor improperly put before the jury the theory that Dr. Arden was on a 
. - -- ~ .- - . 
special mission to help Mr. Grove instead of the state. Exhibit B, p. 1321, ln. 18-p. 1323, ln. 4. 
Then the prosecutor extensively questioned Dr. Arden about the iron stain slides Dr. Reichard 
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had reviewed which Dr. Arden had not reviewed. Ex. B, p. 1353, In. 8-p. 1364, In. 2. And 
finally, the prosecutor closed his cross examination by extensively questioning Dr. Arden about 
his departure from the Washington, D.C. medical examiner's office under pressure. Ex B, p. 
1382, In. 6-p. 1388, ln. 12. That questioning_ is attached as an appendix to this argument for the 
court's convenience. In summary, the questioning brought out that Dr. Arden had been accused 
of gross mismanagement, had failed to attend meetings of the DC Child Fatality Review Board, 
had presided over the office with a backlog of 1300 autopsy reports and an accumulation of 189 
bodies, and had been accused of sexual harassment, sexual discrimination, unlawful retaliation, 
and racial discrimination. Following these allegations, Dr. Arden resigned. 
Dr. Arden's admission to having been accused of all of these things and then resigning 
under pressure was the last thing the jury heard in the trial except for this redirect: 
Q. We've been out here a long time, and I'in goingto be-very;"Yery-brief, okay?· 
Is there anything that the Prosecutor asked you or answers that you've given that 
in any way changes the opinions you provided to this jury under direct 
examination? 
A. No, sir. 
Ex. B, p. 1388, ln. 20-25. 
Mr. Grove produced evidence that proves by a preponderance that counsel was 
constitutionally ineffective in failing to get Dr. Arden the iron stain slides prior to trial and in 
failing to prevent the prosecutor's impeachment of Dr. Arden both with the notion that he was on 
a special mission to help the defense but not the state and with the irrelevant and unfairly and 
hlglilypfejudicfalinformation about his employment with and resignation from the D. C. · Medical 
Examiner. 
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At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Arden testified that he had asked Mr. Chapman to send 
him all the microscopic slides that had been made by the medical examiner who performed the 
autopsy. EH Tr. p. 134, ln. 8-11. These slides included the iron stain slides. EH Tr. p. 136, ln. 
8-1 O; p. 13 8, In. 6-10. Mr. Chapman, for his part, testified that he was aware prior to trial of the 
existence of the iron stain slides but that in the letter he sent to the prosecutor requesting recuts 
for Dr. Arden's review prior to trial he did not ask for the iron stain slides. EH Tr. p. 201, In. 13-
p. 204, In. 1. Mr. Parnes, testifying as a Strickland expert, stated that the failure of trial counsel 
to obtain the iron stain slides for Dr. Arden prior to trial violated reasonable professional norms 
because provision of all relevant information to an expert is critical to the expert's ability to 
review the matter fully and to have credibility before the jury. EH Tr. p. 254, ln. 20-p. 255, In. 
15.3 
The state presented nothing whatsoeverto rebut any ofthis evidence~0·The state did not 
dispute that Dr. Arden asked for Mr. Chapman for all slides or that Mr. Chapman did not ask for 
or send the iron stain slides to Dr. Arden. Nor did the state present its own expert testimony to 
contravert Mr. Parnes' testimony that failure to provide a defense expert with all relevant 
information is contrary to reasonable professional norms of practice. In fact, the state did not 
even ask Mr. Parnes anything in cross examination about the failure of trial counsel to provide 
3 Mr. Parnes' testimony is consistent with State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 385, 247 
P.3d 582, 612 (2010), which recognized that failure to properly prepare an expert may be 
deficient performance, but found that Shackelford had failed to demonstrate prejudice. See also, 
·Murp1iyv:'Sfiite, 143Idaho 139, 146-47;t.39'2-P.3d,41, 748-49 (Ct. App. 2006),·holdtn.gtltat --:-,,,_- , 
failure to ask for a continuance to consult with an expert medical witness was deficient 
performance. Also see, Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2466 (2005), 
holding that defense counsel must obtain information that the State has and will use against the 
defendant. 
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the iron stain slides to Dr. Arden other than to ask him whether he had made averments about the 
iron stain slides in his affidavit earlier filed in this case. EH Tr. p. 282, In. 23-p. 283, In. 9. 
The evidence before this Court is clear that trial counsel acted contrary to reasonable professional 
norms in failing to provide Dr. Arden the iron stain slides prior to trial. 
With regard to the impeachment of Dr. Arden as being on a special mission, Mr. 
Chapman testified that he did not believe it was proper for the prosecutor to impugn the motives 
of Dr. Arden without evidentiary support and that he could not now recall why he did not object 
to the line of questioning, but that he was certain that Dr. Arden was not going to tell the jury that 
he was on a special mission for the defense. EH Tr. p. 21, In. 11-p. 215, In. 18. Mr. Parnes 
testified that the special mission questioning was improper and should have been objected to. 
EH Tr. 260, In. 10-22 .. The state did not present any evidence that such questionirlg by the 
:prmmcution was appropriate or that counsel acted in conformity witlrreasonable professional 
norms in not objecting to the questioning. 
With regard to the other impeachment, Dr. Arden testified that he had alerted Mr. 
Chapman prior to trial to the circumstances of his departure from the Washington, D. C. office. 
EH Tr. p. 128, In. 3-p. 130, In. 12. Dr. Arden further testified that the allegations did not in any 
way relate to his medical expertise or his honesty. EH Tr. p. 131, In. 6-14. Mr. Chapman 
testified that he was aware pretrial of the allegations both from discussions with Dr. Arden and 
from his own internet research. EH Tr. p. 205, In. 14-p. 206, In. 4. Mr. Chapman further 
testified that he assumes the prosecutor was also aware of the allegations against Dr. Arden; that 
. - . . : _-. - - ·- ..... ...,.. ·-· - .-- -~---· ·_.:.. .. ·: .. 
he (Mr. Chapman) did not believe that evidence about the accusations against Dr. Arden and his 
departure from the D.C. office was relevant; that he viewed the evidence as prejudicial; that he 





could have made a pretrial motion in limine to exclude the evidence or made a contemporaneous 
objection to it at trial; but that he did not attempt to keep the evidence out. EH Tr. p. 204, In. 2-
p. 207, In. 1. 
The state did not dispute any of this evidence. The state's only question to Mr. Chapman 
on this topic was whether he could have taken advantage of the prosecutor's questioning of Dr. 
Arden regarding the circumstances in Washington, D.C. by arguing to the jury that the state had 
nothing to do at trial but attack Dr. Arden because it could not attack his opinions. EH Tr. p. 
237, In. 8-17. 
Mr. Parnes testified that Mr. Chapman should have objected to the impeachment of Dr. 
Arden because the impeachment was irrelevant. Mr. Parnes testified that Mr. Chapman should 
have filed a motion in limine to exclude the evidence or, in the alternative, to preserve error in 
,'.---admittingthe evidence.4 Mr. Parnes·also testified that the timing of the impeachment; coming at 
the very end of Dr. Arden's testimony and the very end of the trial made it particularly 
prejudicial. ER Tr. p. 259, In. 4-15. This prejudicial effect was compounded by the failure of 
counsel to do anything to rehabilitate Dr. Arden. EH Tr. p. 256, In. 19-p. 260, In. 2. The state 
presented no expert testimony to contradict Mr. Parnes' conclusion that counsel was deficient in 
failing to keep this evidence out .of trial or at least preserving a record for appeal if the evidence 
was erroneously admitted over objection. Mr. Parnes ultimately testified that trial counsel's 
performance as a whole during the preparation for Dr. Arden's testimony and in the direct and 
- 4 ·w.-Pames' testimony is consistent with·IRE-401 and 402 because the evidence did not-· 
impeach Dr. Arden's medical testimony. Moreover, the evidence's unfair prejudice outweighed . 
any probative value and was inadmissible under IRE 403. Lastly, the evidence was not 
admissible under IRE 404, nor did the state give any notice of its intent to use the evidence as 
required by IRE 404(b). 
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cross-examination of Dr. Arden did not meet reasonable professional standards for criminal 
defense attorneys. EH Tr. p. 260, ln. 23-p. 261, ln. 3. The state presented no expert or other 
evidence to the contrary. Thus, Mr. Grove has proven deficient performance as required by 
Strickland 
The second question is whether the deficient performance was prejudicial. Mr. Grove has 
also proven this. 
Dr. Arden testified at the evidentiary hearing that the slides he had pretrial and Dr. 
Reichard's report of the iron staining were sufficient, as he testified at trial, for him to conclude 
that  s injuries occurred at least 48-72 hours prior to death. But, upon seeing the iron stain 
slides himself, he could now further conclude that there were injuries in the mesentery and eyes 
that were significantly older, some as old as aweek or more prior to death. EH Tr. p. 167, ln. 8-
p. · 1'69~ ln. 10. Had Dr. Arden been able to give this·testimony at trial, it would'have effectively 
countered Dr. Hunter's and Dr. Harper's "in my experience" claims that  could not have 
been active after receiving the injuries that resulted in death. If the jury had known that  
had been active for over a week with both retinal injuries and mesentery injuries, there is a 
reasonable probably that at least one juror would have had a reasonable doubt that death resulted 
' ' 
from injuries inflicted in the 35 minutes prior to the arrival of the ambulance. 
In addition, had counsel objected to the improper impeachment of Dr. Arden, one of two 
things would have happened: the improper evidence would have been excluded or if it was 
admitted, there was a reasonable probability that the appellate court would have found reversible 
. .,.·, -· -,-.\ :, .. ·._:=::; ~ -
error. 
If the evidence was not admitted, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror 
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would have found that the testimony of the most qualified medical pathologist at the trial created 
a reasonable doubt as to Mr. Grove's guilt. This is especially evident given the timing of the 
impeachment and the failure of trial counsel to rehabilitate Dr. Arden. The last thing that the jury 
heard was that Dr. Arden was accused of all sorts of mismanagement and bad acts. Given that 
the jury was never instructed to disregard this evidence, the jurors likely used it to determine 
what sort of credibility to give to Dr. Arden's expert testimony. Indeed, the prosecutor 
recognized the power of this impeachment to discredit Dr. Arden's medical opinions. He 
devoted part of his closing argument to discrediting Dr. Arden because Dr, Arden was a paid 
expert. He argued: 
Dr. Arden, as we presented to you, was a well-paid public servant for many years. 
And as he described to you, he resigned his position under pressure. And for the 
next five years, 2003. until today - well,. until, excuse me, a month ago or so, he 
was not employed as a forensic pathologist, but he was employed as, quote, a paid 
consultant ,,-·-a, : 
And that's - and he said in criminal cases, what he does is he comes and testifies 
for the defense. Now, in fairness to Dr. Arden, he said, if it's clearcut that the 
person is just flat wrong, he won't take the case. But on the borderlines on 
clearcut, don't you think that it's reasonable, and in your life experience probably, 
that his financial situation leads him to decide what cases he can take? Doesn't it 
extend out? Doesn't it make sense that it extends out, that realm of reasonable 
medical probability? That's for you to decide. When you're deciding on his 
credibility, think about that. 
Ex. B, p. 1428, In. 20-p. 1429, In. 13. 
The prosecutor continued this line of attack in his rebuttal: 
He [Mr. Chapman] mentioned putting on evidence just to attack the guy [Dr. 
Arden]. Well, when somebody's opinion is so important to you making a 
decision, it is necessary to put-arr evidence about-the-kind of:person that's making 
the opinion, why he's doing it, to enable you to decide how much weight to give 
that opinion, if any. It's not an attack on the person. It's information for you. 
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Ex. B, p. 1458, In. 5-12. (It is telling to note that Mr. Spickler acknowledges that Dr. Arden's 
testimony was "so important" to the jury's decision and central to the defense case.) 
Later, the prosecutor continued: 
Dr. Arden certainly has credentials, but he also has a purpose here. When I 
commented to you earlier that he was stretching things and I talked about the brain 
death and stuff, look at your notes and see if when he admitted that certain of 
these things, according to the literature, can appear one to three days after death, if 
he didn't always pick three days, you know, the outside limit, not the early part of 
it. But look at your notes and see if that isn't true. 
Ex. B, Trial Tr. p. 1461, In. 9-17. 
These arguments demonstrate that the prosecutor believed that the improper impeachment 
evidence was integral to the case against Mr. Grove. Otherwise, he would not have introduced 
the evidence nor argued it repeatedly in closing and rebuttal. Reviewing this argument and the 
remainder of the evidence presented at trial, there is a reasonable probability that had trial 
·:--~.c.. .. 
counsel not been deficient in his handling of Dr. Arden's preparation and the improper 
impeachment of Dr. Arden that the outcome -of the trial would have been different - there would . 
have been an acquittal or a hung jury. 
Moreover, had the court allowed the improper evidence even over objection, the error 
would have been raised on appeal. And, there is a reasonable probability that relief would have 
been granted. 
The question of relevancy is subject to free review on appeal, a standard favorable to the 
appellant. State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713,717,264 P.3d 54, 58 (2011). The evidence regarding 
expertise or the validity of the opinions offered at Mr. Grove's trial. Indeed, it did not even have 
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any relevance to the doctor's general credibility as the evidence had nothing to do with Dr. 
Arden's general reputation for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Therefore, the evidence was 
inadmissible under IRE 401 and 402. See, State v. Palin, 106 Idaho 70, 74,675 P.2d 49, 53 (Ct. 
App. 1983), noting that prior sexual misconduct alone is not a proper basis to impeach a witness' 
general credibility. See also, IRE 403, IRE 404 and IRE 608. Moreover, on appeal, a very 
favorable standard of review would have applied. Specifically, the state would have to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the error in the admission of the impeachment evidence did not 
contribute to the verdict. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221-22, 245 P.3d 961, 973-74 
(2010), citing State v. Thompson, 132 Idaho 628, 636, 977 P.2d 890, 898 (1999); State v. Zichko, 
129 Idaho 259, 265, 923 P.2d 966, 972 (1996); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 74, 778, 810 P.2d 680, 
716 (1991); and State v. Stoddard, 105 Idaho 169, 171,667 P.2d 272,274 (Ct. App. 1983). 
Given the evidence presented at trial, there is a reasonable probability that had this Court allowed · 
the evidence over objection, Mr. Grove would have prevailed upon appeal and received a new 
trial. 
Thus, Mr. Grove has proved both deficient performance and prejudice as required by 
Strickland as to counsel's handling of Dr. Arden's preparation and testimony. Post-conviction 
relief should therefore be granted. 
C. Ineffective Assistance With Regard to Sleeping Jurors 
Mr. Grove alleged in his amended verified petition for post-conviction relief that trial 
counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a mistrial after jurors fell asleep during testimony 
:.:::. .-... ' -: .•. , 'l •• ·--····-~-=-- .. - .- ----:-
at trial. Amended V eri:fied Petition p. 3 3. He has now proven this ineffectiveness by a 
preponderance of the evidence and post-conviction relief should be granted. 
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At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Grove presented testimony from witnesses Debbie Grove, 
Carol Grove, Lori Stamper, Karen Stamper, Craig Stamper, and Justina Hyder that they had 
observed one or more jurors sleeping during the trial. EH p. 13-123. The witnesses testified to 
sleeping by Jurors Neiman, Lind, Yates, Barrett, and Loetscher. EH p. 18, ln. 15-p. 21, ln. 19; p. 
77, ln. 4-25; p. 86, ln. 7-13; p. 106, ln. 6-7; p. 112, ln. 4-5. He also presented the testimony of 
Mr. Chapman that he recalled a side bar during trial about jurors having been sleeping. EH p. 
216, ln. 7-10. Mr. Chapman testified that he was aware that some jurors may have been sleeping 
during Dr. Ross' testimony but that he did not attempt to make a record with regard to this nor 
did he consult with Mr. Grove about whether action should be taken as to the sleeping jurors. 
EHp. 218, ln. 3-p. 219, ln. 12. Mr. Chapman's testimony was consistent with the trial record. 
During the prosecutor's direct examination of Dr. Ross, the Court interrupted the prosecutor sua 
sponte and called for a side--bar. Immediately after the side bar, the Court noted that the 
proceedings had been going on for some time and that the Court and counsel had determined that 
it would be best to take a break. Ex. B, p. 921, ln. 20-p. 922, ln. 6. During Mr. Chapman's 
cross-examination of Dr. Ross, the prosecutor asked for a break in the proceedings. He stated 
that it was warm in the courtroom and "I've recently noticed that the jurors might be in need of a 
break. They're having a hard time staying awake." Ex B, p. 983, ln. 10-12.5 
The state attempted to rebut this evidence through the testimony of seven of the jurors to-
5 Insofar as the state intends to now argue that no jurors were sleeping, the argument is 
contrary to the spirit, if not the letter of, the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Judicial estoppel 
=-- ·,,4'prec-:tutles"a party from gaining an advantage by taking one-position, and then seeking a second 
advantage by taking an incompatible position." Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 235, 178 P.3d 
597, 600 (2008), quoting McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 152, 937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997). 
The underlying policy is the orderly administration of justice and regard for the dignity of judicial 
proceedings. It is intended to prevent a litigant from playing fast and loose with the courts. Id. 




the effect that they personally did not sleep and that they did not observe others sleeping. EH pp. 
305-341. Yet, the state could not present any juror who testified that he or she had watched all 
the other jurors throughout the proceedings and no one fell asleep. Id Moreover, the state did 
not present testimony from Mr. Yates or Ms. Barrett that they had not been sleeping during the 
trial. Id Mr. Grove's evidence as to those two jurors was not impeached by the state. 
Mr. Parnes testified that when an attorney becomes aware of a sleeping juror he or she 
has a duty to discuss the matter with the client and create a record. Failure to consult potentially 
impeded the client's right to a unanimous jury. The right to a unanimous jury is a right that 
counsel cannot waive for the client without the client's consent. In this case, Mr. Chapman did 
not meet reasonable professional standards in failing to consult with Mr. Grove regarding the 
sleeping jurors. EH p. 262, 1n. 4::-p, 264, ln. 6, The state did not present any evidence from an 
expert or otherwise that Mr. Chapman's failure to:consult with Mr. Grove to controvert Mr.--' , 
Parnes' testimony. 
Mr. Parnes' testimony is consistent with State v. Umphenour, S.Ct. No. 41497, -Idaho 
-, -P.3d-, 2015 WL 1423789 (Ct. App. March 30, 2015). Umphenour, relying on State v. 
Swan, 108 Idaho 963,966, 703 P.2d 727, 730 (Ct. App. 1985), holds that Article I,§ 7 of the 
Idaho Constitution requires that waiver of the right to a jury trial requires the defendant's 
personal waiver. Id, at *3. See also, ICR 23 (a) which states that issues of fact must be tried by 
a jury in felony cases unless a trial by jury is waived by a written waiver executed by the 
defendant in open court with the consent of the prosecutor expressed in open court and entered in 
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Umphenour further holds that a constitutionally invalid waiver of a jury trial is a 
structural defect which requires reversal without a showing of an actual effect on the outcome of 
the trial. The Court of Appeals relied upon Arizona v. Fulminate, 499 U.S. 279 (1991); Duncan 
v. State of Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993); State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222-23, 245 P.3d 961, 974-75 (2010); and Swan, supra, to conclude that 
the error in not obtaining a personal wavier by the defendant of the right to have his/her case 
determined by the jury affects the framework within which the trial proceeds and thus is not 
subject to a harmless error review. Umphenour, at *6-9. 
In Mr. Grove's case, the fact that one or more jurors slept though part or parts of the trial 
denied Mr. Grove the right to a trial before a jury of 12 as required by Article I, § 7. Counsel did 
· ·not meet reasonable professional norms··inwaiving,that right without consulting Mr. Grove. 
Umphenour, supra; Swan, supra. 
Moreover, as counsel's deficiency created a structural error in the trial, the deficiency 
should be evaluated under the standards of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039 
(1984). Under Cronic, there is a presumption of prejudice when a deficiency results in an actual 
breakdown of the adversarial process. A deficiency which results in structural error is a 
deficiency which is entitled to the presumption of prejudice under Cronic. 
But, even if Strickland's prejudice prong must be proven, Mr. Grove has proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that post-conviction relief must be granted. This case turned on 
6 As Umphenour was resolved on state constitutional grounds, the Court of Appeals did 
not address whether the Sixth Amendment likewise requires a personal waiver. Mr. Grove 
asserts that it does. See State v. Wheeler, 114 Idaho 97, 102, 753 P.2d 833, 838 (Ct App. 1988). 
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expert medical testimony which, absent prosecutorial misconduct, would have weighed in favor 
of Mr. Grove. There is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been 
different, whether through a hung jury or an acquittal, had all twelve jurors heard all the expert 
testimony. 
D. Ineffective Assistance With Regard to Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing 
Mr. Grove alleged in his petition that "[d]efense counsel's performance during the state's 
closing and rebuttal arguments was deficient because he failed to object to multiple instances of 
misconduct by the prosecutor" and that "[d]efense counsel's performance was deficient because 
he failed to move for a mistrial after the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments." Amended 
Verified Petition, p. 34-35. He also alleged multiple instances of such misconduct. Id., p. 15-17. 
Ec:1.ch of these allegations and the evidence presented at the hearing are discussed below: 
1. The prosecutor misstated the defense position,regarding preexisting head injury, 
saying that the defense was that there was "some long-term brain injury." Exhibit B, pg. 
1419, ln. 6-10. 
Defense counsel testified that the defense theory of the case was not that there was a long-
term brain injury. "It was a defense theory that there was some injury prior to the time that the 
child was with Stace ... I wouldn't define it as long term, no." He also agreed that it is improper 
for the prosecutor to misrepresent the defense's theory of the case, but could not say why he 
failed to object to that misrepresentation. EH Tr. p. 224, ln. 5 - pg. 225, ln. 4. 
Mr. Parnes testified that defense counsel should object when the state misstates the 
defens~ theory of the case. EH Tr. p. 269, ln. 23. Indeed, the case law is clear that it is improper 
for a prosecutor to misrepresent or mischaracterize the evidence. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 
Idaho 758, 769, 864 P.2d 596, 607 (1993); State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 166, 610 P.2d 522, 







525 (1980); State v. Tupis, 112 Idaho 767, 771-72, 735 P.2d 1078, 1082-83 (Ct. App. 1987); 
State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P.3d 583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007). Further, the prosecutor's 
statement about a long term injury implied a period of time longer than a few days or a week 
"[a]nd that was clearly not the defense in this particular case." EH Tr. p. 270, In. 1-8. The 
prosecutor's mischaracterization of the defense theory was intended to make the theory appear 
improbable because it would be unlikely that the brain injuries could go unnoticed by care givers 
for a long period of time, while the true theory was much more plausible and supported by Dr. 
Arden's testimony. 
2. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "[c]are takers kill little 
babies all the time." Exhibit B, p. 1460, In. 5-6. 
3. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "[p]arents kill babies all 
the time." ... Exhibit B, p. J 460, In. 6-7. 
· · -- 4. The prosecutor told the jury without strpporting evidence that ''there areliterally 
thousands of [similar] incidents in any given span of time[.]" Exhibit B, p. 1460. In. 8-
~ 
5. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that he believed that "our 
local paper has probably shown ... probably six more of these cases since- since this 
one started." Exhibit B. p. 1460. ln. 11-14. 
Defense counsel agreed that it is improper for a prosecutor tostate facts which are not 
supported by the evidence. EH Tr. p. 225, In. 17-19. Our appellate courts agrees:. "It is plainly 
improper for a party to present closing argument that misrepresents or mischaracterizes the 
evidence." State v. Troutman, 148 Idaho 904,911,231 P.3d 549,556 (Ct. App. 2010); see also 
Griffiths, 101 Idaho at 166, 610 P.2d at 525; State v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 521, 525, 37 P.3d 18, 
22 (Ct. App. 2001); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587. Defense counsel could 
not recall any evidence to support the above statements, but could not say why he failed to object 
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to them. EH Tr. p. 226, ln. 5 -p. 227, ln. 1. 
Mr. Parnes testified that these comments were not supported by evidence and were 
highly inflammatory because the state alleged that Mr. Grove was the caretaker at the time of 
Kyler's injuries. Consequently, there should have been an objection. EH Tr. p. 271, ln. 4-7. 
The case law supports Mr. Parnes' opinion. While both sides in a trial have traditionally 
been afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury, "[t]his latitude is not 
boundless, however, and it is impermissible to appeal to the emotion, passion, or prejudice of the 
jury through the use of inflammatory tactics." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 266-67, 233 P.3d 
190, 197-98 (Ct. App. 2010), citing State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 20-21, 189 P.3d 477, 482-83 
(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86, 156 P.3d at 587 ("Considerable latitude, 
however, has its limits, both in matters expressly stated and those implied."). A prosecutor 
exceeds the scope of this considerable latitude if he on:he "attempts to secure a verdict on any 
factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during 
trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence." State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209,227,245 P.3d 961,979 (2010). Thus, "[u]rgingthejuryto render a verdict based on 
factors other than the evidence and jury instructions, such as sympathy for the victim, has no 
. . . . . 
place in closing arguments." State v. Felder, 150 Idaho 269,275,245 P.3d 1021, 1027 (Ct. App. 
2010); State v. Beebe, 145 Idaho 570,576, 181 P.3d 496,502 (Ct. App. 2007). Finally, the ABA 
instructs that "[t]he prosecutor should not make arguments calculated to appeal to the prejudices 
of the jury." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense Functions § 3-5.8 
(3d. ed.1993). 
In fact, our Supreme Court has long held that the limits on permissible closing argument 
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apply most stringently to a prosecuting attorney: 
A prosecuting attorney is a public officer, "acting in a quasi judicial capacity." It 
is his duty to use all fair, honorable, reasonable, and lawful means to secure the 
conviction of the guilty who are or may be indicted in the courts of his judicial 
circuit. He should see that they have a fair and impartial trial, and avoid 
convictions contrary to law. Nothing should tempt him to appeal to prejudices, to 
pervert the testimony, or make statements to the jury, which, whether true or not, 
have not been proved. The desire for success should never induce him to endeavor 
to obtain a verdict by arguments based on anything except the evidence in the 
case, and the conclusions legitimately deducible from the law applicable to the 
same[.] 
It will be observed from the foregoing authorities that the courts do not look with 
favor upon the action of prosecutors in going beyond any possible state of facts 
which can be material as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant in a particular 
case for which he is upon trial. Prosecutors too often forget that they are a part of 
the machinery of the court, and that they occupy an official position, which 
necessarily leads jurors to give more credence to their statements, action, and 
conduct in the course of the trial and in the presence of the jury than they will give 
to counsel for the accused. It seems that they frequently exert their skill and 
ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, and generally in 
so doing they transgress upon the rights of the accuse&It is the d1ity of the 
prosecutor to see that a defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent 
evidence is submitted to the jury, and above all things he should guard against 
- anything that would prejudice the-minds of-the jurors, and tend to hinder them 
from considering only the evidence introduced. 
State v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44, 71 P. 608, 609-11 (1903). See also, State v. Babb, 125 Idaho 
934,942, 877 P.2d 905,913 (1994); State v. Givens, 28 Idaho 253,268, 152 P. 1054, 1058 
(1915). 
Mr. Spickler's multiple references to matters outside the record were so far afield from 
acceptable practice that defense counsel's failure to object to any one of those statements was 
deficient performance. In this regard, Mr. Parnes noted that the fact that defense counsel could 
not state a reason for failing to object was "important in terms of making a decision about 
deficient performance, that it implies that there's no ... tactical or strategic reason thought out 
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andplannedfor." EHTr.p.271,ln.11-17. 
Further, the failure to object was prejudicial. The prosecutor used the argument as an 
emotional appeal to the jury to take a stand against (his asserted epidemic of) child abuse. As 
Mr. Parnes stated: 
It just absolutely is an instance of prosecutorial misconduct. It's inflammatory. 
It's not supported by the record. It[] ... has the - the incredible impact of telling 
jurors this happens all the time. This is something that you've got to do 
something about. And the way that you're going to do something about it is to 
convict Mr. Grove who's in front of you. You can't do anything else other than to 
convict Mr. Grove in order to stop this problem that -you know, the problem in 
the community. 
EH Tr. p. 271, In. 23 - p. 272, In. 8. 
6. The prosecutor argued that "Dr. Ross had the unenviable task of taking Kyler's body 
apart piece by piece[.]" Exhibit B, p. 1464, In. 24-25. 
Defense counsel testified that he agreed that is is improper for a prosecutor to appeal to 
the sympathies of the jury, but could not say why he failed to object to the above comment. EH 
·Tr; p. 225, In. 5-15. -Mr; Parnes testified that the statement was inflammatory and defense 
counsel should have been objected. EH Tr. p. 272, In. 13-18. Of course, appeals to emotion, 
passion or prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible. 
Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho at 769, 864 P.2d at 607; State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 891, 898, 792 P.2d 
916, 923 (1990); State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 844, 655 P.2d 46, 51 (1982); Griffiths, 101 
Idaho at 168, 610 P.2d at 527. And that is the only possible purpose behind Mr. Spickler's 
comment about ''taking Kyler's body apart piece by piece[.]" Id, pg. 1464, In. 24-25 
-7_·-Toe prosecutor argued that "we don't want to let a murderer go free." Exhibit B, p. 
1466, In. 9. 
Defense counsel stated that he did not know whether the prosecutor's argument was 
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objectionable, but agreed that it could be interpreted as diminishing the state's burden of proof 
and could not say why he did not object. EH Tr. p. 223, ln. 1-19. 
Mr. Parnes testified that the prosecutor's statement was objectionable. First, it was highly 
inflammatory because it informed the jury that the prosecutor would not let a murderer go free, 
even if the evidence did not support a guilty verdict. "[T]hat' s not the prosecutor's 
responsibility. It's to do justice under the law." EH Tr. p. 268, ln. 10-15. Moreover, the burden 
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is, in fact, designed to let some guilty people go free in order 
to protect the innocent. Proof beyond reasonable doubt reflects ''fundamental value 
determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty 
man go free." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added). That fundamental value applies in allcriminal cases, even - perhaps even more so - in 
,~- -~: - murder cases where the consequences are so high. Beyond a reasonable doubt requires the jury 
to _deliberate from the starting position of innocence and test the state's ·case to determine whether 
it overcame the presumption. "[W]e don't want to let a murderer go free," flips the presumption 
on its head and asks the jury to begin its deliberations with the presumption that the defendant is 
a murderer and then determine whether the evidence disproves that. fu Mr. Parnes' opinion, the 
comment was so improper that an objection and motion for mistrial outside the presence of the 
jury would have been appropriate. EH Tr. p. 268, ln. 16 - p. 269, ln. 1. 
8. The prosecutor argued without suworting evidence that the emotional breakdown of 
Mr_. Grove at trial showed that Mr. Grove had a different kind of "emotional breakdown. 
an instantaneous fit of anger. that morning that resulted in these injuries[.]" Exhibit B. p. 
1458, 111: 16-18. · 
Defense counsel agreed that the only evidence of an "emotional breakdown" by Mr. 
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Grove was elicited, without objection, by the prosecutor during the cross-examination of Mr. 
Grove. EH Tr. p. 228, In. 7-14. He was not asked by either party whether he had a strategic 
reason for failing to object to this comment. However, defense counsel agreed that a defense 
attorney's job is to protect his client's right to a fair trial. He also agreed that objecting to 
prosecutorial misconduct could have a deterrent effect preventing future misconduct and that 
defense attorneys sometime make such objections for that purpose. Finally, he agreed that 
making an appellate record is a part of the defense attorney's duties and that making objections to 
prosecutorial misconduct is a method to create an appellate record. EH Tr. p. 228, In. 15- p. 229, 
ln. 9. 
Mr. Parnes agreed with defense counsel that it is part of defense counsel's duty to create 
an adequate record for appellate review because "if there's no record made, then the objections 
· [Oii appeal] are-reviewed under a very· strict standard, in Idaho fundamental error- standard,--and in 
most courts and they are, in essence, deemed to be waived." EH Tr. p. 267, In. 5-7. In addition, 
an early objection to misconduct can rein in an overzealous prosecutor. Id., In. 12-17. 
As to the emotional breakdown comment, Mr. Parnes stated that there should have been 
an objection to Mr. Spickler's questioning about the emotional breakdown. "[T]hat was 
irrelevant evidence and should have been excluded." EH Tr. p. 269, ln. 7-11. He also noted that 
the reference in closing argument was prejudicial to Mr. Grove because it was "the only evidence 
that they have, in essence, that there was some reason why [the alleged event] occurred." EH Tr. 
p. 267, ln. 15. 
Here, the prosecutor committed multiple instances of misconduct during closing and 
\_ 
rebuttal argument. Yet, with one notable exception, defense counsel did not object to any of it. 
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Mr. Parnes' opinion was that counsel's performance during closing and rebuttal arguments when 
considered in totality did not meet reasonable professional standards. EH Tr. p. 273, In. 1-3. 
That is clearly the case. Indeed, the state did not present any evidence to contradict Mr. Parnes' 
opinion on that prong of the Strickland test. 
Defense counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial because, had proper objections 
been made, the jury would not have been misled by the prosecutor about the defense position 
regarding when the brain injury occurred. It would not have heard "evidence" from the 
prosecutor about an alleged widespread problem of care givers killing infants or heard argument 
about how horrible it was to take Kyler's body apart during the autopsy, arguments which aimed 
to appeal to the jury's passions rather than focusing it on the evidence and jury instructions. 
With a proper objection, it would not have heard the prosecutor undermine the state's burden of 
proof and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; nor would it have heard the - - · -- . 
state's insinuation that it acceptable to convict Mr. Grove even if the evidence did not support 
such a verdict because "we don't want to let a murderer go free." Finally, had an objection been 
made, the jury would not have heard Mr. Grove's testimony about his "emotional breakdown" 
during trial and the prosecutor would not have been able to use that testimony to establish an 
reason why Mr. Grove would have committed the offense when it had no other explanation. 
Had the jury not been exposed to such improper argument, there was a reasonable probability of 
a different result. 
Consequently, relief should be granted on this basis alone. 
E. Cumulative Prejudicial Effect of the Totality of the Deficient Performance 





example of deficient performance and determine whether it was prejudicial. Instead, the Court 
should consider all the deficient performance and then determine whether the cumulative effect 
was prejudicial. See, Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 527, 927 P.2d 910, 917 (Ct. App. 1996) 
and Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 24, 32, 878 P.2d 198, 206 (Ct. App:1994). As the Ninth Circuit 
has explained, "Separate errors by counsel ... should be analyzed together to see whether their 
cumulative effect deprived the defendant of his right to effective assistance. They are, in other 
words, not separate claims, but rather different aspects of a single claim of ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel." Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2003). 
As set forth above, there is a reasonable probability of a different result had defense 
counsel's performance not been deficient. Highly prejudicial evidence would have been 
excluded;additional exculpatory defense evidence would have been presented by Dr. Arden.and 
Dr. Arden wotild not have:been impeached with irrelevant matters, Mr. Grove would hav.e0 had a- - · ---,.--
jury trial with 12 jurors who had heard all the evidence presented ( or a mistrial), and egregious 
prosecutorial misconduct would have been prevented or resulted in a mistrial. This is more than 
a sufficient showing of prejudice under Strickland. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons above, this Court should grant the petition, vacate the judgment and 
sentence in the criminal case, release Mr. Grove on his own recognizance pending further 
proceedings, and order that a new trial be held within a reasonable amount of time. 
d this~l of April, 2015. 
~--=-~,__..Alff-· __, bw& ~-
Deborah Whipple Dennis Benjamin 
Attorneys for Stacey Grove 
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somebody who stayed that way for a week. I don't know 
in the literature if there's an example of somebody who 
stayed in that condition for a long, long time. But, 
you know, depending upon what you mean by long time, 
several days at a time, yes, I've seen that many times. 
Q. Doctor, why did you resign your position in 
Washington DC? 
A. I was under pressure because I came to Washington 
DC, you said yourself, from the fat into the -- or the 
frying pan into the fire, which was true. I came to a 
place that was horribly dysfunctional. It was very well 
known not only in the forensic community, but actually 
more broadly, that that agency was pretty much in chao.s:, 
had been for close to 20 years. And I came in to try to 
revitalize it. 
I was very tough in enforcing standards, 
enforcing ruies, trying to create an agency that worked 
much better. Along the way, I made a bunch of people 
unhappy, and they got together and decided to make all 
kinds of allegations about me and said that I did all 
kinds of terrible things and harassed them and so on and 
so forth. 
In the course of that, my position to leave that 
agency became untenable. There was publicity. The 





























point, and so it was clear I couldn't possibly lead this 
agency with people making all kinds of wild allegations. 
At that point, and under pressure from the government, I 
resigned my position. 
Q. Now, you're familiar, obviously, with the 
report -- the Final Report of Inspection of the Office 
of the Chief Medical Examiner conducted by the District 
of Columbia Office of the Inspector General? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And without going into a ton of detail on that, 
that report aacused you of gross mismanagement. Now, 
I'm going to as fair as I can to you, because being a 
government-€mployee-myself, I know that there's never 
enough money to do what needs to be done, and it's very 
-
easy to sit on the outside and tak~ potshots wi~hout 
looking at the fiscal realities or the political 
realities. And I'm going to grant you that. 
But I'm just going to ask you, this report had 
approximately 84 recommendations for changes, and you 
agreed with about 80 of them -- or 80 percent of them in 
your -- when you were given an opportunity to respond. 
One of the things~- and the reason I bring this up is 
in y~ur discussion with the jury this morning about your 
involvement in various child abuse things, you mentioned 













things that they were critical of you about, was it not, 
not attending those meetings? 
A. At some point late in my tenure, I could not 
possibly attend as many of those meetings as I wanted 
to. I had at that point -- most of the hand-picked team 
that I brought in had moved on to other jobs in other 
places. They had withstood a lot of tough service and a 
lot of bad times with me, and they chose to move on to 
other opportunities. So, I was short probably the two 
10 most important positions in my administrative team, my 
11 executive team. 
12 Other than all the other generalities you were 
13 -talking about ;:---·what's .c __ fiscal reality, what's political 












the agency. 1nd I wasn't able to backfill some of those 
very important critical positions of the people who were 
closest to me on the executive team. And as a result of 
more things happening.and more demands, yes, as a matter 
of fact, I missed a number of those meetings. 
stop supporting that Fatality Review Committee. 
I didn't 
We 
didn't stop supplying them with records and information 
and data. 
As a matter of fact, I think one of the other 
recommendations or accusations in that report has to do 
with not providing them with adequate facilities, which 
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is really nonsense. We took them into the Medical 
Examiner's Office. We tried to make statutory change or 
regulatory change to make them a part of the office 
because they had no home; they had no agency that 
actually sponsored them for a period of time. We gave 
them space. We gave them computers. We provided them 
with, you know, the place to work and the materials with 
which to work. And they didn't get everything they 
wanted and not everything worked perfectly, which is 
true in general of what happened in government when I 
was there. Not everything worked perfectly. 
And so, under the -- under the strains of not 
being able to· be i-n three,i,)laces at on.ce, I missed a 
number of meetings, and they correctly identified that 
in the report. No denying that. And I think they also 
said things about not providing them with support, which 
I really don't ag~ee with. 
Q. Certainly. 
to every story. 
I understand there's always two sides 
There were some statistical problems, 
though, a backlog of over 1300 autopsy reports, an 
accumulation of 189 bodies, some of which went back to 
2000. There was just not a good situation; is that 
correct? 
A. Well, it depends upon how you want to define not 















problems that were still ongoing at the time that I 
left. And I said -- when I responded to that report, I 
said, I'm the agency director. 
responsibility. 
I take ultimate 
Now, in reality, there are other forces at work, 
both within the agency and within the government in 
general, so that I mean, I couldn't possibly do every 
single thing myself. But I take responsible as the 
former chief of the agency for the problems. Some of 
those were problems that were very serious, and I wish I 
could say that I fixed them. I had about a five-year 
run trying to fix an agency that had been in the toilet 









examiner who did the job and understood the job for 
about 20 years. 
In fact, somebody else in my organization, in the 
National Association of Medical Examiners, publicly 
posted after they after I went that the average 
tenure of a chief medical examiner in the District of 
Columbia for the past 20 some odd years had been 
3.75 years. And I made five-and-a-half, so I'm 149 




But yes, there are some serious problems, and 
those are things that I can't deny and that I wouldn't 





























and were in the midst of making substantial improvements 
in the agency, and I'm proud of the improvements that I 
did make. 
Q. Now, you made mention, Doctor, of some wild 
accusations and so forth. And, again, without getting 
into a huge amount of detail, unless you wish to, those 
included allegations of sex~al harassment, sexual 
discrimination, and unlawful retaliation by five medical 
examiners, all women, and allegations of racial 
discrimination in the training of black students and 
residents. Now, those.are allegations. Were they 
investigated? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And were they investigated by the Office of 
Corporation Counsel 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. -- for Washington DC --
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. -- for the District of DC? And were they 
sustained? 
A. Well, there was some talk in the investigation 
that the investigator may ~ave believed that some of 
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these things happened. They were never actually 
sustained in the sense that the deciding official never 




























out. There was no due process hearing. I never had a 
chance to present a defense. None of these was ever 
adjudicated by any body, deciding official or otherwise. 
I was never sanctioned. I was never disciplined. 
I did resign under pressure. I wasn't fired. I 
resigned under pressure. And they probably would have 
moved to remove me had I not resigned. By the way, they 
also were motivated enough to pay me about a $70,000 
settlement after I left to avoid me suing them over this 
whole issue. So, I don't think it's fair to say that 




MR. SPICKLER: That's all I have, Your 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Spickler. 
Mr. Chapman, redirect? 
MR. CHAPMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHAPMAN: 
Q. We've been out here a long time, and I'm going to 
be very, very brief, okay? Is there anything that the 
Prosecutor asked you or answers that you've given that 
in any way changes the opinions you provided to this 
jury under direct examination? 
A. No, sir. 
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The State of Idaho, by and through Jessica M. Lorello and Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 
Attorneys General and Special Prosecuting Attorneys for Nez Perce County, hereby submit the 
state's post-evidentiary hearing closing argument. 




In January 2007, a grand jury indicted Petitioner Stacey Grove on one count of first-
degree murder for the death ofK.M. (Exhibit A (#36211 R., p.13).) Following a seven-day trial, 
a jury convicted Grove of that offense. (Exhibit A (#36211 R., p.210).) Grovewas.-repres.ente.cL .,,. 
at trial by Scott Chapman. (E.H. Tr., p.186, Ls.22-24.) Grove unsuccessfully challenged his 
conviction on appeal. Grove v. State, 151 Idaho 483,259 P.3d 629 (Ct. App. 2011). 
On September 7, 2012, Grove, with the assistance of coun~el, filed a post-conviction 
petition raising several claims. (Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.) Grove filed an 
amended petition on January 2, 2013. (Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
("Amended Petition").) Both Grove and the state filed motions for summary dismissal 1; the 
Court denied Grove's motion and granted the state's motion, in part, and denied it in part. 
(Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary Disposition ("Summary Dismissal Order"), filed 
July 11, 2013.) Grove filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court decied, and sought an 
interlocutory appeal, which this Court granted, but which the Idaho Supreme Court denied. The 
Court thereafter scheduled Grove's non-dismissed claims for an evidentiary hearing. In its 
Summary Dismissal Order, the Court identified the following claims that would be considered at 
the evidentiary hearing, which was held March 24-25, 2015: (1) "Whether counsel's 
performance was deficient during direct and cross-examination of [Grove]"; (2) "Whether 
counsel was deficient during the direct and cross-examination of Dr. Arden" with respect to the 
microscopic slides of tissue taken from K.M. and with respect to the prosecutor's impeachment 
of Dr. Arden; (3) "Whether counsel was deficient for failing to move for a mistrial because 
jurors may have been sleeping during the presentation of testimony"; and (4) "Whether defense 
1 Undersigned counsel were not appointed until after summary dismissal proceedings. 
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counsel's performance during closing argument was deficient." (Summary Dismissal Order, 
pp.38-39.) Following the evidentiary hearing, the Court set a briefing schedule for closing 
arguments . 
. .;,_.;~-· .,·.,.-_,,..,._.-:_.:.,._--~ ,_ ----
I. 
Grove Has Failed To Prove Either Deficient Performance Or Prejudice In Relation To Trial 
Counsel's Performance Regarding Grove's Testimony 
A. Introduction 
In his Amended Petition, Grove raised three claims relating to counsel's performance 
during Grove's direct examination and cross examination. First, Grove alleged "[d]efense 
counsel's performance was deficient when he failed to object to the prosecutor asking Mr. Grove 
when he had been prescribed Ativan and whether the prescription 'was a result of [his] emotional 
state Friday.'" (Amended Petition, p.32, 86.) 
Second, Grove alleged "counsel was deficient because he introduced evidence in the 
direct examination of Mr. Grove regarding the bad relationship between Mr. Grove and his son 
Alex" and claimed "[t]his evidence could have been kept out by filing a motion in limine as it is 
both irrelevant and inadmissible other acts evidence." (Amended Petition, p.33 ,, 91-91.1.) 
Third, Grove alleged "counsel's performance was deficient because he failed to object to 
the prosecutor questioning Mr. Grove about the fact that he was behind on child support" and 
claimed "[t]his evidence could have been kept out by filing a motion in limine as it is both 
irrelevant and inadmissible other acts evidence." (Amended Petition, pp.33-34, ~ 92, 92.1.) 
Grove failed to meet his burden of proof in relation to any of these allegations. 
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B. Grove Failed To- Meet His Burden Of Proving Counsel Was Ineffective During The 
Direct Or Cross-Examination Of Grove 
Grove's first claim relating to counsel's performance during Grove's cross-examination 
is based on a situation that arose at trial where Grove was unable to testify on the date counsel 
originally planned to have him testify. Following an in-chambers discussion, the Court invited 
defense counsel to explain the situation on the record, which he did, stating: 
... [A]s we discussed in chambers, based upon my observations and interactions 
with my client this morning, it became apparent to me that, for whatever reason, 
he was going to be unable to proceed today. 
We had originally anticipated his testimony this morning. And based 
upon what I would -- for lack of a better term, and I'm not a physician or anything 
of that nature, but an unraveling due to a culmination of stress and the pressures 
involved with this, he would be -- was to such a state that he would have been 
unable to testify. And, in my opinion, was unable -- or at least borderline unable, 
or would have been in that state, to assist me in the defense. 
We had a full schedule for today, and we had fully anticipated proceeding 
on that basis. But based upon lengthy discussions with him, and without waving 
[sic] any attorney/client privilege, I'll give the Court one example. In an effort to 
see where we were going to go with this, I started asking him fairly simple 
straightforward questions, as we would on the stand, like his name and date of 
birth. And when I asked him his address, he could not tell me his address. 
I've been at this for 23-plus years. I've never run into this before. It's 
with reluctance that I do this, but I've asked the Court for -- to continue the trial 
until Monday morning to enable us to seek medical help and get things put back 
together so that we could proceed. 
. . . And on that basis, would ask the Court to continue this matter until 
Monday morning. 
(Trial Tr.2, Vol. II, p.1061, L.18-p.1062, L.25.) 
The state objected to.the request for a continuance, explaining: 
2 The trial transcripts from the underlying criminal case were admitted as Exhibit B at the post-
conviction evidentiary hearing. (E.H. Tr., p.6, Ls.23-24.) For ease of reference, the state will 
refer to those transcripts as "Trial Tr." and by volume number. 
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Number one, despite Counsel's fears of the defendant being borderline unable to 
assist in his defense, there's been no adjudication of such a condition. However, 
having said that, I accept Mr. Chapman's explanation to the Court in its entirety 
as being true. 
Secondly, a trial is an organic process. It flows from the beginning to the 
end in a predictable manner .. And it is predictable that after a defendant heariuiay 
after day of incriminating evidence, that the defendant would feel some stress and 
some emotional reaction. 
But in this case, it's particularly important because it's the State's 
position, as it has been all along, that this defendant had an emotional meltdown 
on the morning that the injuries were inflicted on this child. And I believe the 
jury should be entitled to observe his demeanor as an additional factor to be 
weighed in deciding the facts of this case. 
While I understand that Defense Counsel, as well as the Prosecution, 
designs their case in such a way as to have witnesses come in in a certain order, it 
-- it appears to me if your lead witness is unavailable, he could at least sit here and 
observe the other testimony. 
And lastly, as a final alternative to granting this condition, the defendant 
could be called to the stand; and if the fears that Mr. Chapman had expressed, in 
fact, tum out to become reality, the Court could then grant the continuance. 
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1063, L.7-p.1064, L.10.) 
The Court granted defense counsel's request for a continuance and informed the parties 
that it was "simply going to tell the jurors that an unforeseen medical situation has arisen 
affecting our ability to proceed today" and that the trial would ''resume Monday morning" (Trial 
Tr., Vol. II, p.1064, L.18 - p.1066, L.6.) The Court so advised the jury. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, 
p.1066, L.20-p.1067, L.7.) 
When the trial resumed on Monday, defense counsel's first witness was Grove. (Trial 
Tr., Vol. II, p.1069, Ls.22-25.) During direct examination, Grove discussed his background and 
how he met K.M.'s mother, Lisa, and his relationship with Lisa, K.M., and Lisa's daug];lt~r-
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1070, L.18 - p.1073, L.22.) Grove also explained his relationship with his 
biological son, Alex. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1073, L.23-p.1074, L.24.) Grove then testified about 
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the days and events leading up to K.M. 's death, and events after K.M. 's death. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, 
pp.1074-1112.) 
Near the end of the prosecutor's cross-examination of Grove, the prosecutor inquired 
-- ~-:c-whether Grove was ~:currently on any medications.:' (Tri.alTr.,Vol. II.., p,.ll2Q,_J.,~.6~7.)_GrovX:,.:.~, ,~-- s'·-· '"· 
answered that he was taking Ativan, and then the following exchange occurred: 
Q. And when was that prescribed for you? 
A. Friday. 
Q. And that was the result of your emotional state Friday? 
A. Just -- yeah. I mean, it's -- it's just lack of sleep. It's just the whole thing. I 
mean, you know, this is pretty ... 
Q. Now, is this -- what effect does this Ativan have on your ability to testify? 
A. I don't believe anything. It just helped me get some sleep. Like I said,· 1 was 
exhausted. 
Q. So, you're okay -- you're okaytoday, and your --
A. I feel perfectly fine. 
Q. -- your memory is not affected by any --
A. No, sir. 
Q. -- medications? 
A. No, sir. 
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1120, Ls.9-25.) 
"To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show that 
the attorney's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by the 
deficiency." Heilman v. State, 158 Idaho 139, _, 344 P.3d 919, 925 (Ct. App. 2015). It is 
well-established that an attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls 
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below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 
Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 
"requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, 
a trial whose result is reliable.". Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). "Unless a 
defendant makes both showings, [ deficient performance and prejudice], it cannot be said that the 
conviction . . . resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result 
unreliable." Id. Other bedrock principles governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims, as 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Stricklang, are worth repeating: 
In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be 
whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. 
Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards 
and the like ... are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only 
guides. No particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily 
talce account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range 
of legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant. Any 
such set of rules would interfere with the constitutionally protected independence 
of counsel and restrict the wide latitude counsel must have in making tactical 
decisions. Indeed, the existence of detailed guidelines for representation could 
distract counsel from the overriding mission of vigorous advocacy of the 
defendant's cause. Moreover, the purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of 
the Sixth Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation, 
although that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system. The 
purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial. 
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is 
all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after 
conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining 
counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular 
act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney 
performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects 
of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, 
and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of 
the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
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professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption 
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound 
trial strategy. There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any 
given case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a 
particular client the same way. 
,.:·-< -_ The availability ef-intru.sive-p0st-trial inquiry into attorney performanc~:.or .. 
of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of 
ineffectiveness challenges. Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant 
would increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel's 
unsuccessful defense. Counsel's performance and even willingness to serve could 
be adversely affected. Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for 
acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of 
defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the 
trust between attorney and client. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688 (citations and quotations omitted). 
.·-.,;. ---·--, --·-- . 
Application of the correct legal standards shows Grove has failed to establish deficient 
performance, much less prejudice, in relation to defense counsel's failure to object to the 
prosecutor's inquiry into Grove's medication use at the time Grove testified. In support of his 
claim that counsel's lack of an· objection was deficient, Grove relies on Andrew Parnes'3 opinion 
that "the evidence was irrelevant." (Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.9.) Mr. Parnes' opinion 
on the subject falls far short of establishing the testimony was irrelevant as a matter of law. 
Indeed, it is unclear why a witness's ability to perceive and recall events would not be relevant 
The testimony could also be relevant in relation to Grove's demeanor at the time he testified, and 
3 Grove attempts to bolster Mr. Parnes' testimony by describing him as a "highly credible 
witness" and noting Mr. Parnes has "been an attorney for 37 years practicing criminal defense" 
and "was awarded a doctorate from Stanford and a law degree from UC-Berkeley, both world 
class universities." (Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.5.) While Mr. Parnes may be a fine 
attorney with degrees from well-known educational institutions, this does not mean that the 
· decisions Mr; Parnes thinks he would have made based on his limited review C?f th<? record are 
the only constitutionally permissible decisions. Indeed, such a conclusion would be contrary to 
the Strickland standard. Mr. Chapman, having been an attorney for 30 years, during which time 
he handled an estimated 500 plus criminal cases, with approximately 20 jury trials, is certainly 
well-qualified, knowledgeable regarding the law, capable of making strategic and tactical 
decisions, and a highly credible witness as well. (E.H. Tr., p.229, L.19-p.230, L.17.) 
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his emotional state, as compared to what his demeanor may have been in relation to K.M. when 
Grove was alone with him before he became unresponsive, was hospitalized, and died. As the 
prosecutor noted in objecting to the continuance that was required due to Grove's condition 
! I 
i ! 
· ·-·--·c--.· ·--- ··-· when~tfral·-counsel requested-the--eontinuance, the-,state~s,.theory was. that_,µrQY-~-:-~~h!Ml_an_ -·-- ______ ..... ~ _ 
emotional meltdown on the morning that the injuries were inflicted on this child," and the jury 
was "entitled to observe his demeanor as an additional factor to be weighed in deciding the facts 
of this case." 
Even if the relevance of the testimony was debatable, Grove did not prove that trial 
counsel's decision not to object was constitutionally deficient. As the Idaho Supreme Court 
recently explained, "In our view, counsel's choice of witnesses, manner of cross-examination, 
and lack of objection.to testimonyfalL within the area of ta9tic~l, or stra.,tegic, decisions .... " 
State v. Abdullah, _Idaho_, _P.3d_, 2015 WL 856787, *112 (2015). Such tactical or 
strategic decisions "wilr not be second guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief 
under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to have resulted 
from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or some other shortcomings capable 
of objective review." Id. That Mr. Parnes believes he would have objected does not mean Mr. 
Chapman was deficient for making a different decision. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 ("There 
are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal 
defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way."). 
Grove has also failed to prove that Mr. Chapman's failure to object to the prosecutor's 
inquiry about Grove's use of Ativan was an error "so serious as to deprive [Grove] of a fair 
trial." Strickland, 668 U.S. at 687. This case did not turn on whether Grove started taking 
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Ativan three days-before he testified in order to help him sleep. The jury's knowledge of that -
fact does not render its guilty verdict unreliable. 
C. Grove Failed To Meet His Burden Of Proving Counsel Was Ineffective In Relation To 
··· - ---- -~--=,~~~ec:,--,-'The-Testimony-About Gr-eve's Relationshli:?c-Witb: His BiologicaLSon,Jncluding_ That _ 
Grove Had Not Been Paying Child Support 
On direct examination, Grove testified that he had a "great" relationship with K.M. and 
K.M.'s sister. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1073, Ls.1-2.) Following that, trial counsel inquired about 
Grove's relationship with his biological son. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1073, L.23 - p.1074, L.4.) 
Grove explained that it was a "complicated situation," but described his son as a "great boy." 
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1074, Ls.5-6.) Grove, however, had a "rocky relationship" with his son's 
mother. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1074, Ls.7-11.) Grove believed the strained relationship with his 
- - -- -· . ---
son's mother made the situation with his son "bard" and he thought it caused his son "stress" 
when Grove was seeing him. (Trial Tr.,_Vol. II, p.1074, Ls.12-17.) As a result, Grove thought it 
"would be best if [he] removed [himself] from the situation until [his son] was old enough to be 
able to ... talk with him about what was going on." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1074, Ls.16-24.) 
Grove characterizes this testimony as the presentation of a "bad relationship" between 
Grove and his son. (Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.3.) To the contrary, the testimony was 
simply that Grove did not have an active relationship with his biological son, not that he had a 
"bad" one. It was not deficient for counsel to inquire into this area given that the defense clearly 
wanted to portray Grove as a caring father-figure to K.M. and his sister - a reasonable strategy 
under the circumstances of this case. The state's obvious response to that would have been to 
ask about Grove's relationship with his biological son. It is not an unreasonable tactical decision 
for the defense to ask the question first. Grove has failed to articulate any basis for this Court to 
conclude that the line of questioning was based on a lack of preparation, ignorance of the law, or 
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some -other objective shortcoming. Rather, Grove implies that the line of questioning was an 
"accident," but offers no evidence to support such a claim. (Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.3.) 
Because Mr. Chapman was not deficient for inquiring into Grove's relationship with his 
,-;_,;o.c~·--:-s._c---,·biofogica-l: son;-there was no-basis-forcounsel:.te-ohject-tothe prosec.utor-'s,inqµicy __ onthe.sam.e _______ .. _ 
subject. As for counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's specific question on cross-
examination regarding Grove not paying child support, a topic not directly addressed on direct, 
Grove claims ''this question was not relevant to any issue at trial and an objection to it would 
have been sustained." (Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.4.) Whether an objection would have 
been sustained does not, however, resolve whether Grove has met his burden of proving 
constitutional deficiency. Grove has not. Just because Mr. Chapman did not object does not 
mean the decision was not strategic or :tactical, based on _igngrance of the law, __ or lack of 
preparation. As noted, "counsel's choice of witnesses, manner of cross-examination, and lack of 
objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or strategic, decisions." Abdullah, 2015 
WL 856787, * 112. Mr. Chapman's testimony regarding the child support question illustrates 
this point. Mr. Chapman indicated that, to the best of his recollection, he would not object in 
order to avoid ''mak[ing] it any bigger than it is." (Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.4 (quoting 
E.H. Tr., p.189, Ls.3-5).) Nevertheless, Grove contends "[t]his is not evidence of a strategic 
decision on defense counsel's part" because he "qualifie[d] his answer with 'I guess' and- 'best as 
I can recollect."' (Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.4.) Grove's contention reveals a 
misunderstanding of the applicable presumption and his burden. The presumption is that the 
decision was strategic or tactical and it is Grove's burden to overcome that presumption. That 
Mr. Chapman had to speculate about his thought process behind not objecting to a question 
asked during a trial that took place nearly seven years ago does not overcome the presumption 
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and neither the state nor Mr. Chapman were required to prove the underlying reasons for every 
single choice trial counsel made during trial. 
In addition to his failure to meet his burden of proving deficient performance with respect 
0-:~,<:---~·'., .. ,,,;,io ·the ··testimony· elicited about ,Gt.'eve?-eS:0-relationship with hi&:son-and his .failure-to pay. .child -... 
support, Grove has failed to prove resulting prejudice. In fact, Grove's prejudice argument on 
this issue is unclear. It appears Grove may be contending that it was prejudicial because it 
"undermine[d] the defense case which 'was based on Mr. Grove's credibility' and the 'scientific 
evidence. "'4 (Petitioner's Closing Argument, pp.4-5.) Grove, however, does not explain how 
this is so. The fact that Grove made the decision not to have an active relationship with his 
biological son because he thought that decision was in his son's best interest has no bearing on 
his credibility and has absolutely nothingto do with the "scientific evid~nce." The same is true 
regarding his lack of child support payments. There is no reasonable probability that the jury 
.. . ~ ' 
would have reached a different result in this case if it had never heard evidence that· Grove was · · 
not actively paying child support and did not maintain a relationship with his biological son. 
Grove failed to meet his burden of proving otherwise. 
II. 
Grove Has Failed To Prove Either Deficient Performance Or Prejudice For Not Supplying The 
Iron-Stained Slides To Dr. Arden 
A. Introduction 
Grove claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to supply iron-stained slides to 
Dr. Arden prior to trial. (Amended Petition, pp.35-37,, 97.) Specifically, he alleged Dr. Arden 
"requested ... all existing microscopic slides for examination prior to trial" (Amended Petition, 
4 Grove also complains that the prosecutor committed misconduct ''when he raised the child 
support issue." (Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.6.) Any independent prosecutorial 
misconduct claim is not properly before the Court. (See Summary Dismissal Order, pp.38-39.) 
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p:3s,-,r 97.1), but Mr. Chapman "did not comply with that request" (id. at p.35,-~ 97.l(a)), and 
had the slides been supplied, Dr. Arden "could have testified that  had been injured at some 
much earlier time or times" (id at p.37, ,r 97.1(1)). 
-- .. --- ---Counsel ·must conduct-a·-~'-reasonabls--investigation'..''-'-for- ·potential exculpatory _evidence, 
but failure to discover additional exculpatory evidence is not unreasonable unless "the known 
evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further." Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 
396, 412-13, 327 P.3d 372, 388-89 (Ct. App. 2013). 
Grove's claim fails because Dr. Arden testified at trial that he had been supplied with all 
the information he needed to form opinions about the case and that Mr. Chapman and the 
prosecution had provided everything he had requested. The evidence establishes that Mr. 
-- Chapman in fact conducted an adequatefactual investigation by providing his expert with all_Jh~ 
information his expert requested, and thus did not render deficient performance. Furthermore, 
there was no prejudice because the post-conviction examination of the iron slides produced 
evidence with no actual exculpatory value. 
B. Grove Has Failed To Prove Deficient Performance Because The Evidence Shows That 
Mr. Chapman In Fact Provided Dr. Arden With All The Materials Dr. Arden Needed Or 
Requested For Review Of This Case 
At the trial Dr. Arden testified as follows: 
Q. Did you feel like there was any information that you needed in order to form 
opinions about this that was not provided to you? 
A. No, sir. And, in fact, I will tell you that along the course of reviewing 
materials, one of the things that I felt I needed was the recuts of the slides. They 
didn't come initially. And so, at that point, I requested them of you, and you and 
the state arranged for them to be.provided. _So, what I requested I was given. 
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- (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1252, 1.25 - p.1253, L.9 (emphasis added).) Dr. Arden's trial testimony 
conclusively establishes that he was provided all of the materials he "needed to form opinions" 
about the case and that "what [he] requested [he] was given." 
· · · ---· ---- ·· ·· At-the evidentiary- ··kea:ring-Dr,··:Arden · stat,ed,.,.tb.atA1e,requested ''.alLof the 
slides that were done pursuant to this autopsy." (E.H. Tr., p.133, 1.24 - p.134, L.11.) When 
asked about "when he testified at the criminal trial" that he had "received all the information [he] 
needed to form opinions about that case," Dr. Arden answered that his trial testimony was only 
"correct insofar as I had received everything I needed to support the opinions that I was prepared 
to render, that I was prepared to give under oath." (E.H. Tr., p.138, Ls.14-23.) 
Dr. Arden's attempt to qualify the testimony he gave at trial is unpersuasive. When 
~asked if''there was any:information that [he.]_ne.eded in order toform QPinions about this [case]_ __ 
that was not provided to [him]" he unqualifiedly answered, "No." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1252, 
L.25 - p.1253, L.3.) Dr. Arden further testified that, ''what [he] requested, [he] was given." 
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1253, Ls.8-9.) He did not testify at trial that he "received everything [he] 
needed to support the opinions that [he] was prepared to render" but did not receive enough 
information to make a thorough review of the case and that he had requested additional materials 
that had not been supplied. Any finding that Dr. Arden requested additional information he felt 
was necessary to thoroughly review the case and it was not provided to him would require a 
conclusion that Dr. Arden was deliberately deceptive in his trial testimony. 
The evidence in this case shows that Mr. Chapman arranged for Dr. Arden to be supplied 
with all of the materials Dr. Arden requested and felt he needed. He was not required to conduct 
further investigation into whether supplying additional, unrequested materials might help the 
defense. Grove has therefore failed to prove deficient performance. 
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C. Grove Has Failed To Prove Prejudice Because Dr. Arden'-s Testimony About Prior. 
Healed Injuries Has Little. If Any. Probative Value . 
Grove has also failed to prove prejudice. Dr. Arden's discovery of prior, healed injuries 
through his examination of the iron-stained slides is not exculpatory evidence. 
Dr. Arden testified that when he examined the iron-stained slides for the post-conviction 
action he discovered evidence of healed injuries in one of K.M.' s eyes, his back, and the 
mesentery in his abdomen that were "substantially older" than the injuries that killed K.M. CE:& 
E.H. Tr., p.162, L.19 - p.164, L.7; p.166, Ls.12-19; p.166, L.21 - p.169, L.10; p.173, L.20 -
p.177, L.13.) He also testified that he could detect those injuries in the standard "H and E" 
stained slides, which he had examined prior to trial. (E.H. Tr., p.135, Ls.14-21; p.165, Ls.5-11; 
p.174, L.14 - p.175, L.2.) Dr. Arden testified in post-conviction that seeing the iron-stained 
-· - -~---.----~- - .. - .. ----- -- -- --------- ·-.- .-·· ------ ---- - - --·--- ----- - -- ·-- -· ·-··· -··---- --- --- - ···- ···-·· .. - -- -- - ··-· ·------ - --
slides did not "change[] any of the opinions [Dr. Arden] expressed;' at trial, but did cause him to 
"exp~d[] [his] opinion to include some injuries of greater age." (E.H. Tr., P·!_72, Ls.5-12; see 
also p.177, Ls.4-13.) 
The trial transcript, however, reveals that Dr. Arden testified that he had observed injuries 
of more than a week old and used those observations to form his opinions. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, 
p.1302, L.15 - p.1304, L.1 (discussing older, healed injuries); p.1308, L.16 - p.1309, L.11 
(discussing older injuries in context of whether  would have shown severe symptoms); 
p.1340, Ls.16-24 (acknowledging that his findings of prior injuries were disclosed in pre-trial 
discovery); p.1363, Ls.2-20 (discussing older injuries with scarring).) The record does not 
establish that Dr. Arden made any truly new findings based on his review of the iron-stained 
slides. 
Moreover, the existence of older injuries does not call the verdict into question. Grove 
contends this testimony "would have effectively countered Dr. Hunter's and Dr. Harper's 'in my 
RESPONDENT'S POST-EVIDENTIARY HEARING CLOSING ARGUMENT - 15 
538
experience' claims that [K.M.] could not have been active after receiving the injuries that 
resulted in his death." (Petitioner's Closing Argument, p. 19 (internal quote original).) The 
evidence does not support this argument. 
Dr. Hunter testified that .. K.M.'s,abdominaUnjuries (exclusive of brain injuries),W,Q11Jd..._,,_._ .. -
have produced "absolute agony ... an incredible amount of pain." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.872, Ls.1-
15.) He further testified that, to his knowledge and in his experience, the severe brain injuries 
suffered by K.M. would have . "produc[ ed] immediate symptoms" from "severe headache and 
confusion to unconsciousness," with unconsciousness being more likely. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, 
p.875, Ls.2-22.) Dr. Hunter testified that it was "virtually impossible" that K.M. engaged in 
activities such as playing, laughing, climbing, and getting himself pudding after being injured. 
- - _(Trial TL, \foLII,_p.8}_6,_Ls,7-20.)_ Dr. Rarp~r testified that K.M.'sabdominal and brain injuries ~·· ~ 
would have caused K.M. to be "immediately" and "obviously critically ill," including being 
· "unconscious or semi-conscious," and were inconsistent with K.M. 's described activities prior to 
being left with Grove. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1033, L.12-p.1037, L.24.) 
Grove does not explain how Dr. Arden's testimony about previously undetected older 
injuries would have countered these medical opinions. Grove has presented no evidence that the 
prior, healed injuries were significant in scope or severity. By definition they were less severe 
than the fatal injuries Dr. Hunter and Dr. Harper testified were inconsistent with K.M.'s 
described activities before being left in Grove's care. Moreover, there is no evidence that K.M. 
was not symptomatic of having suffered some form of injury in the weeks or months prior to his 
death. Finally, because Dr. Arden detected no additional brain injuries the testimony related to 
the physical effects of that ultimately fatal injury are completely unimpeached, even under 
Grove's theory. 
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Evidence that K.M. suffered previous injuries of unknown severity in his back, eye, and 
mesentery in no way impeaches the testimony about the pain and other physical manifestations 
that would have been caused by infliction of the ultimately fatal injuries to his abdomen and 
brain~ ··-6mve -:-has-· failed- to establish-,that--fuis-t0stimony -is .. even .relevant,.-much ,l~$_-J:p.atjts., _ .,. .. , 
presentation at trial would probably have produced a different result. He has therefore failed to 
prove prejudice. 
III. 
Grove Has Failed To Show Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Regarding The Impeachment Of 
Dr. Arden 
A. Introduction 
Grove alleged that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel for "failing to 
-- -----·---··--·--·--· ----- --· ---·-· - ··- ------ ----- ·- ·- ··-
object to the prosecutor attempting to impeach Dr. Arden with alleged 'gross mismanagement' 
when he was the Medical Examiner in the District court Columbia" and "failing to attempt to 
rehabilitate Dr. Arden on re-direct examination." (Amended Petition, pp.32-33, ~~ 87-88.5) 
Grove has failed to prove his claims under the applicable legal standards. 
B. Grove Has Failed To Prove Deficient Performance 
During direct examination, Dr. Arden described a "20-year career of government 
employment for public service working for four different medical examiner offices" after 
completing his education. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1242, Ls.14-22.) He "first worked in the Office 
5 In his closing argument Grove also claims counsel provided ineffective assistance for failing to 
object "to the impeachment of Dr. Arden as being on a special mission." (Petitioner's Closing 
Argument, p. 17.) Grove did not allege this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in his 
Amended Petition. (See generally Amended Petition; see also Petitioner's Closing Argument, p. 
11 (listing claims made in Amended Petition and not including claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel for not objecting to "special mission" impeachment). Because it was not pled, this claim 
is not properly before this Court. Hull v. Giesler, 156 Idaho 765,777,331 P.3d 507,519 (2014) 
(" An unpleaded issue not tried by either express or implied consent cannot be the basis for a 
court's decision."). 
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of the Medical Examiner for Suffolk County," New York. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1240, Ls.22-25.) 
After two years in Suffolk County he "then went to Delaware, where [he] was an assistant 
medical examiner for the state of Delaware for a three-years [sic] period." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, 
-- -"-, '~-124-3;<Ls.3.-.5 .} He then-,work-ed -nine-years-in-the-Office of Chief Mediqal:Ex~mer.b:i New . 
York City, first as a medical examiner, then as a deputy chief medical examiner supervising the 
office covering one of the five burrows, and finally as First Deputy Chief Medical Examiner. 
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1243, L.5 - p.1244, L.4.) He then became the Chief Medical Examiner of 
Washington, D.C., a position he left in October, 2003. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1244, Ls.5-10.) 
After leaving government service he opened a private consulting practice "in the field of forensic 
pathology and medicine." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1244, Ls.11-17.) 
____ . ___ In~cross~examinatiOil the_prosecutor eJilllored _D.r. Arden's transition from government 
employ to private consulting work. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1375 L.8 - p.1378, L.8.) The topics 
included how fast he was able to grow his consulting business, why there is an apparent gap in 
his work history, and why he had recently taken part-time work for a medical examiner's office. 
(Id.) The prosecutor then asked, ''Doctor, why did you resign your position in Washington, 
DC?" (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1382, Ls.6-7.) Dr. Arden testified that he took over a "dysfunctional" 
office, tried to "revitalize it" by being "very tough in enforcing standards" which made "a bunch 
of people unhappy" so they made "all kinds of allegations" and "said that [he] did all kinds of 
terrible things and harassed them," so "under pressure from the government, [he] resigned [his] 
position." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1382, L.8-p.1383, L.4.) The prosecutor then asked Dr. Arden a 
series of questions based on the "Final Report of Inspection of the Office of the Chief Medical 
. -
Examiner conducted by the District of Columbia Office of the Inspector General" and an 
investigation by the Office of Corporate Counsel for Washington DC. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1383, 
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L.5 - p.1388, L.11.) Dr. Arden acknowledged that he resigned under pressure, but was not fired 
and was paid $70,000 so that he would not sue. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1388, Ls.5-11.) Mr. 
Chapman on re-direct asked if anything in cross examination had "chang[ ed] the opinions [he] 
.. - ,,._., ,·.·;{'Jo¥i4ed.to this jury und.er,.direcLexaminatio~ towhich Dr. Arden respo:p.~~.40:~~Q., liit,'', (Trjal ·_;:-~·- ·;,.- . c .. 
Tr., Vol. II, p.1388, Ls.20-25.) 
In closing arguments the prosecutor told the jury the evidence shows that Dr. Arden ''was 
a well-paid public servant for many years" but "resigned his position under pressure." (Trial Tr., 
Vol. II, p.1428, Ls.20-23.) This resignation led to him making his living for the previous five 
years as a "paid consultant." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1428, L.23 - p.1429, L.1.) The prosecutor 
encouraged the jury, when deciding credibility, to consider whether the circumstances under 
_ whic11 ]2r, .Argeg left Qµblic. em__pl9yment and entered consultancy might have created a_ financial .. _ 
incentive to take less than clear-cut cases and provide testimony ultimately beneficial to the 
defendants who hired him. (Trial Tr., Vol. U, p.1429, Ls.2-13.) 
In closing arguments Mr. Chapman argued, "Don't let the Prosecutor fool you" with 
argument about how Dr. Arden is a paid consultant, because the evidence established he was an 
accomplished medical examiner. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1441, L.19 -p.1444, L.3.) He also argued 
that although the circumstances under which Dr. Arden left the Washington, DC, medical 
examiner's office were "less-than-ideal," they "were administrative things at best and have 
nothing at all to do with his qualifications to render an opinion or the opinion he has rendered." 
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1444, Ls.4-12.) He asserted the prosecutor's approach was "if you can't get 
at the man's testimony, get at the man." (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1444, Ls.13-16.) He asserted the 
prosecutor wanted to "harp on" the resignation, which was political in nature, because he had 
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nothing to-undercut Dr. Arden's integrity or his skills· and qualifications. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, 
p.1444, Ls.16-24.) 
The record from the underlying criminal case thus establishes that the prosecutor 
-- -, .-,~. -"i,,-,--,attempted to impeach- -Dr. Arden-:with-evidence ... thaLhe had left ,hisjo;b .a~iJ:P,~ heact rne9J9sfil.s .. -., ... ;.. ._ ,,. 
examiner in Washington, DC, involuntarily to start a consulting business, and that lead to a 
reasonable inference of a financial motive to take consulting jobs in questionable cases and 
testify favorably to defendants. Counsel chose to respond to that tactic by arguing that the 
circumstances of leaving the DC job and becoming a consultant did not affect Dr. Arden's 
opinion in any way, and even suggested that the prosecutor's tactic was a sign of weakness in the 
ability to attack the substance of that opinion. 
__ ___ _ _ _ ___ Groye mesented no evidence that_ coUU§_el' s tactical choice to addressthe circumstances ___ _ __ 
of Dr. Arden leaving the DC job through argument was the result of objective shortcomings. In 
fact, the evidence presented shows quite the opposite. When asked, Mr. Chapman testified that 
he was aware of both the facts and the law6 related to the issue and tactically handled it the way 
he did because he concluded the evidence related to Dr. Arden leaving the DC office did. not 
undermine "Dr. Arden's opinion or his medical abilities and that the jurors would see that." 
(E.H. Tr., p.204, L.8 - p.207, L.6.) He did testify in retrospect that presenting the evidence 
himself to "pull the thorn" might have been a better tactical choice (E.H. Tr., p.207, L.7 -p.208, 
L.13), but such "second guessing" does not show deficient performance, Abdull!:!h, 2015 WL 
856787 at * 112. 
6 Mr. Chapman testified that evidence regarding Dr. Arden's forced departure from the DC 
examiner job was not "relevant to his credibility as to his medical opinions" or the "credibility of 
his medical testimony," and that it "could be" prejudicial. (E.H. Tr., p.205, Ls.1-13.) This 
testimony was consistent with his closing argument to the jury. Mr. Chapman did not testify he 
thought the evidence was irrelevant to all issues in the case, was unfairly prejudicial, or that it 
was inadmissible. 
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· While the trial transcript and Mr. Chapman's testimony support the presumption of 
effective performance, the only evidence that actually supports a claim that trial counsel's 
tactical decisions were objectively unreasonable is the testimony of Mr. Parnes. (Petitioner's 
carrying Grove's burden of proof. Mr. Parnes opined that counsel should have objected because 
he might have gotten a favorable ruling7 and would have preserved the issue for appeal. (E.H. 
Tr., p.256, L.19 - p.258, L.14.) While Mr. Parnes is entitled to make tactical choices in cases 
where he is counsel, what tactical choices he would have made in this case is of little, if any, 
relevance to whether Mr. Chapman's choices were based on an objective shortcoming such as 
ignorance of the law or inadequate preparation. 
_______ .. The. decisiQJl!LOf _whether. to ob~ctto admission _of evidence of the circumstances_ Dr. 
Arden left the DC examiner's job; whether to present it in direct examination; whether to 
rehabilitate in re-direct examination; or address it in closing argument (which is what counsel 
ultimately elected to do), are all tactical decisions. Such decisions are second-guessed only if 
based on an objective shortcoming such as ignorance of the law or inadequate preparation. 
Because Grove presented no evidence of any objective shortcoming, he has failed to prove 
deficient performance. 
C. Grove Has Failed To Prove Prejudice 
To prove prejudice the petitioner must "establish by a preponderance of the evidence that 
there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different." Abdullah, 2015 WL 
856787, -*89. · Grove has failed to prove prejudice because the evidence in __ question was 
7 The state does not believe Mr. Parnes' motion would have succeeded. The admissibility of the 
cross-examination is addressed in the prejudice argument, below. 
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admissible and, even if inadmissible would not have created a reasonable probability that the 
result would have been different. 
"Relevant evidence is generally admissible." State v. Harvey, 142 Idaho 527, 532, 129 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Harvey, 142 Idaho 
at 532, 129 P.3d at 1281 (citing I.R.E. 401). Evidence impeaching or corroborating a witness's 
testimony i~ always relevant. See State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533, 540, 285 P.3d 348, 355 (Ct. 
App. 2012) (quoting United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984)) ("Generally, 'Proof of bias is 
almost always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has 
. _historically been entitled to .. assess.all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a 
.. . .. '. '-·--- ---·---·.·. .·.·. -,--·-- .. - ----- --··- -·--· --- ~ -~--
witness' testimony."'). 
Dr. Arden's career path changed-rather dramatically a few years before trial, when he 
went from an upwardly mobile career track working for government medical examiner offices to 
running his own consulting business. The prosecutor explored that change from several angles, 
including the change in practice of writing reports in every case as a medical examiner to writing 
reports only if requested by a defense attorney (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1318, L.11 -p.1320, L.19); 
whether Dr. Arden had effectively switched from testifying for one side to testifying for the other 
(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1376, L.2 - p.1377, L.8); and whether he had given different opinions in 
similar cases when he was a medical examiner (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1323, L.19 - p.1328, L.3). 
The prosecutor explored evidence of a gap between the medical examiner job and establishing 
the consulting business and the speed at which the consulting business grew. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, 
p.1375, L.14 - p.1376, L.1; p.1377, L.9 - p.1378, L.8.) Only part of the exploration of this 
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subject of the change in-career path and why-that Dr. Arden was forced out of his career path 
upon accusations of mismanagement, including sexual harassment (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1382, L.6 
- p.1388, L.11)--does Grove believe his counsel should have objected to. All of it, however, 
w.as.,relevantAo- explore- potential-bias.--ThatD.r,o--Nd&n, . .:was:forced from hi~::..&.h9.s.~g,.ca.r,eer _path 
because of allegations of mismanagement and therefore had a gap in employment and had to 
build a business was all relevant to show bias in taking this case and reaching conclusions 
helpful to the defense. Grove has not shown the evidence to be irrelevant. 
Nor has he shown it to be inadmissible because it was unfairly prejudicial. "Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations 
__ _ of undJ1e_ delay, waste_ of time, or_needless presentation of cumulative evideI1ce." State v. Ruiz, _ _ 
150 Idaho 469,471,248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010) (quoting I.RE. 403). "To exclude evidence under 
Rule 403, the trial court must address whether the probative value is substantially outweighed by -
one of the considerations listed in the Rule." Ruiz, 150 Idaho at 471, 248 P.3d at 722. This 
balancing test is committed to the discretion of the trial judge. Id. Although there is arguably 
some potential for unfair prejudice from the evidence in question, the prosecutor focused on the 
effect those accusations had on Dr. Arden's career path and his ultimate choice to abandon (or 
mostly abandon) working as a government medical examiner and instead become a consultant 
hired by criminal defendants. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1428, L.20-p.1429, L.13.) Grove has failed 
' 
to establish that this evidence was inadmissible. 
More importantly, even if inadmissible it is unlikely that this evidence played any 
significant role in the verdict. As noted above, Mr. Chapman vigorously argued that this 
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evidence did not -ultimately undercut Dr. Arden's medical opinion. This argument likely 
reduced, if not eliminated, any unfair prejudice. 
Moreover, it is exceedingly unlikely that the jury resolved differences in the medical 
__ ,,.,.,,<,_ testimony. based-. on evidence of a forced resi~u_o:Yer.allegations o,f.o:ffic_e:.mi,~m~agen:i~_nt. . _ 
Dr. Ross and Dr. Arden agreed the fatal injuries were inflicted about three days before death, but 
Dr. Ross marked death at cross-clamping (stopping the heart and therefore the flow of blood 
carrying the cells involved in healing), which meant the injuries were inflicted on the day K.M. 
was admitted to the hospital (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.933, L.3 - p.936, L.1; p.968, Ls.6-23), while 
Dr. Arden measured the time of death as some amorphous time between brain death and cross-
clarnping, meaning the injuries were inflicted before K.M. was in Grove's exclusive physical 
_ ~ ___ custod)'. (lrial Tr., Vol. l1 p.126~ L.2] =-P.J~67~ L)~~ Far more likely than differences in the 
medical evidence being resolved on whether Dr. Arden was guilty of mismanagement is the 
probability that the medical evidence-was resolved because Dr. Arden failed to articulate why he 
thought brain death would have stopped the biological healing processes by which the doctors 
aged the injuries, as opposed to cross-clamping, which stopped the heart. 
Even more likely, the jury concluded that K.M. would have immediately shown 
symptoms of his fatal injuries. As set forth above, the doctors who testified for the state were of 
the opinion that the infliction of the fatal injuries would have resulted in immediate severe 
symptoms that would have excluded the activities K.M. was seen engaged in between returning 
home and being left in Grove's custody. Dr. Arden's opinion that the symptoms would not have 
coincided with the injury (Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.1306, L.15 - p.1310, L.25) was ultimately 
unpersuasive. 
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Grove has failed to prove prejudice. First, the evidence that Dr. Arden was forced to 
change career paths because of accusations of mismanagement was admissible to show bias and 
was not excludable as unfairly prejudicial. More importantly, however, there is little reason to 
·' -- -,---- 0 - ·-" --- --believe that-the evidence of mismanagement-p.l-3¥eciany significant-role.as cq_mpared toJ::vidence_ _ 
that the biological healing process did not stop upon brain death (but instead stopped upon heart 
death) and that K.M. would have been immediately and obviously symptomatic upon being so 
severely injured. 
III. 
Grove Has Failed To Prove Either Deficient Performance Or Prejudice For Not Moving For A 
Mistrial Because Jurors Were Allegedly Sleeping 
A. Introduction 
--- -- ----- -···- ·- ---·· - -~-·- - - -- - - --- -- ------·--- ------- -. ---- - ---····--· -- -- --- ·- --·--··· - ---- - - - ---- --· 
Grove alleged that his trial counsel's performance was "deficient because he failed to 
move for a mistrial after many jurors fell asleep during the testimony." (Amended Petition, p.33, 
',• -
, 90.) Grove has failed to prove this claim. First, Grove has failed to show that a mistrial 
motion by counsel based on a claim of sleeping jurors would have been granted. Second, even if 
a juror or two were having trouble staying awake for part of the trial, Grove has failed to show 
that Mr. Chapman's tactical choice to not move for a mistrial was based on any objective 
shortcoming. Finally, he has established no prejudice. 
B. Grove Has Failed To Show That A Mistrial Motion Would Have Been Granted 
"To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the petitioner must show that 
the attorney's performance was deficient and that the ·petitioner was prejudiced by the 
deficiency." Keserovic v. State, 158 Idaho 234, 345 P.3d 1024 (Ct. App. 2015) (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). Where a claim of ineffective assistance 
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of counsel is based on a failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion "would not have 
been granted by the trial court, is generally determinative of the Strickland test." Abdullah, 2015 
WL 856787, *96 (brackets omitted); see also Zepeda v. State, 152 Idaho 710, 715, 274 P.3d 11, 
-16 (Ct: App. 2012). Grove-faile4t~-c&h@wthata mistriaLmotion, ifmade by counsel,would 
have been granted. Thus, he has failed to prove either prong of his ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim. 
A mistrial is appropriate where there has been conduct, inside or outside of the 
courtroom, that is "prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the defendant of a fair trial." I.C.R. 
29. l(a). A mistrial should be granted where "the event which precipitated the motion for a 
mistrial represented reversible error when viewed in the context of the record." State v. 
trial because of a juror's inattentiveness, the defendant must demonstrate the misconduct by clear 
and convincing evidence and also prove "the identity and duration of the specific testimony, 
argument or instructions the juror missed." State v. Strange, 147 Idaho 686, 689, 214 P.3d 672, 
675 (Ct. App. 2008); see also Campbell v. State, 130 Idaho 546, 549, 944 P.2d 143, 146 (Ct. 
App. 1997). 
Where a juror has been inattentive, remedies include "admonishment of any inattentive 
juror, replacement of a juror with an alternate or, in appropriate circumstances, declaration of a 
mistrial." State v. Bolen, 143 Idaho 437,441, 146 P.3d 703, 707 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Grove has failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that juror misconduct due to 
inattentiveness occurred at trial. He has also failed to show prejudice because the evidence does 
not establish the identity and duration of any testimony allegedly missed. Finally, he has failed 
to show that remedies short of mistrial were inadequate. 
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Grove's claim of juror misconduct relies almost entirely upon the testimony of friends 
and family who assert they saw one or more jurors apparently sleeping. This testimony is not 
credible. Furthermore, it is rebutted by credible evidence. 
· .·,, .. ········-· ··· ·:··-- ···-···-Grove presented-the tsstiffloay-.--ef--fivewitnesses,_asserting .juror.misconduct during the ... 
testimony of Dr. Ross. Debbie Grove, Grove's mother, testified that five jurors-Neiman, Lind, 
Yates, Barrett, and Loetscher-were "sleeping and nodding off." (E.H. Tr., p.13, L.22 - p.14, 
L.5; p.15, Ls.21-25; p.17, L.20-p.19, L.3.) Carol Grove, Grove's grandmother, testified she saw 
three jurors, Loetscher, Barrett, and ''the gentleman ... that had a mustache," "sleeping" during 
Dr. Ross's testimony. (E.H. Tr., p.75, L.11 - p.78, L.4.) Karen Stamper, a friend of the Grove 
family, saw two male jurors "sleeping." (E.H. Tr., p.93, L.15 - p.95, L.25.) Craig Stamper, a 
- - ---- ~personaLfriend...oLGrov..e,Jestified~thatJID.e..j!ll'or, Loetscher._"ap_p~ed to be sleeQ_ing." (E.H_. ____ _ 
Tr., p.104, L.13 - p.106, L.17.) Justina Hyder, a close friend of Grove, testified that jurors 
· Loetscher arid Yates were "obviously sleeping" and other, unidentified, -jurors were· '~kind of 
nodding off." (E.H. Tr., p.110, L.10 - p.113, L.20.) 
All of the witnesses testified that these observations were made shortly before the 
. 
prosecutor asked for a recess because the jurors were having a hard time staying awake. (E.H. 
Tr., p.23, L.8 -p.24, L.17; p.78, Ls.19-22; p.96, Ls.1-8; p.107, Ls.12-15; p.113, L.14 -p.114, 
L.3; see Trial Tr., Vol. II, p.983, Ls.9-16.) 
The evidence is insufficient to show that had Mr. Chapman made a motion for a mistrial 
at this time the motion would have succeeded. First, the evidence in support of the motion is 
unconvincing. Groves' friends and family gave wildly different accounts of who appeared to be 
sleeping. One said it was five jurors, one said three, two said two, and one said it was only one. 
Second, the jurors available to testify in post-conviction denied sleeping or seeing any of the 




.. ---- -- ---~-----~ .... ---=:.i 
other jurors sleeping. (See generally E.H. Tr., pp.305-342.) Grove has-not proved by clear and 
convincing evidence that any juror actually fell asleep. At best he has demonstrated that at least 
one juror appeared to be asleep.8 Moreover, the alleged sleeping happened shortly before a 
· -~- ----re-cess requested by· the,;_pn,seeutor-;--- ~iven , alL'c.these-,.·ciroumstancesv-it-is likely .that had Mr __ 
Chapman made a motion for a mistrial it would have been denied because the recess was 
sufficient cure for any issue of staying awake. Even if Mr. Chapman could have demonstrated 
that a juror had fallen asleep the best remedy he could have hoped for would have been excusing 
that juror in favor of one of the two alternates. For these reasons Grove has failed to prove that a 
motion for mistrial made at this time would have been granted. 
The second episode of alleged juror sleeping occurred during Dr. Harper's testimony. 
- ----- --Gr-<JveS-mother,J).ebbie,_claims_she__saw__tw_o_jJJIQrs. Neiman and Lind, "nodd4!g_ off' during Dr. -------
Harper's testimony. (E.H. Tr., p.26, Ls.1-10.) No other person saw this. (See generally E.H. 
Tr.) Nor did -anyone call this alleged episode to Mr. Chapman;s (of anyone else's) attention. 
Finally, no evidence indicating what testimony was covered or how long the jurors were 
allegedly inattentive was presented. This evidence fails to establish any basis for moving for or 
declaring a mistrial. 
Finally, Grove's mother also testified that three jurors, Yates, Loetscher and Barrett, 
"dozed off' during Dr. Arden's testimony. (E.H. Tr., p.26, L.11 - p.27, L.2.) Lori Stamper, a 
friend of Grove's, claimed to have seen either juror Keller or Loetscher apparently asleep at 
some point during Dr. Arden's testimony as well. (E.H. Tr., p.86, L.3 - p.87, L.11.) Grove's 
other friends and family in attendance did not report seeing any issue with the jury at this time. 
8 It is noteworthy that the only juror identified as appearing to sleep by all of Grove's friends and 
family was Kendall Loetscher. Mr. Loetscher testified that he did not fall asleep. (E.H. Tr., 
p.315, L.9 - p.316, L.12.) In addition, juror Loetscher was not identified as having been asleep 
in documents prepared by Grove's witnesses prior to trial. 
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(See generally E.H. Tr.) Again, this evidence is insufficient because it is contradicted by the 
jurors' testimony and fails to identify what evidence would have been compromised. 
The evidence presented by Grove does not show that a mistrial would have been granted. 
because of the bias of the witnesses, the remarkable inconsistency in what they claim they saw, 
and the contrary evidence. Moreover, even if there were an issue with jurors becoming 
inattentive, Grove failed to establish that the issue was not properly addressed through taking a 
recess, much less that other remedies short of declaring a mistrial, including juror admonishment . 
and using alternates, were inadequate. Having failed to show that a motion for mistrial would 
have been granted, Grove fails on both prongs of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
~-----fornotmmdng_foLa.mi£trial._~---·--.-.. -.. -. ____ ~-----
C. Grove Has Failed To Show That The Tactical Decision To Not Seek A Mistrial Was The 
Result Of An Objective Shortcoming By Counsel 
To establish deficient performance, Grove had the burden of showing that Mr. 
Chapman's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. "In order to 
prevail in a post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner must prove the allegations by a 
preponderance of the evidence." Popoca-Garcia v. State, 157 Idaho 150, _, 334 P.3d 824, 825 
(Ct. App. 2014). That proof must overcome a strong presumption that counsel's conduct is 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 
634, 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, .775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. 
App. 1989). 
"[T]he decision to request or consent to a mistrial involves tactical choices appropriately 
made by the defendant's counsel." State v. Nab, 113 Idaho 168, 172-73, 742 P.2d 423, 427-28 
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(Ct. App. 1987). "[T]actical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on 
appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law, or some 
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." Heilman v. State, 158 Idaho 139, _, 344 
presented any evidence tending to show any shortcoming of counsel capable of objective 
evaluation, such as deficient observation of the level of attentiveness of the jury or ignorance of 
the law. 
Grove contends his trial counsel's performance was deficient for not consulting him 
about whether to request a mistrial. (Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.24.) Grove did not plead 
failure to consult with him as a cause of action, however. Rather, his amended petition alleged 
"---- ------~hat-~efense-counsel~s-:l)erformance-was-deficienLhe_cause he_failed to move for a mistrial after ~ __ ~ __ 
many jurors fell asleep during the testimony." (Amended Petition, p.33, ,r 90.) Because Grove 
never alleged that failure to consult with him about seeking a mistrial was deficient performance, 
that claim is not before this Court. 
Even if the claim had been pled, it fails both factually and legally. It fails factually 
because Grove presented no evidence that he was not consulted or that, had he been consulted at 
the time, he would have wanted a mistrial. It fails legally because, with respect to Mr. Parnes, no 
court has ever said that electing not to ask for a mistrial because of a sleeping juror is the legal 
equivalent of waiving the jury and proceeding with a court trial. As set forth above, there are 
many cases addressing the legal significance of a claim of a sleeping juror. Grove has elected to 
address none of them, and none of them support his legal theories. It is generally not deficient 
performance to fail to advance a "novel legal theory." Abdull~ 2015 WL 856787, *96. 
RESPONDENT'S POST-EVIDENTIARY HEARING CLOSING ARGUMENT - 30 
553
Grove has not articulated, much less proven, a claim of deficient performance for failing 
to seek a mistrial, as alleged in his pleadings. He instead argues it was deficient performance to 
not consult with him about whether to seek a mistrial, a theory neither pleaded nor supported by 
D. Grove Has Failed To Prove Prejudice 
"To establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that, but for the 
attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different." 
' 
Heilman v. State, 158 Idaho 139, _, 344 P.3d 919, 925 (Ct. App. 2015). Here the outcome 
would have been different if the court granted a mistrial. As set forth above, however, a motion 
for a mistrial would not have been granted. To be entitled to a mistrial Grove would have had to 
----------·-··----- ... - - - ·--. - -~--~~ - ----------------------~ - ------- -------~-~ 
establish that more than two jurors (because there were two alternates) were sleeping to a degree 
that disqualified them from continued jury service. The evidence failed to prove that jurors were 
sleeping, much less sleeping to a degree requiring the remedy of a mistrial. 
Grove's argument is apparently that if a juror nods off the jury trial is rendered equivalent 
to a court trial. This is not a cognizable theory of prejudice because it relies on no cases actually 
addressing the legal standards by which a mistrial should be granted because of an inattentive 
juror. In order to prevail under the relevant standards Grove would have had to establish by clear 
and convincing evidence that a juror was inattentive, as well as ''the identity and duration of the 
specific testimony, argument or instructions the juror missed." State v. Strange, 147 Idaho 686, 
689, 214 P.3d 672, 675 (Ct. App. 2008); see also Campbell v. State, 130 Idaho 546, 549, 944 
P.2d 143, 146 (Ct. App. 1997). He would also have had to prove that alternate remedies would .. 
have been inadequate, State v. Bolen, 143 Idaho 437, 441, 146 P.3d 703, 707 (Ct. App. 2006). 
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Because Grove's claims of prejudice ate not based on the legal standards actually relevant to his 
claim, they should be rejected. 
Grove's claim that his prejudice is automatic is not grounded in law. Under the relevant 
,----·--: -}egi:tl:0-standar.ds -Grove has..::failed-to-prove--that too .outcome of the trial wol!ld-lla-Y;-~e_en.i!Jfferent. 
had be made a motion for a mistrial because he has failed to prove a mistrial would have been 
granted. 
IV. 
Grove Has Failed To Prove Either Deficient Performance Or Prejudice In Relation To Closing 
Arguments 
A. Introduction 
The final claim the Court identified as subject to consideration at the evidentiary hearing 
misconduct by the prosecuting attorney" and failing to "move for a mistrial or curative 
instruction following the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments." (Summary Dismissal 
Order, p.39.) In particular, in his Amended Petition, Grove alleged the prosecutor committed 
misconduct during closing argument by (1) twice misstating the "defense position regarding 
preexisting head injury," (3) using the phrase "smoke and mirrors to get you confused" in 
relation to Dr. Arden's testimony, (4) "suggest[ing] without supporting evidence that Dr. 
Arden's 'financial position' leads him to decide what cases he can talce," (5) commenting that "a 
'colleague' said that Dr. Arden's answers during cross-examination were slippery as an ice cube" 
and "opin[ing]" that Dr. Arden "was stretching things," (6) telling the jury "without supporting 
evidence that '[p]arents kill babies all the time,"' (7) telling the jury "without supporting 
evidence that 'there are literally thousands of [similar] incidents in any given span of time," (8) 
telling the jury ''without supporting evidence that he believed that 'our local paper has probably 
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shown . . . probably six or more of these cases since - since this one started,"' (9) saying that 
"Dr. Ross had the unenviable task of taking [K.M.'s] body apart piece by piece," (10) implying 
that "he had evidence not presented at trial that Mr. Grove had previously been 'violent with 
K.M.'s biological father as a witness because the state's "medical experts unanimously, to no 
exception, said he could not have done it," and (13) arguing "without supporting evidence that 
the emotional breakdown of Mr. Grove at trial showed that Mr. Grove had a different kind of 
'emotional breakdown, an instantaneous fit of anger, that morning that resulted in these injuries." 
(Amended Petition, pp.16-17.) 
Grove failed to prove deficient performance or prejudice related to counsel's failure to 
~--------objec-t--t-e-an-y:f)om-en-0f-the-pr-osecutor~losing-.argument_ahont which he complains. ___________ _ 
B. Grove Failed To Meet His Burden Of Proving He Is Entitled To Relief On His Claim 
That Counsel Was Ineffective In Relation To The Prosecutor's Closing Argument 
"From a strategic perspective ... , many trial lawyers refrain from objecting during 
closing argument to all but the most egregious misstatements by opposing counsel on the theory 
that the jury may construe their objections to be a sign of desperation or hyper-technicality." 
United States v. Molin~ 934 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1991). A defense attorney may also 
decide not object because he believes the prosecutor's argument is helpful to his case or believes 
he can capitalize on the prosecutor's statements during his own closing argument. Id.; see also 
Lambert v. McBride, 365 F.3d 557, 564 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Under Strickland, we must note that 
there may very well be strategic reasons for counsel not to object during closing arguments. 
Counsel may have been trying to avoid calling attention to the statements and thus giving them 
more force."); United States v. Daas, 198 F.3d 1167, 1179 (9th Cir. 1999) (counsel's decision not 
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to object to the prosecutor's closing argument "falls within the range of permissible conduct of 
trial counsel"). "Whatever the actual explanation, Strickland requires [the Court] to 'indulge a 
strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional 
·: ··-·:o~~:::-_.';:-··-~--asststan:ce."'· Mo-liria,-934F.zd at 1448- (-quoting-Strickland,466 US-.cat-689) ... :'This presumpti.QIL,~ .... ,,, .... ___ ·· 
especially applies to silence in the face of allegedly improper arguments." Vicory v. State, 81 
S.W.3d 725, 731 (Mo. App. 2002) (citation omitted). 
In addition to the Strickland standards applicable to Grove's claim that counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to several portions of the prosecutor's closing argument, the 
Court should also consider the overriding legal standard applicable to closing arguments: 
"Generally, both parties are given wide latitude in making their arguments to the jury and 
---~ -·· ~-disGRssing-~€-ev-i.denceandlnferenceS-to-be_made.ther.efrom~ State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694L 
720,215 P.3d 414,440 (2009) (citations omitted). 
In an effort to meet his burden, Grove ignores most of the applicable legal standards. As 
the foregoing authority indicates, it is well-within counsel's strategic decision-making authority 
to not object during closing argument, even if he could technically do so. At the evidentiary 
hearing, Grove, usually without providing any context, asked trial counsel why he did not object 
to several of the statements the prosecutor made during closing that Grove believes were 
improper. (See generally E.H. Tr., pp.220-228; p.230, L.18 - p.231, L.3.) Frequently Mr. 
Chapman could not provide a reason he did not object. (Id.) That does not, however, mean that 
the decision, at the time, was not strategic or tactical, based on ignorance of the law, or based on 
some other shortcoming capable of objective evaluation. In fact, on cross-examination, Mr. 
Chapman agreed there are a variety of considerations relevant to the courtroom dynamics during 
closing argument, including tone, "circumstances and the context," and tactical concerns related 
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to juror perceptions. (E.H. Tr.~ p.231, L.16 - p.233, L.3, p.238, L.18 - p.239, L.3.) Mr. 
Chapman also explained the difficulty with providing specific reasons for failing to object in 
relation to a trial that occurred almost seven years ago. (E.H. Tr., p.241, L.23 -p.243, L.5.) 
· ··· · ·· ·-- ·· ''Ftir1het;·c:1:,·defense attorney--is ,undoubtedly-not--Qens:titutionally- obligated.-tQ~l;?jecLtq,; 
statements that are not improper. For example, in this case Grove contends an objection should 
have been made to the prosecutor's use of the phrase "long-term" because it is different than the 
defense theory that the brain injury occurred prior to the time K.M. was alone with Grove. 
(Petitioner's Closing Argument, p.26.) However, as defense counsel acknowledged at the 
evidentiary hearing in response to the question whether the defense theory was that "there was 
some long-term brain injury," "it depends on how you define long term." (Trial Tr., p.224, 
----- --Ls . .l-3,J..6..}-Disagr.eemellLoY..eu:ucl:L1erminoJ.o.~does not demonstrate objectionable misconduct 
in terms of "misrepresenting" the defense's theory of the case, much less show that counsel's 
failure to object was deficient under Strickland. 
Even if this Court could find that Grove met his burden of establishing that counsel was 
deficient for failing to object to one or more of the statements the prosecutor made during closing 
argument, Grove failed to prove prejudice. There is no reasonable probability that the result of 
the trial would have been different if counsel had objected. Any objection, even if sustained, 
would have only resulted in reiterating instructions the jury received anyway. (Exhibit A 
(#36211 R.; pp.225 (Instruction No. 3 - instructing jury it could only consider evidence and 
defining evidence), 228 (Instruction No. 4 - again defining evidence and specifically instructing 
that arguments of counsel are not evidence and that if facts as remembered by jurors were 
different than what was stated by the lawyers, jurors should follow their own memories)).) In 
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addition, given the weight of the evidence presented, Grove was not prejudiced by any 
deficiency in counsel's failure to object to any portion of the prosecutor's closing argument. 
Nor is Grove entitled to relief based on any cumulative alleged deficiencies by counsel. 
· - · ··(Pefitiot'ler~-s Closing· Argument; p;34}·Because -Grove.':fai:led-to Jffove counse-Lwas--de:ficient--in .. 
any manner, there is no alleged deficiency to accumulate. Even if this Court finds one or more 
deficiencies, Grove has failed to show any sufficient prejudice entitling him to relief. 
CONCLUSION 
Grove failed to meet his burden of proving he is entitled to relief on any of the claims that 
were properly before the Court at the evidentiary hearing. The Court should, therefore, dismiss 
the remaining claims from Grove's Amended Petition and enter judgment denying Grove's 
request for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 8th day of May 2015. 
JE ICA M. LORELLO 
D ty Attorney General 
Nez Perce County Special Prosecutor 
eputy Attorney General 
Nez Perce County Special Prosecutor 
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COMES NOW, Petitioner Stacey Grove, through counsel Dennis Benjamin and Deborah 
Whipple, and offers this Rebuttal to Respondent's Closing Argument. 
A. Ineffective Assistance in the Direct and Cross-Examination of Mr. Grove 
1. Evidence regarding Mr. Grove's relationship with his. son and child SUIWOrt 
The Respondent argues that "[i]t was not deficient for counsel to inquire into this area 
[Mr. Grove's relationship with his son] given that the defense clearly wanted to portray [Mr.] 
Grove as a caring father-figure to K.M. and his sister - a reasonable strategy under the 
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circumstances of this case." Respondent's Argument, pg. 10. This argument is flawed because it 
ignores the fact that it was not a strategic decision to bring that evidence out. Defense counsel 
testified that he could not recall why he elicited the evidence from Mr. Grove on direct 
examination; He also-testified that the evidence was-unfavorable to Mr. Grove:-·-EvideRtiary . ---- -···- ... 
Hearing Transcript ("EH Tr.") p. 187, ln. 14-24. In addition, the Respondent's suggestion that it 
was a tactical choice to bring out the evidence is incorrect. In fact, defense counsel filed a 
motion in limine to exclude "any mention of the relationship that Stacey Grove has with his son, 
Alex Light, and/or child support obligations." Exhibit A, Vol. lB, p. 17 4. 
The Respondent also argues that "[i]t was not an unreasonable tactical decision for the 
defense to ask the question" because the state would have inquired about Mr. Grove's 
~-'-"-'~'~---retatlonship-withms·so1n)n~c1'oss--=exarninatton----:-"Responaent's-mgIDllent,·pg. -i-o-:---llutthistactic-·-~---~--~~-
did not further the Respondent's supposed defense strategy. Mr. Grove's relationship with his 
son does not show either that he was or was not a caring father figure to  and had defense 
counsel not raised the issue on direct examination the state could not have cross-examined upon 
it. Defense counsel knew the evidence was prejudicial and excludable and the fact that he 
unnecessarily presented the evidence to the jury is a "shortcoming0 capable of objective review'' 
which need not be deferred to by this Court. State v. Abdullah, -Idaho-, -P.3d-, 2015 
WL 856787, *112 (2015). 
Not only was defense counsel's performance deficient when he unnecessarily raised the 
topic of Mr. Grove's relationship with his son, his failure to exclude the evidence that Mr. Grove 
was behind on his child support payments was also deficient. Whether Mr. Grove was current or 
delinquent with his obligations has nothing to do with whether he was a caring caretaker to 
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 And the fact that defense counsel sought to exclude that evidence and did not raise i-t 
himself during the direct examination of Mr. Grove shows that he did not intend to bring that fact 
to the jury's attention. Thus, as previously argued, the failure to obtain a pre-trial decision on his 
.,:c.·_-,, ·._·c- - , mo.ti-0n in limine was objectively unreasooahle.--The.same is -true for:.cdefense counsel's failure to ·· - . 
object to the state's cross-examination on the topic. Defense counsel could not state a reason for 
failing to object to the prosecutor's cross-examination on that topic and it could not have been in 
furtherance of the defense strategy. Evidentiary Hearing ("EH") Tr. p. 189, ln. 3-5. Thus, it was 
deficient performance for defense counsel to let the prosecutor's misconduct go unchallenged. 
2. Prosecutor's comments about ''the story you need the jury to believe" 
The Respondent does not address Mr. Grove's argument that defense counsel's 
-· - · ~· ~'--performance-wa:s-deficientbecause-he-failedto-move·to ·-s1Jike-the-pro-se-cutCYr'-s-c1>:rnments-afte-r ~---·---·-- · 
his objection to prosecutorial misconduct during cross-examination was sustained. Verified 
Amended Petition, p. 32; Petitioner's Closing Argument, pg. 7-9.1 Thus, no reply is needed. 
3. Prosecutor's question about Mr. Grove's emotional state 
The Respondent seeks to justify the prosecutor's line of questioning about Mr. Grove's 
use of Ativan by commenting that "it is unclear why a witnesses's ability to perceive and recall 
events would not be relevant." Respondent's Argument, pg. 8. It is clear, however, that Mr. 
1As previously noted, the trial record shows that the prosecutor characterized Mr. Grove's 
sworn testimony as the "story you told, which is ''the story you need the jury to believe" and then 
opined that "some things ... just don't really make sense." Exhibit B, p. 1113, ln. 8-13. While 
defense counsel's objection was sustained, he did not ask tliat the comments be stricken or that 
the jury be instructed to disregard the comments. Id The comments should have been stricken 
because a prosecutor should not interject his personal opinion and beliefs about the credibility of 
a witness or the guilt or innocence of the accused. State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86, 156 P .3d 
583, 587 (Ct. App. 2007) 
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· Grove's ability to perceive events occurring at the time of the charged incident in July -2006 could 
not have been affected by his three-day-long use of Ativin during the trial in July of 2008. 
Further, it is a far-stretch for the Respondent to even claim it could have affected Mr. Grove's 
,.=- -· · - · ... , -ability te-aeeurately recall the events~he:;previouslyper-ceived sinceAtiviThls not a nm:cotic,:- .. - . 
intoxicant or hallucinogen.2 In this regard, it is worth noting that Mr. Spickler never presented 
any evidence that Ativan might affect Mr. Grove's ability to accurately recall the events of July 
2006. Likewise, Mr. Stickler never asked if the Ativan affected Mr. Grove's demeanor or made 
any attempt to prove that it could. 
More importantly, the Respondent's argument misses the purpose of the questioning. Mr. 
Spickler was not interested in the effect of the Ativan on Mr. Grove's demeanor or ability to 
·----·----i:estiry.!'Iewantoo tooring·ounherrretevant andiligbiy-prejudidatfactofMr:-6:rove-'s--------·------
"emotional breakdown" before the jury. As the Respondent frankly admits, "the state's theory 
was that [Mr.] Grove had an emotional breakdown on the morning that the injuries were inflicted 
on [the] child[.]" Respondent's Argument, pg. 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). But, the 
state had a problem with its theory. It had no evidence to support it. There was no evidence 
presented at trial that Mr. Grove was in a homicidal emotional state before, during or after the 
time he was alone with  So, the state had to resort to improper questioning about Mr. 
Grove's medical condition during trial to show this imagined emotional breakdown. That 
evidence was irrelevant because "[ e ]vidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not 
admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on a 
.. 
·- ·-- -·---· ---. 
2 Ativan, the trade name for Benzodiazepine, "has a tranquilizing action" on the Central 
Nervous System ''with no appreciable effect on the respiratory or cardiovascular systems." 
www.pdr.net/drug-summary/ativan-tablets?druglabe1id=2135&id=l869 (last visited 5/12/2015). 
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particular occasion" except in limited situations not applicable here. 1.R.E. 404(a). 
Even if such evidence was admissible character evidence, the fact that Mr. Grove was 
overcome during trial with the effect of loss of sleep does not tend to prove he had a totally 
-·, ... ,,; ·····- . difrenmttypeof emotionalbreakdown-ID.2-006,abreak-down:-,which,the-stateimagined.to be "an .... 
instantaneous fit of anger, that morning that resulted in these injuries to the kids -- to the kid, to 
 Exhibit B, p. 1458, 1n. 13-19. There was no evidence that Mr. Grove's medical 
condition during the trial was an expression of some long-standing underlying character defect 
which could manifest itself in a homicidal rage. Thus, it was irrelevant under I.R.E. 401 because 
it did not have "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence" and was 
--~ot--atlmissibte-1mderi--:R.-:E-:-4-()2-. -~-~-------------
Trial counsel did not strategically fail to object to the above. He testified that he did not 
believe it was objectionable. EH T. p. 193, ln. 5-10. Thus, Mr. Grove has shown that defense 
counsel's failure to object "resulted from ... ignorance of the relevant law'' and thus is "a basis 
for post-conviction relief for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel[.]" State v. Abdullah, supra. 
4. Prejudice 
The Respondent argues that the jury learning that Mr. Grove's use of Ativan did not 
render the jury's verdict unreliable, Respondent's Argument, pg. 10, but that argument misses the 
point. It was the evidence about the "emotional breakdown" which the state used to establish its 
theory that :Mr. Grove had a previous emotional breakdown and brutally beat  to death; 
Next, the Respondent argues that it is "unclear" how the improper evidence affected Mr. 
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- Grove's credibility, Respondent's Argument, pg. 12, but Mr. Grove has already explained that 
the evidence showing Mr. Grove had a bad relationship with his biological son and that he was 
not even paying child support painted him as a bad person and bad care giver and the 
· c"- -pmsecutor's comments~that--M:r;·Gro-v.e-neededthe,juey~ro:-believe-his story suggested-that Mr; -
Grove would lie to them because had to. That all goes to the believability of Mr. Grove's 
testimony. 
Finally, while the Respondent argues that each individual instance of deficient 
performance was not prejudicial under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984), it does 
not address Mr. Grove's cumulative error argument. 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in the Direct and Cross-Examination of Dr. 
Arden 
Mr. Grove has, as set out in his Closing Argument, established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that trial counsel was ineffective in the preparation for and presentation of Dr; Arden's 
testimony at trial. The Respondent argues that the failure to supply Dr. Arden with the iron 
slides was not deficient performance because Dr. Arden could form an opinion without them and 
that there was no prejudice because the slides were not exculpatory. Respondent's Closing p. 13. 
This argument misses the central point - that it was counsel's duty to supply the expert with all 
the available materials, including the iron slides, which were used to impeach Dr. Arden's 
opinion at trial, and that the slides not only were actually exculpatory, but even if they had not 
been exculpatory, the impeachment with them was prejudicial to Mr. Grove's defense and would 
not have occurred had counsel properly fulfilled his obligation to secure all the evidence that 
would be used by the state against Mr. Grove and to properly get it to his expert prior to trial. 
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Mr. Grove has also demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was 
ineffective in the presentation of Dr. Arden's testimony at trial. Specifically, counsel was 
ineffective in failing to stop the improper impeachment of Dr. Arden and in failing to rehabilitate 
·· ·· ··-·· ·· ······ · ·· ·-him.·following the,impfoper·impeachmenL ·. 'Fhe'R:espondent-argues fu.atcounselwas simply 
making a tactical choice to not stop the improper impeachment and in not rehabilitating Dr. 
Arden on redirect. Thus, the Respondent argues, the decision to not act could not be deficient 
performance. Respondent's Closing p. 20-21. However, this argument is contrary to the record. 
1. Deficient Performance in Failing to Provide the Iron Slides to Dr. Arden 
With regard to the iron slides, Dr. Arden testified that he had asked Mr. Chapman to send 
him all the microscopic slides that had been made by the medical examiner who performed the 
Chapman testified that he was aware prior to trial of the existence of the iron slides, but did not 
~ -~ - -, 
ask for the slides in his letter to the prosecutor seeking materials for Dr. Arden's review. EH Tr. 
p. 201, ln. 13-p. 204, ln. 1. Mr. Parnes testified that failure of trial counsel to obtain the iron 
slides violated reasonable professional norms because provision of all relevant information to an 
expert is critical to an expert's ability to review the matter fully and to have credibility before the 
jury. EH Tr. p. 254, ln. 20-p. 255, ln. 15. 
In his closing argument, Mr. Grove cited this Court to State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 
355,385,247 P.3d 582, 612 (2010); Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 146-47, 139 P.3d 741, 
748-49 (Ct. App. 2006); and Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 2466 (2005), 
each of which supports the conclusion that failure to properly prepare Dr. Arden by providing 
him with all the slides, including the iron stains, which the state intended to use against Mr. 
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Grove, was deficient performance. 
The Respondent has not addressed the case law at all in its closing. Rather, the 
Respondent argues, contrary to the evidence presented, that Dr. Arden never requested all the 
Chapman arranged for Dr. Arden to be supplied with all of the materials Dr Arden requested and 
felt he needed." From this, the Respondent asks this Court to conclude that counsel's 
performance was not deficient. 
This argument is directly contrary to Dr. Arden's unrebutted testimony that he had asked 
for all the microscopic slides prior to trial, including the iron stains. EH Tr. p. 134, In. 8-11; p. 
136, ln. 8-10; p. 138, In. 6-10. The Respondent certainly had the opportunity to rebut this 
evidence by asJ.oiigMLCliapm.an whetlier DKArclen asked:fiim forlesstlian all'llie slia.es prior ------
to trial, but the Respondent chose not to ask this question. The validity of the Respondent's 
argument that Dr. Arden never asked for all the slides must be measured against the actual record 
and, of course, common sense. The Respondent's argument that Dr. Arden never asked for all 
the materials relied upon by the state's experts is not only contrary to Dr. Arden's testimony at 
the evidentiary hearing, but also contrary to common sense. There is no logical reason for Dr. 
Arden to have requested all the microscopic slides, except that he wished Mr. Chapman to 
withhold the iron stains. 
While the Respondent's argument is contrary to the record and common sense, what is 
even more important is that the Respondent's argument is beside the point. It is not the expert's 
·- jobt-o obtain-the materials needed forthe expert's review. That is the job of counsel. As--"··. 
discussed in Rompilla,supra, it is counsel's duty to obtain and review the evidence the state will 
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be using against the client. 
The notion that defense counsel must obtain information that the State has and 
will use against the defendant is not simply a matter of common sense. As the 
District Court points out, the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal 
Justice in circulation at the time ofRompilla's trial describes the obligation in 
,- ·~: :t-enns'no·ohe-could misundetstanttirr-circum:stances-ofa-case like this one~-~, 0----~~-"-0' , 
'It is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of 
the circumstances of the case and to explore all avenues leading to 
facts relevant to the merits of the case and penalty in the event of 
conviction. The investigation should always include efforts to 
secure the information in the possession of the prosecution and law 
enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless 
of the accused's admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts 
constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead guilty. 1 
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1 (2d ed. 1982 Supp.). 
Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 387, 125 S.Ct. at 2465 (footnote omitted). 
Tneiron stains were information 1n. ffie · possession of the prosecution and law 
enforcement. It was incumbent upon defense counsel, not Dr. Arden, to obtain the slides. It was 
further incumbent upon defense counsel, not Dr. Arden, to send those slides to Dr. Arden. See, 
Murphy v. State, supra. In failing to obtain the slides and forward them to Dr. Arden for his 
review, defense counsel provided deficient performance. 
The Respondent attempts to persuade this Court not to reach the conclusion that counsel 
was deficient by arguing that "Any finding that Dr. Arden requested additional information he 
felt was necessary to thoroughly review the case and it was not provided to him would require a 
conclusion that Dr. Arden was deliberatively deceptive in his trial testimony." Respondent's 
Closing p. 14. However, as noted above, whether Dr. Arden requested the slides or not is beside 
·· the point Counsel had adutytctprovide the slides. Counsel failed in that duty. And,further, the - --... ------ -.. ·. 
Respondent's logic is flawed. Dr. Arden testified at trial that he had the information needed to 
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form opinions about the case. Ex. B, p. 1252, ln. 25;.p. 1253, ln. 3. As explained in the 
Evidentiary Hearing, that is a different question than the question of whether he received all the 
slides that existed in the case and that would be used by the state against Mr. Grove. EH p. 138, 
· · - · - -- · --hL ,1.g.:ap: 139,· ln: 10. · Dr. Ar.Jenwas··honest-with1:he-jury when hetesti:fied that.he;;had~ficient 
information to form opinions about the case. There was nothing deceptive about his testimony. 
Even if Dr. Arden's forthrightness was at issue in this post-conviction case, he was forthright in 
his trial testimony. But, in any event, a finding of deficient performance is not dependent upon a 
finding that Dr. Arden was not forthright. 
Contrary to the Respondent's arguments, counsel was deficient in failing to provide Dr. 
Arden with the iron slides. 
- -~-~.--~-------~-:-PreniwceFromlheUefic1ency inFailmgto'"ProviaethelronSl1desto'Dr. 
Arden 
The Respondent argues that the failure to provide Dr. Arden with the iron slides was not 
prejudicial because the record did not establish that Dr. Arden made any truly new findings based 
upon this review of the slides. Respondent's Closing p. 15. In fact, Dr. Arden did testify in the 
Evidentiary Hearing that in viewing the iron stains he was able to date the injury to the mesentery 
as weeks rather than days prior to death. EH p. 159, ln. 8-p. 168, ln. 11. Dr. Arden testified that 
"[T]hat's what different from simply reading in the report, there is positive iron staining. This 
tells me that something else has gone on that is substantially older than whatever is happening in 
the fresher appearing hemorrhage. And this was not available to me by interpreting the written 
report without personally examining the iron stains." EH p. 164, 1n. 1-7. He further testified that 
because he could see iron stains in the connective tissue separate from the area where he could 
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still see hemorrhage, he can conclude that the mesentery injuries were weeks rather than a week 
old. EH p. 168, ln. 8-11. This contrasts with his trial testimony that the injuries to the mesentery 
appeared to be days and "possibly" a week or more old. Ex. B, p. 1317, ln. 12-13. Likewise, in 
part of the hemorrhage in the optic nerve was older than the age of three plus days that was 
presented at the trial. EH p. 168, ln. 19-p. 169, ln. 10; Ex. B, p. 1294, ln. 6-9. This was 
especially significant because Dr. Ross testified that the hemorrhage in the optic nerve was 
possibly the result of the hemorrhages in the brain. Ex. B, p. 927, ln. 10-20. Dr. Ross's 
testimony combined with Dr. Arden's dating the optic nerve injures as older than a few days goes 
to prove that the fatal head injuries were not inflicted during the time Mr. Grove was alone with 
 In oilier words, oyseemgthe rronstruns, Dr. Amen was ablelo effectively reburtlie------~---
state's evidence that  sustained the head injuries in the few minutes prior to the 911 call. 
But, even if Dr. Arden had not found anything new in the iron stains, the failure to 
provide him the stains was prejudicial because the state used that failure to undermine the 
credibility of Dr. Arden's trial testimony. The prosecutor questioned Dr. Arden extensively 
about the iron stains at trial. Ex. B, p. 1355, ln. 9-p. 1364, ln. 25: And, all Dr. Arden could do 
was to respond that he could only rely upon the autopsy report because he had never seen the iron 
stains. Ex. B~ p. 1355, ln. 9-19. This cross-examination undermined Dr. Arden's credibility with 
the jury because the jury would conclude that Dr. Arden had not seen all the evidence the state's 
experts had seen and therefore his opinion could not be as accurate as their opinions. 
The Respondent further argues that the existence-of older injuries does not call the-jury's --
verdict into question. Respondent's Closing p. 15-16. In other words, the Respondent appears to 
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argue that the older injuries were not exculpatory. However, as Mr. Grove explained in his 
Closing Argument at page 19, had the jury lmown that  had been active for over a week 
with retinal, mesentery, and pancreas injuries, there is a reasonable probability that at least one 
' ,>-_:,.a,,- -juror-would have-::eoncludedtb.aH{yler·remained active for-some·time--a:fter-reeeiv-ing the- fatal"'·'.<, - -.,> -· ,,, .. - . - ... 
injuries. In this, the evidence from the iron stain slides was exculpatory. 
The Respondent also argues that Mr. Grove did not present any evidence of the earlier 
injuries being significant in scope or severity. Respondent's Closing p. 16. However, the record 
is contrary to this argument. Dr. Hunter testified that the autopsy showed "extensive injuries to 
the intestines." Ex. B, p. 871, ln. 3-21. He further opined that  would have been in 
"absolute agony" from the muscle injuries. Ex. B, p. 872, ln. 5-15. Dr. Ross testified that the 
abaomll1fil · 111Junes were veryaebrnratmg mJillies which woulanave oeen very pain:ful:-:Ex:B-;-p. 
943, ln. 18-22. Dr. Harper described the abdominal injuries as "quite awful" and ''major, major" 
trauma Ex. B., p. 1034, ln. 18-p. 1035, ln. 11. Dr. Harper further opined that the injury to the 
mesentery would have been fatal if  had not died from the head injury. Ex. B, p. 1058, ln. 
1-8. 
The older injuries were clearly extremely serious injuries as testified to by the state's own 
medical witnesses. Dr. Arden's testimony that the abdominal injuries were older than the few 
minutes before 911 was called was vital. It would have created a reasonable doubt that  
was fatally injured during the short time he was with Mr. Grove. In addition, had the jury been 
aware that some part of the retinal injury was older than a week per Dr. Arden's testimony based 
on the iron slides and that the retinal injury was possibly caused by the fatal head injuries-per Dr .. 
Ross' s testimony, then the jury would have had a reasonable doubt that the fatal head injury was 







--·--·--=--~--·- -~~-~· .. --········- - ------------------------ -
inflicted just prior to the 911 · calL -
Further, the Respondent's argument that "because Dr. Arden detected no additional brain 
injuries the testimony related to the physical effects of that ultimately fatal injury are completely 
-~~c...-,--- ' " '' --,,- -umntpeached~"- Respondent's Closing p:-16, is;" like-its ·earHer argument, is not on point.~Br, · ··. · .,,, 
Arden testified at trial extensively as to the head injuries. The fact that he did not find any 
additional brain injuries as a result of his inspection of the brain slides does not mean that there 
was no evidence produced at trial to challenge the state's medical witnesses' testimony as to the 
timing of the head injuries. In fact, as discussed above, inspection of the iron slides allowed Dr. 
Arden to provide exculpatory evidence that the head injuries did not occur when Mr. Grove was 
alone with  Nor, does the fact that no additional head injuries were observed change the 
·----fact that colJllsel was deficient in failing to get D!.L\ro.en the rron stams~ Nor, does 1t cliange that 
fact that the failure to get the iron stains was prejudicial because as noted above, the state 
extensively questioned Dr. Arden about not having reviewed the iron stain slides which cast a 
doubt upon all of his testimony including his testimony about the head injuries. The state 
certainly never attempted at trial to cast doubt only upon Dr. Arden's opinions as to the 
abdominal injuries. Rather, the state attacked Dr. Arden's preparation and credibility in its 
entirety. Ex B, p. 1425, ln. 3-p. 1430, ln. 14; p. 1461, ln. 9-p. 1466, ln. 1. 
The Respondent's last argument against a finding of prejudice is that the testimony about 
the iron stains was not even relevant. Respondent's Closing p. 17. The testimony was, as 
discussed above, relevant because it undermined the testimony of the state's medical witnesses' 
· testimony about the timing of  s injuries which was the central issue at trial; And, 
moreover, the Respondent is judicially estopped from arguing that evidence of the iron stains was 




-~-. - ' -~-. --
- irrelevant as it relied upon that evidence to obtain its conviction. Ex. B, p. 1355, ln. 6-p. 1364, ln. 
2. McCallister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891, 894, 303 P.3d 578, 581 (2013), stating, "Judicial 
estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking one position and then subsequently 
-- - seeldng-a.-seconcfpo-sition tb:atis-incompatibkwithihefusf;''-· ---~: -
In sum, Mr. Grove has proven by a preponderance of the evidence both deficient 
performance and prejudice in the failure of trial counsel to supply Dr. Arden with the ir~n stain 
slides prior to trial. 
3. Deficient Performance in The Presentation of Dr. Arden's Testimony 
As set out in Mr. Grove's Closing, Mr. Grove has established by a preponderance of the 
evidence that trial counsel was deficient in not objecting to the prosecutor's impeachment of Dr. 
Arden with the theory iliat Dr. Araen was cm a mission for the defense or wi-nfllie irrelevant 
evidence regarding Dr. Arden's departure from the Washington, D.C. medical examiner's office. 
The Respondent responds to this proof and argument by asserting that trial counsel made the 
tactical choice to allow the improper impeachment and to not rehabilitate Dr. Arden and 
therefore the decision cannot be deficient performance. Respondent's Closing p. 17-21. 
The Respondent also argues that Mr. Grove did not demonstrate prejudice because the 
impeachment was proper and because there was "little reason to believe that the evidence of 
mismanagement played any significant role" in the jury's deliberations. Respondent's Closing p. 
17-21.3 However, the Respondent's argument is contrary to the record and contrary to the law. 
3 The Respondent also argues in a footnote that this Court should not consider deficient 
-· ----_,._ performance in the failure to object to questioning and ar-gumentto the effect-that Dr .-Arden was 
on a paid mission for the defense because the claim was not made in the petition. Respondent's 
Closing, p. 17, footnote 5. In making this argument, the Respondent has confused allegations 
supporting claims with claims. The claim that Mr. Grove was denied effective assistance of 
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As the Respondent notes, Mr. Chapman testified that the improper impeachment was not relevant 
to Dr. Arden's medical opinions or his credibility and that it could be prejudicial. EH Tr. p. 205, 
ln. 1-13, cited in Respondent's Closing, p. 20, footnote 6. While the Respondent appears to argue 
'ihatthere·c'ould be a strategic reason·fornot-objectingto-J)Ot-entially prejudiciate-videnc®',that is . 
not relevant, it does not cite this Court to any support for that argument. This is likely because 
there is no such support. Likewise, the Respondent does not cite this Court to any place in the 
record where Mr. Chapman testified that it was his strategic choice to allow this evidence 
without objection. There can be no possible strategic reason for allowing in irrelevant evidence 
that is harmful to the client, especially when, as in this case, the evidence could have been kept 
out by a motion in limine thus eliminating any possible negative consequences to an attempt to 
eliminate the evidence. 
As Mr. Parnes testified, the failure to object to this evidence was deficient performance. 
EH p. 256, 1n. 19-p. 261, 1n. 3. The evidence was inadmissible under IRE 401, 402, 403, and 
404. Moreover, a great part of it was evidence of other bad acts which could not be admitted 
without prior notice from the state under IRE 404(b ), a notice which the state failed to give. The 
failure to object to the improper impeachment was objectively unreasonable.4 
counsel at trial in violation of the state and federal constitutions. Amended Verified Petition p. 
24. While the allegations in support of the petition did not include that counsel was deficient in 
failing to object to the "on a mission" inappropriate questioning and argument, the claim of 
ineffective assistance was clearly before the Court. See, Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493, 
95 P.3d 642,644 (Ct.App. 2004), noting the difference between claims and allegations 
supporting the claims. 
4 The Respondent tries to characterize Mr. Parnes' testimonyas,testimony only that he 
personally would have conducted the defense according to a different strategy than Mr. Chapman 
chose. Respondent's Closing p. 21. However, this argument misconstrues Mr. Parnes' 
testimony. Mr. Parnes specifically testified that counsel's failure to object to the inadmissible 
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Mr. Parnes' testimony is consistent with the case law. fu McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 
571,225 P.3d 700, 703 (2010), the Supreme Court held that counsel's performance was deficient 
when there was no conceivable tactical justification for the failure to object to inadequate jury 
·,z_:;.' ·_, ,~-instructions:·· Likewise here, there was-nu-conceivable-tactical justification for the failure to file a -. 
motion in limine or object at trial to the improper impeachment. 
Mr. Grove has proven deficient performance by a preponderance of the evidence. 
4. Prejudice From the Deficient Performance in Presenting Dr. Arden's Testimony 
The Respondent has argued that Mr. Grove did not prove prejudice by a preponderance of 
the evidence because the improper impeachment evidence was admissible and therefore there 
was no prejudice in not objecting. At the same time, the Respondent argues that even if the 
evidence was inadmissible there was no prejuaice oecause 1t was unlilcely that the evidence 
played any role in the verdict because it "did not ultimately undercut Dr. Arden's medical 
opinion." Respondent's Closing p. 23-25. 
The Respondent argues that the evidence was properly admissible with this reasoning: 
"That Dr. Arden was forced from his chosen career path because of allegations of 
mismanagement and therefore had a gap in employment and had to build a business was all 
relevant to show bias in taking this case and reaching conclusions helpful to the defense." 
Respondent's Closing p. 23. This argument might carry the day if in fact the state had presented 
impeachment showing that Dr. Arden was unemployable, was desperate for money, and thus lied 
to the jury in order to collect his expert fees. But, that is not the evidence the state presented. 
testimony was deficient performance - not because it was a different strategy from that which Mr. 
Parnes would have chosen if he had been trial counsel, but because the failure was not the result 
of a strategic decision and was objectively unreasonable. EH p. 260, In. 23-p. 261, In. 3. 
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There was no indication that Dr. Arden was unemployable, that his income was precarious, or 
that he was desperate for money and work. Moreover, there was no evidence that he was the sort 
of man who, even if he was in such a situation, would lie to a jury in order to obtain the fees the 
,..;/ , · - •: > • 'defense could· pay for his expert testimony; -Nof'Wa.S·there· any evidence that,Mr ;· Chapman-was --
the sort of attorney who would seek out an indigent desperate unemployable doctor so that he 
could put medically questionable "expert" testimony before the jury. In short, there is absolutely 
no evidence that Dr. Arden is dishonest. Nor is there any evidence that Mr. Chapman would 
seek out a dishonest expert and knowingly put dishonest testimony before the jury. The 
Respondent's relevancy argument fails because the evidence before the jury did not go to prove 
bias or dishonesty. 
At tlie same time, ffie Respondent argues that even utne eviclence was inadmissible ana. 
did, as it concedes "arguably [have] some potential for unfair prejudice," Respondent's Closing 
p. 23, the evidence did not play a role in the verdict. Why in the world would the state have 
sought out and presented this evidence if it did not believe that the evidence would play a role in 
the verdict? Why would the prosecutor question Dr. Arden so extensively about his departure 
from the Washington, D.C. medical examiner's office at the end of his cross-examination at trial, 
if the evidence would not play a role in the jury's verdict? Ex. B, p. 1372, ln. 8-p. 1378, ln. 9; p. 
1382, ln. 6-p. 1388, ln. 12. Why would the prosecutor make the arguments in closing and 
rebuttal set out in Mr. Grove's Closing at pages 20-21 focusing on the exit from the Washington, 
D.C. office if the state did not believe that the evidence was going to play a role in the verdict? 
The Respondent's argument in its Closing in this case is contrary to its position at trial 
and is not sensible in light of the record the state itself created at trial. It should be rejected both 
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on the -grounds of judicial estoppel, McAllister, supra, and because it is inconsistent with the trial 
record. 
Mr. Grove has proven prejudice by a preponderance of the evidence.5 
· ---.- c. IneffectiveAssistaiice'W'itlfRegard·tt1 Sleeping'ffitrors· · ,, ···--
Mr. Grove presented unrebutted evidence in the hearing on the petition that one or more 
jurors had slept at various points in the trial. He has also argued that the failure of counsel to 
consult with Mr. Grove and alert the Court through a motion for a mistrial was deficient 
performance. Closing Argument p. 23-26. Mr. Grove presented expert testimony, EH p. 261, ln. 
19-p. 263, ln. 14, and case law, State v. Umphenour, S.Ct. No. 41497, _Idaho__, _P.3d 
_, 2015 WL 1423789 (Ct. App. March 30, 2105), relying on State v. Swan, 108 Idaho 963, 
966, 703 P.2d 727, 730 (Ct. App. 1985), which confirms that tneTdalio Constitution requrresllie 
defendant's personal waiver of the right to a jury trial. Mr. Grove has set out how the failure of 
counsel to consult him regarding action to be taken regarding the sleeping jurors potentially 
impeded his right to a unanimous jury and amounted to a waiver which counsel cannot make 
without the client's consent. Closing Argument p. 24. Mr. Grove has thus carried his burden of 
proof on this matter. 
The Respondent has responded by arguing that Mr. Grove failed to show that a mistrial 
5 Mr. Grove also proved by a preponderance of the evidence that had counsel objected to 
the improper impeachment at trial and the evidence was nonetheless admitted the matter would 
have been reviewed on appeal under the standard of free review with the burden on the state to 
prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. EH p. 258, ln. 1-14. State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 
713,717,264 P.3d 54; 58 (2011-);Btate V; Perry, 15-0ldaho209; 22-1'-22, 245 P.3d 961, 973-74 -· 
(2010). Closing p. 21-22. The Respondent has not disputed this statement of the law nor argued 
that Mr. Grove did not show a reasonable probability that he would have prevailed on appeal had 
the error been preserved. On this basis also, Mr. Grove has carried his burden of proof. 
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would have been granted and that the tactical choice to not move for a mistrial was based on any 
objective shortcoming. The Respondent further denies any prejudice. Respondent's Closing p. 
25. 
Tne Respondent's argam:ent'l'egardingwhether'~a1n.istrial •would have been granted is - ---
beside the point. The question is not whether a mistrial would have been granted. The question 
is whether counsel was deficient in waiving the right to a unanimous jury without consulting the 
client. This is not a tactical decision that counsel may make. Umphenour, supra; Swan, supra; 
ICR23(a). See also, State v. Wheeler, 114 Idaho 97, 102, 753 P.3d 833,838 (Ct. App. 1988). 
The Respondent attempts to evade the conclusion that counsel was deficient by arguing 
that Mr. Grove did not plead that the failure to consult him was deficient performance. Again, 
the Respondent has confused claims with allegations m support oftlie cl~;· Grove c1early 
claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. Amended Petition p. 33. This Court clearly articulated 
that the issue before it was whether counsel was deficient in not alerting the Court to the sleeping 
jurors. Opinion and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment p. 39. If the Respondent believed 
that this claim of ineffective assistance was not properly before the Court, the Respondent should 
have moved to reconsider the Court's order granting an evidentiary hearing on the matter. 
Having failed to do so, the Respondent consented to the matter being tried before the Court. 
IRCP 15(b) stating that when issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the 
pleadings. 
Toe-Respondent also0 argues thatMr:-Grove did not present any evidence that he was not 
consulted by counsel. Respondent's Closing p. 30. However, Mr. Chapman specifically testified 
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that he carinot recall consulting with Mr. ·Grove about the sleeping jurors and that he did not 
obtain a written waiver from Mr. Grove. EH p. 219, 1n. 3-12. 
The Respondent further argues that counsel did not have a duty to move for a mistrial 
· -· "--· ·because to request otiewbula·hlive-advanced a~1mvel""legal'1:heory:" However, it is not a novel -.-~..:: . ,-----~,-'., ,· 
theory that the waiver of a jury trial is an action that requires the personal waiver of the 
defendant. ICR 23(a) and Swan, supra. See also, State v. Strange, 147 Idaho 686,689,214 P.3d 
672, 675 (Ct. App. 2008), noting that sleeping during trial may constitute juror misconduct. 
There is nothing novel about the idea that if one or more jurors are sleeping and thus not present 
for the trial that the right to the jury trial has been impeded. 
The Respondent lastly argues that Mr. Grove's argument that counsel's deficiency in 
failing to consult him about waiving his right to a jury tnal amounted to structural errons 'not 
grounded in the law." Respondent's Closing p. 32. However, the Respondent does not elaborate 
on or explain its position and so Mr. Grove cannot respond to it. Mr. Grove stands on his 
argument that the deficiency created a structural error that is to be treated as presumptively 
prejudicial per United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039 (1984). Closing Argument 
p. 25. 
The Respondent also argues that Mr. Grove has not shown prejudice per Strickland. 
Respondent's Closing p. 32. However, Mr. Grove has shown prejudice. He has shown that the 
case turned on the medical evidence, which absent the improper impeachment of Dr. Arden, 
provided greater support for the defense than for the state. Had the jurors all been awake for all 
of the ex.pert testimony, there is a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have ···-···= · 
been different. Moreover, had counsel not been deficient in failing to consult with Mr. Grove, 
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there is a reasonable probability that he would have declined to waive his right to a jury trial - as 
evidenced by his election to proceed to a jury trial in the first place. This would have resulted in 
some sort of remedy - whether a mistrial or, if possible, the dismissal of the sleeping jurors as 
· - · ·· · · ·· alternates. In 'either event, there is a reasoit:tbie-probability; given the evidence presented, that,-',.:~. , 
Mr. Grove would not have been convicted in this trial by this jury. 
D. Ineffective Assistance With Regard to Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing 
Mr. Grove alleged in his petition that defense counsel's performance was deficient 
because he failed to object to multiple instances of misconduct by the prosecutor and failed to 
move for a mistrial after the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments. Amended Verified 
Petition, p. 34-35. In his Closing Argument, he set forth each of those examples and 
demonstrated why an objection wascalloo for andsliowedtliat defense counsel"'coula not account 
for why he did not object. 
The Respondent does not address these instances individually, but instead resorts to 
generalities about how there might be legitimate reasons for not objecting. Respondent's 
Arguments, pg. 33-34. In doing so, it ignores the evidence presented at the hearing where 
defense counsel could not account for the failure to object. Defense counsel did not testify that 
he feared the jury might see an objection ''to be a sign of desperation or hyepertecnicality." He 
did not testify that he thought any of the prosecutorial misconduct was "helpful to his case" or 
that he believed that he could "capitalize on the prosecutor's statement during his own closing 
argument." (And, in the case of the emotional breakdown evidence discussed in Part A, defense 
"counsel's attempt to address thatissue·ii:rclosing only opened the door to a devastating rebuttal · 
argument.) Nor did defense counsel testify that the failure to object was based upon a decision 
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· ''to avoid calling attention to the statements and thus giving them more force." Thus, this Court 
need not "indulge in a strong presumption" that counsel's failure to testify falls within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance. See Respondent's Argument, pg. 33 (quoting cases). 
· · · · --····· · ····· · ·· · :rv.tr: Grove-presented: evidence that theffa:ilure-ta-0 bjectwas-below the standards o:f reasoaable---,-. "'' ,- .- ,.,. - -·· - , .. ~ 
assistance and defense counsel could not state any reason why he failed to object. Thus, Mr. 
Grove has overcome the presumption with evidence. 
The fact that defense counsel could not state a reason for failing to object was "important 
in terms of making a decision about deficient performance, that it implies that there's no ... 
tactical or strategic reason thought out and planned for." EH Tr. p. 271, ln. 11-17. The 
Respondent belatedly complains, however, that Mr. Grove ''usually'' did not give defense counsel 
any context wlien aslan~ about mdiVIdual instances· ofaefic1ent performance. Respondent's 
Argument, pg. 34. Mr. Grove disagrees with the blanket statement, but even if it were true, the 
Respondent ignores the instances where, in its opinion, context was given. It also ignores that it 
had a full and fair opportunity to cross examine defense counsel about each of the instances and 
give the matter all the context it felt appropriate, but failed to do so. The Respondent knew well 
in advance that defense counsel would be questioned on the specific instances raised at the 
hearing. It attended the deposition of defense counsel, had a copy of the transcript of that 
deposition and knew from pages 16-18 of the Verified Amended Petition precisely where Mr. 
Grove believed objections should have been made.6 One can only presume that the Respondent 
made no effort to ask defense counsel if there were possible explanations for the failure to make 
6 Paragraph 50 of the Amended Petition alleged: "Defense counsel did not object to any 
of the misconduct alleged in paragraphs 47-49." Thus, the Respondent had ample advance notice 
of what would be asked and would have provided its own "context" had it thought it was needed. 
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specific objections because it knew there were none. -
Mr. Grove has shown that a reasonable professional defense attorney would not have let 
the prosecutor: 1) misrepresent the defense's theory of the case; 2) argue facts not in evidence; 3) 
tactics; 4) diminish the state's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt;7 and 5) argue 
conclusions not supported by the evidence. While both sides in a trial have traditionally been 
afforded considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury, a prosecutor exceeds the scope of 
this considerable latitude if he or she "attempts to secure a verdict on any factor other than the 
law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during trial, including 
reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 
227, 245~ag--61--:-979-(2010J. That was the case here ando.efense counselslioulclnave done 
something to stop it. 
Finally, the Respondent argues that there could be no prejudicial effect because "[a]ny 
objection, even if sustained, would have only resulted in reiterating instructions the jury received 
anyway." Respondent's Argument, pg. 35. But that is not the case. Had proper objections been 
made, the prosecutor's misstatement of the defense theory of the case would have been stricken 
and the jury would have been instructed to disregard. The same is true regarding the prosecutor's 
comment about how horrible it was to perform the autopsy. While the jury might have heard one 
of the assertions about the widespread problem of care givers killing infants that comment would 
7 Defense counsel testified that he did not know whether the prosecutor's argument that 
thejury didn't wanttolet-amurderer go free was objectionable. EHTr .. p. 223, ln.l-19 .. So, the_----·--
failure to object would not have been a matter of tactics as theorized by the Respondent. Rather, 
the failure to object must have been based upon ignorance of the law as the comment was clearly 
improper. 
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have been stricken and the rest of the comments never would have been made at all. And if the 
jury heard the state's argument that it acceptable to convict Mr. Grove even if the evidence did 
not support such a verdict because "we don't want to let a murderer go free," it also would have 
examination question about Mr. Grove's "emotional breakdown" been made, the jury would not 
have heard the prosecutor's closing argument that incident proved that Mr. Grove had another 
breakdown when he was alone with  Had the jury not been exposed to such improper 
argument, there was a reasonable probability of a different result and relief should be granted. 8 
E. Cumulative Prejudicial Effect of the Totality of the Deficient Performance 
The Respondent does not dispute that the Court should consider all the deficient 
-performance andllien aetermme wliellier llie cum.mauve effect was prejilltic1al. See, Boman v. 
State, 129 Idaho 520,527,927 P.2d 910,917 (Ct. App. 1996) and Reynolds v. State, 126 Idaho 
24, 32,878 P.2d 198,206 (Ct. App.1994); Sanders v. Ryder, 342 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2003). 
Here, Mr. Grove was prejudiced by defense counsel's deficient performance during: 1) his own 
direct and cross-examinations; 2) the direct and cross-examination of Dr. Arden; 3) the time the 
jurors were sleeping while testimony was being presented; and 4) the multiple instances of 
prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument. So, even if each individual instance of deficient 
performance was not enough to undermine confidence in the verdict, the Court should find that 
totality of the effect was prejudicial under Strickland. 
-8 " The Respondent does not dispute the claim that defense counsel was also ineffective for. 
failing to preserve the prosecutorial misconduct claim for appeal by making timely objections. 
Given the enormity of the misconduct, it is reasonably probable that Mr. Grove's conviction 
would have been reversed had the issue been preserved for appeal. 
24 • PETITIONER'S REBUTTAL TO RESPONDENT'S CLOSING ARGUMENT 
584
III. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons above, this Court should grant the petition, vacate the judgment and 
sentence in the criminal case, release Mr. Grove on his own recognizance pending further 
: ---·~·-,.·.~_-::., "j>rocee1liligs~ and ordet-thata·new·trialbeb.eld-witbin·areasonable amountoftinte,-· .· 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
) 
STACEY LEWIS GROVE, ) 
) 
Petitioner, ) CASE NO. CV 2012-1798 
V. ) FINDINGS OF FACT, 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) AND ORDER; ORDER 
) DENYING MOTION TO 
Respondent. ) RECONSIDER 
This matter came before the Court for an evidentiary hearing to determine four 
remaining issues from the Petition for Post Conviction Relief. The Petitioner was 
represented by Dennis Benjamin and Deborah Whipple, of the firm Nevin, Benjamin, 
McKay & Bartlett. The State was represented by Jessica Lorello and Kenneth Jorgensen, 
of the office of the Idaho Attorney General. Evidence was presented to the Court on 
March 24, 2015. The parties also presented oral argument on Petitioner's Second Motion 
to Reconsider. Following the hearing, the Court allowed the parties additional time to 
submit written closing arguments. The Court, being fully advised in the matter, hereby 
renders its decision. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF l 
LAW, AND ORDER; ORDER DENYING 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
587
-BACKGROUND 
Following a trial by jury, Stacey Grove was found guilty of first degree felony 
murder by aggravated battery of a child under twelve years old. The victim was twenty-
three month_old  Martin. Thejury returned the guilty verdict onJuly30,_2008. --·""-"'"' -----,-- .- "-- _______ _ 
Judgment of conviction was entered on January 28, 2009. The Idaho Court of Appeals 
considered the Petitioner's appeal of his judgment of conviction. On March 25, 2011, the 
Court issued an appellate opinion which affirmed Grove's conviction of first degree 
felony murder. 
A detailed factual summary of this case is found in the Court of Appeals Opinion, 
State v. Grove, 151 Idaho 483, 485-489, 259 P.3d 629, 631-635 (Ct. App. 2011). The 
---~~-~---£etitioner initiate.diliis_pr_o~e_ding_for_post-conYictionrelieflw filing~a Verified Petition _______ · _____ _ 
for Post-Conviction Relief on September 7, 2012. On April 30, 2013, the Court heard 
oral argument on the parties' cross-motions for summary disposition. This Court issued 
an Opinion and Order on Motions for Summary Disposition on July 11, 2013, wherein 
this Court found the Petitioner had raised a material issue of fact with respect to four 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel within the Amended Verified Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief. 
Following the Court's order on summary disposition, the Petitioner filed a motion 
to reconsider, which was denied on November 11, 2013. Evidence was presented on the 
post-conviction claims in open court on March 24, 2015. The Court also heard the 
Petitioner's second motion for reconsideration. First this Court will address the motion to 
reconsider. Then the Court will review the legal standard for post-conviction relief and 
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set forth findings of fact from the evidence presented, followed by conclusions of law on 
these four remaining claims. 
SECOND MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
---- - --- - - - - 0The 0P.etitioner-has filed a--secondmotion for reconsideration, asking this Courtto-.--. -
reconsider its order granting the Respondent's motion for summary disposition as to the 
confrontation clause issue and the Confrontation Clause aspects of the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim. The Court has reviewed the motion and finds there still 
remains a split of authority on the issue of whether an autopsy is considered "testimonial" 
for purposes of Confrontation Clause analysis. Therefore, the Court stands by the ruling 
set forth in the Opinion and Order on Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, filed 
______ -- _____ November.21,2013 ____________ _ 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF STANDARD 
Under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, a person sentenced for a 
crime may seek relief upon making one of the following claims: 
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution 
of the United States or the constitution or laws of this state; 
(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence; 
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law; 
( 4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented 
and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the 
interest of justice; 
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, or conditional release was 
unlawfully revoked by the court in which he was convicted, or that he is 
otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; 
(6) Subject to the provisions of section 19-4902(b) through (f), Idaho 
Code, that the petitioner is innocent of the offense; or 
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack 
upon any ground or alleged error heretofore available under any common 
law, statutory or other writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy. 
LC. § 19-490l(a). 
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A petition for post-conviction relief "may be filed at any time within one (1) year 
from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from 
the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later." I.C. § 19-
Petitions for post-conviction relief are a special proceeding distinct from the 
criminal action that led to the petitioner's conviction. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 
711,905 P.2d 642,644 (Ct. App. 1995). "An application for post-conviction relief 
initiates a proceeding which is civil in nature." Fenstermaker v. State, 128 Idaho 285, 
287,912 P.2d 653,655 (Ct. App. 1995). However, unlike an ordinary civil action that 
requires only a short and plain statement of the claim, an application for post-conviction 
-~~ -~-~--reliefc')llustbe~v--erified-With..respectio facts_withirLthe..personalJmowledge_ofih~-·~--
applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting its allegations must be 
attached, or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with 
the petition. I.C. § 19-4903." Id. 
In a proceeding for post-conviction relief, the petitioner bears the burden of 
pleading and proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. "Thus, an applicant must allege, and 
then prove by a preponderance of the evidence, the facts necessary to establish his claim 
for relief." Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844,846, 875 P.2d 941 (Ct. App.1994). 
Under I.C. § 19-4906, summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief 
may occur upon motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. However, 
"[s]ummary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has raised no 
genuine issue of material fact which, ifresolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the 
petitioner to the requested relief." Fenstermaker, 128 Idaho at 287, 912 P.2d at 655. "If 
FINDINGS OFF ACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 4 
LAW, AND ORDER; ORDER DENYING 






the application raises material issues of fact, the district court must conduct an 
evidentiary hearing and make specific findings of fact on each issue." Sanchez, at 711, 
905 P.2d at 644. "It is also the rule that a conclusory allegation, unsubstantiated by any 
~ "' ' · --- --fact,- is insufficient to entitle a petitioner to--art evidentiary hearing.'\.Baruth v. Bardner, . 
110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986). 
FINDINGS OF FACT ON REMAINING ISSUES FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF 
There are four issues which were addressed at the evidentiary hearing. 
Accordingly, findings of fact will be presented as they apply to each issue, following 
these general facts of the case: 
1. Grove hired attorney Scott Chapman to represent him during the criminal 
-·~~---· . . -- .. ·---··~---~~---------- .----------
proceedings. Chapman filed motions in advance of the trial, and represented 
Grove throughout the entire proceedings. Sarah Geis assisted Chapman during . _. 
the trial as a paralegal. 
2. At the time of the evidentiary hearing, Chapman had been an attorney for almost 
thirty years. Chapman's area of practice has become more focused on criminal 
defense over his years of practice. Chapman estimated he has handled over 500 
criminal cases and represented clients in over twenty jury trials, typically 
averaging one to two criminal trials per year. 
3. Chapman presented Grove's case following the legal theory that the injuries that 
led to the victim's death occurred prior to the early morning hours of July 10, 
2006. The State presented evidence that the injuries occurred on the morning of 
July 10, 2006, while the victim was alone with Grove. 
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- <. ·~- ,_.·, c-_. 
Whether counsel's performance was deficient during direct and cross-examination -
of the Petitioner. 
4. Grove claims Chapman's performance was deficient when he questioned Grove 
on direct and cross-examination. First, Grove claims Chapman should have 
objected when the prosecutor questioned Grove regarding his relationship with his 
biological son. When asked why he failed to object to the prosecutor's question 
regarding child support, Chapman stated that he thought about objecting but chose 
not to in order to not draw the jury's attention to the issue more than it already 
had been. 
5. During the trial, the prosecutor made the statement, "Mr. Grove, I understand the 
story you've told this morning is the story you need the jury to believe, but there 
-~-~ --------·-------- -------------------~----· 
are some things I am curious about. They just don't really seem to make sense." 
Cha,pman objected to the statement and the objection was sustained by the Court. 
Chapman did not recall why he did not ask the statement to be stricken. 
6. When asked about the prosecutor's questions to Grove regarding the Ativan 
prescription and his inability to testify as scheduled at trial, Chapman stated that 
he was not sure that under the circumstances the testimony was objectionable. 
7. Grove presented Attorney Andrew Parnes as an expert regarding his claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Parnes has been a member of the California 
State Bar since 1978, the Idaho State Bar since 1990 and various federal district 
courts and the United States Supreme Court, and also courts of appeal, Ninth and 
Tenth Circuit. His practice includes representation-in,capital litigation, habeas 
corpus cases and appellate practice. 
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8. -Parnes opined trial counsel should have objected to the prosecutor's cross- -
examination regarding Grove's biological son, trial counsel should have asked the 
prosecutor's statements regarding ''the story you need the jury to believe" to be 
- stricken, and that trial counsel-should-have objected-when the prosecutor 
questioned Grove regarding his Ativan prescription and the delay of the trial. 
Whether counsel was deficient during the direct and cross-examination of Dr. 
Arden. 
9. Grove asserts that Chapman's performance was deficient for failing to provide the 
expert witness, Dr. Arden, with copies of iron stained slides the medical examiner 
reviewed during the autopsy. Chapman sent a letter to the prosecutor seeking 
recuts of slides made during the autopsy. He could not recall if he followed up 
with Dr. Arden to see if Dr. Arden had received all the slides he wanted. 
However,_itwas his practice to facilitate getting information to an expert if it was 
requested of him. 
10. Grove also asserts Chapman was deficient in his handling of information 
available for purposes of impeaching Dr. Arden's testimony. Chapman was 
aware of potential impeachment issues regarding Dr. Arden's employment as 
Chief Medical Examiner in Washington, D.C. Chapman explained he did not 
object to the prosecutor's attempt to impeach because none of the issues went to 
Dr. Arden's opinion or his medical abilities, and the jurors would see that. He did 
not feel an objection would make a difference to the opinions presented. In 
hindsight;· Chapman thought it may have been better to present the issue in direct 
testimony, or "pull the thorn," by presenting it to the jury first so it doesn't look 
like you are trying to hide the information. 
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11. Dr. Jonathan Arden testified in the criminal trial as an expert witness on behalf of 
the defendant. Dr. Arden is a forensic pathologist who has held his medical 
license since 1981. He currently conducts a consulting practice in forensic 
pathology and medicinec,:-and..alsohasapart.,.time,appointment as a medical 
examiner in the state of West Virginia. 
12. Dr. Arden was called as the last defense witness in the criminal trial. During 
cross-examination he was questioned by the prosecutor regarding the issue of his 
departure from his employment as Chief Medical Examiner in Washington, D.C. 
Dr. Arden confirmed he had discussed this matter with defense attorney Scott 
Chapman when Chapman contacted him to potentially be a witness in the case. 
_____ ... ______ . Dr~~en_explainedJ:hatJ:heissue.s_of_his__depar:tur_eJtom___emplo}'lllenLasthe~ . _______ _ 
Chief Medical Examiner in Washington, D.C. did not relate to his medical 
expertise, credibility, or honesty as a witness. 
13. In preparing for the criminal case, Dr. Arden requested a set of all the microscopic 
slides that were done pursuant to this autopsy, both the general autopsy and the 
brain examination, including slides that utilized special stains. At the time of 
trial, Dr. Arden had copies of all slides, except iron stain slides that were 
reviewed by the medical examiner who conducted the autopsy on the body, Dr. 
Marco Ross. Dr. Arden did review the iron stain slides of the abdomen in 
preparation for the evidentiary hearing on post-conviction relief. 
14. Dr. Arden felt that in preparation for the criminal trial he had received everything 
he needed to support the opinions he was prepared to render regarding the timing 
of the injuries to the victim. However, recently, when reviewing the iron stain 
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slides from the abdomen, he learned additional information to support his 
determinations regarding the timing of the injuries to the victim's abdomen, 
including pancreas and mesentery. 
15. -At the criminattrial;,withoutthe benefitoi,r€-viewing the iron stain slides from the- -
abdomen, Dr. Arden opined that there were injuries in this area that were 48 to 72 
hours of age. By reviewing the iron stain slides, he found evidence of injuries 
that were substantially older, on the order of a week or more. Similar evidence 
was also noted from review of iron stain slides from the eyes and optic nerves. 
There were no iron stain slides made of the brain, thus, Dr. Arden did not review 
any such slides to prepare for this evidentiary hearing. Ultimately, Dr. Arden 
--c-0pineS-hechas-11ow---expandedhis-0riginal-Opinion_at-1riaLas.__a_re.sult~of_the_reyiew _____ _ 
of the iron stain slides. However, Dr. Arden confirmed that his opinion regarding 
the age of the most recent injuries, which were the injuries that led to the victim's 
death, were the same as his opinion presented at trial. 
Whether counsel was deficient for failing to move for a mistrial because jurors may 
have been sleeping during the presentation of testimony. 
16. Debbie Grove, Carol Grove, Lori Stamper, Karen Stamper, Craig Stamper, and 
Justina Hyder were all present in the gallery during various dates of the trial, to 
support Stacey Grove. From their vantage point in the gallery, each witness 
described what they viewed to be jurors sleeping during the presentation of 
evidence in this case. 
17. The State presented testimony from the following individuals who presided as 
jurors in the criminal trial: Kim Behler, Casey Neiman, Kendall Loetscher, 
Michael Keller, Sharon Taylor, Gregory Lind, and Nanda Lamb. Each juror 
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testified that they did not sleep during the presentation of evidence, nor did they 
notice any of the other jurors sleeping. 
18. While the observers in the gallery were credible in their testimony, the jurors 
· · themselves~were .inthe,,bestposition.t&I'6COgnize.whether-they personally were. _ .. ,.:c-~~- ,··,.. ~:,,- ·;-: _ . 
sleeping, or whether a fellow juror on the panel fell asleep during the proceedings. 
The jurors all testified consistently that they did not sleep, nor did they notice 
· anyone sleeping. 
19. Chapman testified that during the trial it came to his attention that someone 
thought a juror was sleeping. He could not recall if he was told the juror was 
sleepy or that the juror was sleeping. After Chapman was advised of the concern, 
·-·--the-Coui:t.called~for.aJunchrecess.~hapman_didnoHake_an~ac.tions_r.e~ar.ding _______ _ 
the issue. 
Whether defense counsel's performance during closing argument was deficient. 
20. Grove asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to object to several statements 
made by the prosecutor during closing argument and rebuttal argument. Further, 
Grove claims counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a mistrial based upon 
the prosecutor's misconduct. 
21. Chapman confirmed that he did not make objections to the statements set forth in 
the Amended Petition. Chapman did object once to statements made by the 
prosecutor during the closing statement. When Chapman made his closing 
statement,' he responded to the:State' s theory of the case and explained where the 
State failed to meet its burden of proving the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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22. Parnes testified that in his opinion Chapman should have objected to the 
statements made by the prosecuting attorney. He opined that because Chapman 
did not have an explanation of why he did not object to the statements, there was 
no -ta€ticalor-strategic reasoning-employed-during the closing arguments. . --·-:-:· ,-.,~~c,;::_ ..,_,. ~-s-.' ,··:, , 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are judged under the standards set forth in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 674 (1984). 
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-
conviction petitioner must show that the attorney's performance was 
deficient and, in most cases, must also show that prejudice resulted from 
the deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674,693 (1984); Bergv. State, 131 Idaho 517, 
520,960 P.2d 738,741 (1998); Hassettv. State, 127 Idaho 313,316,900 
.. __g,2d-22l,-224-.{Ct.App...l.995};.Jlussellll....8tate,J.l&_Idaho-65~.fJ1,..J.9A.P.2cL___ __ 
654, 656 (Ct.App.1990). Deficient performance is established if the 
applicant shows that the attorney's representation fell below an objective 
standard ofreasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 
80 L.Ed.2d at 693; Berg, 131 Idaho at 520,960 P.2d at 741; Aragon v. 
State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988); Russell, 118 Idaho 
at 67, 794 P .2d at 656. To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a 
reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance 
the outcome of the criminal case would have been different. Strickland, 
466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d at 697; Berg, 131 Idaho at 
520, 960 P.2d at 741; Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177; Russell, 
118 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656. 
Mintitn v. State, 144 Idaho 656, 658-659, 168 P.3d 40, 42-43 (Ct. App. 2007). It is well 
established that an attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong presumption that 
counsel's performance is within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 
Gibson V;Btate, 110 Idaho 631,634; 718 P.2d 283, 286 (1986). 
When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court 
does not second-guess strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions 
cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is 
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shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance·ofthe 
relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. Pratt v. 
State, 134 Idaho 581,584, 6 P.3d 831, 834 (2000). "There is a strong 
presumption that counsel's performance fell within the wide range of 
professional assistance." State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 511, 988 P.2d 
1170, 1185 (1999) (internal quotations omitted) ( quoting Aragon v. State, 
----,,, ,_,4:::J:-¥Ida.ho :758; 760,96Q:.P~d-l114rl-l-'l6-(198-8)}.-- -. -- ~,-~_:::,,_,"- .. ,..,,,--, __ _ 
State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008).1 
1 Idaho appellate courts look to the bedrock principles governing ineffective assistance of counsel claims as 
articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland. Recently, the Idaho Court of Appeals in 
Stevens v. State, 156 Idaho 396, 327 P.3d 372 (Ct App. 2013) stated: 
This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of 
counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on 
inadequate preparation, ignorance ofrelevant law, or other shortcomings capable of 
objective evaluation. Gonzales v. State, 151 Idaho 168,172,254 P.3d 69, 73 
(Ct.App.2011). There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within the 
·--:---wicle-range-ofprofessional-assistance:-S1ate.r.--S-hackelford;-i-50--I-daho-3-55,-383,--14-1-P-;3d 
582,610 (2010); State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496,511,988 P.2d 1170, 1185 (1999). 
Because it proves important in this case, we note that in Strickland, the United States 
Supreme Court elaborated regarding the considerations applicable when a court is 
determining whether counsel rendered deficient performance: - · 
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all 
too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction 
or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense 
after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of 
counsel was unreasonable. A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that 
every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct 
the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct 
from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in 
making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, 
the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action "might be considered sound trial strategy." There are countless 
ways to provide effective assistance in any given case. Even the best criminal 
defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way. 
The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of 
detailed guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of 
ineffectiveness challenges. Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant 
would increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel's 
unsuccessful defense. Counsel's performance and even willingness to serve could 
be adversely affected Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for 
acceptable assistance could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of 
defense counsel, discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the 
trust between attorney and client. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694-95 (citations 
omitted). 
Id. at 409-10, 327 P.3d at 385-86. 
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The Petitioner sets forth several claims that trial counsel was ineffective. Material 
issues of fact were raised with respect to four issues, each will be addressed below. 
1. Whether counsel's performance was deficient during direct and cross-
examination of the Petitioner. 
The Petitioner asserts counsel's performance was deficient during the direct and 
cross-examination of the Petitioner during the criminal trial. Specifically, the Petitioner 
claims counsel was deficient because he introduced evidence regarding the Petitioner's 
relationship with his son, Alex, and then failed to object when the prosecuting attorney 
asked whether the Petitioner was behind on child support payments. The Petitioner 
asserts counsel's performance was deficient for failing to move to strike the prosecutor's 
comments after an objection to a statement, ''the story you need the jury to believe," was 
·-··~---·-··------·---~ 
made. Finally, the Petitioner asserts defense counsel was deficient for failing to object 
when the prosecutor questioned Grove about his emotional state which led to a delay of 
the trial. 
The Petitioner has not met his burden of showing counsel was ineffective with 
regard to direct and cross-examination of Grove. The testimony in question falls into the 
category of strategic and tactical decision making which occurs during the trial process. 
The decisions made by counsel are within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance. None of the issues raised by the Petitioner are matters which resulted from 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the law or other shortcomings capable of objective 
review. See Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 584, 6 P.3d 831, 824 (2000). 
a. Testimony regarding Grove's relationship with his biologicalson. 
The Petitioner asserts that counsel questioned Grove about the bad relationship 
between Grove and his biological son. Exhibit B, p. 1074, 1n. 1-24. At the evidentiary 
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J -.. ·--------------. -__ ,. ·_.-.... 'J ·-
- - . ·----- ~--.... ----... ~ - _ .. '""'"""" ..................................... ...__,~--
hearing counsel stated he could not recall why he elicited this testimony and agreed when 
asked if the evidence was unfavorable to Grove. Evidentiary hearing transcript, p. 187, 
In. 14-24. The Petitioner asserts counsel was deficient by failing to object when the 
·-----·- prosecutor questionedGrove aboutfailingt-0 pay child support, which wa$-n0-t,relevantto- .. -:-,..:'-''",c-·--.. ,-c, 
the issues of the case. Ultimately, the Petitioner claims that counsel's actions portrayed 
Grove as an uninvolved dad in a case where he was accused of harming a child. The 
Petitioner relies on a case from the Tenth Circuit, Fisher v. Gibson, 282 F.3d 1283 (10th 
Cir. 2002) to argue that where an attorney accidentally brings out damaging testimony 
due to a failure to prepare, his conduct cannot be called a strategic choice. See Fisher, 
282 F.3d at 1296. 
------'.I'h~-F-i-she,-Gase-iS-distinguishable-:fr.om-the..case..at-hancLin.-Eisha,-trial counsel~------~ ___ _ 
strategy was very poor: counsel admitted to attempting to conduct his investigation at 
-- --. 
trial. Id. at 1294. 2 In the case before this Court, Petitioner cannot establish that trial 
2The Fisher Court reviewed an objectively unreasonable failure to investigate. In Fisher, there was no 
virtually no pretrial preparation or investigation. The same cannot be said in the case before this Court. 
The lack of preparation revealed by these illustrative exchanges indicates an 
objectively unreasonable failure to investigate. Counsel has a duty to investigate all 
reasonable lines of defense, or make reasonable determinations that such investigation is 
not necessary. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. A decision not to investigate 
cannot be deemed reasonable if it is uninformed. Id. Mr. Porter's decision not to 
undertake substantial pretrial investigation and instead to "investigate" the case during 
the trial was not only uninformed, it was patently unreasonable. 
Nor can the actions described above be considered part of a general trial strategy 
of pointing to holes in the state's evidence to create a reasonable doubt. Mr. Porter could 
have pursued such a strategy: he elicited testimony about certain physical aspects of the 
crime and his client that the state itself never introduced or used to link his client to the 
crime. Mr. Porter could have argued to the jury it should infer from these circumstances 
that the state had no physical evidence against Mr. Fisher, or even that its evidence 
exonerated him. However, ''the mere incantation of 'strategy' does not insulate attorney 
behavior from review." Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343; 1369 (10th Cid994) 
(internal quotation omitted). Here it is evident that counsel did not have a strategy of 
pointing to holes in the evidence or trying to create a reasonable doubt in jurors' minds. 
To the contrary, it is obvious that during his direct and cross examinations Mr. 
Porter had no idea he might elicit information that could be useful to such a strategy. 
Furthermore, he made no attempt whatsoever to draw the jury's attention to any gaps in 
the state's evidence, and never otherwise articulated a reasonable doubt theory to the jury. 
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counsel had not prepared for trial; he relies instead on pointing to one instance in the trial 
where he contends evidence was not favorable to his case. 
The Petitioner presented evidence from Attorney Andrew Parnes wherein Mr. 
-··c:·,','e.°'.:~'."c·-.,--;c.h-P,amesfound~thaHherewas-no-valid-s-trategicpurpose.fordefenseoounsel.to-eli~it-fi:om .. -:-:::::·-·.: .. :·---~--2,.- •... 
Grove the evidence of his relationship with his son. Parnes also testified that counsel's 
failure to object to the prosecutor's question regarding child support was also below 
reasonable professional standards. Ultimately, the Petitioner contends that this portion of 
the case resulted in no strategy on the part of trial counsel. 
To satisfy the requirements of Strickland, the Petitioner must show that the 
attorney's performance was deficient and, that prejudice resulted from the deficiency. 
-----Str-iekland--v.--Washingt<Jn,466..U..-S..668,-687,l..04-S .. Ct.2052,.2064,...80L.Ed.2d.6J..4,1i93 
(1984). The Court does not find that counsel's representation fell below reasonable 
professional standards with respect to the testimony regarding Grove and his son. 
Further, even if the Petitioner were to establish the first prong of Strickland, there is no 
evidence in this record that prejudice resulted from this deficiency. In other words, there 
is no evidence the outcome of the trial would have been different but for this avenue of 
testimony. While in hindsight it may have appeared that Grove had a bad relationship 
with his biological son, this has minimal bearing on whether Grove committed a battery 
Consequently, the accidentally elicited damaging testimony remained just that, damaging, 
rather than part of a strategy designed to benefit his client. Where an attorney 
accidentally brings out testimony that is damaging because he has failed to prepare, his 
conduct cannot be called a strategic choice: an event produced by the happenstance of 
· .. ···coi.uisel's uninformed and reckless cross-examination cannot be called-a "choice" at all. 
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (counsel's failure to investigate must be 
the product of a reasonable decision that the particular investigation is unnecessary or it is 
deficient). We conclude counsel's uncontroverted failure to investigate some of the most 
obvious aspects of the case was unreasonable and deficient. 
Fisher, 282 F.3d at 1296. 
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upon  Martin. Therefore, the Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
is denied. 
b. Failure to move to strike statement of prosecutor "the story you need the 
jury to believe." 
-- --··------- -----------.- -··· ···-·· ----~--. . 
The Petitioner asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to move to strike the 
prosecutor's comments. The trial record shows that the prosecutor characterized Grove's 
sworn testimony as the "story you told, which is the 'the story you need the jury to 
believe' and then the prosecutor opined that "some things ... just don't really make 
sense." Exhibit B, p. 1113, ln. 8-13. Defense counsel's objection was sustained, but 
counsel failed to ask the comments be stricken, or that the jury be instructed to disregard 
the comments. 
The Petitioner relies on cases which held that the failure to object to improper 
statements by the prosecutor have been found to be deficient performance under 
Strickland. See People v. Bodden, 82 A.D.3d 781, 784, 918 N.Y.S.2d 141, 143 (2011). 
In the case at hand, there was an objection to the statement. The Petitioner fails to 
establish that counsel's failure to ask for a motion to strike rises to the level of deficient 
performance. Further, there is nothing in the record of this case to establish, that but for 
the failure to request the Court strike the testimony, the outcome of the case would have 
been different. Therefore, the Petitioner fails to meet his burden on this claim. 
c. Prosecutor's questions about Grove's emotional state. 
In the criminal trial, Grove was scheduled to testify on Friday; however, the case 
--wa~rdelayed until Monday because Grove was unable to testify, nor aid in his defense, -
due to his emotional state on that day. The jury was informed that an unforeseen medical 
situation had arisen which affected the court's ability to proceed that day. During the 
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State's cross-examination of Grove, the prosecutor asked if Grove was currently taking 
any medications, when the medication was prescribed, and whether it was prescribed due 
to Grove's emotional state on Friday. Exhibit B, p. 1120, In. 9-1.2. At the evidentiary 
hearin'.g' Attorney Parnes testified that in his opinion-defense counsel should hav@oojeeted ,, -·- - - . -. ·.--- ------,-+ 
to the testimony as irrelevant and highly prejudicial. 
The Petitioner relies on United States v. Wolf, 787 F.2d 1094, 1099 (7th Cir. 1986) 
to support his argument that performance is deficient where a prosecutor used cross-
examination to bring in extraneous and at times unfounded charges to blacken the 
defendant's character. In the Wolf case, the court found defense counsel was deficient, 
because the attorney's strategy of the case was to not object to any line of questioning by 
-- ------t-h.epr-oseeut-er-.----- -. -··-. - - ·----~-------------
Any doubt about the prejudicial effect of the improper cross-examination 
. . is erased when we consider Wolfs last challenge to his conviction, which .. 
is that his trial counsel was totally incompetent. Counsel made no 
objection to any of the improper cross-examination. The government 
argues that this was a tactical decision: a tactic of no objections. It is true 
that lawyers will frequently not object to objectionable questions, 
believing either that the witness will give an answer helpful to the defense 
(or at least not harmful to it) or that too-frequent objecting will irritate the 
jury or make it think the defendant is trying to hide the truth. But to have a 
policy of never objecting to improper questions is forensic suicide. It shifts 
the main responsibility for the defense from defense counsel to the judge. 
It would make no sense in a case like this where the prosecutor was intent 
on bringing in extraneous and at times unfounded charges in order to 
blacken the defendant's character. The failure to object to any of the 
improper cross-examination discussed above is incomprehensible, as is the 
failure to object to the instruction on intent or to offer a "dominant 
purpose" instruction. 
United States v. Wolf, 787 F.2d at 1099. Wolf is clearly distinguishable from the case at 
hand. In this matter, there is no evidence in the record that defense counsel was operating 
in a manner similar to the defense attorney in Wolf 
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The Petitioner has not established that counsel was deficient for failing to object 
to the questions regarding Ativan at the trial. This issue falls into tactical and strategic 
decision making, and thus, does not establish counsel was ineffective. 3 Further, the 
~:"1P-etitioner has not shown-that had-the tes-timony not4Jee!l--€.licited, the outcome:o£the case--- --- --,---
would have been different. Therefore, this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is 
dismissed. 
2. Whether counsel was deficient during the direct and cross-examination of 
Dr.Arden. 
The Petitioner has presented a question of material fact regarding whether counsel 
rendered deficient performance in the presentation of the expert testimony of Dr. Arden. 
~--· --· -.'.f-he--P--et-itioner-asserts-that-Df.Aroon-Was-not-suppli-ed-Wi.th-all-existingmicmscopic-_slicies_ ____ _ 
for examination prior to trial. Further, the Petitioner asserts counsel was deficient for 
failing to object when the Prosecutor elicited testimony for purposes of impeaching Dr. 
Arden. 
a. Whether counsel was deficient for failing to provide the iron stain slides. 
At the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Arden testified that he had asked defense counsel 
to send him all the microscopic slides that had been made by the medical examiner who 
performed the autopsy, which included iron stain slides. Attorney Chapman testified that 
the letter he sent to the prosecutor requested recuts for Dr. Arden's review, but not 
specifically iron stain slides. Attorney Parnes opined that failing to obtain the iron slides 
3 The Petitioner presented the testimony of Attorney Parnes to establish that defense counsel should have 
objected to the cross-examination regarding Grove's use of Ativan, and emotional state. While Attorney 
Parnes testified that he would have objected, this does not establish that defense counsel was ineffective 
when he made a different decision. "There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given 
case. Even the best criminal defense attorneys would not defend a particular client in the same way." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). 
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for Dr. Arden prior to trial violated reasonable professional norms because providing all· 
relevant information to an expert is critical to the expert's ability to review the matter 
fully. 
- -·-:---··· ·- .· . .:. .. ·· .·, .. 
information he needed in order to form opinions about the case. Dr. Arden responded 
that he requested recuts, and those were provided. 4 During the evidentiary hearing Dr. 
Arden testified he had received all the information he needed to form opinions about the 
case. Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 133-138. Because Dr. Arden had sufficient 
evidence to support the opinions he presented in the case, the Petitioner fails to establish 
counsel was deficient. 
----------~Fmther-,th€-l!et.iti0n€r-eannot-establish-that.butfor.counsel:sJailure10_.proYideJhe __ ._.__ ... . 
iron stain slides; the outcome of the case would have been different. At the evidentiary 
hearing, Dr. Arden testified that examination of the iron stains led to the discovery of 
evidence of healed injuries in one of the victim's eyes, his back, and the mesentery in his 
abdomen. Evidentiary Hearing Transcript at 162-177. However, during the trial Dr. 
Arden testified regarding his observations of injuries that were more than a week old 
based upon his examination of the evidence provided to him at that time.5 The existence 
of injuries older than those which caused the victim's death does not call the verdict into 
4 At the trial Dr. Arden testified as follows: 
Q. Did you feel like there was any information that you needed in order to form opinions about 
this that was not provided to you? 
A No sir. And, in fact, I will tell you that along the course of reviewing materials, one of the 
things that I felt I needed was the recuts of the slides. They didn't come initially. And so, at that 
point, I requested thetn of you; and you and the state arranged for them to be provided. So, what I 
requested I was given. 
Trial Transcript, Volume II, p. 1252, ln. 25-p. 1253, ln.9. 
5 Trial transcript, Volume II, p. 1302 (discussing older, healed injuries); p. 1308(discussing older injuries in 
context of whether the victim would have shown severe symptoms); p. 1340 (acknowledging that his 
findings of prior injuries were disclosed in pre-trial discovery); p. 1363 (discussing older injuries with 
scarring). 
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question. -While the iron stains may have helped Dr. Arden discuss older injuries to the 
eye, back and mesentery, there is no evidence regarding the significant injuries to the 
victim's brain. Therefore, because the Petitioner fails to establish that Dr. Arden's 
• - :< --·<•- - · 1• - ·presentation from the-iron stains would-have-ehanged the outoome--ofthe trial-, this claim- - --- -·--- H ---
is dismissed. 
b. Whether counsel was deficient for failing to object when the Prosecutor 
elicited testimony for purposes of impeaching Dr. Arden. 
The Petitioner asserts trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the 
prosecutor's attempt to impeach Dr. Arden regarding alleged gross mismanagement when 
he was the Medical Examiner in the District of Columbia and failing to attempt to 
rehabilitate Dr. Arden on re-direct examination. At the evidentiary hearing, Attorney 
-------- "·-·----~---- --- ---------------
Chapman testified that he was aware of the impeachment issues from discussions with 
Dr. Arden and from his own internet research; he assumed the prosecutor would also. be _ 
aware of this· information; that he did not believe the accusation evidence was relevant, 
and could be prejudicial; and that he could have made a pretrial motion in limine to 
exclude the evidence.6 Attorney Parnes opined counsel's failure to object and failure to 
file a motion in limine were prejudicial and deficient performance. 
The Petitioner's claim that trial counsel did not adequately address cross-
examination and impeachment of Dr. Arden falls within the area of tactical or strategic 
decision making. 
"[C]ounsel's choice of witnesses, manner of cross-examination, and lack 
of objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or strategic, 
decisions, as- does counsel's·presentation of medical evidence." Giles, 125 
Idaho at 924, 877 P .2d at 368. "[S]trategic and tactical decisions will not 
be second guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless the decision is shown to 
6 Evidentiary hearing transcript, at 128, 131, 204-207. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 20 
LAW, AND ORDER; ORDER DENYING 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
606
have resulted from inadequate preparation; ignorance of the relevant law -
or other shortcomings capable of objective review." Pratt, 134 Idaho at 
584, 6 P.3d at 834. 
State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 348 P.3d 1, 116 (2015). In the case at hand, there is no 
- - -evidence to support counsel 1s -de£isiens.,resulted from inadequate preparation or..._. _____ . __ 
ignorance of the relevant law. Therefore, the Petitioner cannot establish counsel was 
ineffective based upon the strategies he employed regarding the prosecutor's attempts to 
impeach Dr. Arden. 
Further, the Petitioner has not shown that but for the impeachment of Dr. Arden, 
the outcome of the case would have been different. The evidence that Dr. Arden was 
forced to change career paths due to mismanagement was admissible for purposes of 
--- -impeaGhment-in:-t:his-ease,-it-callsinto question..the.witne.ss.es. credibility._ Second, the _____________ _ 
impeachment evidence was a small portion of the case compared to the significant 
amount of medical evidence presented in the case. The Petitioner has not established that 
had the prosecutor not attempted to impeach Dr. Arden, the outcome of the case would 
have been different. 
3. Whether counsel was deficient for failing to move for a mistrial because 
jurors may have been sleeping during the presentation of testimony. 
The Petitioner raised a material issue of fact regarding whether defense counsel 
was deficient for failing to bring to the Court's attention that jurors may be sleeping. 
During the evidentiary hearing, several individuals from the gallery testified regarding 
their observations of what appeared to be jurors sleeping during the presentation of 
testimony. However, several of the jurors also-testified, and each stated they did not 
sleep during the trial. The Court found the testimony of the jurors to be credible, and 
thus, found no evidence that jurors were sleeping during the presentation of evidence. 
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The Petitioner asserts counsel was ineffective for failing to seek a mistrial when 
the jurors were inattentive. "Where a claim of ineffective assistance is predicated on 
counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion would not have been 
- --- -successful generally prec1ud-es-a-finding·ofpr-ejudi£ec}},c:;;:Zepeda v.-State, 15 2.Idaho 710, .... 
715,274 P.3d 11, 16 (Ct. App. 2012). The Petitioner cannot establish by clear and 
convincing evidence that the motion for a mistrial would have been granted, had it been 
made. 
In State v. Strange, 147 Idaho 686,214 P.3d 672 (Ct. App. 2008) the Idaho Court 
of Appeals considered whether a juror's inability to hear testimony constituted juror 
misconduct. 
I ------ -----~----- ~iliilii~~=:~:::y~!::::~:J!;~~:~:':~~!j~r~OI~~---- . ----- - --- 11 
inattentiveness, through sleeping or drawing during witness testimony, ) 





706-07. Here, Strange has failed to show by clear and convincing evidence 
that the juror's difficulty with hearing constitutes misconduct. The l 
complaints from the jurors dealt with what they considered bad acoustics f _-
and a poor sound system. Aware of the problem during trial, the court I 
instructed defense counsel on separate occasions to speak louder. One 1 
juror needed the use of a listening enhancement device, which was 
provided. Post trial, the jurors, upon questioning, indicated that they were 
able to hear the questions presented to the witnesses at trial as well as the 
answers. The difficulty in hearing was not attributed to the jurors. 
Therefore, the district court did not err in determining no juror misconduct 
occurred. 
Even if we assume the difficulty with hearing amounted to 
misconduct, Strange failed to show he was prejudiced thereby. To 
establish prejudice, a defendant must show the identity and duration of the 
specific testimony, argument or instructions the juror missed. See, e.g., 
Chubb v. State, 640 N.E.2d 44, 48 (Ind.1994); Ratliff v. Commonwealth, 
194 S.W.3d 258, 276 (Ky.2006); State v. Chestnut, 643 S.W.2d 343, 346-
47 (Tenn.Crim.App.1982); seeal-so.Statev. Hayes, 270 Kan. 535, 17 P.3d 
317, 319-21 (2001) (reversing trial court's denial of motion for mistrial 
based on juror's complete inability to hear defendant's testimony, which 
violated defendant's rights to an impartial jury and due process). In this 
case, the jurors who had difficulty hearing during the trial testified that 
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their greatest difficulty was with hearing defense counsel when he was 
sitting down at the defense table. Strange failed to identify any specific 
portion of the trial that the jurors missed because they were having a hard 
time hearing defense counsel. The general complaint expressed by the 
jurors is insufficient to show prejudice. See, e.g., People v. King, 121 P.3d 
234, 241-42 (Colo.Ct.App.2005); Durham v. State, 867 A.2d 176, 181 
. (Del.2005).· The·-districtctmrtdid-noterrin"determining that-there was no 
basis to determine that the jurors were unable to receive and consider fully 
the evidence presented at trial. 
Id. at 689, 214 P.3d at 675. 
In the case at hand, the Petitioner fails to show by clear and convincing evidence 
that jurors were sleeping, which rose to the level of juror misconduct. 7 Based upon the 
evidence presented, the preponderance of the evidence supports a determination that the 
jurors did not sleep during the presentation of evidence. Trial counsel was informed a 
· ·-·· --· -- ·--jurormight be ,sleepy,or-sleeping'°After0this r-eport, the-Gourt £ailed foF-a-lunch-reGess-. -----~ -
The record does not indicate whether the recess was taken because jurors were not paying 
attention, or because it was a reasonable time for a break based upon the flow of the 
proceedings. Based upon the evidence presented, Grove's attorney acted in a manner that 
fell within an objective standard of reasonableness. 
Further, the Petitioner has failed to meet his burden to establish he was prejudiced 
as a result of the alleged misconduct. Finally, there is no evidence in the record that had 
defense counsel made a motion for a mistrial, that it would have been successful. Thus, 
this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is dismissed. 
7 The Petitioner relies on State v. Umphenour, S.Ct. No. 41497, 2015 WL 1423789 (Ct App. March 30, 
2015) for the proposition that the Idaho Constitution requires that waiver of the right to a jury trial requires 
the defendant's personal waiver. In the case at hand, because the Petitioner fails to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that jurors were sleeping, he cannot establish that his right to jury trial was 
waived. Therefore, the case at hand is distinguishable from the waiver issue discussed in Umphenour. 
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4. Whether defense counsel's performance during closing argument was 
deficient. 
Lastly, the Petitioner asserts that counsel's performance was deficient during 
closing statements because he failed to object to multiple instances of misconduct by the 
prosecuting attorney. 8 Further, defense counsel failed to mov~ for a mistrial or c~ative -
instruction following the prosecutor's closing and rebuttal arguments. 
The right to effective assistance extends to closing arguments. See Bell v. 
Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 701-02 (2002); Herringv. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 
865 [95 S.Ct. 2550, 2556--57, 45 L.Ed.2d 593, 602] (1975). Nonetheless, 
counsel has wide latitude in deciding how best to represent a client, and 
deference to counsel's tactical decisions in his closing presentation is 
particularly important because of the broad range of legitimate defense 
strategy at that stage. Closing arguments should "sharpen and clarify the 
issues for resolution by the trier of fact," Herring, 422 U.S. at 862 [95 
S.Ct. at 2555, 45 L.Ed.2d at 600], but which issues to sharpen and how 
-- -·- - . - ------ -bestt-0-elarifythemare-(!uestions-With.many.r.easonable-answers.-Indeed, .. -----··---- ---~- ·--· 
it might sometimes make sense to forgo closing argument altogether. See 
Bell, 535 U.S. at 701-02 [122 S.Ct. at 1863-54, 152 L.Ed.2d at 931]. 
Judicial review of a defense attorney's summation is therefore highly 
deferential. ... 
Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5-6, 124 S.Ct. 1, 4, 157 L.Ed.2d 1, 7-8 
(2003). 
State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386,348 P.3d 1, 123 (2015). In the case at hand, the 
decision to not repeatedly object during closing arguments is a strategic decision. 
Decision made by trial counsel during the presentation of closing arguments fell within 
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. From a strategic perspective, it is 
8 The alleged instances of misconduct include: 
1. The prosecutor misstating the defense position regarding pre-existing head injury as "some long-
term brain injury" 
2. The prosecutor told the jury without supporting evidence that "caretakers kill little babies all the 
time," that ''parents kill babies all the time," that "there are literally thousands of similar incidents 
in any given span of time," and that "our local paper has shown ... probably sic more of these 
cases since - since this one started." · 
3. The prosecutor argued that "Dr. Ross had the unenviable task of taking Kyler's body apart piece 
by piece." 
4. The prosecutor argued that ''we don't want to let a murderer go free." 
5. The prosecutor argued without supporting evidence that the emotional breakdown of Grove at trial 
showed that Grove had a different kind of emotional breakdown, an instantaneous fit of anger, that 
morning, that resulted in these injuries." 
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reasonable for a trial lawyer to refrain from objecting during closing arguments to all but 
the most egregious misstatements made by opposing counsel. During closing argument, 
Chapman presented a strategic and tactical argument based upon his theory of the case, as 
· well as explained how the State faire·d-tomeeHhe·burdenof proof. Therefore, the.-, - .--.T~_,;: • . :., .. ...,,_0 .", .. ~-
Petitioner has not established the counsel's performance was deficient based on this 
claim. 
Further, even if counsel were deficient for failing to repeatedly object during the 
closing statements, the Petitioner fails to prove prejudice. There is no reasonable 
probability that the outcome of the case would have been different if counsel had 
objected. Therefore, the petitioner's claim is dismissed. 
·-·--. - - ·---- c-- -- --5-. -. W-heth-er-cth-e.P-etitioner-cest-abli-sh-ed-ther-e wa~-cumulatbr..e.pr..ejudiciaLeffecL ___ _ 
of the totality of the deficient performance. 
The Petitioner asserts that separate errors by .counsel should be analyzed together 
to determine whether the cumulative effect deprived the defendant of his right to 
effective assistance of counsel. Having reviewed each claim separately and finding the 
Petitioner has not met his burden of proof, there is no support for a claim of cumulative 
prejudicial effect. Therefore, the petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The Petitioner was afforded the opportunity to present evidence on four separate 
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Based upon the foregoing determinations, the 
Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving he is entitled to relief on any of the claims. 
Therefore, the Petitioner's Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is dismissed.in 
its entirety. 
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ORDER 
The Petitioner's Second Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED. IT IS 
FURTHER ORDERED the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is hereby DISMISSED. 
·IT ,IS0=SO GRDERED. 
·TL 
DATED this Q.5 day of August 2015. 
CARL B. KERRICK - District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of 
_the_FINDINGS_OF.FACT.., CONCLUSIONS OF ___ ~~- _____ ~·· ___ _ 
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Lewiston, Idaho, this day of 
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Dennis Benjamin 
Deborah Whipple 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay and Barlett LLP 
PO Box 2772 
Boise ID 83701 
Attorney General's Office 
Jessica Lorello 
Kenneth Jorgensen 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Criminal Law Division 
PO Box 83720 
Boise ID 83720-0010 
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) 
V. ) FINAL JUDGMENT 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: All claims contained within the 
Petition for Post-Conviction relief are hereby DISMISSED. 
, jl.. 
DATED this J.s day of August 2015. 
Carl B. Kerrick - District Judge 
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Kenneth Jorgensen 
Deputy Attorneys General 
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IN THE DISTRJCT COURT FOR THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STACEY GROVE, ) 
) CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
Petitioner, ) 
! i 
-··--··--·---------------- ------··· --) -~- _-_. . . ------- -- ---- ----- -------
vs. ) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, State ofldaho, AND ITS ATTORNEY, 
the Ada County Prosecutor, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellant, Stacey Grove, appeals against the above named 
Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final judgment dismissing his petition for post-
conviction relief filed on the 25th day of August, 2015, the Honorable Carl Kerrick, presiding. 
2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments or 
orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 1 l(a)(l) 
I.A.R. 
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3. A preliminary statement of the issue on appeal is listed below which the Appellant 
then intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent 
the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal: Did the Court err in failing to grant 
Petitioner's Petition for Post Conviction Relief? 
4. No order sealing any portion of the record has been issued. 
5. Transcript: 
(a) A reporter's transcript is requested. 
(b) The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's 
transcript in both hard copy and electronic format: 
• 12/18/2012 Hearing - Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages 
• 02/12/2013 Hearing - Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages 
• 04/30/2013 Hearing - Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: NIA 
~•l"fl/28/26l3Hearing-"-eourtReporter:-Nancy-'fowler~--~--~"~ ---~ --- - --- --- - - - -
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages 
• 03/24/2015 and 03/25/2015 Evidentiary Hearing - Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: 325 PAGES 
• 05/29/2015 Hearing - Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
6. The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included Rule 28, LA.R: 
• 09/07/2012 Verified Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
• 09/07/2012 Affidavit of Stevie Grove in Support of Verified Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief 
• 09/07/2012 Affidavit of Lori Stamper in Support of Verified Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief 
•09/07/2012 Affidavit of Carol Grove in Support Verified Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief 
• 09/07/2012 Affidavit of Lynette Walton in Support Verified Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief 
• 09/07/2012 Affidavit of Deborah Grove in Support Verified Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief 
• 09/07/2012 Affidavit of Jack Grove in Support Verified Petition for post Conviction 
Relief 
• 09/19/2012 Request for Judicial Notice 
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• 10/01/2012 Affidavit of Karen Stamper in Support of Verified Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief 
• 10/01/2012 Affidavit of Craig Stamper in Support of Verified Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief 
• 10/05/2012 Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissal and to Set for Hearing 
• 10/10/2012 Objection to State's Motion for Summary Disposition and Motion for a 
-More Definite Statement - , -
• 10/15/2012 Order Granting Request for Judicial Notice 
• 10/15/2012 Order Granting Motion to Declare Petitioner a Needy Person 
• 10/15/2012 Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition 
• 11/28/2012 Affidavit of Eric Fredericksen 
• 11/28/2012 Affidavit of Diane Walker 
• 12/10/2012 Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin 
• 12/13/2012 Affidavit of Jonathan L. Arden MD 
• 12/18/2012 Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Disposition---State 
• 01/02/2013 Amended Verified Petition for Post Conviction Relief 
• 02/06/2013 Answer and Amended Motion for Summary Disposition and Dismissal 
and to set for hearing 
• 02/11/2013 Petitioner's Renewed Motion or Summary Disposition 
• 03/15/2013 Petitioner's Brief Filed in Response to State's Motion for Summary 
·-· - --, ... ,,~ ~ - · --- fiispo-sition-andin-.. Support-of-Petitioner's-Motion.·-- --- --- -- -- ··--- -· ·- -·------·-· --- .. __________ -- - - "'--- ---- -- ---
• 04/01/2013 Reply Brief in Support of State's Motion for Summary Disposition and 
Response to Petitioner's Brief in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Summary disposition 
• 04/12/2013 Affidavit of Andrew Parnes 
• 04/12/2013 Petitioner's Reply Brief in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Summary 
Disposition 
• 04/12/2013 2nd Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin 
• 05/03/2013 Affidavit of Stacey Grove in Opposition to State's Motion for Summary 
Disposition 
• 05/08/2013 Motion to Strike---State 
• 05/08/2013 Objection to State's Motion to Strike--Petitioner 
• 07/11/2013 Opinion & Order on Motions for Summary Disposition 
• 08/09/2013 Motion for Reconsideration---Petitioner 
• 08/09/2013 Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration---Petitioner 
• 09/03/2013 Petitioner's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration 
• 11/21/2013 Opinion & Order on Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration---DENIED 
• 04/09/2015 2nd Motion for Reconsideration 
• 04/09/2015 Memorandum in Support of 2nd Motion for Reconsideration 
• 04/16/2015 Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration---Respondent 
• 04/24/2015 Petitioner's Closing Argument 
• 05/14/2015 Respondent's Post Evidentiary Hearing Closing Argument (original) . 
• 05/15/2015 Petitioner's Rebuttal to Respondent's Closing Argument 
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• 08/25/2015 Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law and Order; Order Denying 
Motion to Reconsider 
• 08/25/2015 Final Judgment 
7. The Appellant requests the following documents, charts, or pictures offered or 
admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: 
• All Exhibits offered or admitted at evidentiary hearing. 
8. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom a 
transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below: 
• Nancy Towler, Nez Perce County Courthouse, P.O. Box 896, Lewiston, ID 
83501 
(b) That the Appellant has been found to be indigent and is exempted from paying the 
estimated cost for the preparation of the transcript on appeal. 
--c -,-,---------- --- -{c:J -rhaftheAppellanthas oeenfouncl tobe indigentand is exe:rnpted-from-p-ayin-g- the ----- --· - - ·-- -
estimated fee for the preparation of the record on appeal. 
( d) That Appellant is exempt from paying the· appellate filing fee because there is no 
filing fee for post-conviction petitions. 
( e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20 
(and the Attorney General of Idaho pursuant to Section 67-1401(1), Idaho Code). 
Dated thi~ day of August, 2015. 
~~...._~ ~,~ 
Dennis Benjamin . 
Attorneys for Stacey Grove 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY that on Augu~ , 2015, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document to be: mailed to: 
• Nancy Towler, Official Court Reporter, Nez Perce County,Courthouse, P .0, Box.:896,- ----- -- , 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
• Jessica Lorello and Kenneth Jorgensen, Deputy Attorneys General, Criminal Law 
Division, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0010 
• Clerk of the Supreme Court, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0101 
"".)L~ . . . . 
Dated thi~_ day of August, 2015. 
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CASE NO. CV-12-01798 
ORDER APPOINTING STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
--· ·-···- - c-'fhe-eourt;imvingumsideretl-Petitioner~·moti-on-forarrorder appointin-g-1heiJffice-uf- ~ - · - -- -
the State Appellate Public Defender to represent him on appeal and good cause appearing, 
,, 
HEREBY ORDERS that DennisiB~njamin and Deborah Whipple of Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & 
l : ' 
¥· 
Bartlett LLP are withdrawn as attorneys of record and hereby appoints the State Appellate Public 
' Defender to represent Mr. Grove from the final order and judgment entered in this case on 
;f 
;, 
August 25, 2015. 
sr <~.L /-BC DATED this-1..:.:__ day of~z015. 
Qp;JL __ <=)_ 
Hon. Carl Kerrick 
District Judge 
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TO: ClerkoftheCourt :·.: ·· •. 
Idaho Supreme Court .. ·. ·. . . . : . . c· \·.LE G 
P.O. Box 83720 .· · .. · , ......... ,_. . . l \ · · · . 
Boise, ID 8374.0~0~?:.:~/:/· .. //·i .. ~' .. i--/i:~OlS ~P.tS p 2 51\ 
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( State of Idaho . 
. NOTICE OF:'T.RANSCRIPT LODGED 
~ -~ ; ' ' .. 
Notice is ~ereb_~. giventhat QJ Se~~¢:ajber 28, 2015, I, Nancy_K. Towler; 
I 
' I ,• I,•_.,,:• .•:' ' ','' • '.• • > :. • • 
----·------·--··----·--·-------. ---···.· - . ---- --------·------ -- ~ -----------······ 
C.S.R., lodge4· rui ~lectroruftranscript.of434 pages in length for the above-referenced 
; . : . ~ : . ,; t - • . ' ' . • . . . • ·. 
appeal with the Distrlti C6tirt~'Gl~rk .. cif fu.~ County ()fNez Perce in 
the Second Judicial District. · 
·,·: ·--·· .. _,. ... .. • ... 
• : .,. ·,.', •• : .. l 
Included therein: He~g~ D.ecehl.ber 'ts, 2oi2; 
: H~~g; Febrt1arfi2, 2013;'·· ... -
Oral Argument;April 30, 2013;. 
'oral Argument, 'October 28, 2013; 
.. Evidentiacy1Iearing,. March 24-25, 2015; and 
'0riu_Argu:nien( :M:ay 29, 2ois. · 
···, .. 
I also filed an electronic c~py wi:th the. Supreme Court of the State of Idaho on the 
same date. '· ::·'::-,'::.::·:::.~·i\/r}t-:'.:··~·~tlj_:.;~:(.;-. . '.: .. · .. ·". ! 
' . -•' ........ ,. .. , .... ' ... "'. ~ .. 
• ~· • J 
.. ..· '. . .. 
"· .,..: ::?;·/>:,;i ·~;)'\i::-~)i/:,>; 
•.· ., '. . . ' . 
. : < /'.\.:~f i,it;:): .//{~:~ (.\.',,,;, _-. 
:.: .\ .. : . : .. .. : ; .. 
·.:. .·. . 
.•• : ·!~ ;~:;_?:,~t:~~~- ·::·./\::.;,~::?:~(-·:·\: 
_N~cy K. Towler ____ _ 
.Nancy K.Towler, C.S.R. #623 
. }€;:.>,.:.:~.:<:·· (:.:-~-.1? .. ~~: .. ··1\~.1 :~·>: · ... ; ... · .. 
· ~·.= 1··./~. :··-.:.;·_,:_.'-. .. :-.-/ ~.:.~ :· ;~ .:~ t _; :·· •. 
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I, Patty O. Weeks, Clerk of the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for Nez Perce 
County, do hereby certify that the following is a list of the 
exhibits offered or admitted and which have been lodged with the 
Supreme Court or.,r~tai~ed as indicated. 
IN WITNESS WHEREQF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the 
2015. day of t~o\}£,~ 
"" 
seal of the .Court this 
PATTY 0. WEEKS, Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIB1TS 
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Date: 11/4/2015 
Time: 11 :29 AM 
Page 1 of 1 
Second Judicial District Court - Nez Perce County 
Exhibit Summary 
Case: CV-2012-0001798 
Stacey Lewis Grove, Plaintiff vs· State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Sorted by Exhibit Number 
Number Description 
1 State's exhibit #1 
CD---sentencing exhibits 
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING 3-24-15 
2 Petitioner's exhibit A, B & C 
CD---contains all 3 exhibits and is · 
attached to the Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief filed in 
CV12-1798 can not be returned 
because of being attached to 
petition. 








Property Item Number 
Exhibit Vault 
Lorello, Jessica M 
IN FILE 
Benjamin, Dennis 
3 Petitioner's exhibit D 
juror seating chart 
< .... ,,-.,; ,;3.,:.? iX<Admitted , ·• ·· ·ExhibifVault-Large Chai 
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY 






Petitioner's exhibitE · · 
newspaper clipping St Joseph 
Recognizes Excellence-Ken 
Loetscher 
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING 3-24-15 
Petitioner's exhibit F 
Reichard Autopsy Report 
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING 3-24-15 
Petitioner's exhibit G ... 
CD---Dr. Arden powerpoint : .· .. 
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING 3-24-15 
Petitioner's exhibit H 
letter to Judge Kerrick dated 
August2008 · · 
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING 3-24-15 .... 
Petitioner's exhibit I 
letter to Dan Spickler from Scott 
Chapman dated 4-23~08. . . 
ADMITTED AT EVIDENTIARY 
HEARING 3-25-15 
· .: ·Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Assigned to: Benjamin, Dennis 
..... Admitted . ExhibitVault . 
.:•' .,' .,:,·:·· 
Assigpe9 to: Benjamin, Dennis 
~9rnitte~ Exhibit Vault 
~ssigned to: Benjamin, Dennis 
Admitted Exhibit Vault 
Assigned to: Benjamin, Dennis 
· Admitted !=xhibit Vault 
Assigned to: Benjamin, i;:>ennis 
.• ~·,' · .. , .,. . 
'·-':. · ... 
:>,·. ,'., 
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SUPREME COURT NO. 43537 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
I, Patty 0. Weeks, Clerk of the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District0;f,t.h~.,:--St.ate of.Idaho, in and for .the County of 
Nez Perce, do hereby certify that the foregoing Clerk's Record in 
the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound by me and 
contains true and. correct copies of all pleadings, documents, and 
papers designated to be included under Rule 28, Idaho Appellate 
Rules, the Notice of Appeal, any Notice of Cross-Appeal, and 
additional documents that were requested. 
I further certify: 
1. That all documents, x-rays, charts, and pictures 
offered or admitted as exhibits in the above-entitled 
. ' 
cause, if any, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of 
, . 
the Supreme Court with any Reporter's Transcript and 
the Clerk's Record. The above exhibits will be retained 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
624
in the possession of the undersigned, as required by 
Rule 31 of the I.daho Appellate Rules. 
2. That the following will be submitted as confidential 
exhibits to the record: 
Affidavit of Dennis Benjamin-Exhibits Bl, B2, B3, B4, 
B5, B6 filed December 10, 2012 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
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I, Patty O. Weeks, Clerk of the District Court of the Second 
. . ' ., 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Nez Perce, do hereby certify that copies of the Clerk's Record 
and Reporter's Transcript were placed in the United States mail 
and addressed to ·~'1.wf$Rq~ G .. · Wai:ict'en; Attorney General, P. O. 
Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 and Sara B. Thomas, SAPD, PO 
Box 2816, Boise, ID 83701 this /):!Jfllday oft/a~ 2015. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
the seal of the said Court· this. J5'fh day of ~hlltm~ 2015. 
PATTY 0. WEEKS 
CLERK 
> :;~:_:}.~ ~ .· 
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